Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

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Chepicoro
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#76

Post by Chepicoro » 19 May 2016, 02:23

Mori wrote:Could you remind us where it comes from? Isn't that an analysis from the 1970's?
As far as I know the data has not changed, but maybe you prefer an analysis from 2000 or early 90´s?? because it is the same story with different authors.

You have something different?

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#77

Post by David Thompson » 19 May 2016, 06:35

A group of insulting exchanges between Chepicoro and Richard Anderson was removed.


Mori
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#78

Post by Mori » 19 May 2016, 10:01

Chepicoro wrote:
Mori wrote:Could you remind us where it comes from? Isn't that an analysis from the 1970's?
As far as I know the data has not changed, but maybe you prefer an analysis from 2000 or early 90´s?? because it is the same story with different authors.

You have something different?
I'd need to check around, but I remember there was one author trying to model combat efficiency through a statistical model in the 1970's. Can't remember the name of the guy. His model had a lot of limits, which he plainly explained.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#79

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 May 2016, 04:00

Mori
There were some of those discussed in the first few pages of this thread.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#80

Post by Mori » 31 May 2016, 21:54

pintere wrote: I'll try to stay on-topic and not get into insulting matches. Let's go back to my original claim, that while the Allied strategy worked, the only reason that enabled it to work was that they had a larger amount of industrial capacity to bear. If the economic might of both sides was more balanced, then such a thorough strategy would have run into difficulties. There is nothing inherent in this claim that the German army must be superior than the Allied armies, so I'll keep the old "which army was better" discussion out of this.
This claim is very wrong.

Not that Allied had a larger industrial capacity etc., but that this was the "only" reason it worked. I should first remind the obvious: the attacker needs much more assets than the defenders (remember the rule-of-thumb 3:1 factor for an attack to succeed).

In 1944 in Normandy, there is a conceptual difference in the way to make war between Allies and Germans. The Allied strategy is not to beat the Germans at mobility. It is not to excel at flanking movements or surprise dashes. The Allies do not try to mimick the German way of war (or the German tricks). They decide to fight a battle of attrition and are not interested in surrounding their enemy. This does not mean they take advantage of an opportunity to surround the Germans should one happen ; but that they do not aim at creating encirclment(s).

This is fundamentally different from the German practice all war long.

What the Allies do is create a situation were the German front is bound to collapse. It takes a few weeks of battle, with repeated strikes in various areas of the front. It's better if these strikes extend the beachhead, but that's a secondary benefit only. The goal is to use the German assets and to deny the Germans any opportunity to build a reserve. End July, the Germans lines are pressed so thin that have to crack somewhere. It's mechanical.

All battle long, except maybe during the firs 2-3 days (and even that is debatable), the Germans are not offered any opportunity to gain the initiative.
The Allies do not need any lucky move to defeat their oponent, they don't need a providential German mistake. The Allies impose a warfare method that does not leave any chance of victory to the Germans. It's checkmate, if you prefer, and sides clearly see that the situation is an Allied win, much earlier than Cobra, Mortain and Falaise.

PS: Stephen Hart's "Colossal Cracks" is a must-read book to understand all this.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#81

Post by Michate » 01 Jun 2016, 12:13

I should first remind the obvious: the attacker needs much more assets than the defenders (remember the rule-of-thumb 3:1 factor for an attack to succeed).
This claim, though often repeated, is itself quite wrong. Refer e.g. what John Mearsheimer, or Steven Biddle, have written about it.

Or look at the writings of that "author trying to model combat efficiency through a (very limited) statistical model in the 1970's", whose name you cannot remember. That writing offers an IMHO much superior set of factors influencing strength relations between attack and defense.

Mori
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#82

Post by Mori » 01 Jun 2016, 13:14

Michate wrote:
I should first remind the obvious: the attacker needs much more assets than the defenders (remember the rule-of-thumb 3:1 factor for an attack to succeed).
This claim, though often repeated, is itself quite wrong. Refer e.g. what John Mearsheimer, or Steven Biddle, have written about it.
I will happily have a look.

As much as I believe that 3:1 ratio is too vague to be of any pratical value, as much I'd be surprised to learrn that the attacking party routinely has fewer assets than the defending. But that would be a happy surprise.

If you could point to the relevant book(s) by Mearsheimer and Biddle, it'd be even better.
(the only Mearsheimer thing I read is the essay on Liddel Hart).

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#83

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Jun 2016, 14:42

Mori wrote: What the Allies do is create a situation were the German front is bound to collapse. It takes a few weeks of battle, with repeated strikes in various areas of the front. It's better if these strikes extend the beachhead, but that's a secondary benefit only. The goal is to use the German assets and to deny the Germans any opportunity to build a reserve. End July, the Germans lines are pressed so thin that have to crack somewhere. It's mechanical.

All battle long, except maybe during the firs 2-3 days (and even that is debatable), the Germans are not offered any opportunity to gain the initiative.
The Allies do not need any lucky move to defeat their oponent, they don't need a providential German mistake. The Allies impose a warfare method that does not leave any chance of victory to the Germans. It's checkmate, if you prefer, and sides clearly see that the situation is an Allied win, much earlier than Cobra, Mortain and Falaise.
That is incorrect though. Fresh German divisions were being committed to the fighting in Normandy at a rate of about one every three days during July. It was the German mistake, and the Allied intention, that most of these were sent to 5th Panzer Army, leaving only the line of German 7th Army 'thin'.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#84

Post by Mori » 02 Jun 2016, 20:09

Gooner1 wrote: That is incorrect though. Fresh German divisions were being committed to the fighting in Normandy at a rate of about one every three days during July. It was the German mistake, and the Allied intention, that most of these were sent to 5th Panzer Army, leaving only the line of German 7th Army 'thin'.
I believe the rate of reinforcements and their location are correct, but do not justify the conclusion. If these German divisions had been sent to the other army, another area would have been held thin and vulnerable to breakthrough. It did not really matter where this weak point would be located; just that it had to happen. It was structural.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#85

Post by Sheldrake » 03 Jun 2016, 02:03

Mori wrote:
Gooner1 wrote: That is incorrect though. Fresh German divisions were being committed to the fighting in Normandy at a rate of about one every three days during July. It was the German mistake, and the Allied intention, that most of these were sent to 5th Panzer Army, leaving only the line of German 7th Army 'thin'.
I believe the rate of reinforcements and their location are correct, but do not justify the conclusion. If these German divisions had been sent to the other army, another area would have been held thin and vulnerable to breakthrough. It did not really matter where this weak point would be located; just that it had to happen. It was structural.
The Allied plan was based on the assumption that the Germans would reinforce the East rather than West sector. Montgomery had studied the German approach to war. The picture of sometime Kreigsacademie instructor Rommel in his caravan was not a mere affectation. German doctrine demanded that the commander made a choice about the point of main effort, in defence as well as attack. The Germans own logic dictated that the Western Sector would be the weaker. A thrust South East from Normandy posed a greater danger than a thrust South from Coutances. This was the gist of the Allied plan.

The key ground in the Normandy beach head we3re the portsd, of which the Germans knew about Cherbourg. Rommel knew that the Germans shouldm attempt to strike the Americans before they captured Cherbourg, but his efforts were pre-empted by 2nd Army attacks which gav ethe Germans no opportunity to regroup.

Gooner1
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#86

Post by Gooner1 » 03 Jun 2016, 14:34

Mori wrote: I believe the rate of reinforcements and their location are correct, but do not justify the conclusion. If these German divisions had been sent to the other army, another area would have been held thin and vulnerable to breakthrough. It did not really matter where this weak point would be located; just that it had to happen. It was structural.
I disagree. Just prior to Cobra the Germans had the better part of 25 divisions, of which 9 were armoured, to defend a front of about 60 miles. No area needed to be thin and vulnerable to breakthrough.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#87

Post by Gooner1 » 03 Jun 2016, 14:47

Sheldrake wrote:German doctrine demanded that the commander made a choice about the point of main effort, in defence as well as attack.
The Germans own logic dictated that the Western Sector would be the weaker. A thrust South East from Normandy posed a greater danger than a thrust South from Coutances. This was the gist of the Allied plan.
In the event I don't believe a thrust in the Eastern sector could have been a greater danger. Assuming there was one where would they go, West to cut-off 7th Army or North East to Paris? Either way I can't see it being as deadly to the German army in France as the actual breakthrough and 'right-turn'.

Moreover, and as has been noted, since most German reinforcements would arrive in the Eastern sector first, any breakthrough there would inevitably encounter those fresh units sooner than they would in the West.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#88

Post by Michate » 03 Jun 2016, 15:03

As much as I believe that 3:1 ratio is too vague to be of any pratical value, as much I'd be surprised to learrn that the attacking party routinely has fewer assets than the defending. But that would be a happy surprise.
The 3:1 rule is at best roughly applicable at the “tactical level” (describing the number of troops and weapon systems at the point of impact, but even at this level many qualifications apply, such as posture, preparedness, terrain, quality of forces and so on.

At the higher levels (operational / strategic) it does not apply at all. While some superiority is usually required, because in its absence superiorities at the tactical level cannot be sustained, historically a measure of superiority much less than 3:1 was often sufficient, sometimes near parity, sometimes even inferiority (but these normally involving a large qualitative difference).

But I guess we agree on this, so please excuse my lecturing.
If you could point to the relevant book(s) by Mearsheimer and Biddle, it'd be even better.
(the only Mearsheimer thing I read is the essay on Liddel Hart).
Stephen Biddle, “Military Power” includes sketches on force relations for several WW1 and WW2 battles (be warned though, he belongs to the "incompetent Brits" school of thought).

Upon re-reading, Mearsheimer (in his article: “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics”, available online) appears more of a measured supporter of the 3:1 rule, because he stresses the need for “special circumstances” in cases where it does not apply (I was speaking from memory).
That is incorrect though. Fresh German divisions were being committed to the fighting in Normandy at a rate of about one every three days during July. It was the German mistake, and the Allied intention, that most of these were sent to 5th Panzer Army, leaving only the line of German 7th Army 'thin'.
This argument is missing the critical context that these “fresh” divisions, apart from their often unfinished state, or that they were sometimes only battlegroups, also served as a substitute for casualty replacements. The large bulk of casualties was not matched by replacements, because at the time of the Normandy battle, the Germans were facing their yet greatest disasters and crisis on the Eastern front. So, seven or eight divisions were needed to nominally replace the 100,000 or so casualties not replaced by normal replacement personnel (disregarding for simplicity that these “fresh” divisions included a lot of non-combat personnel, while combat losses drained almost exclusively combat personnel).
A similar argument could be made for newly arriving armoured divisions, because armour losses in the already committed divisions were not replaced, either.

In addition, there was not much alternative to sending the majority of newly arriving forces to the British sector. A breakthrough there would have cut off all German forces fighting in Normandy, while a breakthrough in the Western sector allowed at least a more orderly retreat to the East (disregarding here the Mortain stupidity, which is another problem).
Also, the terrain around Caen was much more suited for armoured warfare then the Bocage country to the West, so it was quite natural to send the bulk of the armour there, as long as there was no real breakthrough attempt by the Americans.

And despite all arriving German divisions, the British still retained a comfortable numerical superiority, with their 3,000 tanks, and in other key weapon systems (artillery, air) as well.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#89

Post by Kingfish » 03 Jun 2016, 15:40

Mori wrote:
pintere wrote: What the Allies do is create a situation were the German front is bound to collapse. It takes a few weeks of battle, with repeated strikes in various areas of the front. It's better if these strikes extend the beachhead, but that's a secondary benefit only. The goal is to use the German assets and to deny the Germans any opportunity to build a reserve. End July, the Germans lines are pressed so thin that have to crack somewhere. It's mechanical.
While the historical outcome supports the above, I am not convinced this was designed in the way you described. IIRC, the post-Overlord plan called for the allies being on the Seine by D+90. That doesn't suggest the allies envisioned a collapse in the German front line.

With regards to denying the Germans the opportunity to build a reserve, the reason most often cited was their inability to deploy sufficient infantry divisions to Normandy so that the Panzers could be pulled off the front lines. While allied interdiction efforts certainly played a part, the main reason (IMO) was the divided German command structure coupled with paucity of motorized assets for those divisions, two aspects for which the allies really had no control over.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#90

Post by Michael Kenny » 03 Jun 2016, 16:22

Kingfish wrote: the post-Overlord plan called for the allies being on the Seine by D+90. That doesn't suggest the allies envisioned a collapse in the German front line.
They never expected a front line in Normandy. The thinking was the Germans would, after failing to repulse the landings, withdraw in good order into the interior of France using the main rivers as stop lines. The German attempt to hold the Allies in Normandy accelerated their demise.

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