Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record

[steverodgers801]

The movements were seen, but it was not realized that the attack would be of the scale it was and where it would happen. The Soviets had been launching numerous attacks on the immediate flanks of 6th army and it was assumed they would keep happening. Paulus was also limited by the fact he had no reserves left because of his orders to take all of the city and thus his tank units had been used up in street fighting and what few were left had only limited fuel. Paulus. There were also few horses left because of the lack of fodder so they were in the far rear where they could feed. Even if Paulus had done a break out attempt it likely would have resulted the same way, due to the condition of the troops and the lack of transport for equipment. Mansteins force was not strong enough to deal with the Soviet troops that would have been freed up

[Niklas68]

Tbh, I dunno if a break out was actually technically a possibility early on, right after being encircled.
Later the sacrifice of the 6th army allowed army group A, which was all the way down in the Caucasus, gain vital time to move back up through the narrow channel at Rostov to reach the German front line. I think Army group A consisted of 4 armies adding up to roughly 1 million men. One shouldnt forget the soviet strategical goal for saturn and Uranus was not only to destroy the german salient at stalingrad but to cut off Kleist's army as well and rip open the whole south eastern frontline until river dnjepr. They achieved the first goal but arguably somewhat failed with the latter.

[BDV]

In terms of commander's (Paulus) mistakes I thought that his actions seemed somewhat panicky.

He voluntarily abandoned his positions within the north bend, which (1) ensured the collapse of the Romanian 3rd Army pocket, (2) removed the XIth corps from the left flank of the Soviet northern thrust. Then, he weakened the Axis positions South of Stalingrad (removing the 29th(mot) from behind the Romanian 4th Army) to counteract the northern Soviet thrust that his own actions had emboldened, ensuring the success of the Southern Soviet thrust.

In other words Paulus' own actions collapsed german positions in a small isolated nut for the Zhukovite nutcracker to crack at leisure.

[Konig_pilsner]

Curious, do you know why he abandoned those positions? Sounds like you are just drawing arrows on a map again with no context...

kP

[steverodgers801]

Paulus was forced to give up ground to swing troops around to defend his rear.

[BDV]

Paulus was forced to give up ground to swing troops around to defend his rear.

I do not think the troops of XIth infantry corps were in any extent important to the establishment of the defensive perimeter, especially with the equipment they had left behind. That was mostly the work of mobile forces from the Stalingrad area.

by Konig_pilsner » Yesterday, 22:23

Curious, do you know why he abandoned those positions? Sounds like you are just drawing arrows on a map again with no context...

I read some personal reports of troops from the XIth corps being ordered to pull back from reasonable defensive positions, much to their surprise. Of course it could be foggy memories of those vets, "Paulus lost it for us at Stalingrad" being the small version of "Adolf lost things for us!". Still, given that the main kessel does not appear to have been short of men, the XIth Corps might have served better in a separate kessel.

[Mr.No one]

Paulus was forced to give up ground to swing troops around to defend his rear.

I do not think the troops of XIth infantry corps were in any extent important to the establishment of the defensive perimeter, especially with the equipment they had left behind. That was mostly the work of mobile forces from the Stalingrad area.

I still believe that the abandonment of the western bank of the Don was necessary, and as Glantz had recently pointed out, it was fortunate for the Germans that they managed to accomplish that, given the immense danger of the XI.A.K. getting cut off. It was only because the opposing Soviet forces were relatively incompetent at achieving their goal that the Germans managed to save the corps. Otherwise, it is my belief, the XI.A.K. would probably have ended up like Group Lascar.

All the best,
Sean

[BDV]

I do not think the troops of XIth infantry corps were in any extent important to the establishment of the defensive perimeter, especially with the equipment they had left behind. That was mostly the work of mobile forces from the Stalingrad area.

I still believe that the abandonment of the western bank of the Don was necessary, and as Glantz had recently pointed out, it was fortunate for the Germans that they managed to accomplish that, given the immense danger of the XI.A.K. getting cut off. It was only because the opposing Soviet forces were relatively incompetent at achieving their goal that the Germans managed to save the corps. Otherwise, it is my belief, the XI.A.K. would probably have ended up like Group Lascar.

They ended up like Group Lascar, anyway, in the long run. Did they add anything of material significance to the defense of the main Stalingrad kessel?

[steverodgers801]

BDV, if the corps had not been available then other troops would have had to fill the gap. Mobile troops were not a factor because the gas quickly ran out and tanks became pill boxes.

[BDV]

BDV, if the corps had not been available then other troops would have had to fill the gap. Mobile troops were not a factor because the gas quickly ran out and tanks became pill boxes.

The tally at the end was 90,000 POW. There were also 40,000 airlifted out. So 40k for the a real "Don Bend Pocket" would likely not have been disastrous. Also, by withdrawing to the historical kessel, Paulus also allowed the Soviets to establish the flow materiel and units straight into the siege area by means of a railline on the east bank of Don (from the Frolovo direction). Otherwise, RKKA troops and supplies would have to be trucked either across Volga or twice across Don.

Paulus established a hard nut and dared Zhukov to crack it. Zhukov obliged.

[Konig_pilsner]

Hi BDV,

I recall back a few months ago you had posted you had lost family in the kessel. If that is true I am sure all here appreciate your loss. But in the end this is a history forum, and it would be unfortunate if some kid googled Stalingrad and read your assertions and took them for fact.

Paulus was in a terrible situation. No supplies, no information, and handicapped by OKW from day 1. In the end the 6th army held out until January. Have you ever considered that things could have gone worse? Funny how people basing their opinions on hindsight neglect that fact.

[BDV]

I recall back a few months ago you had posted you had lost family in the kessel. If that is true I am sure all here appreciate your loss. But in the end this is a history forum, and it would be unfortunate if some kid googled Stalingrad and read your assertions and took them for fact.

What does that have to do with anything? And my relative was part of the 40k airlifted out.

Paulus was in a terrible situation. No supplies, no information, and handicapped by OKW from day 1. In the end the 6th army held out until January.

He was in a bad spot for sure, some of it his own making, tho. Information he had for sure, just could not separate wheat from chaff so to speak.

Have you ever considered that things could have gone worse?

They went pretty bad as it is, with the unbelievable success of both Soviet thrusts, which can be linked to his actions:
- withdrawing the XIth Korps from the flank of the northern Soviet thrust,
and
- withdrawing (instead of strengthening) the german motorized forces facing the southern thrust.

[Cult Icon]

According to "Endgame I", the goal was to "save" XI AK and the PzK from destruction by soviet spearheads, hence the fighting withdrawal... the units were under a lot of pressure and the PzK (14.Pz, 16.Pz, 24.Pz) were badly damaged/incoherent from months of combat and resembled a bundle of foreign units. The Soviets put out 5,000 sorties in the area vs. only 1,000 by the LW during Uranus.

In retrospect, I think Paulus should have gambled and taken up a fight with these two korps but Paulus did not operate with benefit of hindsight.

[BDV]

According to "Endgame I", the goal was to "save" XI AK and the PzK from destruction by soviet spearheads, hence the fighting withdrawal... the units were under a lot of pressure and the PzK (14.Pz, 16.Pz, 24.Pz) were badly damaged/incoherent from months of combat and resembled a bundle of foreign units. The Soviets put out 5,000 sorties in the area vs. only 1,000 by the LW during Uranus.

Well, most of the armor that Paulus had on hand was ill suited to serve him in the pocket (as it was bound to run out of fuel in short order). Just outside of it, it would be a different issue, though. So if Paulus withdraws the XIth corps, he needs to move armor south (defending the railline to Salsk). If the XIth corps stands and fights where it is, he needs to move armored forces west (defending the railine to Morozowski).

[Erwinn]

I wonder if the situation somewhat differed if the commander of Stalingrad area was a Front-Lead Type General like Guderian or Rommel.

Paulus known to stick to his Headquarters. Therefore he never witnessed situation with his own eyes.