How much planning did Monty do for Market Garden?

[Michael Kenny]

The Allied planners made one critical mistake. They thought they were dealing with intelligent rational men who would see the obvious. They can not be criticised for not knowing a lunatic was going to be kept at the helm. In reality the 'failure' at Arnhem made Germany's ultimate fate harsher. It only delayed the inevitable and resulted in an extra million plus casualties for no advantage whatsoever.
Indeed one can say (in hindsight) the German 'win' at Arnhem was a huge strategic blunder. Fighting to the last man may attract admiration from juvenile SS admirers but not from the surviving relatives of those forced to fight 'to the last old man, the last woman, the last boy and the last babe-in-arms'.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

SHAEF had done some of the planning that you talk about (Source: WO219/2521 - SHAEF G-3 Div Plans Div):

GOT/370-31/Plans (Final)
6th September, 1944 SHAEF
Copy No..27..

MEMORANDUM BY THE PLANNING STAFF

CROSSING OF THE SIEGFRIED LINE AND THE RHINE

OBJECT

1. To determine the best method of crossing the SIEGFRIED Line and the RHINE.

[...]

15. Provided that high priority is given to the above logistical factors and utilising the 500 C-47’s already allocated to air supply (assuming the remainder are retained for airborne operations) logistics will limit our action to the following extent:-

a. On 15th September it will be possible to maintain six BRITISH and six US divisions NORTH of the ARDENNES on the RHINE: smaller forces could be maintained there at an earlier date.

b. In addition, on 15th September, if logistical development is thoroughly satisfactory, and if ammunition expenditure continues to be light, it should be possible to support one corps SOUTH of the ARDENNES through the SIEGFRIED Line and up to the RHINE, and it might be possible to support two corps there.

That's the trouble with having a staff!!

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

Mike,

SHAEF had done some of the planning that you talk about (Source: WO219/2521 - SHAEF G-3 Div Plans Div):

That's the trouble with having a staff!!

Regards

Tom

Is that the same staff that concluded:

By 11 August the G-4 Plans Branch had completed a tentative survey. At that date its estimate of logistic capabilities continued to be guarded. It concluded that four U.S. divisions could be supported in an exploitation to the Seine by 20 August (D plus 75) on the condition that U.S. forces in Brittany were maintained entirely through Brittany ports or beaches by that date.

Were the logistics planning staff taken seriously at SHAEF given the earlier pessimistic judgements?

[Delta Tank]

Aber,

Away from my books, on holiday, but I believe in the book entitled "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" there is a paragraph that basically states what you posted but, when the planners are informed about the current situation on the ground, it shows how out of touch they were with reality.

Mike

[Aber]

The quote is from Ruppenthal and so probably got picked up elsewhere.

I suspect part of the issue is that the logistics staff was inexperienced in mid-1944 and so were going by the book. However there was a similar issue in 1945 - IIRC the Allies final dispositions should have only been achievable in July according to the logistics staff.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi Aber and Mike,

Although, to be fair, they do say that:

Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.

Well, apparently Niels Bohr the Danish physicist said it, but he copied someone, who copied someone, who copied someone!!

https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr

Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

To all,

I found this of some interest! Period maps of 1944 Holland.

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g6000m.gct ... st=gallery

Mike

[steverodgers801]

I remember reading that Browning of Monty's staff did much of the planning and that Monty did very little while never consulting Ridgeway the American expert

[Aber]

I remember reading that Browning of Monty's staff did much of the planning and that Monty did very little while never consulting Ridgeway the American expert

Browning was not on Montgomery's staff, he was Deputy Commander FAAA IIRC, and had been commanding airborne troops since November 1941; and the US divisions revised their own drop plans from those suggested by the British.

[Delta Tank]

I remember reading that Browning of Monty's staff did much of the planning and that Monty did very little while never consulting Ridgeway the American expert

Browning was not on Montgomery's staff, he was Deputy Commander FAAA IIRC, and had been commanding airborne troops since November 1941; and the US divisions revised their own drop plans from those suggested by the British.

Aber,

But General Browning never conducted a combat drop or commanded airborne forces in combat, or amI wrong.

Mike

[Aber]

Aber,

But General Browning never conducted a combat drop or commanded airborne forces in combat, or amI wrong.

Mike

True enough, but he did have WW1 combat experience, and gallantry awards.

[Delta Tank]

Aber,

True enough, but he had zero combat experience in World War II. He never led a division in combat, and why the airborne forces needed a corps headquarters for Operation Market Garden is a mystery to me and many others. Rumor has it that he wanted to get into combat before the war ended, but those 30+ gliders that he used to move a worthless headquarters element would of been better used by the 1st British Airborne.

Now, as far as experience goes, everyone has to start somewhere, but if a corps headquarters was needed I would think that Ridgway's XVIIIth Airborne Corps would of been a better choice.

Mike

[Aber]

The British 1 Airborne Corps Headquarters had existed since 1943 and Browning had been involved at Army level as airborne advisor again since 1943. XVIII th Airborne Corps was not formed until August 1944. Using 1 Airborne Corps looks sensible on paper but it does ignore the poor relations between the US and British airborne commanders.

On use of a Corps Headquarters, if the operation had been successful, then XXX Corps would have operating north of the Rhine, and it would not make sense for it to be responsible for the area below the Rhine. VIII Corps would have been advancing north (and trying to eliminate German forces west of the Meuse), but some commander needed to be responsible for the area between Arnhem and Nijmegen/Grave/points south.

[Delta Tank]

Aber,

Yes, you are correct, but Ridgway had more experience and two of the three airborne divisions were US. But, of course you knew that. I did not know about the poor relations between the forces.

Your second point on the command responsibilities if a successful operation, reinforces the point that the Airborne Corps Headquaters could of arrived by truck!

Mike

[Aber]

Not an expert, but there seems to have been conflict between Browning who set up and developed the British Airborne forces, and US commanders who saw him as an empire builder trying to grab control of the US airborne. Part of this was the view of some of the US commanders that US airborne forces should be supporting 12th Army Group, rather than being part of an Allied Army. This was not helped by having Brereton in overall charge.