Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

[Andy Syl]

The soviets weren't driving their tanks around all day. So how was it possible that, in the absence of any major combat operations, less than 20% of the soviet tanks were operational? A tank (and any other machine) does not usually break down while sitting in a depot. Was the soviet industry delivering defective tanks to the red army for almost a decade and nobody noticed/cared?

Everything is possible in a communist country. People were fond of saying that if communists took over the Sahara Desert, there would be a shortage of sand in two years. And it is very true. The story of tanks breaking down while sitting in a depot doesn't need any explanation except "in a communist country"...

I am sorry, but this is not good enough. I'm not interested in "pub-talk" and wisecracks about communism.

[Michael Kenny]

I do not know enough to opine on the detail but accusations of 'Soviet lying' indicate there is more heat than light being generated.
I have the same type puzzlement over the large number of German tanks shown in late war returns v the small number listed with Units.

[Omeganian]

The part about the decision to dismantle the mechcorps in 1939 is rather controversial - after all, once the Germans attacked the same decision was made again. The mechanized brigades created instead were large enough units by the standards of that time (few German tank divisions in 1941 were the same size), but a thousand tanks in a single unit created some coordination and mobility problems.

[ljadw]

Well,Andy Syl (no more mister nice guy ,or never has been a mister nice guy) can continue to claim that the Soviet forces were excellent on 22 june,but,of course,he never will be able to explain why in 19 days 6814 Soviet tanks were lost,and,his blahblah about tanks which are no buses,will not change this fact .
In february 1940,the Soviets started formong 40 tank and 20 mechanized divisions,with as result that in june,none of the mechanised corps were combat ready.
On 22 june 1941,there even had been no divisional training exercices for these new divisions .
Those who are denying these facts,can be rightly suspected as being only disguised adherents of the theory that Barbarossa was a justified preventive attack,because a full ready Soviet Army was ready to attack Germany .
We kn ow that no one in Berlin/Rastenburg was believing these nonsens .
The 6th mechanised corps was one of the best equipped of the Red Army,having 1021 tanks(of which 352 T34 and KV1),despite this,this corps was destroyed in less than 2 weeks,without having inflicted any serious damage on any German unit .
Source:the actual strength of all Soviet Land combat units in a Deployed state on 22nd june 1941(Part IV 6)(by Nigel Askey)

[ljadw]

It is unwise to join a rodeo,before being able to ride on a horse:before talking about the success of a Soviet attack,one should prove the feasability of such an attack ,and :this was zero,nihil.Most Soviet forces were not massed on the frontier,but were located hundred or more km away from the frontier,and,when on 22 june,they received the order to go west,they simply fell apart.Most tanks,etc were operational on paper only .See the figures I have given from Solonin .
On paper,the Western military district had the following tanks:
97 KV
228 T 34
410 BT-7
183 BT-5
68 BT-2
1321 T-26 (with 8 prime movers)
Amphibious tanks,etc not included
And they were mentioned as following:
1st category (new,not used):470
2nd category(used,operable,or operable,but needed maintenance)1913
3th category :needs repair:479
4th category (needs major overhaul):483
I would be very surprised if more than 470 tanks were operational .
Source is :Armchair general:rkkaww2/wf/1941/wf tank equipm jun o1 1..
About the aircraft
The Western MD had :
1)bombers:489,441 operational (on paper) and a crew of 485,meaning enough for 80 bombers
2)fighters:1043,906 operational ,with a crew of ...626
3)reconnaisance:231,operational:1539,with a crew of 1256
Source:orbat/site/historical /Russia/wfront
On 22 june 1941,the Red Army was a total mess.

Dude, have you actually READ Solonin or are you just trolling this thread? Here is what Solonin actually says in his book "Cask and the hoops" (page 296 in my edition):

The ravings that by the beginning of the war "three quarters of the old type tanks needed repairs" are propagated not only in wall newspapers of a garment factory but also in the publications claiming to be scientifically fundamental. It is sad that even the compilers of such respectful statistical publication as "The secrecy label is removed" were not ashamed to inform the reader in page 345 that out of 14,200 Soviet tank in the western military districts as of 22 June, 1941 "only 3,800 units were totally battle-ready ".

Actual data about the technical status of the tanks are known at least since November, 1993 (since the day of the known publication by N.Zolotov and S.Isayev in No 11 of the "Military-historical Journal"). But it did not affect in any way the falsifiers' graphomaniacal activities. Three quarters broken tanks continue crawling in the pages of the most up-to-date books and articles. N.Zolotov and S.Isayev demonstrated that really elegant technique which was used to construct the multi-year "brain-having".

Under the order by the USSR Narkom of defense No 15 of 10 January, 1940 the armored hardware in the Red Army was subdivided in the following five categories:

1st. New, not used and quite fit for usage for intended purpose.

2nd. Being used, well working and fit for usage for intended purpose.

3rd. Requiring repair in the regional plant (medium repair).

4th. Requiring repair in the central plant (capital repair).

5th. Unsuitable (tanks in this category were written-off and not included on the summary register).

I hope the reader already guessed how the Soviet "historians" pulled his leg: they counted among the "battle-ready" only the 1st category, i.e., brand-new tanks, and attributed the entire 2nd category to the "requiring repair". To make it understandable to everybody, imagine a repair shop technician who agrees to issue the technical inspection sticker only to the owners of the new cars which have not been used yet.

According to the last prewar "Register of the availability and technical status of the combat machines as of 1 June, 1941" (ZAMO, f. 38, l. 11353, c. 924, pp. 135-138, c. 909, pp. 2 — 18) out of 12,782 tanks, to the 1st and 2nd categories are attributed 10,540 tanks. This is 82.5 % of the total park. 82, not 25.

Category 2 is normally considered combat capable. I am extremely surprised someone is actually capable of only considering brand new tech to be servicable. In any case, there are different figures for numbers of servicable tanks.

http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/BiChS ... tavVS.html

The lie about the tanks "not operational" from the Red Army can be exposed easily with a simple question: why were those tanks not operational, what happened with them? A tank is not a bus which has to carry passengers all day and night and can make hundreds of kilometers in a single day. In absence of combat operations, tanks are used pretty seldomly: once or twice per year during large-scale maneuvers and that was about it. The soviets weren't driving their tanks around all day. So how was it possible that, in the absence of any major combat operations, less than 20% of the soviet tanks were operational? A tank (and any other machine) does not usually break down while sitting in a depot. Was the soviet industry delivering defective tanks to the red army for almost a decade and nobody noticed/cared?

Ljadw and his friends seem utterly incapable of thinking about the implications of their claims, limiting themselves to parroting them around. If Glantz drunk himself into a stupor and wrote somewhere that the Red Army was a mess because the soviet soldiers were 4 feet dwarves, he probably would believe that too.

Anyway, this seems to be a waste of time. There seems to be some people around who would reflexively claim even that 1941 german anal rapists were the best in business if someone made a post about them.

This is only proving that you have NO knowledge at all about tanks : once or twice per year during large scale-manoeuvers and that's all :
A tank does not break down while sitting in depot : : a tank needs repair and maintenance every day,even in depot,a few weeks without maintenance,and the tank is only a bunch of scrap iron ready for the old car dump.

[Andy Syl]

Well,Andy Syl (no more mister nice guy ,or never has been a mister nice guy) can continue to claim that the Soviet forces were excellent on 22 june,but,of course,he never will be able to explain why in 19 days 6814 Soviet tanks were lost,and,his blahblah about tanks which are no buses,will not change this fact .

Several explanations have already been provided.

Those who are denying these facts,can be rightly suspected as being only disguised adherents of the theory that Barbarossa was a justified preventive attack,because a full ready Soviet Army was ready to attack Germany .

Gee, so I am no more "mr. nice guy" because of several barbs about the (lack of) professionalism you display, but you, on the other hand, seem to have no issue about slinging the mud of (implied) Hitler apologism on anyone disagreeing with you. The irony...

[Andy Syl]

This is only proving that you have NO knowledge at all about tanks : once or twice per year during large scale-manoeuvers and that's all :
A tank does not break down while sitting in depot : : a tank needs repair and maintenance every day,even in depot,a few weeks without maintenance,and the tank is only a bunch of scrap iron ready for the old car dump.

Dude, you have a lot of nerve to show up with this comeback after your original bullshit about Solonin which you LIED about.
If I don't know, enlighten me. What kind of wear/damage can happen to a tank in a depot to render it unusable, how frequent is expected such wear/damage to occur and how often maintenance should be performed?
I'm not talking about basic maintenance work. You said that there was no possibility to repair them in June-July. So what was happening to them to turn them into a "bunch of scrap"?

If there is someone who served in tank units, maybe could tell.

For comparison here are the losses of several soviet tank armies during offensive operations in july-august 1943 (source: Glantz, Battle of Kursk)

1 Tank Army (3-31 august 1943): 706 combat losses, 334 technical losses
3 Guards Tank Army (19-30 July 1943): 606 combat losses, 35 technical losses
4 Tank Army (15 July-31 August 1943): 1,189 combat losses, 80 technical losses

Total: 2,501 combat losses, 449 technical losses. Much less.

[michael mills]

The discussion so far seems to be based on a comparison of the material strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army with those of the Wehrmacht.

What also needs to be taken into account is the magnitude of the strategic task that each side faced for the purpose of achieving the goal of knocking out the other. The greater the magnitude, the less the possibility of achieving victory, regardless of material advantages.

The strategic task facing the Red Army in 1941 was of a lesser magnitude than that facing the Wehrmacht, as is reflected in its strategic plans of 1940 and the Timoshenko-Zhukov pre-emptive strike plan of May 1941, which is essentially the same as the 1940 plans except that the assumption of a prior German attack is omitted and the principle of a Soviet first strike openly affirmed.

The 1940 and 1941 Soviet strategic plans were all based on the concept of a massive offensive from the Lwow salient pushing through southern Poland as far as the southern part of Silesia, and then turning northward to advance to the Baltic Sea. That offensive would have two strategic objectives:

1. To cut off and encircle the greater part of the German armed forces massed in Poland; and

2. To cut Germany off from its sources of oil and other supplies of raw materials in the Balkans.

The Soviet strategic plans did not detail any operations after the achievement of the above objectives. Obviously the Soviet military planners considered that once the bulk of the German armed forces had been encircled in Poland and German industry deprived of its supplies from the Balkans, German military strength would have been so weakened that the Red Army could afford to take a breather while considering the various options for exploiting the strategic advantage gained.

The distances that the Red Army would have to cover to achieve the objectives laid down in the 1940 and 1941 plans were relatively small, which contributed to the relative achievability of the strategic task facing the Red Army. By contrast, the strategic task facing the Wehrmacht was immense, and essentially unachievable; in order to achieve victory by neutralising the Soviet military-industrial capability, it needed to advance all the way to the Arkhangel'sk-Astrakhan' Line, and even then it would need to rely on air power to neutralise the Soviet industrial zone in the Urals and West Siberia.

The German offensive against the Soviet Union failed essentially because the Wehrmacht's strategic task was far too large for it, given the relative strengths of the German and Soviet forces and military-industrial capacities. In other words, the German offensive could only have been ultimately successful if German strength had been far greater than it actually was, rather than only slighter superior to Soviet strength (if in fact it was superior at all, which is a contentious issue).

By contrast, the strategic task facing the Red Army for the purpose of defeating Germany was considerably smaller, given that it involved much shorter distances and a shorter time frame. Accordingly, a first strike by the Red Army had a better prospect of achieving its strategic objectives and achieving victory over Germany than did the actual first strike launched by the Wehrmacht. In other words, given the Red Army's smaller, more achievable strategic task, it did not need to be vastly superior to the Wehrmacht in order for its offensive to be successful.

The above considerations of course do not mean that the Soviet military leadership was actually planning to launch an offensive in 1941. According to the historian Evan Mawdsley, the Timoshenko-Zhukov pre-emptive strike plan does show conclusively that the Soviet military leadership was preparing to launch an offensive, but that it is more likely that that offensive was planned for the spring of 1942, when the upgrading and re-equipping of the Red Army (which would have made it much stronger than the Wehrmacht) was scheduled for completion. As Mawdsley has pointed out, the Red Army strength levels required by the Timoshenko-Zhukov plan had not been reached by June 1941.

[paspartoo]

The Soviet Union has the largest tank force on the planet but none are in working order. The Soviet Union has millions of troops in the Western areas but these are only for defense.

And everyone who disagrees is a nazi apologist. Yeah I don’t think so.

[ljadw]

I object being called dude by some one who has the nerve to claim that,when there is no big fighting,tanks are leaving the depots only twice a year,some one who does not even know that to maintain what you have learnt,you have to train ,by some one who is claiming that tank drivers are using their tanks only twice a year,by some one who is saying that trucks who are not used,are not breaking down:tell this to a garage-keeper.

[ljadw]

To M.Mills:any comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the WM/Red Army is totally irrelevant for this topic :the question is:was the Red Army capable to launch a blitz offensive against Germany ?
The answer is :NO.
And,I don't understand why some people are still denying this .

[Omeganian]

On 22 june 1941,there even had been no divisional training exercices for these new divisions .

You do know that the Germans have conquered Poland before performing a single real life exercise with actual tank forces, right?

The Soviet Union has millions of troops in the Western areas but these are only for defense.

Without a contingency for the possibility of an enemy attack? With constant war games on the subject of offense, and none on defense? Interesting logic...

And everyone who disagrees is a nazi apologist. Yeah I don’t think so.

I see you are desperate enough for attacks ad hominem, eh. Isn't that same as conceding defeat?

[paspartoo]

On 22 june 1941,there even had been no divisional training exercices for these new divisions .

You do know that the Germans have conquered Poland before performing a single real life exercise with actual tank forces, right?

The Soviet Union has millions of troops in the Western areas but these are only for defense.

Without a contingency for the possibility of an enemy attack? With constant war games on the subject of offense, and none on defense? Interesting logic...

And everyone who disagrees is a nazi apologist. Yeah I don’t think so.

I see you are desperate enough for attacks ad hominem, eh. Isn't that same as conceding defeat?

Friend check what i wrote before and also check here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarcasm

[ljadw]

Exemples of a very strong Red Army in june 1941 (this is sarcasm) :
The 24th MC had NO artillery,NO mortars and 5 motorcycles
From Isaev:
Report from the commander of the 8th MC:the majority of the drivers of the KV/T 34 only had between 3 and 5 hours of practical experience
Chief operations of the 5th Army :the MC were only ID strenghtened by a lot of tanks .

[ljadw]

On 22 june 1941,there even had been no divisional training exercices for these new divisions .

You do know that the Germans have conquered Poland before performing a single real life exercise with actual tank forces, right?

The Soviet Union has millions of troops in the Western areas but these are only for defense.

Without a contingency for the possibility of an enemy attack? With constant war games on the subject of offense, and none on defense? Interesting logic...

And everyone who disagrees is a nazi apologist. Yeah I don’t think so.

I see you are desperate enough for attacks ad hominem, eh. Isn't that same as conceding defeat?

I doubt very much that on 1 september,the German PzD had received no divisional training exercices .