How much planning did Monty do for Market Garden?

[Sheldrake]

Not an expert, but there seems to have been conflict between Browning who set up and developed the British Airborne forces, and US commanders who saw him as an empire builder trying to grab control of the US airborne. Part of this was the view of some of the US commanders that US airborne forces should be supporting 12th Army Group, rather than being part of an Allied Army. This was not helped by having Brereton in overall charge.

Its all about organisational politics.

It should be no surprise that the leg infantry and armour commanders of the 12 AG thought airborne was a waste of resources and that all that air transport would be better placed in their support.

Nor that the airborne enthusiasts were keen supporters of Market Garden. This was about the only proposal to use the expensively recruited and trained airborne army in a strategic role, rather than as a tactical adjunct to seaborne landings.

For more of this kind of thinking check out my interpretation of the campaign on the New Mission Verbs section of ARRSE. http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thread ... st-3984952 (NSFW)

[Delta Tank]

Aber,

That is interesting! I guess they did not know Bradley was not a big airborne fan and they probably would never conduct an airborne operation to support 12th Army Group.

Mike

[Aber]

Aber,

That is interesting! I guess they did not know Bradley was not a big airborne fan and they probably would never conduct an airborne operation to support 12th Army Group.

Mike

After LINNET (drop on Tournai on the Belgium border) was cancelled, Brereton planned for LINNET II ( drop Liege - Maastricht area to help 12th Army Group cross the Meuse) to be executed on 4th September. There was no planning, agreement with Bradley or even maps for this, and Browning threatened resignation over this mess.

After this planning started for COMET (an Arnhem - Nijmegen drop that was the predecessor for MARKET GARDEN), but there were also plans developed for NAPLES I & II (Aachen, and Rhine crossing at Cologne), MILAN I & II (Trier, Rhine crossing at Coblenz), CHOCKER I & II (Saarbrucken, Rhine crossing at Mainz). As I understand it, in early September 1944 the priority for XVIII Airborne Corps was moving to bases in France to facilitate these. eg

Ridgway has talked to Bradley and Hodges. There is a strong desire to support the bridges across the RHINE in about ten days. If the American Division[s] go in MARKET I will have left only the 17 th [US] and 6 th [British] Airborne, both in very inferior state of training. I recommend, if possible, that one Division be kept out of Market.

FAAA diary 11 September

[Sheldrake]

Aber,

That is interesting! I guess they did not know Bradley was not a big airborne fan and they probably would never conduct an airborne operation to support 12th Army Group.

Mike

After LINNET (drop on Tournai on the Belgium border) was cancelled, Brereton planned for LINNET II ( drop Liege - Maastricht area to help 12th Army Group cross the Meuse) to be executed on 4th September. There was no planning, agreement with Bradley or even maps for this, and Browning threatened resignation over this mess.

After this planning started for COMET (an Arnhem - Nijmegen drop that was the predecessor for MARKET GARDEN), but there were also plans developed for NAPLES I & II (Aachen, and Rhine crossing at Cologne), MILAN I & II (Trier, Rhine crossing at Coblenz), CHOCKER I & II (Saarbrucken, Rhine crossing at Mainz). As I understand it, in early September 1944 the priority for XVIII Airborne Corps was moving to bases in France to facilitate these. eg

Ridgway has talked to Bradley and Hodges. There is a strong desire to support the bridges across the RHINE in about ten days. If the American Division[s] go in MARKET I will have left only the 17 th [US] and 6 th [British] Airborne, both in very inferior state of training. I recommend, if possible, that one Division be kept out of Market.

FAAA diary 11 September

The responsibility for fault for this mess lies with Eisenhower and SHAEF. 1st Allied airborne Army was a theatre asset. Until 1st September the co-ordination of its use with land operations by 12th and 21 Army group was Montgomery's responsibility as commander land forces. After this time the planning of air/land operations should have been directed by SHAEF. As it was First Airborne Army made all sorts of plans with only tenuous direction.

[Aber]

As it was First Airborne Army made all sorts of plans with only tenuous direction.

Or link to reality - see LINNET II.

One key point on the existence of all these plans is that FAAA did not see MARKET GARDEN as the last opportunity to cross the Rhine, but more as the first of several airborne operations. In that case the conservative approach to planning that they took eg single lift per day; 101st dropped as a division (rather than smaller drops over a wider area); 82nd only dropped on the south side of the Waal, make more sense. Starting MARKET GARDEN on the 17th, with another separate operation starting off on say 21st (as per diary extract above) means that asset preservation is key.

[Delta Tank]

To all,

Were all these airborne operations proposed by ground commanders before planning began? In a very fluid situation I would think it would be almost impossible to predict were an airborne force could be useful 7 or 8 days in advance.

Thinking out loud, were any of these "proposed" operations planning exercises to train the newly formed staffs at army and corps levels? So, they tried to pick realistic objectives and plan for them, more as a training exercise but with the outside chance they may in fact execute them.

Mike

[Sheldrake]

To all,

Were all these airborne operations proposed by ground commanders before planning began? In a very fluid situation I would think it would be almost impossible to predict were an airborne force could be useful 7 or 8 days in advance.

Thinking out loud, were any of these "proposed" operations planning exercises to train the newly formed staffs at army and corps levels? So, they tried to pick realistic objectives and plan for them, more as a training exercise but with the outside chance they may in fact execute them.

Mike

Some good question and possibly worthy of a PhD or MA paper, because I haven't seen anything on this specific topic.

Dempsey and Montgomery were keen to use 1st Airborne division south of Caen in mid June as a tactical drop. This was vetoed by Leigh Mallory, possibly fortunately for all concerned.

The staff of a military formation in reserve ends up carrying out a lot of contingency planning. Some of this is in response to specific director. Good comamnders carry out their own appreciation and consider possible options as normal battle procedure.

[Delta Tank]

Sheldrake,

I agree! And I do wonder what the answer is to my questions, may be in a personal diary somewhere.

Mike

[Aber]

Difficult to tell. I don't think the named plans were for staff training only, as there was so much going on that everyone was interested in getting a live drop done.

The successive plans for drops near Le Havre, Bolougne, Tounai and then COMET and MARKET GARDEN are relatively well known. I've not heard much about plans for drops in support of 12th Army Group, but I've not gone looking for US airborne histories. However discussions seem to have involved Ridgeway flying to France to meet Bradley so there may be little in the files; the FAAA files seem to have been sanitised by the great survivor Brereton; and memoirs are of course written with the benefit of hindsight.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

On Friday 22 September, the 1st Army diary records [Normandy to Victory, p.134]:

Later in the morning and until three this afternoon the General [Hodges] was closeted with General Ridgeway and other staff officers - the subject being the dropping of airborne troops [on] the other side of the Rhine."

There was also a large airborne conference at 1st Army's HQ on 15 October, 1944 - this included Ridgeway, Miley [17th US Airborne Div], Gale [6th British AB Div] and Williams of IX TCC.

Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

To all,

I think I may of found what I am looking for!! In the book entitled: "The Campaign For The Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years on, Operation Market Garden" John Buckley and Peter Preston-Hough (editors) Chapter 12 "Exploiting "Market-Garden"? Operation "Gatwick" - The Offensive That Never Was".

There was a plan! I knew there had to be, it just would not make sense to seize a crossing over the Rhine and not have determined what to do next.

Reading the chapter now.

Mike

[Aber]

On my 'to buy' list - I think there's also a chapter by Cirillo on overall strategy.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

There was a plan! I knew there had to be, it just would not make sense to seize a crossing over the Rhine and not have determined what to do next.

Had Bradley's 12th Army Group produced a detailed plan between say 10 - 16 September 1944 which tells us what they were planning to do after seizing "crossings over the Rhine" in accordance with the 12th Army Group directive of 10 September 1944?

BTW I think "Gatwick" was developed whilst "Market Garden" was in progress, rather than before.

Regards

Tom

[histan]

This is a statement of the intentions of 21st Army Group:

Market Garden Plan.jpg (129.73 KiB) Viewed 1233 times

A plan was produced for the first stage of 2nd Army's operation - the advance to the Zuider Zee - which was Market-Garden.

As far as I am aware, no detailed planning was undertaken for the follow on operations mentioned in the outline of intentions.

Like Tom, it is my understanding that Operation Gatwick was developed as a result of the failure of Market-garden rather than as a follow on to its success.

Regards

John

[Delta Tank]

To all,

Working on the time line now wii try to post this weekend, just don't have the time right now, it isn't long just need a keyboard!

Mike