Questions about Stalingrad

[Yuri]

I am familiar with the 10 days reports. You should learn how to read the casualty reporting system (Verlustwesen), before correcting other posters. There are KIA, WIA , MIA, DOW/HW, other causes (sick, later returns, frostbitten etc.). They cannot have sustained 150,000 KIA in the city. The ration strength of 6th army was 298,573 (26,000 on leave, 50,000 Hiwis), plus 152,000 allies (see M.Kehrig, Stalingrad, Anlage 14 , 1974, p. 671). 4th Panzer Army had 42,215 men plus Romanian Divisions with 104,700 men (80,700 Romanians in Div., 24,000 non specified/in non-divisional HQ units), for a total of 146,915 men. Actual strength is always lower than ration strength. Ist Stärke: 242,583
These 3 armies faced the Soviet offensive with 597,488 men opposed by 1,106,000 men.

If you take 1,100,006 for the Red Army, Axis forces it is necessary to consider all the forces of the Italian 8th army. The Soviet South-Western front, all the forces which are included in the 1,100,006, occupied the area along Don river, which the enemy held the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian. In the reserve of the 8th Italian army was 294-nd and 62-nd German infantry divisions. Before 19 November the battle group of the 62nd infantry division was transferred to the area of Kletskaya, and the result -in ring.

There, in the ring, was all 294-nd pioneer battalion 294 infantry division. In addition to the ring came a group of Italians (about 1000 people). This group went by truck to Stalingrad for firewood (in the don steppes there are no trees, they wanted to take apart the wooden house on the outskirts of Stalingrad). Just November 19, the group crossed the river via the bridge of Don near Kalach and hit the ring. These examples (such examples can give a lot) show the difficulty in determining the actual size of the documents only the 6th army. Not enough documents of army group B, as the ring came as non-Heer units and even non-Wehrmacht units (e.g. battalions "agricultural" army Goering or RAD).

[Stiltzkin]

The Soviet figure is even without reserves, most Soviet literature uses such a categorization. 3 fronts, facing the German offensive. If anything the number was even higher. Half of those were probably committed to the fighting from Kletskaya over Serafimov to Stalingrad. The Axis units were understrength anyway.

from Kursk Statistical Analysis,

https://books.google.de/books?id=lZb7AQ ... e&q&f=true

"It has also been written that Zitadelle marked a shift in the balance of forces on the eastern front. During the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the Red Army is said to have enjoyed numerical parity, while during Zitadelle the numerical superiority is purported to have been 1.5 to 1 in the Soviet favour, which should have increased further to 2 to 1 in the battles along the Dniepr.23 This is all wrong however. The Red Army enjoyed a far better numerical ratio than equality during the Stalingrad offensive. The myth of equality is fostered by Soviet literature that claims that the 1.106 million men of the Southwest, Don and Stalingrad Fronts were opposed by 1.011 million men from the Axis powers. 24 But the Axis forces on the sector covered by those three Soviet fronts, comprising 1.106 million men, did not amount to one million men. Rather the Red Army was opposed by around half a million men.25 This produces a force ratio quite consistent with the fact that the overall force ratio on the eastern front was 6.03 million Red Army soldiers26 versus 2,932,329 German27 and 648,000 satellite28 troops"

[BarKokhba]

Thanks Yuri. Are there any valid reports of troop strength of those foreign axis units?

[Art]

The ration strength of 6th army was 298,573 (26,000 on leave, 50,000 Hiwis)

BTW about that thing:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1455889
So the original report used by Kehrig reads 31 thousand Hiwis and POWs in divisions and 21 thousand (mostly Germans) in troops attached to divisions.

4th Panzer Army had 42,215 men plus Romanian Divisions with 104,700 men (80,700 Romanians in Div., 24,000 non specified/in non-divisional HQ units)

I guess that rather means 42 215 ration strength in German divisions, 80 700 in Romanian divisions and 24 000 in non-divisional units (mostly Germans):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 03#p493903
From Axworthy the Romanian 4 Army (basically the Romanian element in the 4 PzAOK) numbered about 75 000 at the start of "Uranus", which more or less agrees with said above.

195,000-209,529 captured in the pocket

There was never such a number of prisoners, I'm quite sure about it. The common figures are 91 000 POWs taken during the final reduction of the pocket (10.1.-2.02.43). Plus at most several thousand POWs taken before 10.1.43. If you consider this the 6-digit figure of fatal casualties doesn't seem improbable.

[Stiltzkin]

Overmans established such a number, whether its right or wrong, who knows, but that isn't the problem here.

91 000 POWs taken during the final reduction

Those were remnants in the city, the 300,000 figure is for the complete axis forces (the pocket did not only encompass the city), 178,000 is for the AOK 6, the calculation comes from MIA estimation via Verlustwesen for AOK6 (the majority of troops and also a good amount of german troops).

Lets just assume all of them were in the pocket , if 91,000 prisoners in the last phase are captured, with the majority being Germans, that would leave a maxium of 90,000 KIA, with the fighting from September up to November this figure would not even exceed 100,000. If you are speaking about total axis KIA, sure this figure might surpass 150,000 if you include Kletskaya, Serafimovich and the vicinity.
Fatalities aren't just KIA.

6-digit figure of fatal casualties doesn't seem improbable.

So you are saying there were 150,000 German KIA in the city? AOK 6 did not even sustain 100,000 KIA during 1 year of fighting. The number of Hiwis does not change much. Thats just nitpicking. We are trying to find out German KIA in the city here, not MIA or other figures.
You do not understand the fundamental flaw: The exchange rate in combat is expressed via KIA. Stalingrad is no difference (at least before the envelopment).

[Art]

So you are saying there were 150,000 German KIA in the city?

The original documents said "Stalingrad and the area". I don't know what was the size of the area exactly, but given that the same report read that 38 000 km^2 area was cleared of mines it could be quite considerable. And again it clear that given the difference between the number of men missing in the pocket and the number of POWs taken, casualties as killed or frozen to death in the last weeks were huge. I'm not ready to tell the number but certainly huge.

[Art]

4. Does one have any idea about the amount of Russian POW's in and around Stalingrad?

From the war diary of the 6 AOK, 17.10.42:

Beginning from 13.9 (start of offensive in Stalingrad) to 16.10 the Army captured 17 917 prisoners, destroyed or knocked out 233 tanks, captured and destroyed 302 guns.
In heavy defense fighting on the northern front during the same period 5 625 prisoners were captured, 616 tanks - destroyed or knocked out, 87 guns of all types - destroyed or captured.
Beginning from 13.9 fighters shot down in the Stalingrad area more than 670 enemy airplanes, flak or ground troops shot down further 88.
Own losses in Stalingrad during the same period made:
Killed in action - 69 officers, 2438 other ranks
Wounded - 271 officers, 10 107 other ranks
Missing in action - 3 officers, 298 other ranks

From the day of the Don crossing 21.8 the Army in attack and defense captured 57 800 prisoners, destroyed and knocked out 1950 tanks, captured or destroyed 805 guns of all types, drowned 10 gunboats and 14 other vessels on Volga.
The air force during the same period shot down more than 1700 enemy airplanes, flak and ground troops - further 269.
Own losses of the army beginning from 21.8 were:
Killed - 239 officers, 7456 other ranks
Wounded - 821 officers, 30 360 other ranks
Missing in action - 8 officers, 1127 other ranks.

[Henri Winkelman]

4. Does one have any idea about the amount of Russian POW's in and around Stalingrad?

From the war diary of the 6 AOK, 17.10.42:

Beginning from 13.9 (start of offensive in Stalingrad) to 16.10 the Army captured 17 917 prisoners, destroyed or knocked out 233 tanks, captured and destroyed 302 guns.
In heavy defense fighting on the northern front during the same period 5 625 prisoners were captured, 616 tanks - destroyed or knocked out, 87 guns of all types - destroyed or captured.
Beginning from 13.9 fighters shot down in the Stalingrad area more than 670 enemy airplanes, flak or ground troops shot down further 88.
Own losses in Stalingrad during the same period made:
Killed in action - 69 officers, 2438 other ranks
Wounded - 271 officers, 10 107 other ranks
Missing in action - 3 officers, 298 other ranks

From the day of the Don crossing 21.8 the Army in attack and defense captured 57 800 prisoners, destroyed and knocked out 1950 tanks, captured or destroyed 805 guns of all types, drowned 10 gunboats and 14 other vessels on Volga.
The air force during the same period shot down more than 1700 enemy airplanes, flak and ground troops - further 269.
Own losses of the army beginning from 21.8 were:
Killed - 239 officers, 7456 other ranks
Wounded - 821 officers, 30 360 other ranks
Missing in action - 8 officers, 1127 other ranks.

Thanks Art, I was a little bit lost in the discussion but this is useful stuff. The 17.917 prisoners of the first paragraph are probably included in the 57.800 prisoners of the second paragraph, aren't they?

Anyway, it clearly shows the initial success of the German operation.

[Art]

The 17.917 prisoners of the first paragraph are probably included in the 57.800 prisoners of the second paragraph, aren't they?

Obviously they are.

[Art]

Ok, prisoners captured by AOK 6 in July-October 1942 (all the area, not Stalingrad only):

11-21.7 - about 11 000
22.7 - 549
23.7 - 298
24.7 - 139
25.7 - 127
27.7 - 2 512
28.7 - 704
29.7 - 3 043
30.7 - 2 357
31.7 - 3 124
1.8 - 2 256
Total 16 704 POWs taken 23.7-1.8
3.8 - 1 454
4.8 - 390
5.8 - 803
6.8 - 263
7.8 - 263
Total 1-10.8 - 15 652 POWs
12.8 - 3 908
13.8 - 965
14.8 - 606
16.8 - about 10 000
15.8-17.8 - 12 835 cumulative
15.8-18.8 - 15 030
15.8-19.8 - 16 649
15.8-20.8 - 17 087
15.8-21.8 - 22 566
21-27.8 - 14 594 total
28.8 - 539
29.8 - 1 400
30.8 - 1 152
31.8 - 614
1.9 - 823
2 and 3.9 - 918
4.9 - 2 171
5.9 - 1 433
6.9 - 1 052
7.9 - 643
8.9 - 1 132
9.9 - 1 751
10.9 - 1 186
11.9 - 1 347
12.9 - 1 292
13.9 - 464
14.9 - 867
15.9 - 1 023
16.9 - 465
17.9 - 1 566
18.9 - 1 334
19.9 - 1 878
20.9 - 2 159 (beginning from the night 18/19.9)
21.9 - 562
22.9 - 1 169
23.9 - 669
24.9 - 825
25.9 - 701
26.9 - 1 368
27.9 - 881
28.9 - 1 005
29.9 - 691
30.9 - 1 008
1.10 - 484
2.10 - 456
3.10 - 601
4.10 - 509
5.10 - 522
6.10 - 499
7.10 - 1 598
8.10 - 753
9.10 - 84
10.10 - 84
11.10 - 74
12.10 - 94
13.10 - 84
14.10 - 68
15.10 - 439
16.10 - 1 112
17.10 - 496
18.10 - 1 041
19.10 - 614
20.10 - 322

From daily intelligence summaries of the Army's staff, Russian translation posted online:
http://nordrigel.livejournal.com/tag/aok.6
We have a somewhat higher sum for 13.9-16.10 than according to the army's war diary, but an adequate match more or less.
One should also consider prisoners captured by the Pz. AOK 4. For information according to the same source 6 Army captured 203 774 prisoners in May-July 1942 (Kharkov and operation "Blau")

[xsli]

Beevor said "All that we can be fairly sure of is that just under 52,000 members of the Sixth Army had died between 22 November and 7 January, but it is not stated how many of these were Hiwis." Given total Hiwi number at the is 20,000-30,000 at the beginning of Kessel, the dead Germans should be no more than 50,000.

If we use his initial trapped number of 290,000, subtracting Hiwi/Romanians/Italians, then initial Germans trapped should be over 250,000. Since Beevor's number of deaths (~50,000) should include all 6th Army's deaths (42.11.22-43.01.07), adding the max POW 120,000, flown out 25,000-27,000 - then where are the rest (255,000-120,000-50,000-25,000=60,000) go? My guess is that the 60,000 MIA went dead during and after the siege (there are reports of pocket Germans in late March) are not counted. If so, the reported death is less than half of actual deaths - does that mean Germans being too conservative in counting the deaths?

[Stiltzkin]

too conservative in counting the deaths

Define deaths. KIA is not a "death" but is defined as a battle fallen before evacuation and part of "bloody casualties". Death can be anything from accident, fatality, frozen, executed, starved to died of wounds etc. Contrary to popular belief KIAs lower during city fighting. Urban warfare favours the invader (if he enjoys superior firepower), causes a delay during operations and opens up a possibility of isolation (which occured).The encirclement is the reason for the high attrition rate the Wehrmacht sustained. Stalingrad was edged into peoples heads as this legendary battle, the fame notwithstanding. The Romanians and Italians suffered a terrible fate during Case Blue.
German KIA rose on the other hand steadily at the end of the war. The number of deaths in the Wehrmacht was disproportionally high during the Stalingrad operation (due to the cauldron and also certainly due to Rzhev-Sychevka in that particular quarter), but some of the claims are almost absurd. The vicinity of Stalingrad is actually more important than the city fighting itself. 100,000 KIA inside the city centre is therefore highly unlikely. KIA are usually 19-21% of total casualties (KIA+WIA+MIA), this would mean that the Wehrmacht would have sustained 500,000 casualties during this period, it would therefore surpass German casualties for the entire operation.
In total there might have been that many deaths during the operation if you sum up all axis nations losses, but that would not be exclusively tied to the city.
In any way you will not be able to establish an exact overview, because reports are unreliable under such circumstances, so in order to assess the total casualties you might look at the fatalities with Nachmeldungen (late registrations). Up to mid 1943 we can assume that most of them were indeed registered (due to a lull after the 3rd Kharkov) even though certain units were completely annihilated.

date, Accumulated monthly losses, total accumulated, difference
Nov. 1942 1.851.853, 1.893.447, 41.594
Dez. 1942 1.937.922, 2.008.023, 70.101
Jan. 1943 2.021.394, 2.095.461, 74.067
Feb. 1943 2.113.561, 2.371.119, 257.558
März 1943 2.237.656, 2.504.128, 266.472
April 1943 2.274.171, 2.553.579, 279.408
Mai 1943 2.317.272, 2.627.229, 309.957
Juni 1943 2.354.916, 2.666.870, 311.954

and from Overmans, Rüdiger: Das andere Gesicht des Krieges: Leben und Sterben der 6. Armee, in: Förster, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Stalingrad, München: Piper 1992, S. 419-455, hier S. 444., most of the remaining 170,000 of 6th Army are reported as casualties. That is then KIA plus to this have to be added MIA rates and all sorts of possible "deaths".
50,000 KIA is merely the number until reporting gets cut off. From there on one can only extrapolate and make assumptions.

So this means:

55,166 KIA
177,576 WIA
214,897 MIA
447,639 in total, this leaves 270,000 as total potential deaths since most MIAs are going to be a bloody casualty or a PoW one way or another.
There are two options to clear a pocket: If time is against you a quick liquidation is preferrable, but during the Winter, time was on the Soviets side, hence the number of wounded will be naturally lower and DOW can be expected to be greater. Most wounded will turn into MIA.
My assumption is that a substantial amount of men succumbed to their wounds and were left to die, which leaves my calculation for possible KIA inside the city (and its immediate surroundings if you want), based on the 6th Army diary for the city fighting losses for the earlier period (2 months) and all possible KIA of the remaining forces if we assume that battle intensity remained the same (this is the problem with this calculation):

2,507 + 1,329 + 6,870 + 37,486 = 48,192.

Now, not all men are going to be capable of fighting and the men who went missing before ending up in the Kessel were most likely dead.
(lets assume that all are potentially casualties and all of them fight to the death, which leaves our total manpower pool also as a total casualty figure)

Calculations based on the nature of the EF yield:

32,000 perished due to their wounds during winter attrition. The Winter of 41-42 was assevere in relation to "Tote" and "Gefallene", which was a result of the poor preparation for the harsh conditions, so historically speaking the difference between killed and dead was 54 percent, which enables us to use such a modifier for our calculation (for 42/43).
Then a number of 95,000 would make much more sense considering that we are speaking about an encirclement.
Note that the majority of MIA would be dead, thus 89,000 men could be potentially capable of putting up a fight, resulting in 18,683 KIA.
Which then means that the Germans possibly suffered 29,389 KIA inside the city (and its surroundings) up until anyone could have been potentially captured.
The average exchange rate for the entire front was approx. 4.7 (actually it was over 6 for the 4th quarter of 42, but German combat power shrunk), now KIA * ER = 138,128 if we compare this with the irrecoverable losses presented in Grif Sekretnosti Sniat for the Stalingrad Front in the period of 19 November to 31 December (including Volga flotillas and such) of 108,520 this makes absolutely sense. The difference in losses can be perfectly explained by the lack of data for January 1943.

Now we only need to know how many prisoners the Soviets took after the 12th January and we can say something about fatalities.

[xsli]

Define deaths. KIA is not a "death" but is defined as a battle fallen before evacuation and part of "bloody casualties". Death can be anything from accident, fatality, frozen, executed, starved to died of wounds etc.

This is new to me - are you sure that the "deaths" in Beevor's 52,000 do not account KIA? For an English speaker, KIA is one form of death, and should be included in "death" - unless Beevor's has special meaning. If so, I cannot find a note or reference in his context.

Now we only need to know how many prisoners the Soviets took after the 12th January and we can say something about fatalities.

Cannot find exact number of POWs after 01.12, but there are some numbers for references. Beevor quoted Soviet number of 111,465 POWs+8,928 in hospitals for 42.11.19 - 43.01.31 period. This seemed a bit off on the dates: the northern pocket collapsed in 43.02.02, with ~40,000 went into captivity. The southern pocket was destroyed on 01.31, with ~50,000 captured (from Glantz). These two numbers matched well with the total 91,000 for the surrendered at the end of large-scale resistance. Without the POWs from northern pocket, I doubt that Soviet caught 120,000 POWs at the end of Jan. It should include the POWs from northern one. The mop-up operations continued until the end of March, with another ~10,000 captured - according to Glantz quoting a NKVD report.

Overmans stated a total of ~130,000 went into captivity, among them about 110,000 Germans. These two numbers seem quite acceptable to me.

[Dann Falk]

OK....This is from my unpublished book...My research on the history of the 64 Army.

"But we should also remember the Axis units surrounded at Stalingrad suffered a great deal more. It was reported that after the battle, some 140,000 dead and frozen Axis troops were picked up from the Stalingrad battlefield and buried. Other sources claim 146,300 corpses had been collected, but who can say for sure which number is the real one. The best we can do is to estimate the losses based on what hard data we have, and reach a reasonable/believable value, and then go on from there. "

"Accounting for enemy troops captured during Operation Ring suffers from the same vague but believable values. The Russians reportedly took some 2,500 officers and 24 generals prisoner, and then most accounts go on to announce the capture of over 91 thousand Axis soldiers and officers at Stalingrad. Certainly the 91,000 total prisoners is a generally accepted value, but we may never know the true number. But what we do know, from the historical record, is that most of these 91,000 prisoners were to suffer even further at the hands of their captors, with only some 5,000 - 6,000 returning home after the war. But we must also not forget about the thousands of additional prisoners of war captured in and around Stalingrad during Operation Uranus in November 1942, what happened to them? They number some 109,000 Germans, 40,000 Romanians, 60,000 Italian and about 40,000 Hungarian troops. We know they fell into the hands of the advancing Red Army, but what happened to them after capture? How many of these forgotten POWs would return home after the end of the war? For these Italian POWs, it is thought that only some 10,000 of were repatriated after the war. Of the other prisoners captured during Operation Uranus, who knows how many survived?

But these totals are only for Axis troops, what about the Hiwis? Before during and after the Stalingrad battle, there were large numbers of Russian/Soviet military prisoners of war working for the German and Axis armies. These so call Hiwis (helpers) served mostly in noncombat positions behinds the lines. There were approximately 30,000 of these helpers in and around Stalingrad during November 1942. Most German divisions had several thousand Hiwis assigned to each of them. It has been estimated that during Operation Uranus more than 20,300 Hiwis troops were surrounded at Stalingrad along with the German VI and IV Panzer Armies. Of these, approximately 10,000 Hiwis died during the fighting or were executed by the Soviets after capture. The remaining 10,000 were processed by NKVD forces and then sent to either penal or replacement units. We do know the Soviet authorities, and NKVD troops spared no effort to find and identify there traitors and eliminate them. The lucky ones lived to serve the Red Army again, spilling their blood on the battlefield would cleanse them of their crimes against the state."

Then.....

"A German solider relates “That evening we reached Beketovka Camp and were split up into houses without windows. As they (civilians and Russian troops) had taken our blankets we had to sleep in the cold and damp on the stone floor. Soon there were 50,000 prisoners at the Beketovka Camp. Terrible things went on there because the men were starving. The camp had two Opel-Blitz Lorries (German trucks) which did nothing all day but remove the corpses to nearby gullies. There was a kitchen, but insufficient for so many prisoners, so one got something to eat once a week if one were lucky”...."Eventually over 35,000 POWs were to die just in the camps around Beketovka and even more in the other camps."

"Speaking about rear area organization, the head of the NKVD of the Stalingrad area of Commissioner of State Security, Voronin, once again issues a report, this time #5088 about security at POW camps around Stalingrad. He notes that 16 days after Beria issued orders about the care and treatment of POWs, only about 20-25% of the required food had arrived. Of the vehicles that were to be delivered, only about 50% of the trucks and cars had arrived, and of these only about half were in running condition. He also notes that despite specific orders, there are more than 10,000 sick and wounded prisoners of war in the camps and not in hospitals. Due to all these issues, and more, the death rate had increased for POWs to some 700 men per day. "

And....

"February 25 1943
The NKVD takes over total control of all the remaining POW camps from the Red Army in and around the Stalingrad area. They have listed in 13 different camps some 142,861 prisoners. Clearly some of these prisoners must have also been captured during Operation Uranus in November and during the continuing advances of the Red Army westward in December, January, and February. Nevertheless the long term outlook was grim for prisoners of war. “Chances of survival in the Soviet camp system were rank-dependent. Over 95% of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men perished; 55% of junior officers died; but only 5% of senior officers expired.” By the spring of 1943, some 55,228 prisoners captured at Stalingrad had died. Cold, starvation, and the lack of medical care took their toll, with out of control Typhus being the biggest killer."

I hope this gives you an idea of what went on after the battle. This is my research and I stand by these numbers. For the full story....you must wait for my book

[xsli]

Thanks Stiltzkin and Dann for their additional information. May I ask the name of the book - Dann?