Operation Market Garden a success or failure

[Tom from Cornwall]

Market Garden assumed that once 2nd British Army got across Rhine at Arnhem it could walk to Ruhr , main industrial and armaments production center of Reich and end the war.

Did it? Is their documentary evidence for this assertion?

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

I thought the following letter from Eisenhower to Montgomery on 15 September would suggest why 21 Army Group was trying to capture the RUHR:

15 September 1944
Dear Montgomery,
We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth in my last directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession of the RUHR, the SAAR and the FRANKFURT area. I have been considering our next move.
As I see it, the Germans will have stood in defence of the RUHR and FRANKFURT and will have had a sharp defeat inflicted on them. Their dwindling forces, reinforced perhaps by material hastily scratched together or dragged from other theatres, will probably try to check our advance on the remaining important objectives in Germany. By attacking such objectives we shall create opportunities of dealing effectively with the last remnants of the German forces in the West. Moreover, we shall be occupying further key centres and increasing our stranglehold on the German peoples.
Clearly, BERLIN is the main prize, and the prize in defence of which the enemy is likely to concentrate the bulk of his forces. There is no doubt whatsoever, in my mind, that we should concentrate all our energies and resources on a rapid thrust to BERLIN.

Clearly then, in hindsight, their was considerable optimism in high Allied command circles!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

As for optimistic assumptions about German resistance, it looks like this also reached right to the top:

16 September 1944 (WO219/1924)
SHAEF Intelligence Summary No.26
“The enemy is momentarily fighting better on his own soil. How long this rejuvenation…in the west is likely to last is difficult to say. Probably only…as long as the Siegfried Line (is not) breached in force.”

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

And of course the optimism wasn't limited to SHAEF and 21 Army Group, we should also add the context of 12 US Army Group plan's laid down on 10 Sep 44, i.e. exactly the same date on which Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed to reinforce the 21 Army Group thrust north of the RUHR:

10 Sept 44
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions No.8
To: Army Commanders
NOTE: This Letter of Instruction confirms verbal orders of the Army Group Commander already issued but does not supplement them.
1.
a) See current Int. Summary.
b) 21 Army Group continues advance to the East to isolate and occupy the RUHR. The capture of the Channel Ports, the rocket bomb sites and the destruction of the enemy trapped along the coast will be completed.
2.
a) Twelfth Army Group advances to the East to secure bridgeheads over the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOLN both inclusive.
…
3.
a) FIRST ARMY
i) Continue the advance to the East, to secure crossings over the RHINE River in the vicinity of KOBLENZ, BONN and KOLN.
ii) Maintain contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (North) flank.
b) THIRD ARMY
i) Continue the advance tot he East in zone and secure crossings of the RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM and MAINZ, if sufficient forces become available to Third Army it will also seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.
ii) Protect the South flank East of ORLEANS inclusive.
c) NINTH ARMY
i) Take BREST.

4. Armies will have equal priorities of supply except that the capture of the BREST area will have first priority.

All hopelessly optmistic if viewed in the same light as many criticisms of Market Garden are based on!!

Hindsight is a wonderful thing!

Regards

Tom

[Gary Kennedy]

Tom,

A google was able to turn up a few refs to No.16 Sqn RAF undertaking photo-recce during Arnhem, and being awarded the name as a battle honour. There is ref to a sortie by two Spits and Mossies on 7th Sep 1944 at the below link, but no direct mention of enemy armour being postively identified and quantified -

http://www.34wing.co.uk/34wing.html

http://www.rafweb.org/Sqn016-20.htm

Gary

[Tom from Cornwall]

Gary,

Hi - interesting links thanks. I think these sorties were the ones that produced the famous low level photos of the bridges at Arnhem and more specifically the pontoon bridge being dismantled to allow river traffic through. The date of 7 Sep seems right, although it should be recalled that these recces were for Op Comet rather than Op Market Garden, and, I think I read somewhere that they were specifically carried out to check on the state of bridges in Holland, rather than as recce to investigate ground formations. After all, I would imagine the field of view when 100 ft above the Rhine was pretty small! I don't believe anyone ever identified armour from these photographs but perhaps they explain why Brian Urquahart subsequently remembered low level obliques being taken.

I wonder if all of the 7 Sep 44 low-level photos still exist somewhere.

In summary, I personally believe that the low-level photos of German armour story is a myth!

Regards

Tom

[schrisbpd]

Tom...I believe in the book "A Bridge to Far" there are 1 or 2 low-level aerial photos in there. They clearly show german armored vehicles in the tree line.

But your right...it would be very interesting to see all of those photos!!!

Chris

[Tom from Cornwall]

Chris,

Tom...I believe in the book "A Bridge to Far" there are 1 or 2 low-level aerial photos in there. They clearly show german armored vehicles in the tree line.

I think you are thinking about the movie - apparently as they couldn't find the "original" photos, they made some up for the film! My source for this is Operation Market Garden - Then and Now by After the Battle books. Anyway I'll go look at the book (i.e A Bridge too Far) in the morning and see what I can find!

Regards

Tom

[schrisbpd]

Chris,

Tom...I believe in the book "A Bridge to Far" there are 1 or 2 low-level aerial photos in there. They clearly show german armored vehicles in the tree line.

I think you are thinking about the movie - apparently as they couldn't find the "original" photos, they made some up for the film! My source for this is Operation Market Garden - Then and Now by After the Battle books. Anyway I'll go look at the book (i.e A Bridge too Far) in the morning and see what I can find!

Regards

Tom

OK! Let me what you find...i dont have my copy of that book anymore so i cant verify it!

[EKB]

Gary,

Hi - interesting links thanks. I think these sorties were the ones that produced the famous low level photos of the bridges at Arnhem and more specifically the pontoon bridge being dismantled to allow river traffic through. The date of 7 Sep seems right, although it should be recalled that these recces were for Op Comet rather than Op Market Garden, and, I think I read somewhere that they were specifically carried out to check on the state of bridges in Holland, rather than as recce to investigate ground formations. After all, I would imagine the field of view when 100 ft above the Rhine was pretty small! I don't believe anyone ever identified armour from these photographs but perhaps they explain why Brian Urquahart subsequently remembered low level obliques being taken.

I wonder if all of the 7 Sep 44 low-level photos still exist somewhere.

In summary, I personally believe that the low-level photos of German armour story is a myth!

Regards

Tom

That might be true because the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions lost nearly all of their tanks in France. However, there were nearby scratch forces of German tanks and assault guns that belonged to other units, and these were later identified in Arnhem and Oosterbeek.

All of the RAF and USAAF photo squadrons were flooded with requests for low-level photography of the projected battlefield during the first two weeks of September 1944. The picture labs produced thousands of prints each day. Anything of military interest detected in the photos should have been put in writing, in the squadron Operational Record Books. That would be the first place to look.

The 7th Photo Group history called Eyes of the Eighth notes that PRU aircraft based at Benson brought back the photographs evaluated by General Browning's airborne intelligence staff. The RAF Spitfire and Mosquito spy planes at Benson were not normally associated with Tac/R missions. Based on supply and demand, they were sometimes diverted from high-altitude work to make low-level photo passes for the British Army. The same can be said about the USAAF 7th Photo Group over at Mount Farm, and 25th Bomb Group (Recon) at Watton.

Even if you found something in the picture archives, there is a separate question of how many enemy tanks should be counted before it raised alarm at higher headquarters. A photograph of two lurking panzers would not bring the same reaction as 200.

[Tom from Cornwall]

EKB,

However, there were nearby scratch forces of German tanks and assault guns that belonged to other units, and these were later identified in Arnhem and Oosterbeek.

Well yes, but this is totally different from the subsequent allegations that 1 Airborne Corps had confirmed evidence that:

the photographs clearly showed the presence of armoured vehicles in areas close to the locations of the planned dropping and landing zones.

Quoted from "Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors", p.44.

IIRC the armour that played the greatest role in blunting 1 Airborne Division's advance on the road bridge at Arnhem was from a Training Panzer Company that came from the Ruhr, a Brigade of Assault Guns that were diverted en route to Aachen and a unit of Tigers that came from training grounds in Germany. So, absolutely not "nearby" in air recce terms and available to counter any airborne operation wherever it landed at this time in the war.

Regards

Tom

[canambridge]

I would think that given the euphoria and "victory disease" that seemed to fill all Allied headquarters at all levels it would have taken clear evidence of a lot of German tanks to make anyone realize that the operation should not take place.
In retrospect it seems that the intelligence organizations should have been the "devil's advocates" to say: "Hey, there MAY be two panzer divisions in the landing area" and "Hey, maybe the Germans will be able to quickly move forces into the area to interfere with the plan". It seems that a single SS Recon battalion, with no tanks, was well positioned to intervene at either Arnhem or Nijmegen.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

It seems that a single SS Recon battalion, with no tanks, was well positioned to intervene at either Arnhem or Nijmegen.

And on that basis should MG have been cancelled? It is often the case that the enemy is well positioned to intervene in military operations!

Regards

Tom

[EKB]

Quoted from "Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors", p.44.

IIRC the armour that played the greatest role in blunting 1 Airborne Division's advance on the road bridge at Arnhem was from a Training Panzer Company that came from the Ruhr, a Brigade of Assault Guns that were diverted en route to Aachen and a unit of Tigers that came from training grounds in Germany. So, absolutely not "nearby" in air recce terms and available to counter any airborne operation wherever it landed at this time in the war.

Regards

Tom

That depends on your definition of striking distance.

It was a very long and time-consuming walk to Arnhem from the British landing zones, which did not exactly contribute to maintaining the element of surprise. A situation that in turn created the additional hazard of defending a lengthy and tenuous line of supplies and communication. All this was a lot to ask of lightly armed soldiers, even if German resistance had been less than expected.

It would have been sensible for the planners of Market-Garden to expand the air search area within their purview, closely monitor the rail transport system up until the last day before the assault, and consider what panzer forces might be capable of counter-attack within 72 hours.

Hundreds of factory fresh German tanks were put in front of the U.S Army sectors, especially in the Lorraine region. That should have put to rest any notions the Nazis had quit, or that they would not react swiftly to an enemy crossing of the Rhine.

A deeper investigation of the photo recce operations would be welcome. I don't know how thoroughly this was carried out by the air forces and studied by various intelligence departments. Surely there must be more to this story than the memoirs of one disgruntled officer.

[canambridge]

Hi,

It seems that a single SS Recon battalion, with no tanks, was well positioned to intervene at either Arnhem or Nijmegen.

And on that basis should MG have been cancelled? It is often the case that the enemy is well positioned to intervene in military operations!

Regards

Tom

Actually Tom, you're right, the operation should have been cancelled for that reason. There didn't need to hundreds of panzers, on film or not, to ruin the plan. The plan was so dependent on the Germans not being there and then reacting as planned (cutting and running) if they were there, that even a single German battalion in the wrong place, anywhere from Eindhoven to Arnhem, was in position to knock it off schedule. That was my point, sorry I didn't make it clear enough for you. All of which brings up the interesting "what if" the drops had occurred two days later, after 10th SS had left the area. Oh wait, I think it's op cancelled due to bad weather! The amazing thing about MG remains not that it failed, but that it almost succeeded.