Operation Market Garden a success or failure

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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#106

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Oct 2012, 20:25

Gnets,

Having said all that, I have been reading an article today about the "Rubicon" theory of strategic studies which postulates that decision making (as in deciding to go to war, but I would suggest equally valid for decisions within war) is divided into two periods. In the first, the decision maker contemplates all the available information before making the best decision he can in the circumstances, i.e. crosses the intellectual 'Rubicon'. Then, after he has made his decision, he (or she) is much harder to influence, especially by contrary information, to change his decision. You can probably see where I am going with this...

So it could be argued that:

1. When Montgomery and 21 Army Group realised that resistance was stiffening in the Netherlands, they expanded the airborne assault from the one division 'Comet' to the entire airborne corps 'Market Garden'.
2. Having done so, and having expended huge intellectual effort in pursuading SHAEF to support it, it would have taken very strong contrary evidence to make Montgomery and 21 Army Group cancel MG. You can imagine the scoffing about cautious old Monty!

It is of interest, by way of contrast, that Montgomery did change his plan before Alamein when the evidence suggested that his forces were not capable of conducting his original concept. I guess that you can either believe that Montgomery had become more and more dictatorial and less inclined to change his mind; or, one could believe that the evidence before Alamein was stronger than that before Arnhem.

I would take the argument even further, and demand royalties for the idea :lol: , by suggesting that as we are looking back from the outcome of the decision (i.e the failure of operation MG) we are much more easily persuaded by the evidence, whereas when looking forward to an operation (especially one that you have heavily invested in) it takes stronger evidence to change one's perspective. Hopefully that makes sense.

Regards

Tom

Aber
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#107

Post by Aber » 13 Oct 2012, 11:00

Tom from Cornwall wrote:2. Having done so, and having expended huge intellectual effort in pursuading SHAEF to support it, it would have taken very strong contrary evidence to make Montgomery and 21 Army Group cancel MG. You can imagine the scoffing about cautious old Monty!
This of course is an old argument put forward by Hamilton in his biography, so you will struggle to get royalties on it.

While it was not a perfect plan, it is hard to see that Market Garden was a bad plan doomed to failure, given what it did achieve - some 21st Army Group troops did cross the Rhine.


Delta Tank
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#108

Post by Delta Tank » 19 Sep 2014, 17:26

Tom,
To which the obvious question is: which options were better? And especially given the state of knowledge at the time.
Regards
Tom
The beauty of Axis History Forum is that I can make the same argument on multiple threads covering the same subject. The other option is what General Dempsey wanted to do, drive east by north east to Wesel. It would of strengthened 1st US Army's attack into the Aachen Gap, it would of given FM Montgomery's the concentration of force that he always argued for, and it had a much better chance of being successful.

Mike

Delta Tank
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Re:

#109

Post by Delta Tank » 19 Sep 2014, 17:30

Michael Emrys wrote:I think there is a slim chance that M-G could have worked, but it would have taken more careful planning and somebody in authority to tell the air forces to drop the paratroops closer to their objectives. And there was no time available for careful planning.

In any event, I'm not at all sure that a successful M-G would have been worth the effort anyway. Until Antwerp was opened, the Allied armies weren't going anywhere in a hurry. They had reached the end of their logistical leash. They would inevitably have to stop and stockpile supplies. Meanwhile, the German defence had begun to gel, and given the terrain, this would mean the end of the pursuit phase until spring. Montgomery was living in a fantasy that a score or so divisions could strike out across northern Germany for Berlin and win the war before the end of the year.
To all,

Let's assume for a moment that Operation Market Garden was totally successful and the British Army crossed the Rhine and made it up to the Zuider Zee, then what? Envelope the Ruhr from the north. . how? Was there a plan to do this? Logistical estimate? Time line?

Mike

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#110

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 19 Sep 2014, 20:11

Mike,

I seem to remember having seen a discussion somewhere in the files about the need for a 2 week logistic halt before 2nd Army would have been able to advance again in a serious way. I'll see if I can find out where I saw that.

Cheers

Tom

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#111

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 19 Sep 2014, 20:15

The beauty of Axis History Forum is that I can make the same argument on multiple threads covering the same subject. The other option is what General Dempsey wanted to do, drive east by north east to Wesel. It would of strengthened 1st US Army's attack into the Aachen Gap, it would of given FM Montgomery's the concentration of force that he always argued for, and it had a much better chance of being successful.

Mike
A much better chance of being successful? Easy to say, but not easy to prove. :lol:

Would your option include the same British and airborne army forces?

Cheers

Tom

Delta Tank
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#112

Post by Delta Tank » 19 Sep 2014, 20:42

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
The beauty of Axis History Forum is that I can make the same argument on multiple threads covering the same subject. The other option is what General Dempsey wanted to do, drive east by north east to Wesel. It would of strengthened 1st US Army's attack into the Aachen Gap, it would of given FM Montgomery's the concentration of force that he always argued for, and it had a much better chance of being successful.

Mike
A much better chance of being successful? Easy to say, but not easy to prove. :lol:

Would your option include the same British and airborne army forces?

Cheers

Tom
Tom,

I would say it is impossible to prove, since I don't have the money to hire all those guys back and equip them and launch them into battle and then pay for all the damages! :lol: Yes, same forces, the airborne divisions can be trucked or walk in, no jumping necessary, no need to fly! Same amount of effort, that would be 12 divisions or so heading towards the objective, the Ruhr and not heading north over a swamp with an elevated road running over it.

Any information on the plan if Operation Market Garden is successful? Plan? Logistics estimate? Time line? I don't think I have ever read anything about what would happen if successful. All you read is over the Rhine and envelope the Ruhr from the north, war over!

Mike

Delta Tank
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#113

Post by Delta Tank » 24 Sep 2014, 16:11

To all,

"Victory in the West, The Defeat of Germany, Volume II"
By Major L. F. Ellis
Page 26 and 27

"14 September FM Montgomery issued a further directive, of which the following are the governing clauses:

Together with the 12th Army Group, we will now begin operations designed to isolate and surround the Ruhr; we will occupy that areas as we may desire. Our real objective therefore is the Ruhr. But on the way to it we want the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, since the capture of the Ruhr is merely the first step on the northern route of advance into Germany.

First Canadian Army
Complete the capture first of Boulogne, and then Calais. Dunkirk will be left to be dealt with later. . .The whole energies of the Army will be directed towards operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port of Antwerp. . .Having completed the operations for the opening of Antwerp Canadian Army will operate northwards on the general axis Breda Utrecht-Amsterdam.

Second British Army
The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure the crossings over the Rhine and Meuse in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave. An airborne corps of three divisions is placed under command Second Army for these operations. . .The thrust northward to secure the river crossings. . .will be rapid and violent without regard to what is happening on the flanks. The Army will establish its strength on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem facing east, with deep bridgeheads to the east side of the Ijssel River.

The First U. S. Army is to move eastwards. . .to capture Bonn and Cologne and to establish a deep bridgehead. . on the east side of the Rhine. The Army is then to advance eastwards round the south face of the Ruhr. These operations to be timed so as to be co-ordinated carefully with the move of Second Army round the north face of the Ruhr.”
/////////////////////////////////////////my comments/questions below////////////////////////////////////////

So, what was the time line? I don't know, the logistics? I don't know. Where were the British going to get all these divisions to attack and clear all this territory? I don't have a clue. Was all this feasible? Where are the staff estimates, operations and logistics?
So, you do the staff work first, then you propose a course of action to your boss. You don’t propose a course of action, sell it to your boss and then go back to see if it is feasible. So, with that thought in mind. . .do these estimates exist? They must. . somewhere.

Mike

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#114

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 24 Sep 2014, 18:48

Mike,

As discussed on another thread, this directive was issued by Montgomery in response to the SHAEF directive FWD 13765 issued by Eisenhower on 4 Sep:

“REF NO: FWD 13765
1. Enemy resistance on the entire front shows signs of collapse...

3. Our best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in striking at the RUHR and at the SAAR, confident that he will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas...

6. The mission of Northern Group of Armies and of that part of Central Group of Armies operating north-west of the ARDENNES is to secure ANTWERP, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the RUHR and then seize the RUHR.
Montgomery's response was to write to Eisenhower to say that:
"my maintenance is stretched to the limit...based as I am at present I cannot capture the RUHR...
After lots of arguments, and the infamous meeting in Eisenhower's aircraft on 10 September, Eisenhower issued FWD-14764 on 13 September:

1. This is an amplification of my directive, FWD-13765, of 9 [4] September, which still holds good...

3. After conferences on September 9th, 10th and 11th with both Army Group Commanders and the Naval C-in-C, I am confirmed in my previously expressed conviction that the early winning of deep water ports and improved maintenance facilities in our rear are prerequisites to a final all-out assault on GERMANY proper... Distribution of supplies once they have reached the continent is still a major problem but is approaching solution through the improvement in the railway system...

4. The timing of our efforts toward the attainment of immediate objectives along the German western frontier is now of the utmost importance, because we do not have sufficient resources to do even this much simultaneously.

5. The general plan, already explained, is to push our forces forward to the RHINE, securing bridgeheads over the river, seize the RUHR and concentrate our forces in preparation for a final non-stop drive into GERMANY. While this is going on we must secure bases as follows: Northern Group of Armies must promptly secure the approaches to ANTWERP or ROTTERDAM so that one of these ports and the lines of communication radiating therefrom can give adequate maintenance to the Northern Group of Armies deep into the heart of GERMANY.

The Northern Group of Armies must also secure additional channel ports.

6. The maneuver plan is to push hard over the RHINE on our northern flank with Northern Group of Armies, First US Army and the First Allied Airborne Army, with the Third US Army, except for limited advance below, confined to holding and threatening action until initial objectives, on the left are attained.

7. Northern Group of Armies, swinging generally northward from its present position, will advance promptly to seize a bridgehead over the RHINE and prepare to seize the RUHR. To enable it to accomplish this mission, additional maintenance will be provided until about October 1, if necessary, as indicated in my personal message of today’s date to the Army Group Commander. The First Allied Airborne Army will remain available, for the present, to Northern Group of Armies to seize the bridgehead over the RHINE. However, as quickly as ground troops can reach and pass the positions occupied by the Airborne Forces, the latter must be instantly released for re-assembly and refitting in preparation for their further employment. This is especially important in the case of US airborne divisions which may be necessary in order to secure crossings further up the RHINE.

8. The Central Group of Armies must push its right, only far enough, for the moment, so as to hold adequate bridgeheads beyond the MOSELLE and then create a constant threat to the German forces and prevent the enemy from reinforcing further north by tearing troops away from the METZ area. As quickly as this is accomplished all possible resources of the Central Group of Armies must be thrown to support of the drive of the First US Army to seize bridgeheads near COLGNE and BONN, in preparation for assisting in the capture of the RUHR...
I think the answer to your question lies in the constant pleading by Montgomery for extra resources and for the resources of 12th US Army Group to be given immediately to 1st US Army and not shared between it and 3rd US Army.

To illustrate that Eisenhower thought the mission was logisitically practical, I guess we could look at what he wrote on 15 September:
OCT 370-31/Plans 15 September, 1944

Dear Bradley, Montgomery, Devers,

We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth in my last directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession of the RUHR, the SAAR and the FRANKFURT area. I have been considering our next move.
I'm still looking for the source of my comment about a "2 week delay" for 2nd Army to restock after Market Garden - I'm sure I didn't dream it. :)

Regards

Tom

Delta Tank
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#115

Post by Delta Tank » 25 Sep 2014, 00:14

Tom,

Thanks for the quick reply! I will be digging through some of my books, Logistics by Ruppenthal, Supreme Command by Pogue. But, I think, if they still exist, the estimates (appreciations) will be located somewhere in England.

Mike

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#116

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 27 Sep 2014, 21:15

Mike,

The logistics appreciations that are of relevance are those produced by SHAEF as SHAEF authorised the actions of the Army Groups in September 1944.

Now, I have managed to find in the SHAEF G-3 Division Plans Section war diary (WO219/2521) an appreciation dated 6 September 44 and the next is dated 21st September 1944. There doesn't seem to be anything between those dates - I'll keep looking though, but just to whet your appetite:
SHAEF 370-31 Plans (Final)
6th September 1944 Copy No...27..
MEMORANDUM BY THE PLANNING STAFF
CROSSING OF THE SIEGFRIED LINE AND THE RHINE
1. A study by the Planning Staff on the best method of crossing the SIEGFRIED Line and the RHINE, prepared within the framework of the Supreme Command, AEF’s directive to Army Groups dated 4th September, is attached. Its conclusions are given in the following paragraphs – supporting arguments are in the study.

2. The enemy is not at present able to defend either the SIEGFRIED Line or the RHINE adequately; in spite of the apparent strength of the former, the natural obstacle of the RHINE will probably offer greater difficulties to our advance.

3. Speed is essential, as the enemy has the capability of withdrawing from other fronts or forming further forces to oppose us. We should advance on a wide front extending the enemy and breaking through rapidly wherever he is weakest.

4. The most important areas in GERMANY lie in the NORTH, and the SIEGFRIED Line can be outflanked there. Our main effort should be in the Northern sectors.

5. Road routes and river crossings exist to permit an advance by two British and two US Corps NORTH of the ARDENNES, of two US Corps through the ARDENNES and several corps further SOUTH. Logistics, however, will probably limit an early advance to four Corps NORTH and one or two corps SOUTH of or through the ARDENNES.
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-4 Division
381 GDP (SHAEF/162/12/GDF)
21st September, 1944
SUBJECT: Advance Across the RHINE.

To: A C of S, G-4 Division.

1. Herewith as directed are latest logistical studies, prepared for use of the CAO, as follows:

[Sgd: Whipple]
WILLIAM WHIPPLE
Colonel, GSC,
Chief, Log Plans Branch

5. The Major Effort.

Our logistical effort must be concentrated on those objectives called for by the overall strategic picture. If we delay the final advance until all our forces can advance simultaneously, this advance will inevitably be delayed. When a decision can be reached as to the minimum forces which can safely push forward to seize the necessary objectives, the maximum logistical effort must be placed behind these forces. Preliminary considerations seem to indicate that the most efficient use of the Ls of C supporting Northern and Central Groups of Armies will result if approximately three-quarters of the total force is maintained north of the ARDENNES. However, by shifting rolling stock and truck transportation, considerable flexibility can be achieved, in order to support the maximum effort where it is most required.
Regards

Tom

Delta Tank
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#117

Post by Delta Tank » 28 Sep 2014, 02:14

Tom,

Away for the weekend, in Arlington, Va, there must be a detailed logistic estimate at Army, Corps, and division level. These estimates would be very detailed, tonnage required at each phase line, where the proposed logistic dumps would be established, MSR (main supply routes) for each corps and division, etc. Will write more in the next couple of days.

Tanks! Tanks A Lot!

Mike

Aber
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#118

Post by Aber » 28 Sep 2014, 19:35

Delta Tank wrote: there must be a detailed logistic estimate at Army, Corps, and division level
Well there should be. :D

However this was a period where divisions were being told to advance until their tanks ran dry, and record keeping was poor; even if there are studies they may not be completely reliable.

Delta Tank
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#119

Post by Delta Tank » 28 Sep 2014, 20:50

Aber wrote:
Delta Tank wrote: there must be a detailed logistic estimate at Army, Corps, and division level
Well there should be. :D

However this was a period where divisions were being told to advance until their tanks ran dry, and record keeping was poor; even if there are studies they may not be completely reliable.

Aber,

Unfortunately you are probably correct, but I am always amazed at what does survive, like "morning reports", these are reports that company first sergeants fill out each morning accounting for everyone in the unit, and somehow some really important ones from Korea survived to disprove an accusation.

Mike

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Operation Market Garden a success or failure

#120

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 28 Sep 2014, 21:28

Mike,

Well from the war diary of 2nd Army Q Branch (G-4!) (WO171/230):
17 September 1944 Belgium
1800 Adm Sitrep. Appx I folio 17

Second Army Adm Order No. 10 – Maint of Second Army during op MARKET GARDEN. Appx G folio 1

Loadings continued to show improvement but despatch of trains from railtails and arrivals at railheads were again held up by:

(a) lack of engines.

(b) a derailment on the DOULLENS loop.

As has been stated elsewhere, difficulty has been experienced in building up stocks (sufficient to meet issues, let alone accumulate res) in Army depots on account of non arrival of scheduled trains.
This posn is particularly acute at the moment insofar as POL is concerned, and issues to Corps are dependent upon the arrival of stocks into depots. Consequently, cases have occurred where fmns have been kept waiting at depots until sufficient POL has been received to permit of issues being made, but Corps tpt has been backloaded at railheads on arrival of POL trains to save unnecessary delay in tpt turnround. In order to avoid recurrences of this nature, and in an effort to build up stocks within depots, issues to Corps are now being restricted.
I must go back and get that appendix!

And from 30 Corps HQ S and T Branch (now don't ask why army G-4 is called Q while Corps Q is called S & T, I guess they just wanted to confuse us!) (WO171/356)
Appx ‘C’
Rear HQ 30 Corps, B.L.A.
Ref: 2225 ST.
17 Sep 44
Copy No 38
S.T. 30 CORPS ADM INSTR. NO. 17.

INFORMATION
1. (a) Enemy as in current Sitreps.
(b) Own Tps. 30 Corps will advance at maximum speed to secure the area NUNSPEET Z6621. This advance to be known as operation “GARDEN” will be carried out in conjunction with operation “MARKET” executed by the BRITISH AIRBORNE CORPS.
INTENTION
2. (a) To maintain formations and Corps Tps as follows from 161 F.M.C. BOURG LEOPOLD:-
52 Div Seaborne element Corps )
Corps Br Coln. ) W.E.F. 17 Sep.
Corps Tps (South of R.WAAL) )
82 U.S. Airborne Div ) At a date to be
101 U.S. Airborne Div ) notified later.
(b) To maintain Guards Armd Div, 43 Div Gp, 50 (N) Div Gp, 1 Airborne Div (incl Polish Para Bde), 8 Armd Bde and Corps Tps fwd of R. WAAL from 162 F.M.C. in area ARNHEM wef D+3 incl or as soon as the administrative situation permits.
Now what I would like to see is the G-4 appreciations by 12 Army Group and by 1st and 3rd Armies for September 1944. :thumbsup:

Cheers

Tom

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