Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

[Richard Anderson]

The value of General Geyr's comments lies in his judgment and their nature.

And the limitation of the value of his comments lies in the simple fact they are entirely dependent on his memory for dates and units. There is ZERO documentation for this grading and, if it was used as described, it was unusual. Standard German evaluation was Kampfwert I-IV and not a "letter grade".

The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were the responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West for training from January 1944 to April 1944 and trained to act as an anti invasion force. General Geyr had a good basis to assess their performance.

As noted earlier, the "responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West" ended as of 26 March 1944 when the corps and its two divisions were ordered to the Eastern Front. The only evaluation Geyr could make of those organizations as of 1 June 1944, would be based on the last set of unit reports prepared 1 March 1944. And it is questionable exactly WHY Panzergruppe West would make a report for units on 1 June 1944 which were not under its command and had not been for over two months.

[rays]

I am firmly of the belief that the Allies under rate their combat effectiveness. On D-Day, 8 Allied divisions were in France (of which 3 are airborne). By June 9th, the four divisions of the British sector were faced with three German Armoured divisions including the 21st Panzer Division, 12ss Panzer DIvision, and Panzer Lehr and multiple infantry and security divisions in various states of effectiveness. Despite the Germans best efforts, they were unable to succeed in their attacks against the Commonwealth formations and failed in their task of pushing the Allies to the sea. Blitzkrieg as developed by the Germans worked well in low density environments, or against untrained troops, but against regulars, or defended positions it failed.

The allies meathod of war, and in particular, I will comment upon the Commonwealths, was material heavy. To an extent it was slower, but it worked when higher level of troop concentrations were present and lines of defence needed to be broken. To an extent I believe it to be less examined by historians as it is less flashy, but it was ultimately a successful way to wage war.

[pintere]

I am firmly of the belief that the Allies under rate their combat effectiveness. On D-Day, 8 Allied divisions were in France (of which 3 are airborne). By June 9th, the four divisions of the British sector were faced with three German Armoured divisions including the 21st Panzer Division, 12ss Panzer DIvision, and Panzer Lehr and multiple infantry and security divisions in various states of effectiveness. Despite the Germans best efforts, they were unable to succeed in their attacks against the Commonwealth formations and failed in their task of pushing the Allies to the sea. Blitzkrieg as developed by the Germans worked well in low density environments, or against untrained troops, but against regulars, or defended positions it failed.

The allies meathod of war, and in particular, I will comment upon the Commonwealths, was material heavy. To an extent it was slower, but it worked when higher level of troop concentrations were present and lines of defence needed to be broken. To an extent I believe it to be less examined by historians as it is less flashy, but it was ultimately a successful way to wage war.

Of course it's a successful (if not more successful) way to wage war. The problem is that this strategy is largely dependant on large amounts of militarized industrial production and manpower by the side that uses it. In many ways it reduces reliance on martial skill (though the allies certainly had that), and is more guaranteed to win, but I think this allied strategy would have had problems if the Germans were able to devote their entire resources to the western front.

And even though this allied strategy was largely successful, if the British and Americans pursued a more aggressive strategy later in the campaign they might have been able to end the war by the end of 1944. The German defense lacked operational depth, and given their intelligence, logistical support and air supremacy, I think the allies could have easily encircled the whole German army in Normandy. But, as with Rommel's army at El Alamein, such was not the case.

[Michael Kenny]

In many ways it reduces reliance on martial skill (though the allies certainly had that), and is more guaranteed to win, but I think this allied strategy would have had problems if the Germans were able to devote their entire resources to the western front.

There is no evidence to support such a claim. The forces thrown at the Allies in Normandy were the German 'shock troops' and they were repulsed by Allied Infantry Divisions that (with attachments) were roughly equal to German Pz Grenadier Divisions. The Allied invasion plan did not think it was going to meet 2nd rate opponents but were optimised to take on and defeat the Panzer Divisions. They expected the kitchen sink to be thrown at them and had contingency plans to deal with all foreseeable German reactions including the worst case scenario of a Panzer Division attack on a beach on June 6. .. Given the frontage in Normandy I see no possible way adding (say) 10 Panzer Divisions would do any more than increase the wreck density in the hedgerows. Remember the Allies knew that Southern France was going to be invaded so again more Panzer Divisions in Normandy means more thrown-away panzers of the roads back to the Rhine.

And even though this allied strategy was largely successful,

It was stunningly successful. In 10 weeks they completely destroyed the finest army Germany could muster despite troop-densities far in excess of the most closely fought Eastern Front campaign.

they if the British and Americans pursued a more aggressive strategy later in the campaign they might have been able to end the war by the end of 1944. The German defense lacked operational depth, and given their intelligence, logistical support and air supremacy, I think the allies could have easily encircled the whole German army in Normandy. But, as with Rommel's army at El Alamein, such was not the case.

The Allies knew that their tactics would win. They knew that just by not making mistakes they would win. The Germans knew it. The war was lost in 1944 and nothing at all was going to change the outcome. Thus the whole German strategy for the last 11 months of the war was futile. Now given this madness why on earth would the Allies try the German tactic of betting everything on a throw of the dice? An ill-judged offensive that might end the war 6 months earlier was never going to be an option for an army that knew victory was theirs to lose.

[Michate]

There is no evidence to support such a claim. The forces thrown at the Allies in Normandy were the German 'shock troops' and they were repulsed by Allied Infantry Divisions that (with attachments) were roughly equal to German Pz Grenadier Divisions. The Allied invasion plan did not think it was going to meet 2nd rate opponents but were optimised to take on and defeat the Panzer Divisions. They expected the kitchen sink to be thrown at them and had contingency plans to deal with all foreseeable German reactions including the worst case scenario of a Panzer Division attack on a beach on June 6. .. Given the frontage in Normandy I see no possible way adding (say) 10 Panzer Divisions would do any more than increase the wreck density in the hedgerows. Remember the Allies knew that Southern France was going to be invaded so again more Panzer Divisions in Normandy means more thrown-away panzers of the roads back to the Rhine.

Well, imagine the Allies, after breaking out at Falaise, running into 130 more German divisions. That is, after all, what "able to devote their entire resources to the western front" means.

[Michael Kenny]

Well, imagine the Allies, after breaking out at Falaise, running into 130 more German divisions. That is, after all, what "able to devote their entire resources to the western front" means.

No it does not. If it was not for the Russian front there would not have been '130 more' Divisions to run in to. The Allies tailored their plans to meet the forces available. So if there was an increase in German numbers the Allied plan would have been different. However it still would be the aim to use surprise to land somewhere in Europe and then cripple the ability of the Germans to move their men ands supplies to the lodgement.
It is a fallacy to start from a position that as long as the Germans can concentrate their armies they would be unbeatable. The hackneyed 'in a fair fight the German always win' myth.

[Sheldrake]

The value of General Geyr's comments lies in his judgment and their nature.

And the limitation of the value of his comments lies in the simple fact they are entirely dependent on his memory for dates and units. There is ZERO documentation for this grading and, if it was used as described, it was unusual. Standard German evaluation was Kampfwert I-IV and not a "letter grade".

The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were the responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West for training from January 1944 to April 1944 and trained to act as an anti invasion force. General Geyr had a good basis to assess their performance.

As noted earlier, the "responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West" ended as of 26 March 1944 when the corps and its two divisions were ordered to the Eastern Front. The only evaluation Geyr could make of those organizations as of 1 June 1944, would be based on the last set of unit reports prepared 1 March 1944. And it is questionable exactly WHY Panzergruppe West would make a report for units on 1 June 1944 which were not under its command and had not been for over two months.

Agreed. It is just General Geyr's opinion.

However, unlike anyone posting on this forum General Geyr was a senior German Panzer commander who had commanded several panzer corps during the 1940-42 Blitzkreig, was responsible for the training the ten panzer and motorised formations raised in 1943 - including most of the formations named. He commanded !st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps within Panzer Gruppe West in June 1944 and served as Inspector General of Panzer troops.

If a court ever needed an expert to express a professional judgment about the relative efficiency of Panzer Divisions in in Normandy in 1944, you would be hard pressed to find anyone better qualified to give that opinion.

If you read B466 and the other reports by General Geyr you will find him critical of the SS, but the basis of his observations are worth thinking about

(BTW The estimate was based on 6th June.

[Sheldrake]

The Allies knew that their tactics would win.

I don't think the allies could be certain of victory in Normandy. Sure the resources looked impressive and there was air supremacy and a mighty preponderance of firepower. But there had been on the Somme on 1st July 1916. That thought worried Brooke and Churchill who had fought in that earlier war.

[Michael Kenny]

I don't think the allies could be certain of victory in Normandy. Sure the resources looked impressive and there was air supremacy and a mighty preponderance of firepower. But there had been on the Somme on 1st July 1916. That thought worried Brooke and Churchill who had fought in that earlier war.

I meant the tactic of not making mad dashes into the enemy rear in the hope of a knockout blow. That said the worries of Brooke and Churchill were of nothing compared to the worries of the German commander(s). All I have read shows the men at the top were under no illusions about what was going to happen once their front was ruptured. The Germans lived from day to day and had no means of pushing the Allies back into the sea after their best card was played during EPSOM.

[Richard Anderson]

Agreed. It is just General Geyr's opinion.

Indeed.

However, unlike anyone posting on this forum General Geyr was a senior German Panzer commander who had commanded several panzer corps during the 1940-42 Blitzkrieg, was responsible for the training the ten panzer and motorised formations raised in 1943 - including most of the formations named. He commanded !st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps within Panzer Gruppe West in June 1944 and served as Inspector General of Panzer troops.

My problem is Geyr never commanded II SS-Panzerkorps operationally in Normandy. Beginning at 2245 hours 10 June Allied bombers, guided by ULTRA and radio direction-finding, wrecked the tactical command post of Panzergruppe West, wounding Geyr, killing his Chef des Stabes von Dawans, his Ia Major Burgsthaler, and 17 others and wounding many of the other personnel there. Most of the headquarters communications equipment and vehicles was destroyed as well. The bombing knocked Panzergruppe West out of the battle until 28 June. Geyr was relieved of command on 2 July by Eberbach. II SS-Panzerkorps received orders to return to Normandy on 11June. 9. SS-Panzer began arriving on 21 June and 10. SS-Panzer on 20 June. Initial commitment of elements of the two divisions was on 29 June.

If a court ever needed an expert to express a professional judgment about the relative efficiency of Panzer Divisions in in Normandy in 1944, you would be hard pressed to find anyone better qualified to give that opinion.

Why yes, but with respect, for II SS-Panzerkorps and its two divisions that assessment could only have been made in the period before 26 March or after from 28 June-2 July.

If you read B466 and the other reports by General Geyr you will find him critical of the SS, but the basis of his observations are worth thinking about

I have read them...along with the articles he wrote postwar for the Irish magazine An Cosantoir and the extant KTB and Anlagen for Panzergruppe West/5. Panzerarmee, 7, Armee, and OKW.

(BTW The estimate was based on 6th June.

No, the invasion was 6 June, Geyr says the estimate was "based on 6 June", but German estimates were reported on the 1st of the month, based on information collated during the last days of the previous month or for some reporting (primarily casualties) were for dekades (1st-10th, 11th-20th, and 21st-31st of the month). In either case, you still simply choose to ignore the simple fact if reported on either the 1st or the 6th Panzergruppe West would NOT BE evaluating effectiveness of II SS-Panzerkorps and its two divisions. He is also expressing a reporting format which was very irregular.

This is not an issue of "professional judgment" or expert opinion; it is an issue of anomalous facts.

[Shermaninterest]

By June 9th, the four divisions of the British sector were faced with three German Armoured divisions including the 21st Panzer Division, 12ss Panzer DIvision, and Panzer Lehr and multiple infantry and security divisions in various states of effectiveness.

Anglo/Canadian Units in this sector were: 3rd(can), 3rd ,6th, 7th, 49th, 50th, 51th and 4 armoured brigades 8th, 22nd ( landing around this time ), 27th and 2nd (can). The German divisions you mentioned were involved with all, at least partially, of the above mentioned units all in all on June 8 1669 Anglo/Canadian tanks were broad ashore. I don't know the manpower of those units. Somebody knows more?

The German tank units in this sector were: 3 Panzer divisions with about ~550 tanks and assault guns, unknown number in independed units. Manpower roughly
50.000 man?!?

Infantry divisions: 3 (4?) Infantry divisions: 20.000 men max.

The British sector which you mean is west of Cean but that wasn't the only area with British units, All the mentioned German Panzer units were dealing with other units over the entire front. The 3 German Panzer Divisions and 3 "Infantry divisions" ( more like an infantry brigade, all together roughly the same manpower as full British infantry division) were dealing with 7 full divisions and 4 armoured brigades.

[pintere]

There is no evidence to support such a claim. The forces thrown at the Allies in Normandy were the German 'shock troops' and they were repulsed by Allied Infantry Divisions that (with attachments) were roughly equal to German Pz Grenadier Divisions. The Allied invasion plan did not think it was going to meet 2nd rate opponents but were optimised to take on and defeat the Panzer Divisions. They expected the kitchen sink to be thrown at them and had contingency plans to deal with all foreseeable German reactions including the worst case scenario of a Panzer Division attack on a beach on June 6. .. Given the frontage in Normandy I see no possible way adding (say) 10 Panzer Divisions would do any more than increase the wreck density in the hedgerows. Remember the Allies knew that Southern France was going to be invaded so again more Panzer Divisions in Normandy means more thrown-away panzers of the roads back to the Rhine.

Shock troops? That can only seriously be said about only some of the Panzer and Fallschirmjager divisions that were sent to the western front. Most German infantry divisions that were sent to reinforce the western front were second rate at best and can hardly be considered shock troops.

If the Germans had not Eastern front to worry about they could have tripled the number of divisions available on the western front, this includes Panzer divisions. Not only would the Germans have had more Panzer divisions to counterattack and plug in holes in the line, they would also have enough quality infantry forces to not only hold the line, but also in-depth. Not to mention all the extra resources that would have made the logistics of the western front much easier. They would have had plenty of troops to turn the allied bridgehead into an Anzio equivalent, and with others to spare for any landing in Southern France.

It was stunningly successful. In 10 weeks they completely destroyed the finest army Germany could muster despite troop-densities far in excess of the most closely fought Eastern Front campaign.

I think there are serious problems with thinking that the German army in Normandy was the finest army Germany could muster. One certainly would not expect to see formations like the 716. I.D. in its finest army's order of battle.

The Allies knew that their tactics would win. They knew that just by not making mistakes they would win. The Germans knew it. The war was lost in 1944 and nothing at all was going to change the outcome. Thus the whole German strategy for the last 11 months of the war was futile. Now given this madness why on earth would the Allies try the German tactic of betting everything on a throw of the dice? An ill-judged offensive that might end the war 6 months earlier was never going to be an option for an army that knew victory was theirs to lose.

It was a risk the allies could have easily afforded. Given their superiority in material and airpower any German counteroffensive late in the Normandy battles had little chance of succeeding. Why would the allies risk it? They would've had plenty to gain. Not only would they be able to shorten the war by six months, they could've also reduced their own casualties as well as set themselves up for a better post-war political position. The German sichelschnitt plan succeeded despite allied numerical strength and their having quality equipment. The allies could have easily replicated its success in the summer of '44.

[Michael Kenny]

Shock troops? That can only seriously be said about only some of the Panzer and Fallschirmjager divisions that were sent to the western front. Most German infantry divisions that were sent to reinforce the western front were second rate at best and can hardly be considered shock troops.

If '2nd rate' is the best Germany can field then that is their best. The list of excuses why the 'wrong side' lost is never-ending

If the Germans had not Eastern front to worry about they could have tripled the number of divisions available on the western front, this includes Panzer divisions. Not only would the Germans have had more Panzer divisions to counterattack and plug in holes in the line, they would also have enough quality infantry forces to not only hold the line, but also in-depth. Not to mention all the extra resources that would have made the logistics of the western front much easier. They would have had plenty of troops to turn the allied bridgehead into an Anzio equivalent, and with others to spare for any landing in Southern France.

If...if...if...if..........stick to the facts not your preferred scenario.

I think there are serious problems with thinking that the German army in Normandy was the finest army Germany could muster. One certainly would not expect to see formations like the 716. I.D. in its finest army's order of battle.

If............if.........if.............

It was a risk the allies could have easily afforded. Given their superiority in material and airpower any German counteroffensive late in the Normandy battles had little chance of succeeding. Why would the allies risk it? They would've had plenty to gain. Not only would they be able to shorten the war by six months, they could've also reduced their own casualties as well as set themselves up for a better post-war political position. The German sichelschnitt plan succeeded despite allied numerical strength and their having quality equipment. The allies could have easily replicated its success in the summer of '44.

If.......if.............if...........You simply must get over the fact the (more) professional Allied Generals ran rings around those who you consider better than everyone else. In The West the US & Commonwealth showed the Germans how it should be done. Instead of fixating on the few examples where the German gambles paid off look at the many more times it did not, Kursk, Alamein and the Bulge for example.

[Shermaninterest]

Shock troops? That can only seriously be said about only some of the Panzer and Fallschirmjager divisions that were sent to the western front. Most German infantry divisions that were sent to reinforce the western front were second rate at best and can hardly be considered shock troops.

In a sense Mkenny is correct. The composition of the German forces in Normandy was stronger than on the eastern Front. About 2.000 tanks for about 500.000 Soldiers. This was a very high concentration of AFV's. Indeed it was far higher than in the east and naturally the Eastern Front should have a higher requirement for tank/soldier ratios because of the wide front. On top of that it is noticable that the armor quality was also above what remained in the east. 800 of the AFV's were Tiger I&II and Panther. The first Tiger Bs saw combat in Normandy the first Jagdpanthers saw combat during Bluecoat. From this informations is easy to see that the German High Command was trying to force a decisive victory in Normandy with the use of some of the best they could spare. Obviously that doesn't mean that the number suggest a "powerful" army but the composition of the forces shows that some of the units in Normandy were the best.

The Wehrmacht employed about 5 times as many soldiers on the Eastern Front in Summer 1944 while harldy 2 times the number of tanks. Infantry couldn't be pulled out of the frontline, some tanks could so they did. While only a small part of the force the distribution of Tiger tanks supports this. 3 Heavy tank battalions in Normandy two of them got reinforced with Tiger Bs later. While not impressive in absolute terms the German Army in Normandy was a powerful composition and Mkenny is certainly correct with the assumption the German used the best troops available to crush the beachhead.

[Delwin]

It would be also worth to mention how long was the frontline - especially in the beginning of the fights in the Normandy. The specific issue (in both wars) was that in EF was much more "movable" - not just because Tsarist army being weaker in terms of firepower than the Allies in the West, but the frontline was simply much longer. Thus the defence in the west was theoretically easier - although Germans, with significant help of Allies and semi-Allies in 1940 proved that it can be overhelmed.