Impressive defense by the Dutch in 1940?

[flying dutchman]

I believe that the pride of our dutch armoured service, the lone tank I mean with that, was broken down in may 1940.
It had been sent for repairs.... to England LOL.
At first I was suprised when I learnt how much losses the germans had (especially in the air), the dutch airforce mostly shared the same faith the russian airforce would a year later; destroyed on the ground. Almost all new airplanes of the Dutch airforce (the G-1's) were either unarmed or bombed to shreds while parked.

However, there are a few reasons for the relatively high casualties of the germans in the Netherlands;
-the dutch had relatively much AA, this was quite modern at the time (Bofors)
-the germans made a number of unconventional attacks (paratroops), when these failed (mostly) because the airfields were almost all retaken by the dutch (and amongst others their mission to capture the dutch queen and cabinet failed) and many germans transports had to land on the beach (for example near Scheveningen); making those transports a write-off. In addition to that Ju-52's can easily be shot down by even the most obsolete airplane; and the Dutch had quite a few of those around. Also paratroops almost always have a high casualty-rate.
-the dutch terrain (little or no cover) in combination with a number of bridges that had to be taken by the germans.

And ofcourse the valiant defense of the proud Dutch! (little bit of irony here!)

[Bronsky]

Most of the transport losses sustained by the Germans were not from air action. Registered artillery & mortar fire on the runways that the Germans were using was just as deadly to planes taking off and landing as effective fighters. Between that, and the normal high accident rate from airborne operations, you get to the relatively high total of 170-180 transport planes usually ascribed to the Dutch.

To add to David's account, fire support to the Walcheren defenders was also provided by "Chasseurs" i.e. small boats theoretically designed as subchasers but which would have been as ineffective as Roosevelt's PCs in that role. On the other hand, they proved fairly useful for escort, liaison, reconnaissance and other miscellaneous work.

I recently read an account of these boats' doings, and am now following it up with re-reading the second volume of "The Guns of War" which starts in the same area, though in 1944. At least, I'm now familiar with the geography and don't need to continually refer to a map

[Andreas]

The article below gives some more information on the battles between the Dutch and the German paras:

http://www.generalissue.com/history/ypenberg.html

In historical perspective, the Dutch were doomed to defeat no matter how well they fought. The collapse of the French army at Sedan made the Dutch collapse inevitable. Nevertheless, the German forces in the Netherlands suffered a heavy check, the only rea1 defeat yet suffered by Hitler’s armies. Between May 10 and June 21, for the whole campaign in the West, the Germans lost 27,074 men killed. Between 12 and 15 percent of this loss was incurred during the five days of fighting in the Netherlands. (Dutch military forces comprised just seven percent of the Allied total.)

The airborne corps suffered the worst losses. Of the 4000 paratroops and 14,500-airlanding infantry, between 10,000 and 11,000 were eventually sent into the Netherlands. Of these 2400 were killed or wounded and 1600 captured – a total loss of 38 percent, exceeding the level of losses for the air assault on Crete (5700 out of 17,500 engaged).

The most critical loss was undoubtedly that suffered by the Luftwaffe. About 450 aircraft were lost in the Netherlands (including 280 Ju-52s) or one out of six aircraft lost by the Luftwaffe during the combined Scandinavian and French campaigns. The aircraft could be replaced but the loss in veteran crews was never made good. Many of the pilots killed in the Ju-52s were drawn from the flight schools – the Ju-52 served as both transport and trainer for bomber pilots.

All the best

Andreas

[Gen_Del_Pilar]

Thanks Andreas - a very interesting article!

[pitman]

With all due respect, the Dutch surrendered after only a few days of fighting--one of the fastest surrenders in World War II, despite having a much larger army than, say, Denmark. The Dutch surrendered long before their military capacity was exhausted.

[Andreas]

Well, considering that the Danish did not really fight at all, I am not sure why you bring them up at all. The Dutch army surrendered, BTW, while the government as a whole did not, continuing the fight from the UK.

That they surrendered is no surprise, given that their situation was becoming untenable, and that any continued fighting in a densely populated country such as the Netherlands would have caused massive civilian casualties, something which was probably driven home by the attack on Rotterdam. After this it was clear that the Germans meant business, and that no help was forthcoming. What was the point of continuing the fight?

All the best

Andreas

[Bronsky]

A few things:

1. A figure of 450 aircraft losses in Holland is a vast exaggeration, this must count damaged planes, not just planes destroyed and written off (i.e. damaged at over 60%). Really "lost" planes are usually given at 300, and more probably around 220. Again, I wouldn't object if the figure had been "450 aircraft were lost, half of those permanently".

2.

The Dutch in effect formed a box around the main population centers, the so-called Fortress Holland. It was hoped to hold this box until British or French help arrived.

Note that this meant pulling back away from Allied help. Withdrawing into Fortress Holland only made sense either if the Dutch expected to fight alone or if they hoped to delay a German assault long enough to turn Fortress Holland into an enclave resupplied by sea. If the idea was to fight as part of the Allied line, then this was exactly the wrong move to make.

None of this is to disparage the fact that the Dutch fought well, on the other hand it is a fact that while the airborne losses came as a nasty surprise Dutch resistance as a whole was very short and didn't really slow the Germans down. Even if the Germans hadn't broken through in the Ardennes, Holland would have fallen quickly. This makes Belgian strategic planning a model of inter-Allied cooperation compared to the Dutch one.

[pitman]

That they surrendered is no surprise, given that their situation was becoming untenable, and that any continued fighting in a densely populated country such as the Netherlands would have caused massive civilian casualties, something which was probably driven home by the attack on Rotterdam. After this it was clear that the Germans meant business, and that no help was forthcoming. What was the point of continuing the fight?

You've got to be kidding, right? The point of continuing the fight is that your country was invaded and it is your duty to inflict as severe a loss on the invaders as you possibly can. There is also the "point" that continued Dutch resistance might have helped the Belgians, British, and French.

The Dutch Army was capable of more than 4 days of resistance. Too bad it did not give it. But, then, I guess the Germans "meant business" and the Dutch did not.

[Andreas]

That is the point as you see it, but I do not agree. It is not necessarily as easy a decision to make when continued fighting would cause very large civilian casualties amongst your own population. Military leaders in democratic countries have to take these things into account. So maybe, taking this into account, the Dutch military leaders decided that they had indeed inflicted as severe a loss on the invaders as they possibly could without causing unacceptable civilian casualties amongst their own citizens. The Dutch were hardly alone in this - prior to them the Danes had quickly capitulated, and the Norwegians also did not try very hard to defend Oslo, for similar reasons.

I think it is not generally considered dishonourable to stop fighting when there is no longer a possibility to win, but I guess that attitude went out of fashion a long time ago.

So no, I am not kidding, I am just trying to understand a bit better the dilemma the Dutch army commanders found themselves in, instead of pontificating from an armchair with the safe distance of 66 years and no moral obligation to anyone involved.

All the best

Andreas

[Gen_Del_Pilar]

Andreas has it exactly right. Defending a deserted, hilly volcanic island is one thing, but we are talking about what is easily one of the most densely populated and flattest countries in the world here. Factor in the Nazis’ proven willingness to use terrorism on a mass scale as a means to facilitate their campaign, and you have the potential for horrific civilian losses.

The point of continuing the fight is that your country was invaded and it is your duty to inflict as severe a loss on the invaders as you possibly can.

Yes, but this is incomplete. Not only should it be an aim to maximize enemy losses, but also to minimize one’s own losses at the same time. After all, which is more desirable: to lose 50 men inflicting 150 enemy losses, or to lose 100 men and inflict 160 casualties?

By the fifth day, the Dutch had absolutely no prospect of inflicting nearly as many losses on the Germans as the Germans could (and were willing to) inflict on the civilian populace. I do of course take it as a given that the death of one civilian is regarded (at the very least) as equivalent to the death of one soldier. After all, it’s the very duty of the latter to protect the former, isn’t it?

Overall, the Dutch armed forces appear to have done a very creditable job in their defence of the Netherlands, and it’s a pity that more people don’t see this. The very fact that the Germans had to resort to the bombing of Rotterdam to hurry along what should have been a mere formality is ample evidence that the Dutch army had severely inconvenienced Hitler’s legions. I’m not aware of any attempts by the Germans to deliver comparable ultimatums to for instance Paris (let alone Copenhagen!) in their victorious campaigns of 1940.

[Carl Schwamberger]

A couple of points on the Dutch situation.

The German 9th Pz & supporting motorized inf div had cut entirely across southern Holland. Lehmamn mentions the French DLM & reconissance group engagements. That is who they werre largely fighting, the German armored div, which arrived at their objectives before they did. Once the French were stalled these formations were available to continue attacking the Dutch army.

A large portion of the airbourne enclaves were in & on the edge of 'Fortress Holland'. In retrospect it seems clear that the airbourne enclaves were nuetralized, but at the moment the Dutch had little evidence this was the case. They had no way of knowing what reinforcements might arrive at the airheads, and if new air landings might occur. Neither did they know what attacks the armored forces & infantry arriving might make.

Rotterdam is a clear post ceasefire example of what would have happened had Dutch resistance continued. Note that the destruction that did occur at Rotterdam was inflicted by only part of the attacking air group. At least half the attacking planes recived the cancellation signal before dropping their bombs.

[Gertjan]

Rotterdam is a clear post ceasefire example of what would have happened had Dutch resistance continued. Note that the destruction that did occur at Rotterdam was inflicted by only part of the attacking air group. At least half the attacking planes recived the cancellation signal before dropping their bombs.

This is definetely not true! Rotterdam was bombed BEFORE the capitulation of the Netherlands.

The commander of the Rotterdam Garrison, Col. Scharroo, was asked to surrender under the threat of an full-scale assault, including a bombardment of Rotterdam.

This ultimatum was just 2 hours before the preliminary artillery barrages would start and 2h 50 minutes before the bombing. Due to bad communications from German side, the bombers never received the message to stop the bombing mission of Rotterdam.

Althought Generalleutnant Schmidt, Kommandeur of the XXXIX Armeekorps tried to ward off the bombing by sending red flares into the sky and spreading rolls of white cotton on the streets, he couldn't prevent the bombing of Rotterdam by a substantial part of the bombing party. One party saw the flares just after the first planes dropped their bombs, the second party has never seen the flares. This all happened at 1330 Dutch time.

The commander of the Dutch armed forces, General Winkelman ordered capitulation to German forces at 1650 to the field units. The formal capitulation took place in Hotel des Indes at 1720 to the (interned) German ambassador. The province of Zeeland and naval forces were excludes from the capitulation.

Source: Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede wereldoorlog, vol. 3 by Dr. Lou de Jong

@Pitman,

Keep in mind that the Netherlands is a small (about 1/11th the size of Texas) and (even in those days) densly populated country with hardly any terrain to put up a stiff resistance, unsuitable for any kind of warfare.

Underequipped and under (generally) weak leadership as a result of defence cutbacks, the Dutch forces fought as well as they could, and the capitulation te Gemany after four days was fully under the mandate the gouvernment gave the commander of the armed forces just before they went into exile with the queen to the United Kingdom.

As a result the country didn't surrender and continued the battle on the Allied site, instead of Belgium and Denmark whose kings and gouvernments stayed in their respective countries and in doing so surrendered as countries to the Germans.

@bronsky,

The Dutch government (officially) posed a policy of strict neutrality. In this light you must consider the plans to make the final stand in the "Vesting Holland". Any other way of planning would have been an argument for a party to draw the Dutch government into a position it didn't want to be. Furthermore it is quite doubtful if the war in France would have gone any different if the Netherlands put up a longer resistance.

With regards,

Gertjan

[PropCollector]

The commander of the Dutch armed forces, General Winkelman ordered capitulation to German forces at 1650 to the field units.

And do not forget, that AFTER/during the bombardment on Rotterdam and BEFORE Dutch capitulation, the Germans had to threath the Dutch with more bombardments on Dutch cities. The Germans even made a comparison with "the fate of Warsaw"!
This is something that many people do not know. In my own collection is an original leaflet dropped by the Germans over the city of Utrecht. See my pages at:

http://members.home.nl/ww2propaganda/dutch40.htm

and scroll down to the leaflet "Aan de commandant te Utrecht".

The leaflet contains a clear threath to bombard Utrecht with "bombers and stukas" (stated like that!).
In extract it reads:

"To the commander in Utrecht.
The Dutch lines at the GREBBE have surrendered! The outnumbering German troops are ready in the east, southwest and south, to, under simultaneously use of strong Tank and Air forces (bombers and Stuka's), attack the city of Utrecht.
Therefore I order the commander of Utrecht to stop the useless fight and surrender the city in order to spare the city and its inhabitants the fate of Warsaw.
I order you to signal your unconditional surrender (frequency 1102 kHz, call sign: hol).
If not, I regret to say, I will be forced to view the city of Utrecht as a fortress and attack with all military means.
The consequences will be yours only.
The German Supreme Commander.
14th of May 1940"

It is not a normal size leaflet, but a large poster size sheet.
It was dropped in several thousand copies over the city on May 14th, around the same time as the bombardment of the city of Rotterdam took place! The text of the leaflet was presented earlier that same day to a Dutch fortress in Utrecht by a German negotiator. At that time the Dutch commander did not want to speak with the negotiator. He also refused to accept the document he brought.
But after the airdrop of this leaflet (with the same text as offered to the Dutch commander) and the horror messages that meanwhile came from the city of Rotterdam, the Dutch supreme commander General Winkelman decided to capitulate! Winkelman did send a telex message to all of his commanders in the field. Text started as follows:

"This afternoon Germany bombarded Rotterdam and did also threaten to do the same to Utrecht. I think it justified, in order to stop bloodshed and spare civilians, to ask you to order the troops to stop resistance."

A day later the capitulation was signed!

Hans

[pitman]

But the Danish collapse without offering a fight was hardly admirable, and Norway fought longer than the Netherlands. Moreover, you say that it is not considered dishonorable to stop fighting "when there is no longer a possibility to win," but that was not the case when the Dutch stopped fighting. The Allies had not yet been defeated in France and the Low Countries, and any continued Dutch resistance could only have helped the Allied cause. (not to mention the fact that, of course, Britain fought on and the Allies ultimately won).

It is ironic that the Dutch Army fought twice as long for Java as it did for its own home country, even though the fall of Java truly was inevitable from the beginning.

That is the point as you see it, but I do not agree. It is not necessarily as easy a decision to make when continued fighting would cause very large civilian casualties amongst your own population. Military leaders in democratic countries have to take these things into account. So maybe, taking this into account, the Dutch military leaders decided that they had indeed inflicted as severe a loss on the invaders as they possibly could without causing unacceptable civilian casualties amongst their own citizens. The Dutch were hardly alone in this - prior to them the Danes had quickly capitulated, and the Norwegians also did not try very hard to defend Oslo, for similar reasons.

I think it is not generally considered dishonourable to stop fighting when there is no longer a possibility to win, but I guess that attitude went out of fashion a long time ago.

So no, I am not kidding, I am just trying to understand a bit better the dilemma the Dutch army commanders found themselves in, instead of pontificating from an armchair with the safe distance of 66 years and no moral obligation to anyone involved.

All the best

Andreas

[pitman]

Andreas has it exactly right. Defending a deserted, hilly volcanic island is one thing, but we are talking about what is easily one of the most densely populated and flattest countries in the world here. Factor in the Nazis’ proven willingness to use terrorism on a mass scale as a means to facilitate their campaign, and you have the potential for horrific civilian losses.

Well, the Germans managed to defend the Netherlands much more effectively than the Dutch themselves did, so I don't see your point.

Not only should it be an aim to maximize enemy losses, but also to minimize one’s own losses at the same time. After all, which is more desirable: to lose 50 men inflicting 150 enemy losses, or to lose 100 men and inflict 160 casualties?

It depends on the context. Which is more likely to hurt the enemy and help you? Capture of a strategic objective might be very costly by itself, but may help the general cause immensely.

By the fifth day, the Dutch had absolutely no prospect of inflicting nearly as many losses on the Germans as the Germans could (and were willing to) inflict on the civilian populace. I do of course take it as a given that the death of one civilian is regarded (at the very least) as equivalent to the death of one soldier. After all, it’s the very duty of the latter to protect the former, isn’t it?

So they protected the civilians by surrendering? Perhaps they should not have fought at all, and thus "protected" them completely. By the fifth day, the Dutch Army was still intact and still could have inflicted losses on the German Army and contributed to holding up its still-ongoing offensive. The Dutch were not fighting in a vacuum, as you seem to think they were. They were fighting alongside the Belgians, British, and French.

Overall, the Dutch armed forces appear to have done a very creditable job in their defence of the Netherlands, and it’s a pity that more people don’t see this.

They don't see it because it is not true. Four days of resistance? I mean, come on.

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