How much planning did Monty do for Market Garden?

[Delta Tank]

On my 'to buy' list - I think there's also a chapter by Cirillo on overall strategy.

There is chapter on strategy by LTC Cirillo (ret)

Mike

[Gooner1]

There was a plan! I knew there had to be, it just would not make sense to seize a crossing over the Rhine and not have determined what to do next.

Montgomery’s Operational Directive M 525 14th September:

Second British Army

15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards to secure the crossings over the Rhine and Meuse in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegan-Grave. An airborne corps of three divisions is placed under command Second Army for these operations.

16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem, facing east, with deep bridgeheads to the east side of the Ijssel river
From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to the general area Rheine-Osnabruck-Hamm-Munster.
In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards Hamm, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr.

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12 Army Group

19. First U.S. Army is to move eastwards as follows:
a) 5 Corps directed on Bonn.
b) 7 Corps directed on Cologne
c) 19 Corps carrying out flank protection on the northern flank of the Army, along the inter-Army Group boundary. See para. 7.

20. The Army is to capture Bonn and Cologne, and to establish a deep bridgehead, some 10 miles in depth, on the east side of the Rhine.

21. The Army is then to advance eastwards round the south face of the Ruhr. This operation will be timed so as to co-ordinated carefully with the move of Second British Army round the north face of the Ruhr.
There will be very close touch between General Bradley and myself during these operations.

[histan]

This Operational Directive formed the basis of the plan for Market-Garden:

The final location of forces at the end of Market-Garden shows four divisions North of Arnhem roughly in the locations specified in paragraph 16 of the directive posted by Gooner1.

Regards

John

[Delta Tank]

To all,

The following comes from the book entitled: "The Supreme Comman" by Forrest Pogue page 260. You can find it here:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... 6.html#fn1

"On 15 September, General Eisenhower looked beyond the Arnhem attack and the Antwerp operation, which he expected to follow, to action that the Allies should take after they seized the Ruhr, Saar, and Frankfurt areas. He named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal and said he desired to move on it "by the most direct and expeditious route, with combined U.S.-British forces supported by other available forces moving through key centres and occupying strategic areas on the flanks, all in one co-ordinated, concerted operation." This was the nub of what was to be known as his "broad front" strategy. Having stated it, he virtually invited a debate by asking his army group commanders to give their reactions.21

Only the day before, Field Marshal Montgomery had given an indication of his views when he proposed that, once the Second British Army had an IJssel River line running from Arnhem northward to Zwolle near the Ijsselmeer and had established deep bridgeheads across the river, the Allies should push eastward toward Osnabrueck and Hamm. The weight would be directed to the right toward Hamm, from which a strong thrust would be made southward along the eastern face of the Ruhr. Meanwhile, the Canadian Army was to capture Boulogne and Calais and turn its full attention to the opening of the approaches to Antwerp.22"

Mike

[Aber]

The key question that follows from that extract is whether Eisenhower's conception of "Ruhr, Saar and Frankfurt" before heading for Berlin was feasible, in terms of logistics, German defences and time.

[Delta Tank]

Aber,
What I posted above was not feasible logistically and 21st Army Group did not have enough divisions to execute this plan. Also, what about western Holland? What forces were going to clear that area or if not clear it forces to protect that single line of communication from being interdicted from both flanks.

I just don't see how this could be done.

I got out a map and did some measuring from the LD (line of departure) to Zwollen, really they would have to go to Kampen to anchor the northern flank on water. Then from Zwollen to Hamm!

Got to go!

Mike

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

It's interesting how little effort Pogue puts into discussing the 12th Army Group plans of 10 Sep beyond commenting on the fact that First US Army suffered about 10,000 casualties for little return.

By the way, I do agree with your comment that:

What I posted above was not feasible logistically and 21st Army Group did not have enough divisions to execute this plan

But I think you could go further and say that, in fact, SHAEF's plans were not feasible logistically and 12th and 21st Army Groups did not have enough divisions nor logistic resources to execute their parts of that plan.

Cheers,

Tom

[Delta Tank]

To all,
I found the following very interesting and he tries to answer a question that I have had for years; How can FM Montgomery insist on being the main effort and then stating, but I can't take any casualties, or words to that effect. The passage below comes from the book entitled: "The Campaign For The Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years on Operation Market Garden" John Buckley & Peter Preston-Hough ISBN 978-1-910777-15-2, Chapter 12 by Stephen Ashley Hart


Page 187: The existence of this optimistic atmosphere during autumn 1944 was crucial because it connected with the British politico-strategic aspirations that underpinned the campaign. #9 Senior British commanders recognized that if their forces suffered devastating losses defeating the Germans in North-west Europe, British influence on post-war Europe would be diminished: Britain had not just to win the war but also the ensuing peace as well. #10 Montgomery’s dispute with Eisenhower over theatre strategy and command reflected his determination “to maintain” the campaign on “lines most suitable to Britain,” #11 because “it was of no avail to win the war strategically if we lost it politically.” #12 The maintenance of Britain’s international influence necessitated that British forces played a prominent role in the prosecution of the vital North-west Europe campaign; Britain’s post-war political prestige rested in part on the glory that her soldiers won on the battlefields of Europe. #13 The 21st Army Group, however, scarcely possessed sufficient forces to achieve such prominence. However, if Britain maintained such a high profile, with the 21st Army Group spearheading the Allied onslaught against the German Army in the West (Westheer), its forces would incur severe casualties. Thse partly irreplaceable losses would compel the army group to disband formations, thus reducing its already meager peak strength of 16 divisions. #14 The fewer the divisions with which the British army emerged at the war’s end the weaker its influence on Europe would be in the face of growing might of two nascent superpowers. Indeed, by 1945, the American forces deployed in the theatre outnumbered the British Commonwealth’s forces by three to one. Montgomery’s generalship sought to achieve a high British military profile while paradoxically avoiding the casualties that went with such a profile. #15
The longer the war lasted, moreover, the smaller would be the British effort in North-west Europe comparison with that of the ever increasing American forces. Thus the British remained more interested in achieving victory quickly than the Americans, since “the British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in 1944: no later.” #16 The 21st Army Group, however, possessed insufficient resources to achieve early victory by itself, unless the Germans collapsed unexpectedly. Equally, Montgomery could not afford to sustain the heavy casualties that would be incurred in a British-dominated attempt to secure swift strategic victory over the Westheer. Should such a full-blown British offensive effort fail, Montgomery’s emasculated army group might be reduced to a secondary role in the theatre, left merely to observe America’s defeat of the Wehrmacht.
The launching of Montgomery’s atypically bold “Market-Garden” offensive is more intelligible in this context. The operation reflected his attempt to exploit an apparently unique fleeting battlefield opportunity. With the Westheer seemingly all but defeated, now was the time for the 21st Army Group to gamble that its forces might secure for Britain a prominent profile in an Allied victory over the Germans achieved during 1944. #17 Despite the failure of “Market-Garden” gamble, the “Gatwick” concept represented an attempted continuation of this risk-embracing mentality. If the Germans remained uncohesive to a degree, and if the “Gatwick” offensive could swiftly secure a bridgehead over the Rhine, Montgomery might secure logistical priority for his proposed “narrow-thrust” offensive astride the Ruhr into the north German plain. If the enemy could not rapidly recover, this gamble might just deliver the crucial knock-blow to end the war, without the army group’s forces being devastated in the process. The 21st army Group’s implementation of the “Gatwick” concept was, therefore, inextricable interlinked with the connected issues of Theatre strategy, operational art, command, inter-Allied politics, and logistical priorities. #18

Footnote 16 Montgomery, Memoirs, pp.270-71; Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West, (London: Collins, 1959), p.366
Footnote 17 Such an opportunity presented “the moment for boldness” that required the senior commander “to throw [his] bonnet over the mill and soar from the known to seize the unknown”: Montgomery, Memoirs, p.353.
Footnote 18 Hart, Colossal, pp.62-67

[Sheldrake]

To all,
I found the following very interesting and he tries to answer a question that I have had for years; How can FM Montgomery insist on being the main effort and then stating, but I can't take any casualties, or words to that effect. The passage below comes from the book entitled: "The Campaign For The Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years on Operation Market Garden" John Buckley & Peter Preston-Hough ISBN 978-1-910777-15-2, Chapter 12 by Stephen Ashley Hart

The launching of Montgomery’s atypically bold “Market-Garden” offensive is more intelligible in this context. The operation reflected his attempt to exploit an apparently unique fleeting battlefield opportunity. With the Westheer seemingly all but defeated, now was the time for the 21st Army Group to gamble that its forces might secure for Britain a prominent profile in an Allied victory over the Germans achieved during 1944. #17 Despite the failure of “Market-Garden” gamble, the “Gatwick” concept represented an attempted continuation of this risk-embracing mentality. If the Germans remained uncohesive to a degree, and if the “Gatwick” offensive could swiftly secure a bridgehead over the Rhine, Montgomery might secure logistical priority for his proposed “narrow-thrust” offensive astride the Ruhr into the north German plain. If the enemy could not rapidly recover, this gamble might just deliver the crucial knock-blow to end the war, without the army group’s forces being devastated in the process. The 21st army Group’s implementation of the “Gatwick” concept was, therefore, inextricable interlinked with the connected issues of Theatre strategy, operational art, command, inter-Allied politics, and logistical priorities. #18

Stephen Hart and John Buckley are good mo0dern British historians. The other factor was the need to take a risk to eliminate the threat of the V2 rockets which started their barrage on 9th September. No one knew how effective they might prove to be or whether British morale might crumble. This might have weighed heavily in favour of a line of advance which would isolate the launch sites as well as bridge the Rhine.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

Thanks for posting the extract from the article. As I continue to argue, the author has yet again fallen into the trap of considering the planning for Market Garden in total isolation from the other planning going on during the first couple of weeks of September 44. It may well be true that Montgomery was desirous of winning the war before the end of 1944, but I can see absolutely no difference between the rampant optimism present at 21 Army Group HQ and that at SHAEF or 12 US Army Group HQ (or for that matter in The War Office or in the Pentagon!). The 12 Army Group plan outlined on 10 September 1944 had objectives no less ambitious than those outlined in Montgomery's directive of 14 September - why the interest in Montgomery's "atypically bold" plan but not in Bradley's "atypically bold" plan?

Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

Mike,

Thanks for posting the extract from the article. As I continue to argue, the author has yet again fallen into the trap of considering the planning for Market Garden in total isolation from the other planning going on during the first couple of weeks of September 44. It may well be true that Montgomery was desirous of winning the war before the end of 1944, but I can see absolutely no difference between the rampant optimism present at 21 Army Group HQ and that at SHAEF or 12 US Army Group HQ (or for that matter in The War Office or in the Pentagon!). The 12 Army Group plan outlined on 10 September 1944 had objectives no less ambitious than those outlined in Montgomery's directive of 14 September - why the interest in Montgomery's "atypically bold" plan but not in Bradley's "atypically bold" plan?

Regards

Tom

Tom,

Because Monty's plan got approval and the other plans didn't. I think it is that simple. If Monty's plan had been disapproved and Bradley's plan had failed then we would be discussing Bradley's failure and not Monty's.

By the way, what was Bradley's "atypical bold" plan?

Mike

[Gooner1]

To all,

The following comes from the book entitled: "The Supreme Comman" by Forrest Pogue page 260. You can find it here:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... 6.html#fn1

"Only the day before, Field Marshal Montgomery had given an indication of his views when he proposed that, once the Second British Army had an IJssel River line running from Arnhem northward to Zwolle near the Ijsselmeer and had established deep bridgeheads across the river, the Allies should push eastward toward Osnabrueck and Hamm. The weight would be directed to the right toward Hamm, from which a strong thrust would be made southward along the eastern face of the Ruhr. Meanwhile, the Canadian Army was to capture Boulogne and Calais and turn its full attention to the opening of the approaches to Antwerp.22"

Whilst "The First US Army is to capture Bonn and Cologne, and to establish a deep bridgehead, some 10 miles in depth, on the east side of the Rhine. First US Army is then to advance eastwards round the south face of the Ruhr. This operation will be timed so as to co-ordinated carefully with the move of Second British Army round the north face of the Ruhr."

[Delta Tank]

Gooner1,

Yes, I understand that was 1st Army's mission, but I don't see that as "bold" in anyway. Looks like a straight forward punch to the Rhine and then force a crossing, and then establish a bridgehead, and then. . .

Mike

[Delta Tank]

To all,

I am find some information hard to pin down as far as dates go, when was Operation Comet planned and what was the date of execution and the date it was cancelled?

Thanks in advance.

Mike

[Aber]

Gooner1,

Yes, I understand that was 1st Army's mission, but I don't see that as "bold" in anyway. Looks like a straight forward punch to the Rhine and then force a crossing, and then establish a bridgehead, and then. . .

Mike

Much like Market Garden then, but with less airborne?


Except that there were airborne plans to support US First Army's breaching of the Siegfried line and crossing of the Rhine.