Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

[Omeganian]

I don't know why you keep insisting that a proposal is the same as a plan Omeganian. There were no detailed plans as in military documents to attack the Germans.

The May Document is referring directly to a plan of war. Such a plan would be detailed. It's also unavailable to researchers. But the chances that this document contradicts said plan are... very limited.

[steverodgers801]

Considering Stalin would not even allow his air units to fire on German recon units I don't know what makes you think he wanted to attack in 1941. A good comparison is war plan orange by the US against Japan, does the existence of such a plan prove the Americans were going to attack Japan in Dec1941. I will keep repeating, you keep mixing up the definitions of plans. Stalin believed communism would be victorious over the British and French, does that mean he was going to invade France. Stalin was an opportunist, he would not have invaded Germany unless he was certain he would have victory.

[Omeganian]

Considering Stalin would not even allow his air units to fire on German recon units I don't know what makes you think he wanted to attack in 1941.

Yeah, because we all know that when you plan a surprise attack, you must act all hostile toward the target and warn it about your plans.

A good comparison is war plan orange by the US against Japan, does the existence of such a plan prove the Americans were going to attack Japan in Dec1941. I will keep repeating, you keep mixing up the definitions of plans.

Were the US forces being deployed according to that plan by December?

Stalin was an opportunist, he would not have invaded Germany unless he was certain he would have victory.

Stalin had about seven times as many tanks. He simulated the situation on the maps and got an easy enough victory. Doesn't get more certain than that.

[antfreire]

Stalin believed communism would be victorious over the British and French, does that mean he was going to invade France. Stalin was an opportunist, he would not have invaded Germany unless he was certain he would have victory.[/quote]
I could not agree more.

[ljadw]

That Stalin had about seven times as many tanks ,is totally irrelevant : the number of tanks does not prove an aggressive intention,besides,most of his tanks and most of his tank difisions were not operational :there was only fuel for a few days .The offensive capability of the Red Army was nihil .

Besides,why should Stalin attack Germany ?

[Omeganian]

That Stalin had about seven times as many tanks ,is totally irrelevant : the number of tanks does not prove an aggressive intention,

Didn't say it does.

most of his tanks and most of his tank difisions were not operational :there was only fuel for a few days .The offensive capability of the Red Army was nihil .

Yeah, and that's why a third to a half of the German fuel during the first days of war came from the Soviet leftovers. Give me exact figures, mister; your constant repeating of unsupported mottoes can't even be called bullshit.

Besides,why should Stalin attack Germany ?

Why should Hitler have attacked Poland?

[wm]

Besides,why should Stalin attack Germany ?

Especially that Stalin was the author of the theory of socialism in one country formulated after the defeats of all the communist sponsored revolutions in Europe and Asia in the twenties. The failure of the Soviet interventions in the Chinese Revolution and in the Spanish Civil War only reinforced the theory.
Earlier the tenant was socialism must be exported and established globally, otherwise the USSR would not survive.
So it was known revolutions were hard, and the man himself was of that opinion.

[Omeganian]

Besides,why should Stalin attack Germany ?

Especially that Stalin was the author of the theory of socialism in one country formulated after the defeats of all the communist sponsored revolutions all over Europe and Asia in the twenties. The failure of the Soviet interventions in the Chinese Revolution and in the Spanish Civil War only reinforced the theory.
Earlier the tenant was socialism must be exported and established globally, otherwise the USSR would not survive.
So it was known revolutions were hard, and the man himself was of that opinion.

Stalin never said one country will be enough. He said one country must become a proper beachhead for revolutions in other countries. To quote him:

To bring down the rule of the bourgeoisie and establish the rule of the proletariat in a single state - doesn't mean to ensure the full victory of socialism. By reinforcing their rule and leading the peasantry after it, the proletariat of the victorious state can and must build a socialist society. But does that mean it will thus reach the complete final victory of socialism, i.e. does that mean it can with the powers of a single state secure socialism completely and quite ensure the state against intervention, and thus, a restoration? No, it doesn't. For that, the victory of socialism is required in at least a number of states. Which is why the development and support of revolution in other states is an important task of the victorious revolution. Which is why the revolution of the victorious state should view itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as aid, as means for accelerating the victory of the proletariat in other states.

Well, we saw what he meant by "aid" in 1940 in the Baltic States. According to you, in 1941 he intended to behave in a manner that was different? I see no reason to believe that.

[ljadw]

Yeah, and that's why a third to a half of the German fuel during the first days of war came from the Soviet leftovers. Give me exact figures, mister; your constant repeating of unsupported mottoes can't even be called bullshit.

That's saying the specialist of unsupported claims,the man who proclaims that Stalin would attack Hitler,and remains silent,when he is asked why Stalin would do this .
In june 1941,the Germans captured 54996 cbm of fuel : 54996 was totally inadequate to support a Soviet attack .
Besides,the fuel depots were at the border,while the tank divisions were in the Soviet hinterland .

In july 1941,the Ostheer needed 12000 ton fuel per day:54996 was not enough for 5 days fighting for the Ostheer,neither was it enough for 5 days fighting for the Red Army .

[wm]

Well, we saw what he meant by "aid" in 1940 in the Baltic States. According to you, in 1941 he intended to behave in a manner that was different? I see no reason to believe that.

There was a huge difference between offering aid to a defenseless, tiny country and attacking Germany. The very country that defeated the Czarist Empire without even breaking a sweat, and easily defeated the French - by many regarded as the Gods of War at that time. And France had lots of tanks, artillery and planes too. And the Maginot Line. It didn't do them any good.
Stalin was a cautious man, this is why he preferred the sensible socialism in one country rather than Trotsky's permanent revolution. And this is why, in the end it was Hitler, not Stalin who had to shot himself in the head.

[Omeganian]

Yeah, and that's why a third to a half of the German fuel during the first days of war came from the Soviet leftovers. Give me exact figures, mister; your constant repeating of unsupported mottoes can't even be called bullshit.

That's saying the specialist of unsupported claims,the man who proclaims that Stalin would attack Hitler,and remains silent,when he is asked why Stalin would do this .

When did dictators ever need a reason for that? Did Stalin have a "reason" to attack Japan in 1945?

In june 1941,the Germans captured 54996 cbm of fuel : 54996 was totally inadequate to support a Soviet attack .

And what; once June ended, they suddenly stopped capturing fuel? Halder states otherwise (July has two mentions of large amounts of fuel captured and one complaint that too little was captured lately at the south). Besides, that was hardly all the fuel the Soviets had.

In july 1941,the Ostheer needed 12000 ton fuel per day:54996 was not enough for 5 days fighting for the Ostheer,neither was it enough for 5 days fighting for the Red Army .

The figures of losses in cars for 1941 are 33% (figures given by Mark Solonin, he provides sources). That is, hundreds of thousands of the cars (the army had about half a million total) were driven hundreds of km to the rear. There was fuel for that.

The 5th army, according to Alexei Vladimirsky, had 33 fillings of fuel delivered by the start of the war. Pavlov, during the December conference, stated ten would be more than enough.

According to the book "The Rear of the Soviet Military Forces", during the first days of the war, there were 8,500 tank-wagons with fuel on the railroads which couldn't be delivered because the situation crated traffic jams. The Wehrmacht, according to Halder, needed 22 trains of fuel per day according to pre-war estimates (in reality, somewhat more), so we're talking about a supply for at least a week or two.

No, I find no evidence of fuel shortage. Maybe there were some problems actually getting it to the vehicles, but that's a totally different matter.

Well, we saw what he meant by "aid" in 1940 in the Baltic States. According to you, in 1941 he intended to behave in a manner that was different? I see no reason to believe that.

There was a huge difference between offering aid to a defenseless, tiny country and attacking Germany.

Meaning he first had to check whether this will work. Well, he did in January. The simulations have shown that it will work.

[ljadw]

When did dictators ever need a reason for that? Did Stalin have a "reason" to attack Japan in 1945?

In june 1941,the Germans captured 54996 cbm of fuel : 54996 was totally inadequate to support a Soviet attack .

And what; once June ended, they suddenly stopped capturing fuel? Halder states otherwise (July has two mentions of large amounts of fuel captured and one complaint that too little was captured lately at the south). Besides, that was hardly all the fuel the Soviets had.

.[/quote]

1)YES : dictators need a reason to attack an other country .


2)The fact that in the first 10 days of Barbarossa ,the Germans captured only 54996 cbm of fuel means that only 54996 cbm of fuel was stored at the border,and as this was inadequate for an attack,this means that a Soviet attack in that period was excluded .

3)For the following 6 months (july-december) the Germans captured only 52000 cbm of fuel,of which only 30000 cbm injuly : 30000 cbm of fuel was good for 2.5 days of fighting for the Ostheer and also for the RKKA .

4)Thus the claim that the captured Soviet oil was greatly benefiting the Germans is wrong

5)The fuel captured by the Germans in june/july could only support 7 days of fighting for the RKKA


6)That a lot of cars were evacuated to the east is irrelevant,as these cars did not use the military supplies and as a lot of cars were transported by rail.

[ljadw]

According to the book "The Rear of the Soviet Military Forces", during the first days of the war, there were 8,500 tank-wagons with fuel on the railroads which couldn't be delivered because the situation crated traffic jams. The Wehrmacht, according to Halder, needed 22 trains of fuel per day according to pre-war estimates (in reality, somewhat more), so we're talking about a supply for at least a week or two.

This is totally meaningless: where were going these 8.500 tank-wagons with fuel ? That they were on the rail-roads does not mean that they were a possible supply for the WM .

[Omeganian]

When did dictators ever need a reason for that? Did Stalin have a "reason" to attack Japan in 1945?

1)YES : dictators need a reason to attack an other country .

Then describe the reasons Stalin had for attacking Japan. And then describe why they didn't apply to Germany.

2)The fact that in the first 10 days of Barbarossa ,the Germans captured only 54996 cbm of fuel means that only 54996 cbm of fuel was stored at the border,and as this was inadequate for an attack,this means that a Soviet attack in that period was excluded .

So, according to you, no fuel was stored in tank wagons and was pulled away? No fuel was lost due to bombardments? I am awaiting proof.

5)The fuel captured by the Germans in june/july could only support 7 days of fighting for the RKKA

So, considering the amount the Germans couldn't capture... well, the one month supply (10 days to 2.5 months, actually, depending on the type) stated to exist in Zhukov's May Report sounds about right.

According to the book "The Rear of the Soviet Military Forces", during the first days of the war, there were 8,500 tank-wagons with fuel on the railroads which couldn't be delivered because the situation crated traffic jams. The Wehrmacht, according to Halder, needed 22 trains of fuel per day according to pre-war estimates (in reality, somewhat more), so we're talking about a supply for at least a week or two.

This is totally meaningless: where were going these 8.500 tank-wagons with fuel ? That they were on the rail-roads does not mean that they were a possible supply for the WM .

According to the book, it went both ways. Some was being delivered to the forces, some was evacuated. In either case, this is fuel that would have been available to the forces if not for the German attack.

[michael mills]

Let's put a date to this question. In 1941, or in 1942, or when.

Exactly.

I think the evidence shows that Stalin's plan was to have the Red Army prepared for an offensive against German-occupied Poland by early 1942. That was the date at which the re-equipping of the Red army with armour and aircraft superior to German armament was scheduled for completion.

The available evidence also shows that Stalin believed that Hitler would not launch an invasion of the Soviet Union until he had forced Britain to surrender, and therefore he had sufficient time to build up the Red Army until it was strong enough to be certain of defeating the German forces in a first strike.

However, Stalin had received information about Hitler's December 1940 order to prepare for an invasion of the Soviet Union in May 1941, almost immediately after that order was given, so he realised he did not have that time. There are indications that he ordered the plan for an offensive against German-held Poland to be brought forward into 1941; such indications are the Timoshenko-Zhukov plan for a pre-emptive strike against the German forces massing in Poland, and Stalin's order to the military-industrial complex to be on a full war footing by 1 July.

However, it was too late; the Red army could not get ready in time.

The Timoshenko-Zhukov plan had been based upon catching the German forces in the midst of deploying for an attack, when they would not be in a defensive position; they calculated that such a surprise attack would give the Red Army the advantage, and enable it to defeat the German forces.

Instead, it was the Wehrmacht that caught the Red Army in the midst of deploying for an attack, rather than in a defensive position, and that was what gave the German forces the advantage and enabled them to achieve such huge successes in the first few weeks of the invasion.