Velikiye Luki 1941

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AJFFM
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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#16

Post by AJFFM » 19 Aug 2014, 22:27

BDV wrote:
The 56th (without Totenkopf!) was ordered to get all the way to Velikiye Novgorod. That is not too great to cover?!?

Totenkopf spent the few quiet days following the bloody assault on Opochka building bridges around Porkhov. The Soviets were blowing bridges whichever way Germans advanced.
The LVI corps already suffered a large number of casualties and was the farther corps from its supply base in horrible terrain. So even the distance was not great on paper it was still a multiple of what other corps in the South faced and many times more difficult than Western Europe.
BDV wrote:

However the 19th Panzer made it all the way to V.Luki and had to withdraw only when no help was forthcoming. Also, I was unaware of either 56th Panzer Corps and 16th army having anything to do (even indirectly) with the Smolensk pocket (its formation and/or liquidation). Care to clarify?

Also, the decision was not to withdraw but to pursue a different objective, namely the acquisition of jump-off points for the storming of Leningrad.

BTW, if Soviet maps are to be believed, elements of 3rd (mot) were within 10 miles of Novorzhev on the evening of July 9th, i.e. in excellent position to cut off Soviet forces in the Pushkinskiye Gory area.


Its order to go the V. Luki was rescinded before it went because Corps, Army and AG command knew better. The Red army controlled the supply routes from the east and was present in large numbers behind the 19th Panzer. Only miscommunication between Soviet Armies in addition to the fact that it had two corps encircled prevented the 19th from being destroyed.

BDV wrote:
I disagree, separating infantry from armor, when they were in as good as possible position to help each other was a major blunder, most likely explained by the AGN generals being blinded by a most shiny object(ive), Leningrad. A blunder that, while not causing, facilitated Soviet successful resistance north of Riga Moscow line. That, more than anything guaranteed more Soviet resistance and casualties.
You would get more Soviet resistance anyway, the problem was the deeper you went towards Moscow the closer the Red army was to its supply and manufacturing base and the more access to a descent road/rail network. Something the Germans would have less of if they went deeper. Going to Leningrad while would cause a lot of damage at least ensured that a large number of troops were tied there and isolated a major industrial base from the rest of the country.

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BDV
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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#17

Post by BDV » 21 Aug 2014, 00:19

AJFFM wrote:The LVI corps already suffered a large number of casualties and was the farther corps from its supply base in horrible terrain. So even the distance was not great on paper it was still a multiple of what other corps in the South faced and many times more difficult than Western Europe.
?!?

Five days later, the LVI was 200 km away, and with some heavy fighting in between (TK- Opochka, 3rd mot - Porkhov), and was slated to immediately advance a further 100km. So it does not add up.

Its order to go the V. Luki was rescinded before it went because Corps, Army and AG command knew better. The Red army controlled the supply routes from the east and was present in large numbers behind the 19th Panzer. Only miscommunication between Soviet Armies in addition to the fact that it had two corps encircled prevented the 19th from being destroyed.
Well, obviously as no help was forthcoming and Soviets had just shown good ability to bash exposed armor units (Soltsy and Kampfgruppe Raus in its bridgehead). But it also shows the ability of german armor to maneuver faster than soviet reaction - when not hanged out to dry by higher-up.

BTW what were the encircled Soviet Corps and who was encircling them? One unsupported 50 km dash by a lone Panzerdivison does not an encirclement make.

You would get more Soviet resistance anyway, the problem was the deeper you went towards Moscow the closer the Red army was to its supply and manufacturing base and the more access to a descent road/rail network. Something the Germans would have less of if they went deeper. Going to Leningrad while would cause a lot of damage at least ensured that a large number of troops were tied there and isolated a major industrial base from the rest of the country.
Yes, but Leningrad has the same nasty "all railways lead to Leningrad" feature Moscow had. And if Germany has to settle for an attrition war against Soviet Union, war is lost.

So one either:

a) Attacks Leningrad faster than soviet units can fall back to defend it: all out 4th Panzer attack from the Pskov-Ostrov area towards Leningrad starting from July 9th; with 16th and 18th fully committed to supporting the attack (marching immediately behind the spearheads). The "infantry supports panzers" option.

b) Eliminate promptly all units that could fall back to defend or reinforce Leningrad (Estonia, and the Velikaya River - Lovat River space), and the rabble on the left flank of the AGC, thus tearing a hole in the Soviet defense along the Riga - Moscow axis and diverting the units that would otherwise go to Leningrad. Then attack Leningrad with two panzer armies and two infantry armies. The "panzers support infantry" option.

That's why I was so confused about the VLuki situation - the LVIth was right there, perfectly positioned for a daring coup de main, that'd reap hansome profits.

The historical compromise of infantry and armor going their separate ways, trying to achieve all of the objectives at once ended up as an abject failure.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion


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BDV
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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#18

Post by BDV » 19 Sep 2014, 21:48

Velikiye Luki proved to be a bridge too far for the 19th Panzer, they got there, but as Soviets did managed to slow down the 16th German army, it had to withdraw from the exposed outpost.

16th Army entered Pustoshka July 16, while 19th Panzer captured Nevel on July 15.

So what would have been a more appropriate goal for the 19th panzer, where it could have made the junction with the 16th Army. Novosokolniki? Straight North from Nevel, through the Studenets area, or Compass to Pustoshka? (Base Image courtesy GoogleMaps?
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steinmetz
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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#19

Post by steinmetz » 21 Sep 2014, 12:23

BDV wrote: With AGN's leaders mesmerized by Leningrad (3rd mot. itself moved to 8th's left flank as to assist the 41st panzer in its breakthrough northeast into the Pskov-Ostrov area and beyond), easy to understand how it got overlooked. .
Taking Leningrad was what AGN had been ordered to do.

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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#20

Post by steinmetz » 21 Sep 2014, 13:43

BDV wrote:
JC wrote:LVI Pz.K. had nothing to do with the attempted encirclement of enemy forces along the boundary between the two Army Groups south of Lake Illmann. 16 AOK was on the south flank of A/G North and therefore had responsibility for the A/G North part of the op.
I disagree, conducting deep thrusts, that would have met AGC's armored thrusts was beyond the abilities of an infantry formation like the 16th Army. Also by design, german infantry units were light on the heavy artillery required to deal with the entrenched soviet units. The pertinent Directive 21 paragraph is very clear:

So, while the northern flank was AGN's responsibility, only armored units had the capabilities required for meeting the 19th Panzer in Velikyie Luki on July 19th. Ergo, 41st Panzer, 56th Panzer or some hybrid of the two.
You are conveniently forgetting what the main objective of AGN still was. The amored and mobile forces were never going to be used on the right. Not even OKH would order that. You are making an unjustified improvisation into something much more.
Last edited by steinmetz on 21 Sep 2014, 13:54, edited 1 time in total.

steinmetz
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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#21

Post by steinmetz » 21 Sep 2014, 13:49

BDV wrote: Will take the position of the local commander ("the pressure was unbearable") over a glorified deskjockey's wishful thinking. .
Calling Hermann Hoth a gloriied deskjockey is a rather strange assertion given the man's career.He was a man of high ability who in the first place did not agree with the diversion of 19 Panzer.

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Re: Velikiye Luki 1941

#22

Post by incomitatus » 12 May 2023, 14:30

There's an interesting story concerning the Battle of Kikino, which was just south of Velikye Luki. Han Sturm, who was in the 253rd Infantry division writes about this battle in his book, 'Hans Sturm, a Soldier's Odyssey'. His unit fought there for over a month & took significant casualties. He tells the story from a machine gunner's perspective. He went on the following year to earn the Knights Cross.

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