Impressive defense by the Dutch in 1940?

[Ste]

Always according to Wikipedia, Netherland was invaded by the 18.Armee, which had at the time had 6 Infanterie Division (207ID - 208ID - 225ID - 227ID - 254ID - 256ID), 9.Panzer-Division, 1.Kavallerie-Division, three SS regiment (Leibstandarte - Der Führer - Verfüngstruppe), plus other small units.
Is known which was the manpower strength of the 18.Armee?

Thank in advance.

[Gooner1]

Nine divisions to conquer a country of 9 million people?

I guess that makes the answer to the thread a resounding - No.

[jwsleser]

Let's get the balance sheet correct. To the nine German divisions listed above (6-ID, 1-Pz, 1-Cav, and 1-SS mot Div ) one must add the 22nd Air Landing Div and most of the 7th FJ Div. More importantly, let's not forget the considerable air assets, the 2nd Air Fleet, that the Dutch were powerless to counter. The latter were a game changer, their generally free use of the sky making any comparison of ground forces nearly moot.

We also need to define impressive. A neutral country with a conscript army that lacked a lot of modern military material stood up to a very impressive force for 5 days. The Dutch basically defeated the airborne operations, kept their air force flying, and still had a credible defense in a country one could motor across in less than a day (the amount of time the Germans had planned was needed to to defeat the Dutch). The surrender was based on the threat of civilian causalities which the Dutch were powerless to prevent.

The Dutch recognized in their prewar planning that without Allied military assistance, the Netherlands would fall to any determined attack. The country was too small and lacked significant defensive terrain given the rage of modern weapons. Every single Dutch airfield was within range of German fighter aircraft before the Germans even crossed the border. The southern flank was wide open (the Belgians had pulled back on day 1). Three of the major cities were within artillery range once the Dutch retreated into Fortress Holland. Turning Rotterdam into a Stalingrad doesn't make any sense because the needed 2,000 kms behind the city were missing.

Pista!

[Ironmachine]

Nine divisions to conquer a country of 9 million people?

A country whose army consisted of one light division, nine infantry divisions and 3 infantry brigades, all of them greatly inferior to their German counterparts, and with the air completely controlled by the Germans. Just to give a new perspective to the numbers involved.

[steverodgers801]

The invasion force had to be strong enough to help give the impression that it was the main German attack. Plus it would also be tasked with crossing the Meuse and crossing into Belgium.

[Gooner1]

We also need to define impressive. A neutral country with a conscript army that lacked a lot of modern military material stood up to a very impressive force for 5 days. The Dutch basically defeated the airborne operations, kept their air force flying, and still had a credible defense in a country one could motor across in less than a day (the amount of time the Germans had planned was needed to to defeat the Dutch).

Well the Netherlands had a population of nearly 9 millions and had a higher GDP per capita than Germany. That their armed forces were so weak - the army half the size of Belgiums army - is already unimpressive.

With its rivers, watercourses and dikes the country appears eminently defensible, as the Germans did a pretty good job demonstrating in 1944.

[phylo_roadking]

Well the Netherlands had a population of nearly 9 millions and had a higher GDP per capita than Germany. That their armed forces were so weak - the army half the size of Belgiums army - is already unimpressive

A comparison with Belgium's reservist-based army isn't the best of comparisons - as on a per-capita basis Belgium had the largest army in Europe on the outbreak of hostilities! (from "Belgium-The Official Account Of What happened 1939-40" London, 1941)

[Gooner1]

A comparison with Belgium's reservist-based army isn't the best of comparisons - as on a per-capita basis Belgium had the largest army in Europe on the outbreak of hostilities! (from "Belgium-The Official Account Of What happened 1939-40" London, 1941)

It is a good comparison. The major difference between them is that the Netherlands had avoided being invaded by the Germans a generation earlier.

Army size Belgian 630,000 men or about 16% of the male pop.
Dutch 280,000 men or about 6% of the male pop.

[jwsleser]

The GDP data doesn't support your argument.

GDP and per capita. From Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/content.shtml

1938 (other years will tell the same story)
Germany GDP: 342,351M; Per capita GDP: 4,994; Population 68,558K
Netherlands GDP: 45,593M; Per capita GDP: 5,250; Population 8,374K
Belgium GDP: 40,466M; Per capita GDP 4,832; Population 8,685K

It is easier for an individual Dutchman to help pay for part of a tank, but Germany can buy far more tanks than the Netherlands. One Dutchman taken away from the workforce as a soldier costs the Dutch economy more than the impact of taking away one German from the German economy. Your entire cost based argument is incorrect when discussing rearmament on a national level when the population numbers vary so much.

It is a good comparison.

No it is not. Netherlands verses Belgium (when looking at the numbers):
Dutch vice Belgian Navy (that's right, Belgium doesn't have a Navy – it was only reestablished in 1939. Dutch have a surface fleet, a submarine fleet, a naval air arm, extensive naval bases, etc)
Dutch colonial forces vice Belgium colonial forces (which includes considerable Dutch air forces)
Dutch vice Belgium merchant marine (over 1,000 Dutch ships vice 100 Belgium)

The Dutch had extensive colonies, all which required protection. Part of that GDP and military material was in the colonies. Part of the nation’s working manpower supported its shipping and overseas empire (which helps generates its GDP) and wasn't necessarily available for service in the army.

Last time I check, the Belgians also lost. They surrender once they were bottled in and no hope of allied support (just like the Dutch). They had far more ground to retreat over. They had French/Allied forces (ground and air) supporting them (French 7th Army and BEF). Their cities weren't threatened with terror bombing.

Yet they still lost. Not a good comparison at all if the point was that the Belgians did better. They did 'better' for many reasons that the Dutch couldn't 'fix'.

> With its rivers, watercourses and dikes the country appears eminently defensible, as the Germans did a pretty good job demonstrating in 1944.

The Germans didn't fight with an open flank. The Germans could trade space for time. The Germans in the Netherlands weren't the main objective in 1944.

The defensibility of the Netherlands. As I tried to point out, the country lacks any operational depth. The Netherlands extends 312 km (194 mi) N – S and 264 km (164 mi) E – W. Let us see, at 20 mph, that is 8 hours of motoring through flat, open countryside travelling east to west. Study the river systems for a moment. Remember the southern flank was wide open. Remember the German lead forces were motorized and the Dutch were not. Remember the Germans had total control of the sky and the aircraft available to use that open sky. Read what happened to the lead elements of the French units as they approached Breda.

At issue is not that the Netherlands could have done better using a different set of decisions over the previous 20 years, but that the Dutch did well given what they had to work with. Regardless, without allied support, the Netherlands were going to fall to an unrestrained Germany. Without Belgium holding the southern flank forward, the Dutch position would be rolled up regardless of changes in the military.

[Sheldrake]

From the German point of view the invasion of the Netherlands was a huge strategic success. The international focus on parachutists and fifth columnists attacking neutral Netherlands distracted the world in general and most importantly the British and French from the true schwejhrpunkt of the Germans attack - the Ardennnes.

Worse still the decision to send the 7th French army racing to Breda denuded France of the only strategic reserve which might have countered the sweep of the scythe which cutting across the rear of the allied armies implementing plan D.

[Gooner1]

The GDP data doesn't support your argument.

GDP and per capita. From Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/content.shtml

1938 (other years will tell the same story)
Germany GDP: 342,351M; Per capita GDP: 4,994; Population 68,558K
Netherlands GDP: 45,593M; Per capita GDP: 5,250; Population 8,374K
Belgium GDP: 40,466M; Per capita GDP 4,832; Population 8,685K

It is easier for an individual Dutchman to help pay for part of a tank, but Germany can buy far more tanks than the Netherlands. One Dutchman taken away from the workforce as a soldier costs the Dutch economy more than the impact of taking away one German from the German economy. Your entire cost based argument is incorrect when discussing rearmament on a national level when the population numbers vary so much.

You have the populations of Belgium and the Netherlands reversed.
They are a good comparison as they are similar sized countries in population and economic wealth.
From here http://ww2-weapons.com/History/Producti ... itures.htm
lists wartime expenditure (1939-40) of Belgium as $3.25 billion dollars, the Netherlands at $0.925 billion dollars. If accurate that shows Belgium spending four times as much on defence per capita as the Netherlands.

The defensibility of the Netherlands. As I tried to point out, the country lacks any operational depth. The Netherlands extends 312 km (194 mi) N – S and 264 km (164 mi) E – W. Let us see, at 20 mph, that is 8 hours of motoring through flat, open countryside travelling east to west. Study the river systems for a moment. Remember the southern flank was wide open.

Still plenty of rivers and floodable land to cross. The open flank pretty much condemns the Dutch without mobile forces to Vesting Holland.

Remember the Germans had total control of the sky and the aircraft available to use that open sky.

And who's fault is that? The Netherlands, unlike most of the lesser powers including Belgium, actually had an aviation industry. Fokker was said the be the biggest aircraft manufacturer in the world in the late 20s. Fokker actually had a few good designs but the Dutch Air Force pitifully few numbers.

At issue is not that the Netherlands could have done better using a different set of decisions over the previous 20 years, but that the Dutch did well given what they had to work with.

The question on this thread is 'Impressive defense by the Dutch in 1940?' which to me includes pre-war government decisions on armaments spending, defence strategy, military organisation and alliance building.

[jwsleser]

That you for the correction of the population data.

As for the rest, it is clear that we disagree in how to look at this question. If judging a country's actions in the years leading up in judgment of how the country performed, then the Netherlands did far better than Belgium. The Dutch realized they couldn't win against Germany by themselves, so why waste the money on a military? Instead they developed their shipping, overseas investments, etc. The Dutch merchant fleet (like the Norwegian) was critical in allowing the UK to survive. Belgium did just the opposite, trying to build an army that would be capable of defeating Germany and failing. Belgium’s contribution to Germany’s defeat after June 1940 was negligible when compare to what the Dutch provided (not slamming the Belgians here, just making a point). As you stated, same size countries, same size population. The Netherlands had a smaller army (but had a decent navy) and a higher GDP. Belgium had a larger army, lower GDP and yet still lost.

So which country made the better decision?

Now I am not arguing this point, just demonstrating that by using your scope, I can easily make a case to disprove your position.

I can also argue that the least successfully army was Germany’s. After all, their prewar decisions insured that Germany would be defeated. Germany didn’t make the right prewar decisions to conqueror Europe and hold it. The Dutch at least allied with the right people The Dutch won.

The question on this thread is 'Impressive defense by the Dutch in 1940?' which to me includes pre-war government decisions on armaments spending, defence strategy, military organisation and alliance building.

Again I will point out the Dutch did make the right alliance choice.

What was clear to most of those involved in this discussion was that the question is ‘the performance of the Dutch military as it stood in 1940’. I reread the thread to make sure. The original post used the actual results of the campaign in making the comment, not what could have happen if the previous 20 years had been different.

If you wish to discuss what-ifs, okay, but that is a different thread.

[jwsleser]

I should offer my thoughts on this thread.

I wouldn't use the word ‘impressive’ to describe the Dutch defense. However I would use the word ‘competent’. I have studied the Dutch operations, both in 1940 and in the N.E.I. in 1942. What I discover in my research is that the Dutch weren't a pushover, but in some ways they were quite naïve in warfare. For a country whose last real war was in 1815 at Waterloo (the brief fighting of 1831 really doesn't count), this is not a surprise.

Their prewar plans were realistic and reflected the knowledge that the Netherlands must either maintained strict neutrality or allied itself with the UK/French. In hindsight one can say neutrality was a mistake, but the Dutch had a real fear that UK/FR unilateral actions would pull them into a war they might have been able to avoid. This is one fact many who believe neutrality was a mistake tend to overlook. Certainly the UK’s actions in 1939 and 1940 demonstrated the feelings of it allies weren’t always a consideration. As the Netherlands wasn't one of the German objectives in 1940 until the LW ‘needs’ were highlighted indicated that neutrality had a good possibility of success. The Dutch government didn’t understand that the changes in warfare doomed the nation to war.

When looking at the actual campaign, the Dutch did significantly better than most neutrals. They weren’t caught by surprise, taking the warnings seriously. They quickly adjusted to the reality of airborne operations after Norway, closing and making inoperative unneeded airfields, positioning additional troops at others, and providing clear orders for mandatory actions.

Three issues/decisions negatively impacted the Dutch defense.

-The disagreement between Reijnders and Voorst tot Voorst. This had the effect of creating two plans; a traditional defense that was based on Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie (Reijnders) with the Grebbelinie as a forward position; and a mobile defense with the Grebbelinie as the main defense with the IJssel-Maaslinie as the forward position. The end result was that effort was spent on two positions and the final campaign plan wasn't clear. When Reijnders was forced to resign in Feb 1940, his replacement Winkelman ended-up creating a compromise plan which basically gave up the south but held in the north.

-The government didn't allow the military full control of the defensive areas until 1 May 40. This was the issue that forced Reijnders to resign as he continued to insist on full authority to prepare the positions. The result of this delay was that the areas forward of the Grebbelinie hadn't been cleared and contributed to the loss of the security zone. The delay was understandable in a political sense, as clearing would destroy farms, groves, orchards, and other means of civilian livelihood.

-The 1st Corps in Fortress Holland wasn't alerted on the evening of 9 May. This oversight has never been explained and likely falls under the heading of ‘s**t happens’. This likely contributed to the loss of the Moerdijk and Dordrecht bridges.

My comment about naivety is the recognition that neutral armies always have issues. It is difficult to execute offensive operations. Green troops take time to ‘harden’ so they can advance while taking causalities. The same is true of officers who must learn that sending men to their deaths is something they need to do. Neutral armies tend to believe in rules and usually go through some trials before they understand that there are no rules. Many of the errors the Dutch committed during the campaign are part of the natural learning about war. Because the Netherlands lacked operational depth, these simple mistakes are costly and can be hard to recover from. The German plan was designed not to allow the Dutch and other neutrals such opportunities to recover.

Too often I find that that the German plan is rarely appreciated and the fault for defeat lies entirely on the shoulders of the neutral. The German campaign plans against Norway and the Netherlands was such that any mistake, regardless how small, would be ruthlessly exploited. As Germany had the freedom and resources to do that, any error was potentially significant. The German plans didn't depend on the use of ruses, but if any succeeded, they would have enormous impact. These situations are seen in all the German operations against neutrals, and the training to counter them is something that actual combat needs to instruct. Of course, the German plans were such as not to allow such plans.

So to restate my position, the Dutch did well given the realities of May 1940. Many of the mistakes made by the military leaders and soldiers can be seen in the initial US campaigns. I shouldn't need to discuss why the US survived and the Dutch surrendered.

I am more than happy to discuss any of these points in detail.

Pista! Jeff