4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

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stg 44
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4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#1

Post by stg 44 » 21 Feb 2017, 04:20

Based on some discussions I've been having on other forums about the flaws in Barbarossa, looking at the conduct of the campaign in the Baltic states in 1941 there seems to have been some serious flaws in the conception of maneuver. The race to the Dvina river by 4th Panzer Group seems to have missed a major chance to entrap the Soviet 8th army before it could fall back to the river and Riga, instead apparently relying on deep penetration to achieve the collapse of the enemy; instead 4th Panzer Group stood immobilized in bridgeheads while they waited for supply and foot infantry divisions to keep up; then they raced as quickly for Leningrad as possible, repeatedly immobilized by logistics issues or in Manstein's case running into a Soviet ambush while trying to push through swamps. Again and again it just seems like they were seeking some nebulous deep objective that was either too far for them to reach before it was defended (Leningrad) or their deep strikes produce collapse of Soviet armies, which also never occurred, achieving neither while letting Soviet armies slip away. Am I missing something about what they were trying to achieve or did achieve with their repeated stops and starts? Did they actually screw up by trying to go too deep and neglecting the practical realities of logistics and the need for infantry support in deep operations? I know this comes close to a What If question, but in reading David Stahel's account of Barbarossa, it seems to fit into the idea of too much focus on doctrine and too little on practical realities of Russia level depths of operation and the logistical requirements for it; still some historians talk about multiple missed opportunities for exploitation of deep Panzer operations, but it seems that such arguments ignore the problems of logistics that repeatedly immobilized such thrusts. Anyone care to clarify or offer an opinion?

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#2

Post by Stiltzkin » 21 Feb 2017, 04:38

Yes, surely they must have had some kind of problem with maneuvering because they were only advancing 73.7 km a day.


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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#3

Post by stg 44 » 21 Feb 2017, 04:51

Stiltzkin wrote:Yes, surely they must have had some kind of problem with maneuvering because they were only advancing 73.7 km a day.
Not sure if you misunderstood my point or are strawmanning; the problem was that they were striking too deep to no effect other than pushing the Soviets back without hitting anything vital to disrupt their ability to fight. It would seem that doing something else like helping encircle Soviet armies that were retreating was a more profitable than repeatedly outrunning their logistics and facing repeated pauses while Soviet forces reconstituted.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#4

Post by Stiltzkin » 21 Feb 2017, 05:03

Yes, because other nations had the privilege of retreating 1200km.
Soviet forces did not reconstitute, they were getting decimated or encircled as long as the Wehrmacht could keep up the advance. With the arrival of the rasputitsa, the RKKA losses shrunk, enabling them to build up their forces. Difficulties occured when the German forces were exhausted and logistics strained, resulting in the ultimate decision to stand idle.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#5

Post by stg 44 » 21 Feb 2017, 05:10

Stiltzkin wrote:Yes, because other nations had the privilege of retreating 1200km.
Soviet forces did not reconstitute, they were getting decimated or encircled as long as the Wehrmacht could keep up the advance. With the arrival of the rasputitsa, the RKKA losses shrunk, enabling them to build up their forces. Difficulties occured when the German forces were exhausted and logistics strained, resulting in the ultimate decision to stand idle.
So to be clear what AG-North/4th Panzer Group did historically was the best option?

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#6

Post by Stiltzkin » 21 Feb 2017, 05:22

So to be clear what AG-North/4th Panzer Group did historically was the best option?
It was a race against time, further delays would have given the enemy even more time to prepare, but no the best option would have been not to go there at all.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#7

Post by GregSingh » 21 Feb 2017, 07:05

There was no 1200 km from East Prussia to Leningrad, 750 km max.
Considering it took from 22nd of June to the end of September to get there, we have 101 days. That gives 7.4 km/day, not 74 km/day.

Point is they got quickly to Pskov (9th of July) - 520 km in 18 days - 29 km/day
Then there was no blitzkrieg.
To Luga (31st of July) - 100 km in 22 days - 4.5 km/day
To Uritzk (30th of September) - 110 km in 61 days - 1.8 km/day

There was hardly any rasputitsa in July, August or September.

True is, 4th Pz.G. was too weak for the task. It started to move forward from Luga line only after receiving reinforcements from HG Mitte.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#8

Post by Stiltzkin » 21 Feb 2017, 09:37

There was no 1200 km from East Prussia to Leningrad, 750 km max.
Considering it took from 22nd of June to the end of September to get there, we have 101 days. That gives 7.4 km/day, not 74 km/day.
From Brest-Litovsk to Moscow ca. 1100 km, still 750km is a lot of ground to give. Time was on the RKKA's side.
So advance rates are linear now? Hm, there might be a difference between marching and maneuvering...oh wait, I might be mistaken.

Operation Barbarossa rates of advance, Analyzing World War II eastern front battles, Journal of Slavic military studies, LVI corps (motorized), :
Late June: 310 km in 4 days and 5 hours.
Late September-October: 133 km in 5 days.
Does not seem to indicate that the 4th completely screwed up during Barbarossa, do you really think that would have made any difference?
There was hardly any rasputitsa in July, August or September.
I wish there was a facepalm emote.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#9

Post by Art » 21 Feb 2017, 10:27

stg 44 wrote: Am I missing something about what they were trying to achieve or did achieve with their repeated stops and starts?
The idea was apparently to break through the Dvina River and border fortifications at the former Soviet-Latvian border as fast as possible to prevent Soviet forces from consolidating on those natural defensive positions. That required a movement along a straight line more or less without any complicated maneuvers to save time. This plan worked in general as they advanced about 6/7 of the distance from the Prussian border to Leningrad. Not a small result by any rate.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#10

Post by Art » 21 Feb 2017, 10:34

Worth to add that PzGr 1 employed essentially the same form of maneuver.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#11

Post by Max Payload » 21 Feb 2017, 11:49

Art wrote: The idea was apparently to break through the Dvina River and border fortifications at the former Soviet-Latvian border as fast as possible to prevent Soviet forces from consolidating on those natural defensive positions.
With the ultimate objective of securing Leningrad and closing off the SU's access to the Baltic. I doubt that diverting resources and losing time in isolating 8 Army south of the Dvina would have assisted in the effort to achieve that objective. Also, Hoepner had secured vital bridgeheads over the Dvina within the first five or six days of the commencement of the operation, bridgeheads that he had to defend if he was to make further rapid progress to the north. Diverting resources towards the coast may have compromised those bridgehead defences.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#12

Post by stg 44 » 21 Feb 2017, 14:06

Art wrote: The idea was apparently to break through the Dvina River and border fortifications at the former Soviet-Latvian border as fast as possible to prevent Soviet forces from consolidating on those natural defensive positions. That required a movement along a straight line more or less without any complicated maneuvers to save time. This plan worked in general as they advanced about 6/7 of the distance from the Prussian border to Leningrad. Not a small result by any rate.
Ok, do you think that was the result of WW1 experience of the Russians being able to hold the Dvina line for years? Wasn't that a suboptimal strategy for WW2 though? It let the Soviet 8th army escape and live to fight another day, probably saving Leningrad as 8th army was able to drag out the Estonia campaign and left forces relatively intact enough to fight in defense of the city, while 4th Panzer's forces ran out of steam well short of the city repeatedly until reinforced by 3rd Panzer Group.
Max Payload wrote: With the ultimate objective of securing Leningrad and closing off the SU's access to the Baltic. I doubt that diverting resources and losing time in isolating 8 Army south of the Dvina would have assisted in the effort to achieve that objective. Also, Hoepner had secured vital bridgeheads over the Dvina within the first five or six days of the commencement of the operation, bridgeheads that he had to defend if he was to make further rapid progress to the north. Diverting resources towards the coast may have compromised those bridgehead defences.
But 8th army was able to pull back relatively intact into Estonia and kept that campaign going into September. Isolating and destroying 8th army south of the Dvina would have left Riga open and with it the ability to cross the river relatively without issue and move on to capture Estonia intact from Soviet forces, while Rheinhart's Panzer Corps could then attack East to Pskov from Riga; Manstein's corps could still take it's bridgehead and hold it, but advancing out of it might depend on waiting for Rheinhart from the west to disrupt Soviet forces from that direction while 16th army moves up in support.

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#13

Post by BDV » 22 Feb 2017, 01:30

IMO, mid-July 1941 was screw-up for all Panzer Gruppe.

Interpreting the Directive 21 with hindsight one could lay the blame at the feet of the field generals, in particular for failing to seal the AGC-AGN seam, and launching the strike towards Leningrad.

But the AGC AGS seam was not even touched upon in Directive 21, except to decree the Pripyat Marshes as "impassable" IIRC. I think two soviet armies, 3 and 5 found them passable enough.

So let's blame Honer, Guderian and Hoth, and Kleist

BUT then we have Directive 21's "daring deep strikes" business; which is exactly what Pz Gruppe 2,3,and 4 attempted July 10-July 15.

And surely, from the strategic POV, the deep strikes in July had to succeed, because if the Soviets were not defeated in 6-12 weeks and managed to fight in depth and drag the war to 1942, or Adolf forbid 1943, the Western Front became untenable once USofA joined; with the situation ending in the two front war WWI remake.

Now, Japan attack bought Germany some minimal time, as USA and Britain&Co found themselves engaged in a two front war; and "securing the west coast" while reducing the size of Barbarossa, did secure the Atlantic Coast.

But, if Japan holds out of the war, Germany position is untenable as soon as 1942. "Defending everywhere, he defended nowhere" said an Old Prussian, eminently applicable to the German strategic choice of 1941.
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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#14

Post by Stiltzkin » 22 Feb 2017, 02:05

IO, mid-July 1941 was screw-up for all Panzer Gruppe
They destroyed 185 Divisions in under 5 months, perhaps the failure might lie in that they were given an impossible task?

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Re: 4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

#15

Post by Cult Icon » 22 Feb 2017, 02:46

Glantz talks about Pzgruppe IV needing to produce log roads on the road to Leningrad. Lots of forest, swamps. Terrain issues

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