Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

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Urmel
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Urmel » 04 Feb 2013 20:32

Jentz has the following:

Pr.5 - all 50mm, very few H
Pr.8 - all 50mm almost all H

Say that accounts for 71 H models (one regiment worth) between them.

For Barbarossa 350 were 37mm, the remainder 50mm models. Interestingly PR33 also did get 11 rebuilt G models into the mix issued to , with 50mm guns and bolt-on armour.

A total of 375 Panzer III were produced from March to May 41. There were also rebuilts, but not many.

The data is all from Jentz.
The excellence of [German] forward repair and recovery organisation gives us a salutary lesson in this respect. 7 Armoured Division report, Sept. 1941

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby 1st Cavalry » 04 Feb 2013 22:59

jentz data is for 20.06 .1941, but according to the article on lexicon der Wehrmacht
the 8th panzer regiment had 31 panzer iii with 37 mm guns before sailing to Africa .

http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... -06-22.htm

the 2nd and 5th PD also had 102 panzer III before the Greece campaign but i not sure if they should be counted as lost
or undergoing overhaul .

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby LWD » 04 Feb 2013 23:13

Andy Syl wrote: First, if an invasion of Germany was prepared, I would expect that it was not something generic, "as planning exercises", but much more specific. I do not consider myself a military expert, but I would assume there would be major differences between them. For instance, I would think that a plan for a strike in summer 1941 would refer to actual information regarding the disposition/composition of German and Soviet troops during that period.

If it was a serious plan that might actually see use you would likely see some considerable detail. In all likelyhood however there would be several "plans". First a general assessement, then a more detailed one, there would also be plans at lower levels, and likely several iterations of each of these. That's one of the problems of course there would be enough pieces lying around that in the chaos of the German invasion it is highly unlikly that all of the pieces would have been destroyed.
Second, in such eventuality, the connection will be made with the actual behaviour of the Red Army in the spring of 1941. Even without any specific plans, you know very well that some eyebrows were raised.

How so? From what I've read the Red Army was hardly on a war time footing. If Stalin planned to attack Germany I suspect he would have waited another year or two. Not only was the Red Army rebuilding but some of the indusrial moves had started pre invasion I beleive. That's not something you would do when you are expecting to go to war right away.

Third, being of a more suspicious mind, I would wonder why there are no such plans available. For all the rhetoric about Stalin who "believed" Hitler, as of late, it seems that a potential war with Germany was actually considered. We know there were plans for a strike against NATO. Did the Soviet General Staff sit on its ass in 1940-1941?

That is somewhat suspicous but given the recent purges and the apparently friendly relations with Germany I suspect they were awaiting direction from Stalin. Certainly safer than doing something that would upset him.
Yes they would have thought it an interesting document but of little propaganda value.

Propaganda for whom?

Anyone.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Andy Syl » 05 Feb 2013 01:12

LWD wrote:If it was a serious plan that might actually see use you would likely see some considerable detail. In all likelyhood however there would be several "plans". First a general assessement, then a more detailed one, there would also be plans at lower levels, and likely several iterations of each of these. That's one of the problems of course there would be enough pieces lying around that in the chaos of the German invasion it is highly unlikly that all of the pieces would have been destroyed.


I'm not convinced about the bolded part. Having in mind the soviet obsession for secrecy and the fact that this potential invasion was still some time away, I would be expect that the huge majority of the "give away" documents to be in Moscow, at the General Staff. Whatever reached the lesser echelons, would have been just bits and bolts of the general plan, which did not mean much by themselves. You have to recall that the soviet troops in the western areas were located in hostile territory. It would have been enough for some local nationalists to infiltrate a divisional headquarters and the secrecy of the soviet intentions would have been compromised.

Second, even in the secret documents, the phrasing was extremely cautious. For instance, I had once the chance to read a soviet assessment of the air operations during the Korean war. The document was not for propaganda. It was adressed to the soviet officer corps, at general and colonel level. Yet even there one could read the typical cliches about the "imperialist unprovoked agression" and the "answering strike of the people's army" etc.

Third, some plans DID surface. They are just not the kind of crushing evidence who would remove all doubt. I've encountered references to the infamous draft from 15 May 1941 or the wargames in December 1940/January 1941, which you no doubt are aware of and which seem to be obviously directed against Germany.

How so? From what I've read the Red Army was hardly on a war time footing. If Stalin planned to attack Germany I suspect he would have waited another year or two. Not only was the Red Army rebuilding but some of the indusrial moves had started pre invasion I beleive. That's not something you would do when you are expecting to go to war right away.


For instance, I'll mention just some which are general knowledge:

1. The massive concentration of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov bulges, which has already been questioned, as you may know.

2. The massive increase in size of the Red Army between 1939 and 1941. If a country suddenly increases its army three times, with no immediate threat looming on the horizon, that should raise suspicions. The soviet mobilization started way before they received the first information about Barbarossa, so one would wonder what was up. Countries don't do that just for giggles.

Also, If by "hardly on a war footing" you mean shortages of equipment and personnel as compared to the norms set by the Red Army regulations, I disagree. That was something unavoidable, caused by the way mobilization underwent during that period: the rapid drafting of such masses of recruits meant there were always going to be shortages, there is no way around this.

That is somewhat suspicous but given the recent purges and the apparently friendly relations with Germany I suspect they were awaiting direction from Stalin. Certainly safer than doing something that would upset him.


First, if Stalin made it clear in december 1940 to his highest ranking commanders and in may 1941 even to lower ranking ones that there was going to be a war with Germany, what exactly could they have expected? Stalin to tell them "Break over, boys, get to work"?

Second, why would it have mattered whether they devised warplans against Germany, as long as those plans stayed peacefully in a safe in Moscow? It would have zero effect on the frindly relations with Germany as the officers having access to them would have been very few. During the war, German intelligence was not able to cope with the soviet maskirovka. They were unable to detect actual troop movements for the counteroffensives at Moscow or Stalingrad, for instance. No way they could have had access to top secret documents of the General Staff. And only Stalin could have ordered those plans to be put into action.

One of the biggest problems I have with the traditional version is that is so full of contradictions and inadvertencies. Once you subject them to the Socratic method, well, they don't look well. I'll give you two examples related to your last statement. It is a common trope in history and I'm sure you've read it in many history books on the subjects.
So, let's say that the soviet military brass was paralyzed by fear of Stalin and dared do nothing to upset him. Ok.

But I find in Gorodetsky's book Grand Delusion a very interesting piece of information, regarding the 15 May draft for a preemptive strike against Germany: Gorodetsky does not deny the draft, but he claims Stalin rejected Zhukov's proposal for its implementation because "it would have compromised his peaceful policy towards Germany". The information may seem plausible. But for only those who hate the Socratic method and any kind of critical thinking. First of all, Zhukov can devise a war plan against Germany. That is his job. But to go with the plan to Stalin for approval, if the latter pursued a "peaceful policy", is absurd. Maybe Mr. Gorodetsky does not understand the implication of his words, but it amounts to an attempt by Zhukov to change the foreign policy of the USSR. Basically, in layman's terms, that's like Zhukov telling Stalin "Hey, Joseph Visarionovich, I know you want peace with Germany, but I know better; those dirty Germans are not to be trusted. Here's a plan for war: you don't know what you are doing anyway, so I'll take charge. Sign below, please". Zhukov does not get out of Kremlin a free man after this.

The second example. Is was often maintained that the leadership of the Red Army was incompetent, etc. One of the prime examples is Marshal Kulik. Here is what wiki has to say about thim:

Responsible for overseeing the development and production of new tanks, tank guns and artillery pieces, Kulik's fundamental ignorance in his field of expertise—coupled with his abusive, bumbling personality and tendency to condemn technological advancements as "bourgeois sabotage"—would prove a serious hindrance to the Red Army's ability to modernize itself prior to the war with Germany.
[...] He bitterly denounced Marshal Tukhachevsky's campaign to redevelop the Red Army's mechanized forces into independent units like the Wehrmacht's Panzerkorps; the creation of separate divisions allowed them to use their greater maneuverability for Deep Battle-style maneuver warfare, rapidly exploiting breakthroughs rather than simply supporting the infantry.
[...]
He even criticized his friend Marshal Voroshilov's support for the production of the T-34 and (his namesake) KV-1 tanks, both of which later proved instrumental to the survival of the Soviet Union. After he was overruled by Stalin and ordered to produce the tanks anyway, he began deliberately dragging his feet on production of shells and guns, resulting in a drastic shortage of 76.2mm shells; at the start of war, no more than 12% of the T-34 and KV-1 tanks had a full ammo load, with few having any anti-tank rounds, most having no more than a few HE shells, and a shocking number having to rely solely on their coaxial machine guns, having no 76.2mm rounds at all
[...]
He also disparaged using minefields as a defensive measure, considering it at odds with a properly aggressive strategy and calling it "a weapon of the weak." This disastrous decision allowed for essentially free movement of German forces across Russian defensive lines during Operation Barbarossa, with static defensive strongpoints being easily bypassed by Panzer spearheads and surrounded by infantry, forcing the defenders to surrender
[...]
Kulik similarly scorned the German issuance of the MP-40 submachine gun to their shock troops as a "bourgeois fascist affectation", stating that it encouraged inaccuracy and excessive ammo consumption among the rank and file. He forbade issuance of the PPD-40 to his units, stating it was only suitable as a "pure police weapon".
[...]
Lastly, he refused to support the production of the innovative Katyusha rocket artillery system for no other reason than he did not trust anything other than World War I-era horse-drawn artillery. Although it could have been produced much earlier in the war without his meddling, like the rest of Kulik's rejected innovations the "Stalin organ" eventually proved to be one of the most effective Soviet inventions of the war and a major advancement in artillery technology




The picture is strange. Kulik was one of the highest ranking soviet officers. In addition, he was Stalin's protege and Voroshilov's friend. He held one of the highest offices in the Red Army.
Yet every one of his decisions ended being overruled. It has been said much about the soviet officers being afraid to report bad news, to upset their superiors, etc. Yet apparently, at the Main Artillery Directorate, there was someone who was not paying any attention to his direct superior, the stalinist Kulik, and did things as he saw fit, in defiance of his orders.
I would really like to know who was actually "sabotaging" Kulik. Technically, there were only 2 people who could have overruled him: the Defence Commisar (Voroshilov/Timoshenko) or Stalin. Was there someone in Main Artillery Directorate with direct access to Stalin or the Defence Commisar and such confidence from them that he could go against his superior as he liked?
Moreso, whether Kulik was competent or no, this was a gross case of insubordination which would be frowned upon even in democratic countries, let alone in the very centralized stalinist state. Stalin might keep in the job a fool if they saw things the same way. But it's hardly believable he would have kept in office someone whose decisions he was constantly overruling.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Urmel » 05 Feb 2013 08:22

1st Cavalry wrote:jentz data is for 20.06 .1941, but according to the article on lexicon der Wehrmacht
the 8th panzer regiment had 31 panzer iii with 37 mm guns before sailing to Africa .

http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... -06-22.htm

the 2nd and 5th PD also had 102 panzer III before the Greece campaign but i not sure if they should be counted as lost
or undergoing overhaul .


Jentz data for PR8 is not for 20 June. No 37mm Panzer III were in North Africa.

For 2 and 5 PD there is conflicting information. Jentz says all their tanks were sunk on passage to Italy. Two transports, Marburg and Kybfels, hit mines on their way out of Argostoli, I believe, and went down with a lot of equipment. There's a thread here that does not seem to verify that (search for 'sinking two panzerdivisions' or something like that)
The excellence of [German] forward repair and recovery organisation gives us a salutary lesson in this respect. 7 Armoured Division report, Sept. 1941

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby paspartoo » 05 Feb 2013 09:46

Andy Syl wrote:
One of the biggest problems I have with the traditional version is that is so full of contradictions and inadvertencies. Once you subject them to the Socratic method, well, they don't look well.


You’re being too kind. The standard version of the peace loving SU, Stalin who trusted Hitler, ‘outdated’ tanks that have minus 100% operational rate are so dumb only Western academics and Soviet propagandists could continue to believe in them. As you pointed out the guy wrote a book to prove that the old version was ‘correct’ and he ended up shooting himself in the foot…
A simple economist with an unhealthy interest in military and intelligence history.....
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby 1st Cavalry » 05 Feb 2013 10:49

Andy Syl wrote:For instance, I'll mention just some which are general knowledge:

1. The massive concentration of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov bulges, which has already been questioned, as you may know.

2. The massive increase in size of the Red Army between 1939 and 1941. If a country suddenly increases its army three times, with no immediate threat looming on the horizon, that should raise suspicions. The soviet mobilization started way before they received the first information about Barbarossa, so one would wonder what was up. Countries don't do that just for giggles.




it is not general knowledge

The entire belorusian md/ western front ,Bialystok included had 2900 tanks (2190 operable ) compared to 2100 in army group center , in terms of infantry divisions the germans had a twofold advantage (33/16).

they had a better force correlation against AGS in armor , nearly 4 to 1 at the border , 7 to 1 overall , but again
the germans had a twofold advantage in infantry divisions .

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Andy Syl » 05 Feb 2013 11:09

1st Cavalry wrote:
Andy Syl wrote:For instance, I'll mention just some which are general knowledge:

1. The massive concentration of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov bulges, which has already been questioned, as you may know.

2. The massive increase in size of the Red Army between 1939 and 1941. If a country suddenly increases its army three times, with no immediate threat looming on the horizon, that should raise suspicions. The soviet mobilization started way before they received the first information about Barbarossa, so one would wonder what was up. Countries don't do that just for giggles.




it is not general knowledge

The entire belorusian md/ western front ,Bialystok included had 2900 tanks (2190 operable ) compared to 2100 in army group center , in terms of infantry divisions the germans had a twofold advantage (33/16).

they had a better force correlation against AGS in armor , nearly 4 to 1 at the border , 7 to 1 overall , but again
the germans had a twofold advantage in infantry divisions .


It's not about whether they had greater numbers than the Germans or not. It's about the fact that a massive number of troops and equipment were kept in a location where they were very vulnerable to flank attacks and envelopment. There was nothing valuable to protect in the Bialystok bulge, so why there were so many forces there?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby KDF33 » 05 Feb 2013 12:43

Maybe they had no clue what they were doing?

I don't say this in jest.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby 1st Cavalry » 05 Feb 2013 13:14

Andy Syl wrote:
1st Cavalry wrote:
Andy Syl wrote:For instance, I'll mention just some which are general knowledge:

1. The massive concentration of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov bulges, which has already been questioned, as you may know.

2. The massive increase in size of the Red Army between 1939 and 1941. If a country suddenly increases its army three times, with no immediate threat looming on the horizon, that should raise suspicions. The soviet mobilization started way before they received the first information about Barbarossa, so one would wonder what was up. Countries don't do that just for giggles.




it is not general knowledge

The entire belorusian md/ western front ,Bialystok included had 2900 tanks (2190 operable ) compared to 2100 in army group center , in terms of infantry divisions the germans had a twofold advantage (33/16).

they had a better force correlation against AGS in armor , nearly 4 to 1 at the border , 7 to 1 overall , but again
the germans had a twofold advantage in infantry divisions .


It's not about whether they had greater numbers than the Germans or not. It's about the fact that a massive number of troops and equipment were kept in a location where they were very vulnerable to flank attacks and envelopment. There was nothing valuable to protect in the Bialystok bulge, so why there were so many forces there?



Many forces ?
Draw a 100 km circle around the town Bialystok and you come up with
10 infantry, 7 tank, 1 cavalry, 3 mechanized .

21 divisions compared to a front line of 335 km is the bare minimum to defend , considering the German forces pitted against them , any chance of a soviet successful attack goes out the window.

Good luck arguing with Stalin to pull those forces out and let the Germans overrun the area, Pavlov did it and he got shot .

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Appleknocker27 » 05 Feb 2013 14:34

Andy Syl wrote:Urmel,

We know that the Wehrmacht "ran rings", etc. But the fact that the Soviet tank park was superior to the German one is not "looking at the tree". It suggests that, in the summer of 1941, there were a specific set of circumstances which led to the Soviet defeat, and not some inherent weakness of the Red Army.
The active formations of the Red Army, the best units, with the best personnel and best specialists, had all perished by October 1941. Yet, after October 1941, the Wehrmacht didn't run any "rings" anymore, despite the fact that, logically, the ACTIVE German formations should have gone through the half-trained soviet RESERVISTS like a knife through cheese.

In 6 months, the Red Army had recovered sufficiently enough to launch a major offensive at army group level and in 2 years it was capable to launch offensives at theater level. The T-34 which had "zero operational impact" in July-August suddenly had a big operational impact in December, 4 months later. How come?

I asked Appleknocker, who was one of the loudest here who insisted on the awful state of the soviet logistics, command and control, whether it is possible for an army to fix these weaknesses in such a short a time. Specially AFTER losing all its pre-war personnel, heavy equipment and a good part of its demographical and industrial base. The only answer I received was silence.

Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?


Can we please stop regurgating the same old cliches and use our brains?


Ugh.... 8O

The Soviet tank park was very large and very rotten.
"there were a specific set of circumstances which led to the Soviet defeat, and not some inherent weakness of the Red Army."

No.... The Red Army had huge inherent weaknesses.

"Wehrmacht didn't run any "rings" anymore, despite the fact that, logically, the ACTIVE German formations should have gone through the half-trained soviet RESERVISTS like a knife through cheese"

Did it ever occur to you that the German logistcal support plan was inadequate after Smolensk? What effect would that have on future operations?

"The T-34 which had "zero operational impact" in July-August suddenly had a big operational impact in December, 4 months later. How come?"

The T34 wasn't the reason for Soviet success in the Moscow counter-offensive and German overextension played a key role.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby LWD » 05 Feb 2013 14:55

Andy Syl wrote:
LWD wrote:If it was a serious plan that might actually see use you would likely see some considerable detail. In all likelyhood however there would be several "plans". First a general assessement, then a more detailed one, there would also be plans at lower levels, and likely several iterations of each of these. That's one of the problems of course there would be enough pieces lying around that in the chaos of the German invasion it is highly unlikly that all of the pieces would have been destroyed.


I'm not convinced about the bolded part. Having in mind the soviet obsession for secrecy and the fact that this potential invasion was still some time away, I would be expect that the huge majority of the "give away" documents to be in Moscow, at the General Staff. Whatever reached the lesser echelons, would have been just bits and bolts of the general plan, which did not mean much by themselves. You have to recall that the soviet troops in the western areas were located in hostile territory. It would have been enough for some local nationalists to infiltrate a divisional headquarters and the secrecy of the soviet intentions would have been compromised.

You make some valid points. I still suspect they would have been around if for no other reason to help cover the positions of some of the Red Armys planning staff. But I can't say your position is impossible or even unreasonable.

...
hird, some plans DID surface. They are just not the kind of crushing evidence who would remove all doubt. I've encountered references to the infamous draft from 15 May 1941 or the wargames in December 1940/January 1941, which you no doubt are aware of and which seem to be obviously directed against Germany.

Another valid point. Indeed this is some of what I would expect and thank you for pointing it out.

...
For instance, I'll mention just some which are general knowledge:
...
2. The massive increase in size of the Red Army between 1939 and 1941. If a country suddenly increases its army three times, with no immediate threat looming on the horizon, that should raise suspicions. The soviet mobilization started way before they received the first information about Barbarossa, so one would wonder what was up. Countries don't do that just for giggles.

Well looking at http://rcocean.blogspot.com/2008/04/us- ... -1938.html the US Army went from 161,000 in July of 39 to 1,310,000 in July of 41. That's over an 8 fold increase during the same period,

Also, If by "hardly on a war footing" you mean shortages of equipment and personnel as compared to the norms set by the Red Army regulations, I disagree. That was something unavoidable, caused by the way mobilization underwent during that period: the rapid drafting of such masses of recruits meant there were always going to be shortages, there is no way around this.

They may be unavoidable but until that and the training is up to par they aren't on a war time footing.

That is somewhat suspicous but given the recent purges and the apparently friendly relations with Germany I suspect they were awaiting direction from Stalin. Certainly safer than doing something that would upset him.

First, if Stalin made it clear in december 1940 to his highest ranking commanders and in may 1941 even to lower ranking ones that there was going to be a war with Germany, what exactly could they have expected? Stalin to tell them "Break over, boys, get to work"?

If that was made clear I would expect there to be considerable planning and discussions of just what to do militarily. Stalin "making it clear" should be enough to get things moving.
Second, why would it have mattered whether they devised warplans against Germany, as long as those plans stayed peacefully in a safe in Moscow? It would have zero effect on the frindly relations with Germany as the officers having access to them would have been very few. During the war, German intelligence was not able to cope with the soviet maskirovka. They were unable to detect actual troop movements for the counteroffensives at Moscow or Stalingrad, for instance. No way they could have had access to top secret documents of the General Staff. And only Stalin could have ordered those plans to be put into action.

I think I was making the same point. Indeed that was in part why I brought up the US color plans.
One of the biggest problems I have with the traditional version is that is so full of contradictions and inadvertencies.

The problem I have with the "non traditional versions" is that they seem to be even worse in this regard.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Andy Syl » 05 Feb 2013 15:03

1st Cavalry wrote:
Many forces ?
Draw a 100 km circle around the town Bialystok and you come up with
10 infantry, 7 tank, 1 cavalry, 3 mechanized .



21 divisions basically represent a grouping of 200-300.000 troops with 2,000 tanks, at least.
That's more than the Panzergroup Kleist had, which included only 5 Panzer divisions and 3 Motorized one, and yet it was enough to bring down the Allied front. Roughly equal with Guderian and Hoth's panzergroups.

21 divisions compared to a front line of 335 km is the bare minimum to defend , considering the German forces pitted against them , any chance of a soviet successful attack goes out the window.


No, it's not. See the Sedan breakthrough as an example. The Germans had slightly less forces than the Allies in the theater. Yet it made no matter, because the blow at Sedan hit a weak point in the enemy front, thus a major tank grouping was able to pierce into the enemy rear and the rest is history.
The attacking party would amass their forces and means on the directions of the main strike. According to soviet military regulations, a large tank unit in the battlefield should be positioned in three echelons with intervals between the tanks of 20—30 meters. With such disposition, a soviet tank division (about 370 tanks) carried out a strike on a front less than 4 km-wide. That is less than the defending front of an infantry regiment.
That's exactly how the Wehrmacht carried out its strikes (without having numerical superiority, btw).

Good luck arguing with Stalin to pull those forces out and let the Germans overrun the area, Pavlov did it and he got shot .


Question: why?
The Bialystok salient has no economical value. Defensively, it does not provide any benefit to the army occupying it. Why was Stalin so hung on that area?
There is only one situation where the salient has worth: as a launchpad for an attack against Germany. From there, a strong mechanized force could push into Poland and swing northward towards the Baltic, breaking havoc into the rear of the Army Group North and left wing of Army Group Center (like Kleist's Panzergroup in may 1940). Or it could swing south in cooperation with another mechanized force striking from the Lvov salient and do the same in the rear of Army Group South and a part of Army Group Center.
I'm not arguing how much success such strikes could have had. There really is no way to know for certain. But that's the only situation where the salient has any relevance.

I do not have a firmly defined position on the topic yet (mainly because there are many sources which I cannot check personally). But here is what the shtick is. Suvorov suggested that Stalin was preparing for the invasion of Germany in summer 1941. In order to rebuff the idea, I would expect another, coherent and internally noncontradictory, interpretation of the declassified operative plans and Stalin's actions. Unfortunately, that is not happening. Usually, the counters go like this: "How could Stalin plan the invasion if the 29 mech corps had only 75% personnel? Or the KV engine overheated? Or there were no invasion plans and the drafts Zhukov and Vatutin were preparing were just hobbies activities?" So on and so forth.

The unwillingness from certain people (both historians and laymen) to call a spade a spade often reaches farcical proportions. "Maybe they did not know what they were doing"? Seriously?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby Andy Syl » 05 Feb 2013 15:23

Well looking at http://rcocean.blogspot.com/2008/04/us- ... -1938.html the US Army went from 161,000 in July of 39 to 1,310,000 in July of 41. That's over an 8 fold increase during the same period,


But the US Army WAS preparing for war. While there was significant opposition in the Congress and the public opinion against a US intervention, Roosevelt and his government were very much in favor of getting into the war on the Allied side.
In particular after the fall of France, US basically abandoned neutrality in all but name. The hostile actions of US against Germany (and Japan) were so many and so serious that the Axis was bound to lash out at a certain moment. If you read, for instance, Time from 1940-1941, you would see that there were many circles in US which openly acknowledged the possibility of having to fight the Axis sooner or later.

Nothing of the sort happened in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviet government constantly praised the friendship with Germany and was scathing the Allies.
If you were the Chief of German Intelligence in autumn 1940, what would you believe when receiving such reports? On one hand, in the open, the Soviets try their best to show their appreciation of Germany, but, on the other hand, in secret, there is a steady increase of Soviet military power and most of those forces are deployed in the western areas...
What would you tell your government in such a situation?

Code: Select all

The problem I have with the "non traditional versions" is that they seem to be even worse in this regard.


I'm interested to hear them out. Can you provide some examples?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

Postby LWD » 05 Feb 2013 15:37

Andy Syl wrote:
Well looking at http://rcocean.blogspot.com/2008/04/us- ... -1938.html the US Army went from 161,000 in July of 39 to 1,310,000 in July of 41. That's over an 8 fold increase during the same period,


But the US Army WAS preparing for war. While there was significant opposition in the Congress and the public opinion against a US intervention, Roosevelt and his government were very much in favor of getting into the war on the Allied side.

And the Red Army wasn't?
Nothing of the sort happened in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviet government constantly praised the friendship with Germany and was scathing the Allies.

That doesn't mean that Stalin didn't see war coming or expect to be involved with it. Indeed it was pretty clear that there was a very good chance Germany would attack the USSR at some point. If not there were likely to be a fair few places where a strong army would allow the Soviets to gain some advantage. I'm certainly not suggesting that the Soviets weren't preparing for war. Only that there doesn't seem to have been any plans for attacking Germany in the near future.
The problem I have with the "non traditional versions" is that they seem to be even worse in this regard.

I'm interested to hear them out. Can you provide some examples?

Which one or ones?


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