Operation Market Garden a success or failure

[David Thompson]

aghart -- Our rules forbid personal comments about other posters. Please avoid that practice in the future.

[Kingfish]

It may be a shock to you, but judging history by what Hollywood produces is a mistake, I bet you think U571 is true?

Nonsense.
Everyone knows all the major tank battles in the Ardennes were fought in terrain that look strikingly similar to the wide open fields of central Spain.

[schrisbpd]

I agree with Qvist, it was a failure.

How could the allied Intel fail to see a whole SS Panzer Korps move to what would be their primary objective?

Intelligence had been received via the dutch underground and aerial recon that panzer units had been moved into the area of Arnhem. But unfortunately this intell was ether ignored or not believed by the Allies!

[schrisbpd]

I agree with Qvist, it was a failure.

How could the allied Intel fail to see a whole SS Panzer Korps move to what would be their primary objective?

Intelligence had been received via the dutch underground and aerial recon that panzer units had been moved into the area of Arnhem. But unfortunately this intell was ether ignored or not believed by the Allies!

If the Allied commanders and just spent a little more time investigating or exploiting this intell...there may have been a different outcome to the whole operation!

[aghart]

aghart -- Our rules forbid personal comments about other posters. Please avoid that practice in the future.

apologies.

[stupidmop]

My understanding is that you would have to classify the operation as a failure, simply for the fact that the mission did not achieve its stated goals. The operation, as far as I am aware, was a gamble to try to bring the war to a quicker end. It is interesting to think "what if" with Market Garden: I have always wondered what post-war Germany would have looked like had the Western Allies been successful at Market Garden. Would they have reached Berlin before the Soviets? The next 45 years of German history could have been markedly different.

By the way, this is my first post on this forum. Glad I found it. Hello all!

[Trackhead M2]

My understanding is that you would have to classify the operation as a failure, simply for the fact that the mission did not achieve its stated goals. The operation, as far as I am aware, was a gamble to try to bring the war to a quicker end. It is interesting to think "what if" with Market Garden: I have always wondered what post-war Germany would have looked like had the Western Allies been successful at Market Garden. Would they have reached Berlin before the Soviets? The next 45 years of German history could have been markedly different.

By the way, this is my first post on this forum. Glad I found it. Hello all!

Dear SM,
Welcome aboard. What if is the most thought provoking question on the forum, because the possibilities are endless.
Strike Swiflty,
TH-M2

[stupidmop]

My understanding is that you would have to classify the operation as a failure, simply for the fact that the mission did not achieve its stated goals. The operation, as far as I am aware, was a gamble to try to bring the war to a quicker end. It is interesting to think "what if" with Market Garden: I have always wondered what post-war Germany would have looked like had the Western Allies been successful at Market Garden. Would they have reached Berlin before the Soviets? The next 45 years of German history could have been markedly different.

By the way, this is my first post on this forum. Glad I found it. Hello all!

Dear SM,
Welcome aboard. What if is the most thought provoking question on the forum, because the possibilities are endless.
Strike Swiflty,
TH-M2

Thanks for the welcome!

[Tom from Cornwall]

Intelligence had been received via the dutch underground and aerial recon that panzer units had been moved into the area of Arnhem. But unfortunately this intell was ether ignored or not believed by the Allies!

If the Allied commanders and just spent a little more time investigating or exploiting this intell...there may have been a different outcome to the whole operation!

Hi,

Re Dutch underground reports - can anyone tell me when this information was briefed to "Allied commanders" (SHAEF or 21 Army Group) and what it actually said?

Re aerial recon - despite Brian Urquhart's postwar recollections of low-level aerial photos there is no record of such a mission or any photos. The only document that mentions aerial photos and AFVs and Arnhem is a 1 AB Corps Int Update just before MG that mentions one possible AFV being seen (IIRC on the road between Arnhem and Apeldoorn).

Many thanks

Tom

[ducatim901]

Hans Sakkers states in his book about Enigma that the allies knew that 2 SS Pz Korps was arriving at it's refittingpoint at Arnhem.
But it seems that monty was just busy with one thing, getting in Berlin before the Americans.
Sakkers also states that the neglect in the capture of the Schelde area so the harbour of Antwerp could be used had a great impact on the battle in Brabant and Arnhem, a great part of the AOK 15 could escape and could battle again, these battered units of older men fought a slow moving war and gave way just to survive and fight anotherday, the Allies had fought longer in Brabant (to advance about 50 to 60 km's) then for the 500/600 km's breaking out of Normandy to the standstill on the Dutch/Belgian border.
If Woensdrecht would have had a bigger importance in the battles before Market Garden began te troops of AOK 15 would have had much more troubles getting where they got how it went in 1944.
Also the arrival of the 1 Fallschirm Armee was known to the Allies, It seems Monty and other decisionmakers had the idea that Germany's armies had had it and it was just a matter of time they would collapse and the way to Berlin was open.
They did not expect that the Germans could become fighters instead of runners, the 10 day rest at the canals before Market Garden began was all the Germans needed to get back in bussines, just these ten days the Germans got the remains of AOK 15 over the Scheld and passing Woensdrecht just in time to fill the gaps in the German defense.
Model also had a great hand in the order to collect every soldier retreiting and by doing so Chill and Walther could fill their Battle groups with experienced fighters.
But there are more circumstances that got the Germans turning the tide, but they also made mistakes and the operation could have been more disastrous.
Greetings Jack.

[merdiolu]

For operational outcome Market-Garden was flawed at its birth and doomed from start. There is no point in saying What If. Otherwise there would be too many What Ifs. If 30th Corps blocked Antwerp approaches and besieged 15th German Army in Scheldt/Walcharen during first week of September , if Monty listened Dutch resistance and air recon intelligence , if 101st Airborne captured Son Bridge intact first day on September 17th , if 2nd SS Panzer Corps was not in Arnhem , if 1st British Airborne landed closer to bridge , if weather was better , if 30th Corps moved faster , if operation plans were not captured by Germans etc..

The thing was Market Garden was planned on the assumption that German Army in West was still running away. During its planning and preparation there was a over optimism , an unnecessary hope that war would be over by Christmas. On the contrary in September Germans actually stopped running and rallying.

[canambridge]

Well said merdiolu, the only way Market-Garden was going to achieve it's objectives was if the Germans had kept on running. And the running stopped in early September.
What many lose sight of in the "what if" (and "whose fault") debates is that the objective of Market-Garden was not the relief of Br 1st Airborne Div at Arnhem, but the establishment of a a bridge head over the Rhine, from Arnhem to the Zuider Zee. And even if that objective had been accomplished, how were the Allies were going to drive to another 500 kms to Berlin and end the war by Christmas without having solved their logistic problems?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

Many thanks for your replies but I was rather hoping that someone would actually be able to answer my questions:

Intelligence had been received via the dutch underground and aerial recon that panzer units had been moved into the area of Arnhem. But unfortunately this intell was ether ignored or not believed by the Allies!

If the Allied commanders and just spent a little more time investigating or exploiting this intell...there may have been a different outcome to the whole operation!

Hi,

Re Dutch underground reports - can anyone tell me when this information was briefed to "Allied commanders" (SHAEF or 21 Army Group) and what it actually said?

Re aerial recon - despite Brian Urquhart's postwar recollections of low-level aerial photos there is no record of such a mission or any photos. The only document that mentions aerial photos and AFVs and Arnhem is a 1 AB Corps Int Update just before MG that mentions one possible AFV being seen (IIRC on the road between Arnhem and Apeldoorn).

You all very nicely summed on much of the historiography of Market Garden, however I was rather hoping that we could perhaps discuss some of the primary sources.

Best regards,

Tom

[canambridge]

Sorry Tom 7,000 km from home, I don't even have access to books to see where the derivative information came from.

[merdiolu]

Another thing to add. Getting a bridgehead on Rhine when momentum of Allied advance had already ebbed away due to supply problems , approaching winter and German resistance might have been more harmful to Allied cause than good. Market Garden assumed that once 2nd British Army got across Rhine at Arnhem it could walk to Ruhr , main industrial and armaments production center of Reich and end the war. Remember that even it could do this without support of other armies from a very vulnerable and narrow bridgehead with a tenacious corridor at Netherlands in face of German counterattacks and supply problems , getting Ruhr would no means that Germans would raise their hands and surrender. Nazi regime was too fanatical for that. German Army in West certainly would try everything to contain such a bridgehead and throw it back to river. Result could be another Arnhem fiasco on a larger scale like loss of entire 30th Corps.

Whenever Allies , especially Commonwealth armies won battles they did it after and immense preparetion and planning stage.
Second Battle of Alamein , Mareth Line , Operation Husky and Overlord are all examples of that. This is not a critique please do not misunderstand. It is a military culture. Allies were not military innovators or improvising armies. Germans were like that. Market Garden was at the other hand was hastily prepared , improvised and put ahead in face of an unfounded optimism that war would be over by Christmas.