The problem being this number of 3 million casualties is more than dubious. OKW reports - on which you base - seems to have the lowest casualty numbers out of all reporting channels.
How comes that Armies almost always reported their own losses as higher than OKW reported their losses?
You also claim that these 3 million casualties already include sick - which is completely not true.
Remember also that some of the wounded return to duty. Some of them even more than once.
Another thing is that apart from casualties you would have to include also discharged from service for other reasons (for example being too old) to your count to receive accurate numbers of real manpower changes.
BTW - what did Overmans write about number of war invalids in Germany after WW2?
This number of war invalids indicates that there were much more wounded. Also comparing post-WW2 Krivosheev's data to WW2 OKW data is wrong because these figures have different nature. Krivosheev presents already - at least partially - verified (and in most cases this verification increased numbers) data. OKW - not.
And I'd like to know what exactly does your number of 27 million Soviet casualties include.
Because if it includes also for example POWs who were recaptured during the war, it would be another thing which makes your estimation as unreliable, considering that most of them probably returned to service.
I am sorry, but this just betrays total confusion. Obviously I have taken too much for granted when attempting to explain this.
1. Where on earth do you find a figure of 3 million German casualties? I have not given such a figure anywhere. On the contrary, I gave a rough figure for the purposes of making a specific point which required little precision of 5-6 million.
2. What makes you think I am basing myself on "OKW losses", whatever that is supposed to refer to?
3. I have explicitly stated that I am talking of force addition including returning sick and wounded. Didn't you notice, or?
4. I don't claim that 3 million casualties include sick, as I am nowhere speaking of 3 million casualties.
I thought it was perfectly clear that the German figure I'm quoting is simply an off-the-top-of-my-head figure. I do pride myself on a sufficient familiarity with German casualty data in the east to be able to do that with some basic accuracy - and as I clearly stated, you can well add a few million without that affecting the validity of the point made. We can make it 8 million if that makes you happy. The margin of validity for the point is simply so large that no great precision is required.
The logic of the basic argument is in fact very simple, and if you want to persist in rejecting it I would appreciate an argument explaining exactly where the problem with it lies. I trust I do not once more have to draw your attention to the distinction between reliability of the data and the validity of the model employing them?
A given force increases its strength from 2 million to 2.5 million over a six-month period, according to the same definition of strength. During that period, it suffers a loss of 500,000 casualties, according to a definition of casualties that includes all men leaving the roll strength of the formations of that force due to being killed, missing or evacuated as sick or wounded.
Can you demonstrate any conceivable set of circumstances in which that does not mean that the net force addition to that force is 1 million men - including all men sent to it as replacements and in new units (and, strictly speaking, having compensated for men leaving the force for any other reason than being casualties, which you would have to conceive of as "force exchange" if you will)? A net total of 1 million actual men will have had to have travelled to and arrived in that force over the course of the period in order to produce that outcome, provided the strength and casualty data are correct.
You can't, because the definition of force addition is all-encompassing (or at least, as encompassing as the strength definition).
And if your estimate is right then German effort on the main front compared to overall effort was surprisingly tiny.
Again, really? How is that? I don't think they're surprising at all. The overall magnitude of German losses in the East has long been established with no very great uncertainty, and since German strength in the East decreased, the net force addition in the east was neccessarily lower than the losses
. We have figures for call-ups to the Wehrmacht that are well below 2 million per year from 1941 onwards. We have more than adequate data for the overall strength development and manpower addition to the Field Army, which somewhat exceeded the losses. All of these are entirely consistent with a German force addition in the East of that general magnitude. Do you have any data that suggests otherwise?
Call-ups from the economy, according to Wehrersatzplan 45:
To that can be added new age cohorts (to the extent they were not economically employed when called-up) and convalescents. That's pretty much it.
So foreign forced-labourers and German women could not work in war industry or other war-important work?
What, am I writing in invisible digital ink or something? How many times have I pointed out that it was exactly foreign labour which enabled the Germans to call up these men gradually?
Strength development + casualties isn't just a simple way of determining force addition, it is the definition of force addition.
Not exactly. Documents concerning force addition + documents concerning force strength are.
Do you understand the meaning of the word "definition" here? We are talking of how concepts relate to each other, not to how they are sourced.
Do you consider these numbers (3 and 27) comparable to each other? Then exactly what do they include?
Again, I have no idea from where you have managed to pick up the absurd idea that I am arguing the Germans had 3 million casualties. 27 million is, if I remember correctly, Krivosheev's total if you subtract 1945.
BTW - are there no documents devoted directly to manpower flow that you have to rely on estimates?
What, you mean documents handily listing the total number of men who went specifically to the Eastern front as replacements, returning convalescents, individual transfers or members of units? No, there isn't. If there were, they would give the same result since they would have needed to be calculated in pretty much exactly the same way and using the same data. Because you know, there wasn't a giant turnstile on the polish border counting everyone who went either way, and "force addition to the east" in this sense was not in fact something with which the German reporting system concerned itself.
And, this is not a question of estimates versus hard and solid information. It is a question of the analytical use of that hard and solid information
. I've been dealing in rough figures because that's all the relatively self-evident point involved requires (and because there's a limit to the time I'm prepared to spend on this) - but it could easily be done in a much more precise and fully sourced fashion. This way of calculating force addition is not just simple and convenient, it can also relatively easily be sourced in a reliable way and above all, it is analytically great because it makes exactly the right kind of distinctions. If you want to assess force addition to the east, it makes no difference whatsoever if a soldier sent to the eastern front was a newly called-up recruit, a returning convalescent or transferred from another front. It also makes no difference if he was killed, wounded and sent to Germany, demobilised to industry or transferred to Italy. What matters is the number of men arriving to the field formations in the east, and the number of men departing from them. There are of course additionally countless other issues pertinent in different ways about which this method cannot tell us anything.