Battle of Britain - could LW have won

[Potsdamerplatz]

Also, blaming ANYONE for the failures of the Battle of Britain is a bit silly. There never was going to be a "winning" situation for the Luftwaffe in that battle., no matter what they targeted. The destruction of Fighter Command could not have been achieved frankly.

I think you are living in a fantasy world if you really believe that the destruction of Fighter Command was never a real possibility. If the Luftwaffe had continued their attacks for another few weeks, the RAF would have been effectively finished.

It is obvious that the Luftwaffe's tactics in the Battle of Britain were disastrous. Compare these figures:

July 1940

77 British aircraft destroyed
216 German aircraft destroyed

August 1940


334 British aircraft destroyed
669 German aircraft destroyed

September / October 1940

501 British aircraft destroyed
882 German aircraft destroyed

On 15 September 1940 at the crucial point of the battle, the RAF only had 256 Spitfires operational. It doesn't take a genius to work out that the RAF couldn't afford to sustain such losses as displayed in the figures above. Although the Luftwaffe sustained more losses, they also had more planes.

My second point is that Goering himself was responsible for Luftwaffe strategy during this period. Of course he is then to blame for the massive German aircraft losses which are double that of the British - 1767 planes destroyed as opposed to the RAF's 912 aircraft lost.

(Split from 'Göring, Udet, Milch - who really failed the Luftwaffe' http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=88410) - Andreas

[brustcan]

Also, blaming ANYONE for the failures of the Battle of Britain is a bit silly. There never was going to be a "winning" situation for the Luftwaffe in that battle., no matter what they targeted. The destruction of Fighter Command could not have been achieved frankly.

Tony

Hello! Hindsight says the Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain because of leadership. Dowding's leadership won the battle for Britain. Had the Luftwaffe "leadership" been capable of a proper working plan of attack, like attacking only the air fields of fighter command, air superiority over the south/eastern part of England could have been achieved.
At the height of the battle on the air fields, even Dowding was considering pulling back his squadrons to airfields west of London. Cheers brustcan

[Hop]

On 15 September 1940 at the crucial point of the battle, the RAF only had 256 Spitfires operational. It doesn't take a genius to work out that the RAF couldn't afford to sustain such losses as displayed in the figures above.

The losses you posted are for all RAF fighters. The Spitfire was only the second most important fighter.

In total, the RAF had around 700 operational fighters, close to 400 Hurricanes, around 200 Spitfires, the rest a mix of Defiants, Blenheims and Gladiators.

The RAF serviceable aircraft states, as of the morning of 15th September:

* Blenheim - 47
* Spitfire - 192
* Hurricane - 389
* Defiant - 24
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 660

That's serviceable aircraft, the operational total is somewhat larger.

Although the Luftwaffe sustained more losses, they also had more planes.

By this point in the battle, the Luftwaffe actually had less fighters. They had been suffering from low German production, and a poor repair network, and their operational fighters had declined to a low level. They had no reserves, whilst the RAF still had several hundred Spitfires and Hurricanes operational.

The full picture can be seen by looking at serviceable strength.

On the 17th July, just as the battle was starting, the RAF had 659 serviceable fighters. On the 15th September, which is towards the end of the battle, the RAF had 660 serviceable fighters. In terms of operational fighters, the RAF was even better off, the serviceable total was about the same because operations were running at such a high tempo.

On 31st October, the end of the daylight battle in RAF reckoning, the RAF had 684 serviceable fighters.

The Luftwaffe, in contrast, went from 856 serviceable Bf 109s at the end of June to 712 at the end of September. In terms of pilots, they suffered even more, with only 686 operational 109 pilots at the end of September (compared to more than 900 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots)

My second point is that Goering himself was responsible for Luftwaffe strategy during this period. Of course he is then to blame for the massive German aircraft losses which are double that of the British

Goering is to blame for not realising the task he set the Luftwaffe was beyond it's capabilities. He isn't to blame for the losses.

Indeed, if the German claim figures had not been so inflated, or the intelligence assesments better, he might have realised how badly the battle was going somewhat earlier, leading to a reduction in operations, and less losses.

His failure to takes a hands-on approach and his disastrous tactics during the Battle of Britain means that he has to take the blame for the Luftwaffe's failings.

What disaterous tactics?

With hindsight, certain targetting choices could have been better. But Goering could only operate on the intelligence he was getting, and that was poor.

Of course, you could argue he might have organised the intelligence branch better, and inculcated a different ethos in his fighter units (more team and less individual), but those are mistakes made pre-war, not operational failures during the battle.

[tonyh]

Well Brustcan and Potsdammer, I was going to address your points and myths about the battle, but Hop has done it nicely.

Tony

[brustcan]

Goering is to blame for not realising the task he set the Luftwaffe was beyond it's capabilities.

Hello! Totally agree with what you stated HOP. I do believe the original task assigned to the Luftwaffe in July 1940: "to establish air superiority over southern England" was possible. The Luftwaffe did not have to be a "strategic force." Kesselring started the original operations of what targets to bomb,(Goering taking little interest, too busy celebrating the defeat of France), the bombing of the radar stations, and fighter command airfields. IF...fighter commands air fields were bombed daily, and some of the radar stations put out of order, Dowding MIGHT have been forced to pull fighter command back to fields outside the range of Bf 109's. OR Dowding could be faced with having his fighters caught on the ground. You will note that during the Battle of Britain, because of radar, fighter command was hardly ever caught on the ground. When the Luftwaffe used the tactics of escorting 100 bombers, with 200 fighters, bomber losses were very low. The Luftwaffe could have established air superiority over southern England-KENT/the coast, but to defeat Fighter Command was impossible for lack of fighter escort that could fly deeper into England. Cheers brustcan

[Hop]

IF...fighter commands air fields were bombed daily, and some of the radar stations put out of order, Dowding MIGHT have been forced to pull fighter command back to fields outside the range of Bf 109's.

In the last week of August and the first week of September, that's pretty much all the Luftwaffe did, and the RAF never seriously considered pulling out of the SE.

Much is made of the Luftwaffe giving up attacks on the radar stations. The truth is, their attacks were not very successful, and came at high cost. The stations overlapped, and the British used mobile radar stations to help provide coverage.

The problem for the Luftwaffe is they had to provide very heavy escort for their bombers (3 fighters per bomber) otherwise the bomber losses were too high (and they were very high even with ample escort).

That limited the number of bomber sorties the Luftwaffe could fly, which limited the amount of damage they could do.

They could probably have done a lot of damage to the radar network, but only by concentrating on it, and neglefting other targets, like airfields.

When they did target airfields, they did some damage, but only 2 airfields were out of action for more than a few hours, and the repair orginisations, which were initially weak, were soon able to repair an airfield very quickly.

When the Luftwaffe used the tactics of escorting 100 bombers, with 200 fighters, bomber losses were very low.

No, their losses remained pretty high throughout the battle. Over 7% of sorites in August, nearly 5% in September, only with the sporadic raids in October did the losses drop to 2% of sorties.

The Luftwaffe could have established air superiority over southern England-KENT/the coast,

The only way for the Luftwaffe to establish air superiority (other than for very short periods) over any part of Britain was for them to shoot down more RAF fighters whilst losing less themselves.

That's nothing to do with tactics or strategy, the simple fact is when the Luftwaffe fighters fought RAF fighters during the BoB, the score was about even, and the RAF also shot down fairly large numbers of bombers during the engagements. The Luftwaffe had to do better than that, they needed to shoot down RAF fighters at a rate of 3 to 1 or better. No change in tactics or strategy would accomplish that, they needed either far more aircraft, or much better performing aircraft.

but to defeat Fighter Command was impossible for lack of fighter escort that could fly deeper into England.

To defeat Fighter Command was impossible because the Luftwaffe didn't have superior performance and had less replacements as the battle went on.

The problem for the Luftwaffe was not range, range would only have been an issue if the RAF had refused to defend the SE. The losses both sides suffered show that there was no failure to reach the enemy on the Luftwaffe's part, there was a failure to defeat the enemy when they did meet.

[Smileshire]

simple fact is when the Luftwaffe fighters fought RAF fighters during the BoB, the score was about even

After looking at 'day to day' combat figures i find the ratio generally for RAF victories is considerably more.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html

Apart from the fighters don't forget the German bombers defensive machine guns with a slightly higher caliber than the RAF's

The Battle of Britain, however, saw the vast majority of the planes involved, German and British alike, armed with very light caliber armament: RAF´s fighters had .303 Browning caliber machine guns while the Germa bombers mainly carried 7.92 mm machine guns (either MG15 or MG81) for self defense. The exception to this rule was made by the cannon armed Bf109E-3 and Bf110C.

So as you can see, German bombers defensive MG´s were of a caliber slightly higher than the guns of RAF interceptors.

[tonyh]

>>After looking at 'day to day' combat figures i find the ratio generally for RAF victories is considerably more.<<

That depends on what these 'day to day' figures are based on. If they're based on official RAF figures of the period, then they're bunkum. Overclaiming was rife, until it was pointed out to the fighter pilots that they were "missing more than they were getting".

These overclaims were let slide however, for the sake of "morale".

Tony

[Smileshire]

Well put it this way the RAF losses were always low if you get my meaning

Don't forget even the 'probable' box is quite significant.

I dare you to look at 13th August 1940. 13 RAF losses compared to... 8)

[Hop]

RAF claims were certainly higher than Luftwaffe losses, but actually not by that much. The RAF ended up awarding aout 1.5 times as many kills as the Luftwaffe lost, which isn't high by historical standards. The Luftwaffe awarded about 3 kills for every aircraft the RAF lost.

After looking at 'day to day' combat figures i find the ratio generally for RAF victories is considerably more.

Actuall losses for fighters on both sides were similar, with the Germans losing slightly less. But the RAF, of course, was focusing mainly on the bombers, and shot down very large numbers of them. In overall score in the daylight battle, the RAF shot the Luftwaffe down at a rate of about 1.8 to 1.

These overclaims were let slide however, for the sake of "morale".

I'd like to see some evidence for that. The press were of course told the initial claims, which led to very good headlines in the next day's newspapers, but the RAF certainly tried to award claims based on evidence, hence the fairly accurate (for the day) claims.

What people forget is that whilst the largest battles brought heavy overclaiming from the RAF, they brought heavy overclaiming from the Luftwaffe too.

For example, on the 18th August, the Jagdwaffe claimed 86 RAF fighters. The bomber crews also made large claims (and shot down quite a few). The RAF actually lost 31 fighters to all causes.

On the 15th, the Jagdwaffe claimed 88 RAF fighters, again with an unknown number of claims (and actual kills) by the bombers. The RAF actually lost 30 to all causes.

Not only did the Germans allow these claims to stand, and hand out medals based on them, but they still get credited with them. Galland, for example, scored a large proportion of his kills during this period, when the Luftwaffe was handing out at least 3 victory awards for every aircraft the Jagdwaffe was actually shooting down.

[brustcan]

>>After looking at 'day to day' combat figures i find the ratio generally for RAF victories is considerably more.<<

That depends on what these 'day to day' figures are based on. If they're based on official RAF figures of the period, then they're bunkum. Overclaiming was rife, until it was pointed out to the fighter pilots that they were "missing more than they were getting".

These overclaims were let slide however, for the sake of "morale".

Tony

Hello! Very much agree with you Tony. After reading and examining the day to day combat figures in over a dozen Battle of Britain books, plus information available on the internet, there are many variations of the losses to both sides during the Battle of Britain. A common figure is 915 British fighters, and 1,733 German aircraft. A lot of times only Spitfire and Hurricane losses are compared to ALL the Luftwaffe losses reported by the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General. After doing a lot of research I have found the following: From July 1st. to October 31st, 1940 Fighter command lost(were destroyed due to enemy action) 1,149 aircraft(Hurricanes, Spitfires, Blenhem, Defiant). From the same period of time the Luftwaffe lost(were destroyed due to enemy action) 1,273 aircraft( BF 109, Bf 110, Dornier, Heinkel, Ju 87 and 88). Where the Luftwaffe numbers go up to the 1,733 aircraft lost, is when you add in aircraft lost on operations but not due to enemy action, and aircraft lost that were not on operations. During July 1st. to October 31st., 610 Bf 109's were lost.
Of that number 502 were destroyed due to enemy action. 98 were destroyed on operations, but not to enemy action. 63 were destroyed that were not on operations. If you look at the bombers, 488 were destroyed due to enemy action. 205 were destroyed on operations, but not due to enemy action. 99 were destroyed that were not on operations. The above figures come from the book "The Narrow Margin" by Derek Wood. To give you an idea how true as possible these figures are, John Alcorn wrote an article for "Aeroplane" magazine called the Top Guns (Fighter command) of the Battle of Britain. He states that 1,218 German aircraft were lost to fighter attack. There were 2,475 claims put in by RAF fighters. The number of credited victories were 1,188. This shows how well documented and accuracy was used by the RAF to award victories vs claims. The number is very close to the number given lost by the Luftwaffe in "Narrow Margin." Dr. Alfred Price a well known historian on this subject has stated:John Alcorn has produced the clearest picture I have yet seen of the accuracy of the units(fighter command) victory scores. My question now is, has anyone taken the Luftwaffe claims, and shown the amount that was awarded as a victory. And then comparing these victory claims to the actual Fighter command losses? Cheers brustcan

[Musashi]

The RAF serviceable aircraft states, as of the morning of 15th September:

* Blenheim - 47
* Spitfire - 192
* Hurricane - 389
* Defiant - 24
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 660

Are Polish Hurricanes included or not? The Polish Air Forces were not a part of RAF and I am minding you Polish pilots shot down 13.5% of the total number of German planes shot down during the battle of Britain.

[tonyh]

Polish pilots were actually part of the RAF and flew RAF equipment and were commanded by British officers, along with the Czechs, they did not operate as a seperate entity.

Tony

[Musashi]

Polish pilots were actually part of the RAF and flew RAF equipment and were commanded by British officers, along with the Czechs, they did not operate as a seperate entity.

Tony

If you relate it to the battle of Britain you are right. I must have been very tired in the morning to forget about it. However the Polish squadrons were commaded by Polish officers some time after that battle.

Krzysiek

[tonyh]

Yes, as related to the Battle of Britain. Later in the war, of course, polish squadrons were commanded by Polish Officers who were already proven in the squadron.

But, frankly, the British were very reluctant to allow the foreign squadrons to even exist. until they needed more aircraft in 11 Group, let alone be commanded by foreigners.

After the sterling work done by both the Czechs and the Poles during 1940, objections to "foreign squadrons in the RAF" would have been detrimental.

Tony