LWD wrote:If it was a serious plan that might actually see use you would likely see some considerable detail. In all likelyhood however there would be several "plans". First a general assessement, then a more detailed one, there would also be plans at lower levels, and likely several iterations of each of these. That's one of the problems of course there would be enough pieces lying around that in the chaos of the German invasion it is highly unlikly that all of the pieces would have been destroyed.
I'm not convinced about the bolded part. Having in mind the soviet obsession for secrecy and the fact that this potential invasion was still some time away, I would be expect that the huge majority of the "give away" documents to be in Moscow, at the General Staff. Whatever reached the lesser echelons, would have been just bits and bolts of the general plan, which did not mean much by themselves. You have to recall that the soviet troops in the western areas were located in hostile territory. It would have been enough for some local nationalists to infiltrate a divisional headquarters and the secrecy of the soviet intentions would have been compromised.
Second, even in the secret documents, the phrasing was extremely cautious. For instance, I had once the chance to read a soviet assessment of the air operations during the Korean war. The document was not for propaganda. It was adressed to the soviet officer corps, at general and colonel level. Yet even there one could read the typical cliches about the "imperialist unprovoked agression" and the "answering strike of the people's army" etc.
Third, some plans DID surface. They are just not the kind of crushing evidence who would remove all doubt. I've encountered references to the infamous draft from 15 May 1941 or the wargames in December 1940/January 1941, which you no doubt are aware of and which seem to be obviously directed against Germany.
How so? From what I've read the Red Army was hardly on a war time footing. If Stalin planned to attack Germany I suspect he would have waited another year or two. Not only was the Red Army rebuilding but some of the indusrial moves had started pre invasion I beleive. That's not something you would do when you are expecting to go to war right away.
For instance, I'll mention just some which are general knowledge:
1. The massive concentration of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov bulges, which has already been questioned, as you may know.
2. The massive increase in size of the Red Army between 1939 and 1941. If a country suddenly increases its army three times, with no immediate threat looming on the horizon, that should raise suspicions. The soviet mobilization started way before they received the first information about Barbarossa, so one would wonder what was up. Countries don't do that just for giggles.
Also, If by "hardly on a war footing" you mean shortages of equipment and personnel as compared to the norms set by the Red Army regulations, I disagree. That was something unavoidable, caused by the way mobilization underwent during that period: the rapid drafting of such masses of recruits meant there were always going to be shortages, there is no way around this.
That is somewhat suspicous but given the recent purges and the apparently friendly relations with Germany I suspect they were awaiting direction from Stalin. Certainly safer than doing something that would upset him.
First, if Stalin made it clear in december 1940 to his highest ranking commanders and in may 1941 even to lower ranking ones that there was going to be a war with Germany, what exactly could they have expected? Stalin to tell them "Break over, boys, get to work"?
Second, why would it have mattered whether they devised warplans against Germany, as long as those plans stayed peacefully in a safe in Moscow? It would have zero effect on the frindly relations with Germany as the officers having access to them would have been very few. During the war, German intelligence was not able to cope with the soviet maskirovka. They were unable to detect actual troop movements for the counteroffensives at Moscow or Stalingrad, for instance. No way they could have had access to top secret documents of the General Staff. And only Stalin could have ordered those plans to be put into action.
One of the biggest problems I have with the traditional version is that is so full of contradictions and inadvertencies. Once you subject them to the Socratic method, well, they don't look well. I'll give you two examples related to your last statement. It is a common trope in history and I'm sure you've read it in many history books on the subjects.
So, let's say that the soviet military brass was paralyzed by fear of Stalin and dared do nothing to upset him. Ok.
But I find in Gorodetsky's book Grand Delusion a very interesting piece of information, regarding the 15 May draft for a preemptive strike against Germany: Gorodetsky does not deny the draft, but he claims Stalin rejected Zhukov's proposal for its implementation because "it would have compromised his peaceful policy towards Germany". The information may seem plausible. But for only those who hate the Socratic method and any kind of critical thinking. First of all, Zhukov can devise a war plan against Germany. That is his job. But to go with the plan to Stalin for approval, if the latter pursued a "peaceful policy", is absurd. Maybe Mr. Gorodetsky does not understand the implication of his words, but it amounts to an attempt by Zhukov to change the foreign policy of the USSR. Basically, in layman's terms, that's like Zhukov telling Stalin "Hey, Joseph Visarionovich, I know you want peace with Germany, but I know better; those dirty Germans are not to be trusted. Here's a plan for war: you don't know what you are doing anyway, so I'll take charge. Sign below, please". Zhukov does not get out of Kremlin a free man after this.
The second example. Is was often maintained that the leadership of the Red Army was incompetent, etc. One of the prime examples is Marshal Kulik. Here is what wiki has to say about thim:
Responsible for overseeing the development and production of new tanks, tank guns and artillery pieces, Kulik's fundamental ignorance in his field of expertise—coupled with his abusive, bumbling personality and tendency to condemn technological advancements as "bourgeois sabotage"—would prove a serious hindrance to the Red Army's ability to modernize itself prior to the war with Germany.
[...] He bitterly denounced Marshal Tukhachevsky's campaign to redevelop the Red Army's mechanized forces into independent units like the Wehrmacht's Panzerkorps; the creation of separate divisions allowed them to use their greater maneuverability for Deep Battle-style maneuver warfare, rapidly exploiting breakthroughs rather than simply supporting the infantry.
[...]
He even criticized his friend Marshal Voroshilov's support for the production of the T-34 and (his namesake) KV-1 tanks, both of which later proved instrumental to the survival of the Soviet Union. After he was overruled by Stalin and ordered to produce the tanks anyway, he began deliberately dragging his feet on production of shells and guns, resulting in a drastic shortage of 76.2mm shells; at the start of war, no more than 12% of the T-34 and KV-1 tanks had a full ammo load, with few having any anti-tank rounds, most having no more than a few HE shells, and a shocking number having to rely solely on their coaxial machine guns, having no 76.2mm rounds at all
[...]
He also disparaged using minefields as a defensive measure, considering it at odds with a properly aggressive strategy and calling it "a weapon of the weak." This disastrous decision allowed for essentially free movement of German forces across Russian defensive lines during Operation Barbarossa, with static defensive strongpoints being easily bypassed by Panzer spearheads and surrounded by infantry, forcing the defenders to surrender
[...]
Kulik similarly scorned the German issuance of the MP-40 submachine gun to their shock troops as a "bourgeois fascist affectation", stating that it encouraged inaccuracy and excessive ammo consumption among the rank and file. He forbade issuance of the PPD-40 to his units, stating it was only suitable as a "pure police weapon".
[...]
Lastly, he refused to support the production of the innovative Katyusha rocket artillery system for no other reason than he did not trust anything other than World War I-era horse-drawn artillery. Although it could have been produced much earlier in the war without his meddling, like the rest of Kulik's rejected innovations the "Stalin organ" eventually proved to be one of the most effective Soviet inventions of the war and a major advancement in artillery technology
The picture is strange. Kulik was one of the highest ranking soviet officers. In addition, he was Stalin's protege and Voroshilov's friend. He held one of the highest offices in the Red Army.
Yet every one of his decisions ended being overruled. It has been said much about the soviet officers being afraid to report bad news, to upset their superiors, etc. Yet apparently, at the Main Artillery Directorate, there was someone who was not paying any attention to his direct superior, the stalinist Kulik, and did things as he saw fit, in defiance of his orders.
I would really like to know who was actually "sabotaging" Kulik. Technically, there were only 2 people who could have overruled him: the Defence Commisar (Voroshilov/Timoshenko) or Stalin. Was there someone in Main Artillery Directorate with direct access to Stalin or the Defence Commisar and such confidence from them that he could go against his superior as he liked?
Moreso, whether Kulik was competent or no, this was a gross case of insubordination which would be frowned upon even in democratic countries, let alone in the very centralized stalinist state. Stalin might keep in the job a fool if they saw things the same way. But it's hardly believable he would have kept in office someone whose decisions he was constantly overruling.
by Urmel on 04 Feb 2013 20:32 
