Operation Round Up Cancelled, I'm mad about it.

[ChristopherPerrien]

After reading a few topics/books on the Invasion of Sicily and the Invasion of Italy, I am convinced that they were just waste of time,soldiers,and resources. And yet I have seen numerous mentions that more troops were landed on Sicily than were landed on D-day. And also I have seen numerous mentions in other books, that there were not enough landing craft until 1944 to carry out Overlord. To me something does not make sense , if they landed more on Sicily than Normandy and the large resources ate up uselessly in Italy could have been used to support a Round-Up landing, WHY IN THE HELL DIDN'T ROUND UP HAPPEN? landing craft? bull! Churchill's Mediterranean fixation/Influence on Roosevelt ?maybe? Let the Germans run amok in Europe another year ? Let Stalin Lose? Win? To me something stinks.

[Jon G.]

I haven't been able to find anything definite on how much shipping was used for Husky, but I doubt if it was of the same magnitude as the shipping which was eventually earmarked for Overlord.

The shipping needs of Husky were likely calculated on the basis that several good deep-water ports would soon be captured by the landing Allies, unlike in NW France the year after - and part of the rationale for invading Sicily was in fact that it would free a lot of Allied shipping by opening up the Mediterranean route to the Far East.

After the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, the Joint Planning Staff wrote a paper according to which

If we decide to exploit the position which we have gained, our first object should be to induce the Italians to lay down their arms everywhere; our next should be directed against the Balkans.
Unless Italy collapses far more quickly than we expect, this exploitation must, however, be at the expense of Round-Up in 1943.
We are therfore faced with the alternatives of:

(a) Concentrating resources in the United Kingdom for a Round-Up which may, in any event, be impracticable for 1943; and this at the cost of abandoning the great prizes open to us in the Mediterranean and of remaining inactive for many months during which Germany could recuperate,

or

(b) Pursuing the offensive in the Mediterranean with the knowledge that we shall only be able to assault Northern France the next year if there is a pronounced decline in German fighting power.

We cannot have it both ways. In our view (b) is the correct strategy and will give the Russians more certain, and possibly even greater relief.

(From John Strawson: The Italian Campaign p 80-81)

[ChristopherPerrien]

I haven't been able to find anything definite on how much shipping was used for Husky, but I doubt if it was of the same magnitude as the shipping which was eventually earmarked for Overlord.

The shipping needs of Husky were likely calculated on the basis that several good deep-water ports would soon be captured by the landing Allies, unlike in NW France the year after - and part of the rationale for invading Sicily was in fact that it would free a lot of Allied shipping by opening up the Mediterranean route to the Far East.

Hi Jon,

Thanks for the reply,
Your post however exposes exactly what I was talking about. More divisons were landed on Husky than Overlord. And as far as Deep-water ports , an invasion of France could have been done in a way/place to seize them.The rest all seems like a " British Mediterranean fixation", opening the Med. sea lanes only befitted British Interests. i.e England -Persian Gulf-India route.

As your quote continues, This joint planning staff seems totally "British", this might have been the ones where the US Group was totally unprepared to advance other ideas, it might have been the ones that occured right after Adm Leahy's(?) wife had died, so the leader of the US mission was not there.

After the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, the Joint Planning Staff wrote a paper according to which

If we decide to exploit the position which we have gained, our first object should be to induce the Italians to lay down their arms everywhere; our next should be directed against the Balkans.
Unless Italy collapses far more quickly than we expect, this exploitation must, however, be at the expense of Round-Up in 1943.

That's pure Churchill , WWII and I!

We are therfore faced with the alternatives of:

(a) Concentrating resources in the United Kingdom for a Round-Up which may, in any event, be impracticable for 1943;

Why????????? THis is my original Question and even here it is ignored

and this at the cost of abandoning the great prizes open to us in the Mediterranean and of remaining inactive for many months during which Germany could recuperate,

Great gains my butt , Italy and the Italian Army was more trouble to the Germans than to the "Allies", and any fool should have realized advancing up the Mountainous penisula which is lower Italy was going to be bad. Guess Churchill and everybody else on this joint planning staff, forgot about a similar fiasco , "Gallipoli"

or :roll:

(b) Pursuing the offensive in the Mediterranean with the knowledge that we shall only be able to assault Northern France the next year if there is a pronounced decline in German fighting power.

Since we don't have a cyrstal ball , I guess we have to keep on "plodding", Where's Monty? He should be in charge.

We cannot have it both ways.

Both ways? Looks like one way to me

In our view (b) is the correct strategy and will give the Russians more certain, and possibly even greater relief.

(From John Strawson: The Italian Campaign p 80-81)

Give the Russians relief? Funny, but this time I will side with Stalin , who also felt the whole Italian Campaign was just a wasteful stunt and contributed nothing to defeating Germany.

Sorry to butcher your excerpt, I hardly ever do that,too much work, but Remember I am mad about it, and I hope we catch a fish( an outside- the -box scholar fish) that may bring something other than canned English spam as to why Round-up did not occur.

Regards Chris

Please don't be offended if you happened to be a "British" vagrant

[RichTO90]

My short answer.

For NEPTUNE the assault forces assembled and assigned to the Western and Eastern Naval Task Forces (Assault Force U, O, G, J, S and Follow-on Force B and L) were:

2 HQ ships (Ancon and Bulolo)
10 APA/XAP
45 LSI
220 LST
195 LCI (L) (including those designated as LCH)
709 LCT (all types, but not including 36 LCT ®)
135 Support Craft (LCF, LCC, LCG, and LCT ®)

So actually it appears there were 1,259 "major" craft in the actual assault, not 2,092, although the difference could be in the follow-on forces.

That may be compared to HUSKY with:

5 HQ ships
57 APA and LSI
7 AKA
148 LST
235 LCI
238 LCT

The significant difference of course is the additional use of large ships in HUSKY, neccessary due to the long sea crossing, especially for 1 Canadian Division, and the much larger contingent of LCT for NEPTUNE, possible (barely) because of the much shorter distance. It is also interesting to note that only 268 US-built LST and 314 LCI (L) had been completed through June 1943 making HUSKY a substantial investment in those types and probably the upper limit of what could be done in mid-1943.

To illustrate, the HUSKY lift was sufficient to enable US Seventh Army to assault 16 beach sectors in strengths that were between company and battalion-size. Thereafter, ship-to-shore shuttle operations enabled the landing of the rest of the force, but in fact the lift available for the actual assault waves was less than that assigned to OMAHA alone.

By 17 July, all of Seventh Army ashore in Sicily totaled just 92,815 officers, NCO and enlisted. In comparison, at the end of the first week in Normandy First Army had 132,333 men in combat divisions alone ashore and 219,290 had entered France "across the beach" while another 17,282 had arrived by air.

In terms of armor moved the difference is staggering. For HUSKY the lift included 327 Commonwealth and 125 US tanks landed by 16 July while in Normandy about 1,164 Commonwealth and 680 US tanks had been landed.

HUSKY = 452 landed in one week 10-16 July 1943
NEPTUNE = 1,844 landed in one week 6-12 June 1944 (actually more were landed since the British also brought in and issued virtually all "First Reinforcements" while many of the few US reserves were also landed, an exact count appears impossible at this late date)

The HUSKY fleet had a minimum of about 300 kilometers to travel from Tunisia (and the distance for the Canadians from England was even a bit more than that). The NEPTUNE fleet traveled a maximum of about 300 kilometers from its furthest bases, and most were about 120 kilometers away.

This led to the HUSKY fleet being comprised of a large number of troopships in the initial force, most of which carrierd smaller landing craft (LCA, LCVP and LCM). In the NEPTUNE fleet there was less of a requirement for large ocean going troopships and most of the smaller craft were actually transported on the larger craft. Note that overall the NEPTUNE fleet of just landing ships and craft is larger than the total HUSKY fleet including troopships and ancilliary vessels.

Finally the NEPTUNE plan called for an allocation of US infantry and armored forces similar to that found in HUSKY. However, as can be seen, the allocation for the Commonwealth forces in NEPTUNE was much different from that in HUSKY. The numbers of infantry brigade-sise formations was less, but the number of armored brigade-sized formations, which required proportionately a much greater number of major craft such as LCT and LST, was double that of HUSKY. There were 402 Commonwealth Shermans loaded in the initial HUSKY force, plus 79 awaiting a second lift. For NEPTUNE there were approxiamately 1,090 Shermans and about 120 Churchill AVRE in the first lift. For HUSKY there was a single Commonwealth SP artillery regiment requiring lift, a total of 24 M-7. In NEPTUNE each Commonwealth division was provide with an SP artillery regiment for the assault, a total of 72, and the RM manned 85 Centaur close support tanks as additional direct fire support. In other words HUSKY required transport for just 426 heavy armored vehicles while over three times that many, 1,367 where required for NEPTUNE.

[Martin_Schenkel]

I'd suggest it was a simple matter of experienced and trained manpower. In June of 1943, there were only 10 US Divisions in the European theater. Of those, 5 had combat experience prior to Sicily. By June 1944, there were an additional 19 US Divisions available in Europe, and after June 1944 an additional 39 US Divisions arrived in Europe. Are you suggesting the British and Commonwealth armies in Europe were in a position to take on an invasion of France in 1943 by themselves? That would have been pure folly. The amphibious and airborne landings in Sicily and Italy provided invaluable experience for D-Day. The airborne landings in Sicily were near disaster. Without Sicily, this near disaster happens on D-Day. The landings at Salerno and later Anzio were also very near run things. They showed that a determined and resourceful enemy force can be in a position to destroy a bridgehead that isn't backed-up with sufficient follow-on forces.

Your claim that more troops were landed in Sicily than D-Day is somewhat selective. IIRC (I don't have the exact numbers in front of me), more troops were landed in Sicily on the first day, than D-Day. The difference was in the follow-on force, with hundreds of thousands more more sitting in England waiting to be shipped to France, whereas the force in Sicily was essentially on its own.

[Graeme Sydney]

And as far as Deep-water ports , an invasion of France could have been done in a way/place to seize them.

I think you trivialize the requirements of a seaborne assault on a major sea port. At every level and in every deal they are a major and daunting undertaking.

The Germans faced this in sept ’40. Establish a beachhead on opposed shore, doable. Hold and maintain by reinforcing with large numbers and heavy equipment over the beaches, impossible.

Land and maintain by reinforcing with large numbers and heavy equipment through a working port, doable.

To seize and hold a WORKING port within a manageable time frame, impossible.

Ports/port towns/cities are very defendable (Stalingrad mean anything?) by small numbers of resolute enemy. Port infrastructure is easily destroyed. Block ships are easily placed. Ports and approaches are easily mined. Target ports are easily predicted. Operational and tactical surprise almost impossible to achieve.

The equation was the same for the Allies be it for Roundup or Overload.

For these reasons the Mulberry portable harbours were a major reason for the achieving of operational and tactical surprise at D day.

Cheers, Graeme.

[Andy H]

Italy and the Italian Army was more trouble to the Germans than to the "Allies",

Could you please quantify this?

Kind Regards

Andy H

[Jon G.]

Hi CP, good to see you back on the forum.

Your post however exposes exactly what I was talking about. More divisons were landed on Husky than Overlord. And as far as Deep-water ports , an invasion of France could have been done in a way/place to seize them.The rest all seems like a " British Mediterranean fixation", opening the Med. sea lanes only befitted British Interests. i.e England -Persian Gulf-India route...

I think the question on which operation needed the most shipping has been answered thoroughly and convincingly by RichTO90 already With regards to capturing a deep water port, the lessons of Dieppe taught that seizing a port by amphibious assault was suicidal, at least that's the way Dieppe was interpreted at the time.

Freeing shipping by cutting the sea route short benefitted Allied interests, even those of Admiral King. Casablanca established preliminarily that more forces had to be sent to the Far East, and that the battle for the Atlantic sealanes had to be won - both very strictly Allied goals, not specific British objectives. It was perhaps fortunate for the fabled British Mediterranean strategy that invading Sicily served the common Allied goal of freeing up more shipping for both the Far East and the Atlantic.

...

...
We are therfore faced with the alternatives of:

(a) Concentrating resources in the United Kingdom for a Round-Up which may, in any event, be impracticable for 1943;

Why????????? THis is my original Question and even here it is ignored

I think the inference of Torch was that Round-Up was delayed; I think the British realized this before the Americans did. After all, Marshall had originally been pressing for an invasion in 1942. By agreeing to Gymnast/Torch, the Americans also agreed to postponement; I don't think it was specified exactly how long that postponement would be.

Great gains my butt , Italy and the Italian Army was more trouble to the Germans than to the "Allies", and any fool should have realized advancing up the Mountainous penisula which is lower Italy was going to be bad. Guess Churchill and everybody else on this joint planning staff, forgot about a similar fiasco , "Gallipoli"...

I think you should see Sicily and mainland Italy as two wholly seperate operations, with very different strategic goals. I don't think there was any great American resistance to Husky; it could be seen as a natural follow-up on the successful Tunisian campaign. Maybe the Germans could be persuaded to reinforce failure once more, as they had done in Stalingrad and in Tunisia, and the shipping route to the Far East would be partially opened already by taking just Sicily.

I think the real rift between American and British strategy only really became evident after Sicily - the Americans wanted (and got) an invasion of southern France to help the Normandy invasion; the Brits wanted (and got, and failed at) offensive action in the Aegean, with a view to invading Europe through the Balkans. Italy was the strategic and geographic middle ground, which no-one had originally intended would become the main theater of the war in the Mediterranean.

I guess we have to keep on "plodding", Where's Monty? He should be in charge...

Here's what Mongomery wrote right after he himself had landed in mainland Italy:

Before we embark on major operations on the mainland of Europe, we must have a master plan and how we propose to develop those operations. I have not been told of any master plan and I must therefore assume there was none.

[Michael Emrys]

Two points:

1. Freeing up the shipping lanes through the Mediterranean directly helped the Americans. Since they were were supplying the bulk of the Lend-Lease reaching the USSR via the Persian Corridor, a shorter route to the Gulf was beneficial to them.

2. Forcing Italy out of the war meant that the Germans had to supply forces to garrison the Balkans and other areas that had been held by Italian troops. IIRC, this was equivalent to about an army.

Also, you might consider that one reason that the Italian campaign went so badly was that it was mismanaged. And one of the reasons it was mismanaged was the lack of enthusiasm for it among the higher levels of US command. My own opinion is that they were entirely right in resisting carrying the active war into the Balkans, but that a clearer vision of the possibilities of the Italian theater could well have resulted in an earlier liberation of Rome, followed by a reduced commitment in the theater, i.e., then allowing the front to stagnate. As it was, the Allies ended up carrying on expensive offensive operations there for a year and a half.

Michael

[alf]

Some additonal points.

The U Boat menace was not countered until May/June 1943. It would have taken may more months to build up the troops necessary to sustain the D day landings. Troop convoys and supply convoys heading to Britian would have drawn wolfpacks.

The Luftwaffe was undefeated in 1943, the USAAAF ( i hope that is the right number of A's) with its 8th Airforce was decimated each time it tried to go into Germany proper in 1943. It wasn't until 1944 and the advent of the Mustang and "The Big Week" that success started to come for the Allies and inroads were finally made into German Fuel supplies.

Mulberry Harbours weren't built and they were crucial for D-Day as no working port was captured for some time after the landing. That was the primary lesson of Dieppe in August 1942. No "funnies" tanks would also be available, making every beach another "Omaha". Again a lesson the Britsh learnt from the slaughter at Dieppe but the US Army did not.

Indeed if an Allied landing was suspected by the Germans in 1943 it is quite possible that Kursk may have been delayed and those Panzer Units sent to crush the western Allies and knock them out of the war for some years.

So the U Boats and Luftwaffe still a real force, the ability to call back massive reserves from the USSR, lots of fuel too. The Germans would have welcomed an invasion attempt in 1943. It would have been Dieppe on a larger scale.

[RichTO90]

Two points:

1. Freeing up the shipping lanes through the Mediterranean directly helped the Americans. Since they were were supplying the bulk of the Lend-Lease reaching the USSR via the Persian Corridor, a shorter route to the Gulf was beneficial to them.

That was the specious argument used by Alan Brooke and Churchill to quash ROUNDUP at Casablanca. In fact, there is little evidence that anything approaching a "million tons of shipping" - to use the Churchillian phrase from Casablanca - was freed up by the capture of North Africa. In fact at least that much was probably required in the Med to sustain Allied operations in Italy, so that was a bit of a wash.

2. Forcing Italy out of the war meant that the Germans had to supply forces to garrison the Balkans and other areas that had been held by Italian troops. IIRC, this was equivalent to about an army.

True, but much of it was through surrogates such as the Croatian forces raised as "German" divisions. The largest net loss was the trasnfer of three of the 700-series of Bodenstandiges divisions from France to the Balkans and their conversion to Jager divisions.

Also, you might consider that one reason that the Italian campaign went so badly was that it was mismanaged. And one of the reasons it was mismanaged was the lack of enthusiasm for it among the higher levels of US command. My own opinion is that they were entirely right in resisting carrying the active war into the Balkans, but that a clearer vision of the possibilities of the Italian theater could well have resulted in an earlier liberation of Rome, followed by a reduced commitment in the theater, i.e., then allowing the front to stagnate. As it was, the Allies ended up carrying on expensive offensive operations there for a year and a half.

Michael

True, but it also allowed the Western Allies to begin the process of attriting German ground forces a year and a half earlier. Casualties in Italy were by no means all one-sided. But overall the business from the Allied side was pretty muddled. I sometimes wonder what would have happened if Clark had been kept as Ike's CoS and then maybe had been Commander of Services of Supply ETOUSA - he certainly would have been better there than the odious J.C.H. Lee.

[RichTO90]

Some additonal points.

The U Boat menace was not countered until May/June 1943. It would have taken may more months to build up the troops necessary to sustain the D day landings. Troop convoys and supply convoys heading to Britian would have drawn wolfpacks.

True, only 1.493 million tons of supplies and equipment had been shipped by 31 July 1943 out of an eventual total of 5.297 million tons by 30 May 1943.

Mulberry Harbours weren't built and they were crucial for D-Day as no working port was captured for some time after the landing. That was the primary lesson of Dieppe in August 1942. No "funnies" tanks would also be available, making every beach another "Omaha". Again a lesson the Britsh learnt from the slaughter at Dieppe but the US Army did not.

It actually isn't clear that the Mulberries were crucial. The supply tonnages landed directly onto the beaches from LST probably matched or exceeded the tonnages brought in via Mulberry. Nor does it appear that the Funnies had much real impact - with a few minor exceptions - to British and Commonwealth operations on 6 June. In fact it's unclear that any lessons were learned from Dieppe. Even the Funnies if available then, would likely have had little effect on the outcome - it was simply a piss poor plan utilizing an inadequate force and with inadequate support.

Indeed if an Allied landing was suspected by the Germans in 1943 it is quite possible that Kursk may have been delayed and those Panzer Units sent to crush the western Allies and knock them out of the war for some years.

Unlikely. The whole "what if" ROUNDUP depends on TORCH not happening. Which would likely me Rommel stabilizes a line somewhere in front of Tripoli. Which leaves the newly reconstituted 10. Panzer-Division unemployed and around 300 extra panzers uncommited to the last stand in Tunisia. Which is a tidy little force to augment the reconstituting "Stalingrad" divisions in France. Which would probably be more than adequate to contain a three-division assault in Normandy.

So the U Boats and Luftwaffe still a real force, the ability to call back massive reserves from the USSR, lots of fuel too. The Germans would have welcomed an invasion attempt in 1943. It would have been Dieppe on a larger scale.

But possibly not. The British and Americans were actually pretty tenacious and likely would have been able to remain - barely - in France. But the repercussions are hard to track. It is unlikely for instance that Eighth Army could defeat Rommel at Tripoli, given the length of their logistics tail. Would sanity have suddenly prevailed at OKW if the Allies landed in France? It would have been possible to evacuate the German and Italian forces nearly intact to Europe, so an additional 50,000 German vets and say 150,000 Italian troops for the defense of Italy. And no TORCH means Vichy is intact as well.

See, it gets complicated.

[Michael Emrys]

I sometimes wonder what would have happened if Clark had been kept as Ike's CoS and then maybe had been Commander of Services of Supply ETOUSA - he certainly would have been better there than the odious J.C.H. Lee.

Agreed. Clark's is a strange tale in some ways. He seems to have been one of the Army's rising stars at the time of Torch. But once he got 5th. Army, all the negative qualities of his personality began to emerge. Was the man just too ambitious for his own good, and the good of the men he commanded?

Michael

[RichTO90]

I sometimes wonder what would have happened if Clark had been kept as Ike's CoS and then maybe had been Commander of Services of Supply ETOUSA - he certainly would have been better there than the odious J.C.H. Lee.

Agreed. Clark's is a strange tale in some ways. He seems to have been one of the Army's rising stars at the time of Torch. But once he got 5th. Army, all the negative qualities of his personality began to emerge. Was the man just too ambitious for his own good, and the good of the men he commanded?

Michael

Pretty much. By all accounts he was a brilliant and tireless staff officer who managed to get 110 percent out of his staff at all times. He also had a razor sharp mind for facts and figures and refused to tolerate slackers.

But when he moved from staff to command of Fifth Army all that mysteriously changed. His decision making processes became lethargic and he continually lost track of the prime objective of winning the war in favor of his new objective of making Mark Clark a military genius in the popular press. I think it was truly a case of him being elevated beyond his moral capacity and that then directly affecting his mental capacity. In a sense he was an American Napoleon only without the brilliant victories.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Hi all,


I have been busy, and I see some very good posts and ideas have come up. I especially want to thank RichT090 for his excellent (as always ) figures regarding actual assets used in the Husky/Neptune landing forces.

Which is why I am still mad about Round-up being cancelled. I fail to see the real benefit of Operation Husky, sure it caused the actual fall of Mussolini , but what else did it accomplish? To me Torch and the conquest of North africa , disposed of any theat of Axis expansion in the Med. I see the Husky force as easily being used as the Round -up landing
force even though it had only 621 major landing craft as opposed to 1259 for Overlord. And you can use all the subsequent forces that fought in Italy as the follow-up/build-up forces for round -up. True there was less shipping assets available , but as has been stated the run from England to France was alot shorter than the average run to Sicily/Italy, especially if a round-up was done at Pas de Calais instead of Normandy.

Normandy/Overlord was a walk-over, and as the examples of Normandy and Anzio prove, once our troops get lodged on a beach-head , the Nazis could not dislodge it , in the presence of massive Naval gunfire support and air -superiority. I am positive the American/British Navies and air forces could have paralyzed counter-attacking German forces in France in 1943 as easily as they did in 1944.

True in 1943 the Mulberry Harbors were not finished but as Rich points out and I believe too, they really did not matter and you can say there was only one Mulberry, as the American mulberry was fairly destroyed before it was even finished.

AS to the lack of "Funnies" in 1943 , I fail to see where they materially affected the outcome of Overlord as the only real oppositon encountered was at Omaha , and there no Landing Craft carrying "funnies" could have gotten close enough to the beach those first few hours.

People cite Dieppe as proof that it is hard to seize a port. Well Dieppe was a dam poorly planned 1 divison abortion to begin with and had no support to speak of. Sure ports can be hard to sieze , St Malo, or easy, Cherbough/ Antwerpe. But again one of the real problems with Normandy was it was a great place to land but got real hard to exploit, again Round-up could have happened eslewhere which may have avoided this problem, and perhaps disposed of the real problem of having Hitler's Empire last a year longer.


This post is sort of ramshackle and I apologize, and I know I missed alot , as to "quantifying" if Italy was more trouble to the Germans than to Us. I can't ,except to say that the Africa corps( 3 div's?) might have made a difference somewhere along the Eastern front, or if all the German supply aircaft on the bottom of the Med. might have been useful elswhere, and German support of that Mussolini Balkan bs did supposively hold up Barbarossa for a month, of course I leave it up to anybody else"quantifying", if one more month of campaigning weather would have meant much, in Russia, in 1941.

Regards to all, thanks for the replies and good posts so far.
Chris