Appleknocker27 wrote:They had major issues with personnel shortages, deficient training, equipment shortages, weapon shortages, vehicle shortages, deficient maintenance of existing vehicles/tanks/equipment and a major shortage of electronics/communication equipment. The shortages/deficiencies were all at critical levels which left the Red Army in a very poor state of readiness that even full mobilization couldn't make good until 1942 at the earliest.
If you compare the figures to what they were supposed to have according to the mobilization plan, it might look that way. If you compare it to what they had when they won the war... quite a different impression.
Appleknocker27 wrote: compare German military truck technology, numbers and organization to Soviet (aka the lifeblood of mobility and operational reach).
With a single German tank division having 200 types of trucks? Yeah, I would say the comparison is clear.
Appleknocker27 wrote: Soviet tanks rarely had radios in 1941, put that in comparison to German forces that had radios in all tanks, aircraft, liaison points, command posts, even down to the individual Infantry platoons and logistical units.
Everyone needs a radio when everyone operates on his own. The Soviet military doctrine was large units.
Appleknocker27 wrote: The Germans had a viable tactical radio net in 1941, the Soviets never had that even until the end of the war. Modern warfare requires this essential technology,
It's essential, yet the Soviets won without it? Nice joke...
Appleknocker27 wrote:yet people like Bartov opine about tanks and aircraft in such a way that in spite of Phd status they render themselves incompetent in matters of military science quite quickly.
Judging from the footnotes in the Russian edition of the Stumbling Colossus, Glantz has quite a talent for that himself.
steverodgers801 wrote:Omeganian, not if half or more of your tank forces are incapacitated due to the lack of parts because the BT series of tanks had been discontinued, but production of the T34 was just beginning.
Mind naming a single unit which had to leave half its tanks at the base? Because wherever I look, it's 10-15%.
steverodgers801 wrote:There was also the problem of trying to reform large tank units after disbanding them a few years earlier and few of the commanders had any idea what they were doing, equipment was in short supply as were supplies.
The Germans had to make everything from scratch in the 30-s, a good number of their tank divisions never fought before June 1941 or just had a couple weeks of experience, half were green recruits. Aircraft crews, too. Didn't stop them. Problems can always be found.
Appleknocker27 wrote:Picture if you will a tank corps with only 25-30% of its tanks in running order.
One can only imagine, because the search for such a unit in real life is yet to yield results.
Appleknocker27 wrote:The tank company commanders that do have radios have weak radios (assuming they are in working order) which can't reach their battalion HQ's beyond 7-10kn direct line of sight, who cannot reach their higher HQ's.
Which models of radio are these? Because the common tank radio at the time was 15 km range, 50 while standing. And they were produced at a rate of hundreds per month.
Appleknocker27 wrote:These tanks with all of their issues cannot coordinate refuel, re-arm, resupply because their support units lack radios as well.
Again the old bullshit of no radio=no communication. And mind you, without any figures.