XXXXI. Panzer-Korps and the Luga line

[ViKinG]

Hello all, more information required.

In Mid July around the 10th, XXXXI. Panzer-Korpsattempted to breach the Luga line with the 1st and 6th panzer divisions but both were repulsed by Soviet forces in the sector. At the same time Manstein's 8. Panzer-Division was about to bear the brunt of the Soviet Sol'tsy counter-attack. I know that the XXXXI. Panzer-Korps became stalled out at Luga and did not launch a major attack in the sector until August 8th. Was this mostly due to waiting for the slow moving infantry of 18. Armee to catch up? The 18. Armee at the time was occupied with driving the Soviets out of Estonia and the Baltic islands. Was the 3 week delay mostly caused by a lack of supplies? And lastly, since the XXXXI. Panzer-Korps did not launch a major offensive in that space of time, what was it pre-occupied with in those three weeks? This is obviously a major factor in the defense of Leningrad since it bought the Soviets nearly a month of time to prepare defenses on the Luga line and other subsequent fortified regions behind it. My opinion is that the XXXXI. Panzer-Korps was too weak to smash through the Soviet line on its own and had no choice but to wait for the infantry of 18. Armee to catch up and support it. Also at the same time Manstein's LVI. Panzer-Korps was pushing toward Staraia Russa south of Lake Il'men and was in no position to help Reinhardt's XXXXI. Panzer-Korps. Not the best idea to split up your only two panzer korps..

Thanks in advance.

Luc

[BDV]

AFAIK the 41 did make a lateral move to Kingissepp, trying to get to Leningrad along the coast.

But you're correct, like everywhere across the front german command decisions pushed the panzers forces and the (firepower challenged) infantry away from each other (echoes of 1914 ...) As a result a most disastrous (for the Axis) mid July ensues.

BTW german infantry could march just fine, it was dogged soviet resistance holding them behind. Without soviet resistance the 18th and 16th got to Parnu and Pskov in less than 3 weeks.

[Max Payload]

As I understood it, the issue was less to do with absence of support from the infantry divisions, and more to do with supply restrictions - particularly of fuel and ammunition - at the end of what had become a tenuous supply line, that initially prevented Reinhardt from expanding his bridgeheads at Sabsk and Porietchye against the LOG defences in mid-July. The subsequent diversion of Reinhardt's forces to the army group's right wing to restore the situation there then left the corps too weak to renew its offensive. It was not until the second week of August that Busch had stabilised his right wing between Lake Ilmen and Velikie Luki, that the supply situation to the Luga had improved sufficiently, and XXXVIII Corps had become available on the Luga to support Reinhardt against the significantly increased Soviet defences in the area.

[ViKinG]

Well thanks guys, I agree 100% . Everything you're saying is in line with that I understood out of it too! Always Army group North's problem - not enough resources to go around, with too big of an area to cover.

[BDV]

Well thanks guys, I agree 100% . Everything you're saying is in line with that I understood out of it too! Always Army group North's problem - not enough resources to go around, with too big of an area to cover.

I differ. There were not enough resources to do it how AGN leaders decided to do it on July 10: fanning the armor in a NE direction onto the marshy plains between Peipus and Ilmen; and having the 18th Army operate west of Peipus and the 16h south of Ilmen. That is, spreading out their forces, separating their armor from their infantry, even allowing their two armor spearheads to separate from each other!, sending the armor into unfavourable terrain and then being shocked! shocked! at the Soviets doing successful defensive stands against 4 of the 5 thrusts (the 1st Infantry Corps thrust to Dno succeeded, not in small measure due to Soviet decision to sprung a trap at Soltsy).

However, there were other options, which might have led to significantly better success, but that's more of a WHAT-IF issue.

[ViKinG]

Well that's what i'm saying BDV, they didn't have the required resources to achieve the goals THEY had decided to achieve. Splitting their armour and infantry like that when you don't have enough of each division to go around.

[Max Payload]

However, there were other options, which might have led to significantly better success ...

I'm not sure what better options AG North had. It's objective was to isolate the SU from the Baltic. Eighteenth Army had to clear 8th Army from Estonia, and Sixteenth Army had to maintain contact with the left flank of AG Centre (which was heading for Nevel and beyond).
Although OKH originally envisaged the advance on Leningrad to be via Novgorod and Chudovo, I doubt that the supply situation east of the Vilikaya in the second week of July would have enabled the whole of Fourth Panzer Group to advance along the Soltsy/Shimsk route. Even if that had been possible, the Group's left flank would have been exposed to attack from the north.
Also Hoepner and Busch had little idea of what they were facing or likely to face east of the Vilikaya. LOG, 48th Army, 34th Army, 22nd Army - they weren't supposed to exist.
If Hoepner had paused at Pskov, he would have been sacked for timidity; if he had sent the whole of the Group east, it would have been strung out along a barely adequate road network west of Lake Ilmen and vulnerable to flank attack; and the supply situation precluded sending the whole Group north to the Luga.

[ViKinG]

Good points Max. When Reinhardt's XXXXI panzer pushed north toward Luga, their goal was to piece the Luga defense line before it could be solidly established. When they set out from Pskov, the Luga line was in fact in the first stages of building up. Perhaps if LVI panzer korps had also attacked in the same direction then maybe the results would have been better? Ex - establishing solid bridgeheads across the Luga . However like you pointed out there were several soviet armies in the Lake il'men area that would now threaten their right flank. We can't forget the supply situation which was a definite factor and the Luftwaffe was struggling to offer support with so much territory to cover. If the 16th army would have been left alone to hold the Sol'tsy/Staraia Russa sector there's a strong chance the Soviet units in that area could have punched through their lines and widen a large gap between AGN and AGC. Looking back I think they had no choice but to commit their forces like they did and simply didn't have enough to achieve a quick advance to Leningrad. Before long the STAVKA started to stack new armies in the area, by then it was simply too late to expect a quick victory in the sector. On top of that it was the STAVKA's goal to keep AGN units from being transferred to AGC for operation Typhoon later on.

[BDV]

I think the logical thing to do was to use the armor in conjunction with the infantry in immediate vecinity.

Why did TKopf sacrifice to take Opochka if not to open the road SE to Pustoshka and Nevel (for 8th Panzer to drive down on, joining the19th panzer and bagging the entire AGC-AGN seam).

Also, fall of Pskov left the soviet defenders split in two, by the Peipus Lake. So 41st Panzer can swing west (logistically preferable Tartu is 200 km closer than Luga city). Alternatively, the 18th Army can join (and provide mass for) the drive to Luga, leaving just a screen on the Tartu-Parnu line

[Max Payload]

Why did TKopf sacrifice to take Opochka if not to open the road SE to Pustoshka and Nevel (for 8th Panzer to drive down on, joining the19th panzer and bagging the entire AGC-AGN seam).

The terrain east of Opochka was simply impassable for Manstein's mechanised forces. That's why he turned back and headed for Ostrov.

Also, fall of Pskov left the soviet defenders split in two, by the Peipus Lake. So 41st Panzer can swing west (logistically preferable Tartu is 200 km closer than Luga city).

I don't see the logic of Reinhardt turning back to the west from Pskov when his objective was Leningrad. Also the Soviet defenders would not have been the only ones split in two; so would Fourth Panzer Group and AG North. And from Tartu, where? Narva? Voroshilov might have welcomed only having to defend the relatively short stretch of the Narva between Lake Peipus and the Gulf of Finland instead of the Luga.

Alternatively, the 18th Army can join (and provide mass for) the drive to Luga, leaving just a screen on the Tartu-Parnu line

That is to some extent what happened when two of Eighteenth Army's corps were removed and subordinated to Hoepner. But that was in August. If it had been tried in the first half of July it would just have exacerbated the German supply problems east of the Vilikaya.

[ViKinG]

We can't forget also that OKH had directed Hoepner's fourth panzer group to make its main attack between Lake Peipus and Lake Il'men therefore leading him to Luga. That choice wasn't his to make. There were only two weakened Soviet Rifle Corps in the Tartu/Tallinn area to hold back the 18th army (the 10th and 11th Soviet rifle corps). The 18th army alone could easily deal with the two and I have to agree with Max that the narva line north of Lake Peipus would have been MUCH easier to hold for Voroshilov than the Luga Line. This leaves only the Luga axis of attack option for Reinhardt.

[ViKinG]

I also have another question. In David Glantz' book - The Battle of Leningrad - On page 59 he mentions the diversion of AGC's panzer group three northward to assist AGN in Late August 1941. ON August 22-25 the 19th and 20th panzer divisions were sent north toward Velikie Luki to destroy the Soviet 22nd army and he mentions it was supported by the XXXX Army Korps. What was the make up of XXXX army korps at the time?

[Max Payload]

What was the make up of XXXX army korps at the time?

Not sure about 22-25 August, but on 3 September it was based on the 102 and 256 Infantry Divs.

[ViKinG]

So that means 256th came from XX Korps /9th army and the 102nd came from 18th army's XXXXII Korps. Interesting to see how many of these divisions change locations and Korps' during the fighting. Getting hard to keep track of them all haha. In fact 19th and 20th panzer divisions going to ward Velikie Luki weren't even from the same panzer korps originally but were grouped together in a ''new'' LVII panzer korps. I'm pretty sure 7th panzer was the only panzer division to stay behind with AGC while the rest including XXXIX panzer and LVII panzer korps attacked northward but all their divisions were mixed around.

[Max Payload]

Interesting to see how many of these divisions change locations and Korps' during the fighting. Getting hard to keep track of them all ...

It can get very confusing but it was common practice. There must have been times, during major offensive operations by one side or the other, when even experienced staff officers struggled to keep up with the redeployments.