Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow

[randwick]

.

Not only for the generals , it seems for the soldiers the thought of taking Moscow was a major morale boost
after all they wanted this campaign to be wrapped up before chrismass ,
it made the feeling of failure all the more bitter

.

[princeliberty10311517]

Hi Deans,in reply to your post.

1.The effects of a different rate of advance...
Yes,this was either a problem OR a great stategic opportunity depending on how you viewed it.Smolensk was reached on 15 June,the 24 th day of the attack.About 650 kms from the frontier.Obviously an incredible strategic advantage in such a short space of time,but correspondingly it also presented it's problems too-as you noted.However the first of the infantry divisions started arriving in the area around the 27th[from memory].By early august,the bulk of the infantry divisions were either in the line or reducing the smolensk pocket.Now this certainly does not imply that AGC could have struck out towards Moscow immediately,but given 10-14 days to bring the mobile formations up to strength,there is no reason why Typhoon could not have been launched around 17-18 August.By that date,the soviet forces facing AGC were still numerically,as well as qualitatively,inferior.

2.All units of AG Centre also needed to Stockpile enough supplies for a fresh advance-
The fact that there was a supply problem in July is not at all surprising,given the rate of advance.But by August the converted rail line had been extended through to Smolensk,and AGC was receiving supply both from the rail head at Smolensk PLUS the truck convoys operating out of Minsk.Lack of supply did not stop Guderian attacking Roslavl on Aug 2nd,nor did it not stop Hoth from intervening in AG North's operations in mid-august.ALL of Guderians operations from Roslavl and down to Kiev,were supplied from AGC.Therefore,if there was sufficient supply capacity to maintain AGC in it's positions as well as supporting Guderian's offensives,then a mid-august Typhoon would not have suffered from a crucial lack of supply.The main reason for the supply difficulties in this period was the static nature of the fighting,which used more ammunition,especially heavy artillery ordnance.An early return to the offensive[eg an august Typhoon]would have resolved these difficulties.

3.Soviet formations in the Ukraine may have threatened the southern flank of the thrust.
This just plain wrong.After the fall of Unecha in mid-august,the soviets were actually evacuating Gomel and going south and east.The divisions of 2nd army would have maintained this area and prevented any large scale threat.As well,the soviet forces in the Kiev area were already engaged with AG South,and had really no chance of mounting an offensive north.The roads were poor and the transportation assets were not sufficient.As for the Red Army in Orel-Vyasma falling back,highly unlikely,as they did not fall back at Kiev or during the actual Typhoon of October.Strategic withdrawal was something for 1942,not 1941.

4.The Red Army would also have moved divisions.....
Well given that the trip from Siberia was 2 weeks alone just for the transit,then another 2 weeks to deploy etc,I stongly doubt those forces would have arrived in time to interfere in an August typhoon.It is likely,however,that they would have played a part in late September and that is an open question.
Regards Tim Wells

The Siberian troops coming in, also missing the point.

For the German view the more Russian armies that could be brought into the battle of Moscow in the SUMMER, the beter.

That's one the reasons for going after Moscow, it gives the Germans the best chance to land the biggest blow.

[ljadw]

Hi Deans,in reply to your post.

1.The effects of a different rate of advance...
Yes,this was either a problem OR a great stategic opportunity depending on how you viewed it.Smolensk was reached on 15 June,the 24 th day of the attack.About 650 kms from the frontier.Obviously an incredible strategic advantage in such a short space of time,but correspondingly it also presented it's problems too-as you noted.However the first of the infantry divisions started arriving in the area around the 27th[from memory].By early august,the bulk of the infantry divisions were either in the line or reducing the smolensk pocket.Now this certainly does not imply that AGC could have struck out towards Moscow immediately,but given 10-14 days to bring the mobile formations up to strength,there is no reason why Typhoon could not have been launched around 17-18 August.By that date,the soviet forces facing AGC were still numerically,as well as qualitatively,inferior.

2.All units of AG Centre also needed to Stockpile enough supplies for a fresh advance-
The fact that there was a supply problem in July is not at all surprising,given the rate of advance.But by August the converted rail line had been extended through to Smolensk,and AGC was receiving supply both from the rail head at Smolensk PLUS the truck convoys operating out of Minsk.Lack of supply did not stop Guderian attacking Roslavl on Aug 2nd,nor did it not stop Hoth from intervening in AG North's operations in mid-august.ALL of Guderians operations from Roslavl and down to Kiev,were supplied from AGC.Therefore,if there was sufficient supply capacity to maintain AGC in it's positions as well as supporting Guderian's offensives,then a mid-august Typhoon would not have suffered from a crucial lack of supply.The main reason for the supply difficulties in this period was the static nature of the fighting,which used more ammunition,especially heavy artillery ordnance.An early return to the offensive[eg an august Typhoon]would have resolved these difficulties.

3.Soviet formations in the Ukraine may have threatened the southern flank of the thrust.
This just plain wrong.After the fall of Unecha in mid-august,the soviets were actually evacuating Gomel and going south and east.The divisions of 2nd army would have maintained this area and prevented any large scale threat.As well,the soviet forces in the Kiev area were already engaged with AG South,and had really no chance of mounting an offensive north.The roads were poor and the transportation assets were not sufficient.As for the Red Army in Orel-Vyasma falling back,highly unlikely,as they did not fall back at Kiev or during the actual Typhoon of October.Strategic withdrawal was something for 1942,not 1941.

4.The Red Army would also have moved divisions.....
Well given that the trip from Siberia was 2 weeks alone just for the transit,then another 2 weeks to deploy etc,I stongly doubt those forces would have arrived in time to interfere in an August typhoon.It is likely,however,that they would have played a part in late September and that is an open question.
Regards Tim Wells

The Siberian troops coming in, also missing the point.

For the German view the more Russian armies that could be brought into the battle of Moscow in the SUMMER, the beter.

That's one the reasons for going after Moscow, it gives the Germans the best chance to land the biggest blow.

See :" The Sovjet Union at War ":"How many divisions were transferred from Far East in 1941 " Conclusion of Art:"One should estimate the role of the Far East units as not of primary importance ".

[randwick]

.

In the September magazine " WWII history ",A great article by Jonathan Jordan cover the development of Typhoon

pretty much in the middle of the arguments , he assess the failure to overstretch ,
severe lack of supplies and continuing , indeed increasing , resistance of the soviet forces ,
all those problems multiplying each others ,

He point out that without enough trucks the Germans were relying on rail for supplies , unfortunately the lack of Russian gauge rolling stock hampered their efforts , at lower level , transport was mostly horse drawn ,

....My thinking
this was not a bad thing in principle but horses consume very large amount of feed ,
once the local supply was gone either destroyed or the rest eaten by the Soviets or Germans horses ,fresh supplies couldn't be brought forward , the horses numbers was probably plummeting too ,
it is typical that the the photographs of the retreat show few horses and that the artillery often was left behind

there was an heavy requisition of horses through occupied Europe in the early years of the war ,to be send East

the right wing of Guderian seems to have been unable to clean its area of operation of remaining soviet units ,
pure blitzkrieg doctrine is not to worry about it and proceed to the critical rear ,
but as the general staff and Hitler feared in the campaign of France , the panzers would be overstretched, incapable of quickly assuming a defensive posture or even of covering their flanks .movement was the best defense , once the panzer were immobilized ,desperately short of fuel ammunition and reinforcement ,
they had their necks stretched for the axe to fall

the author Jordan lay the blame squarely on the Generals for being too optimistic and misrepresenting the situation
he confirm Hitler intention to isolate Moscow by seizing its rail connections ,
that is fully consistent with Hitler previous statements and the fate of Leningrad ,
it certainly would have brought the soviet leadership to launch desperate wasteful attacks which could be destroyed on the defensive .

the failure of the operation , the scandal of the lack of winter clothing and the hasty withdrawals orders infuriated him .
never the friend of the junker mafia he got rid of a goodly number to make his point .

.

[Peter K]

I refer you to the premature German attack on Warsaw by the 9th Panzer Division on 8/9 September 1939, which the Polish defenders repelled, inflicting very heavy losses on the German tanks in the process.

This is one of the arguments used by Bryan Fugate to show why the Germans could not have captured Moscow in 1941. In my opinion, this argument is flawed, for the simple reason that the organization of panzer division in 1939, was different to that of panzer division in 1941.

The ratio of tanks to infantry in a panzer division in 1939 was roughly 2 to 1 - by 1941, this ratio had changed to 2 to 1 in favour of the infantry. Had the panzer divisions entered Moscow the brunt of the fighting would therefore have been borne by the infantry (fighting from halftracks, lorries etc).

The ratio of tanks to infantry in a panzer division in 1939 was roughly 2:1, but not in the 4. Pz.Div. In the 4. Pz.Div. it was like 1:1, because it had got IR.33(mot.) attached and this regiment also took part in attacking Warsaw on 9 IX:

Map of the German assault on Warsaw on 09.09.1939 - they attacked in two Gefechtsgruppen:

Map of the German assault on Warsaw on 09.09.1939

And during the assault of Warsaw this ratio was even more in favour of infantry, because only one Abteilung from Pz.Rgt.36 participated in the assault and because apart from infantry also numerous pioneer units attached to the division participated in that assault (as well as numerous artillery units attached) - as can be seen on the map.

Another thing is that German infantry in Warsaw was halted in heavy street fightings, while tanks instead of helping the infantry in breaking enemy resistance, advanced further overruning Polish barricades and not waiting for the infantry. As the result tanks remained practically alone and then suffered heavy losses in Polish counterattacks. Also unconventional combat methods contributed to repulsing the assault - for example on Wolska street Col. Pacak-Kuzmirski and his 8./40 pp halted the entire Gruppe 2 using barrels with turpentine. There was literally hell.

[doogal]

If we look at German Operations against (important civic targets) i.e large urban environments once the culminating point of victory was passed we will see a trend which shows that the Wehrmacht was not trained for in houses close fighting.

Outside Leningrad 2 Panzer Divisions with supporting Infantry moved sluggishly the Panzers losing there edge of fire and manouvere this though was Hoepners last chance at a devisive victory so mayde not a great choice.
Sebastapol: How long did it take manstein to reduse this with infantry and artillery:
Taking a city off the March may be possible as u keep those offensive elements inherant in 1932 Truppenruhrung
Even Panzers could be use in a supporting role.

My Point: Clausewitz`s culminating point of vicyory ended as typhoon kicked off/ although taking large prisoners it distracted those commanders already wavering into thinking pz regiments cut by half could bypass the political centre of the communist regime. What was typhoon a real bypass mission or a close investment ?with what forces
Realistically if the GGS had done its job they would have halted many miles from moscow and let the new Soviet Armies destroy themselves on ground of there choice as per Armoured warfsre tactics.

This is the legacy of the Nazi Sate it gave such added pressure that when a great victort was smelled it would boltkike a rabbid dog suddenly forgetting the strategic picture.

doogal

ps please send me private msgs if tnteresred in armour doctrine/ transformation/ general was studies please i am an open uni history student who is an amateur military historian between term i need to learn so much help

[randwick]

.
I'm not sure Sevastopol is a good example ,the southern army group was a bit of a mess during the winter ,
spring saw Soviet activity on ketch peninsula , it severely unbalanced Manstein plans
also of course Sevastopol was a forteress surrounded by massive fortifications and entrenchments
once the defense lines were breached the taking of the town itself was done on the run by assault
Still , Germans had quite a few unhappy experiences with fighting in cities if the defenders had their backs up

The whole problem was that the first phase of Typhoon was very succesful
a surgical stroke and the Soviet forces offered pathetic disorganized resistance
The German high command was probably also aware of the October panic in Moscow
a complete breakdown of order with crowds frantically trying to escape ,
pillaging and throwing away their party cards , burning madly all sorts of documents in the official buildings
quite a few friendly embassies could have told them , Moscow was in a pandemonium
it was ripe for the picking

By the time the news had filtered to them , order had been harshly reestablished
Stalin decision to hold the October ( November) parade was part of it to demonstrate to the country and the soldiers that Moscow would hold
All who took part in the parade mention it as truly momentous ,they were going from the parade to the front
this was the fight , they wouldn't live but they would win

[doogal]

For the succesfull conclusion of hostilities.

This statement should be considered while one is attempting to formulate an opinion about the option for German forces to attempt an early advance towards Moscow. For this is the only concrete assumption ( and i use both words liberally) which can be used as a strategic reason for any such advance. All military priorities prior to the diversion of both Panzer Groups i,e Hoths and Guderians have to be considered subordinate to this line of reasoning.
We also must realise that the steps taken in terms of altering the Operational direction to what were perfectly reasonable and orthodox military objectives of 1) Supporting PG 4 and Army Group North 2) Clearing the flank of Army Group centre and affecting a junction with PG 1 were also subordinated to this essential truth.
It is easy now to determine that these actions contributed enormously to the slowing down of the advance on the front of Army Group Centre, and this would have been most apparent to its commander (Bock). We know from various sources that Von Bock was as the commander of the most prestigious Army Group affected by thoughts of marching on Moscow and bringing about the condition stated at the top of this page. And it is against this that we must measure the possibility of an early advance towards Moscow.
I realise that you are all well aware of this point but it is sometimes lost when discussing the possibilities which presented themselves to German commanders and there higher authorities during 1941.

What we must consider here is not just an attempt to keep those armoured divisions on Army group centres front fighting forward but a re organisation of the Operational nature of the Barbarossa campaign.
As we know the intention laid out was for Armoured spearheads to drive deeply into the Soviet unions western deployment and to encircle and cut off such formations to stop any chance of withdrawal of these forces.
With this in mind we must conclude that following the battle in the Smolensk area Panzer Groups 2 and 3 would of had to have been supported by the bulk of the following forces in the same manner which had seen them gain the ground they were to advance from. If we want to consider such a proposal we must ask.

1) Did such conditions actually exist for the Fourth and Ninth Armies to support such an advance
2) Would a re-grouping such as was organised for Typhoon have been possible
3) How would this have affected the advance of Army Groups North and South at this early stage.

There also exist a myriad of other questions concerned solely with the supply and maintenance of these formations.
Having fought succesive encirclements we know that both Panzer Groups had suffered losses which were far higher than expected, this was true for the infantry divisions and all other elements of the Eastern Army.

With all of these concepts in mind my next post will attempt to find a solution which i can present with confidence and which will attempt to fullfill the first statement laid out at the top of this post.
It would be overbearing to attempt to do this without reading each and every post prior to this and of researching this thread in a far deeper manner.

Thanks from Doogal

[randwick]

.
The main problem for the German was the split goals of the general staff and Hitler
the first phase of the war had been successfully completed , the Soviet field armies had been effectively crushed
the generals were rather hot for Moscow as an objective while Hitler was cool on holding cities as such .
He perceived rightly that taking the means to wage war form the Soviet state would truly destroy its ability to carry the struggle , all the food was in the southern belt so was most of the raw materials , the Northern part was unable to feed itself , it would be a war of strangulation
For him , Kiev was much more important than Moscow , Stalin agreed with him , holding the Ukraine was so important he send a lot of troops there
I believe Hitler would have forfeited Moscow to hold Rostov ,but the situation looked so favorable ,the Soviets so witless ,
it was believed Germany could reach out for both
the net result was that both objectives were pursued ,
serious problems occurred on both and in the end neither of them were attained

[Peter K]

Some still maintain the simplistic view that Germany could have won the Second World War in the summer of 1941, had the Wehrmacht struck straight for Moscow, rather than turn south to capture Kiev.

Turning south towards Kiev was more forced by hard situation of AG Sud rather than "voluntary".

Which direction was most and which was least important, can be seen by comparing the number of fast divisions:

- AG Nord - 6 armoured or motorized divisions
- AG Mitte - 15 armoured or motorized divisions
- AG Sud - 9 armoured or motorized divisions

AG Nord, despite being the weakest, had the fastest advance. On the other hand, AG Sud turned out to be too week to complete its objective - defeat the Soviet 9th Army. It had only one PG and it was not enough, AG Sud was victorious but it was pyrrhic victory. This resulted in further necessity of changing operational plans for all AGs and their PGs.

So the conclusion is that Germans could afford taking a few divisions (let's say 2 armoured-motorized divisions) from AG Nord and reinforcing AG Sud by these divisions - this could have helped them in Ukraine, and probably wouldn't have much influence on the course of events on Leningrad's direction, maybe apart from minor difficulties.

Germans simply underestimated the strength of enemy forces in Ukraine, in front of AG Sud. Moreover, Germans completely lacked reserves, which were necessary after their frontline forces bleeded themselves.

[Qvist]

Er, no. The advance was by far the quickest in the Center, not in the North. By mid-July, when , AG North was preparing to resume its advance from the Dvina, not much more than 300 km from the startline. At the same time, Center was past Smolensk - more than double the distance. Then of course Center came to a halt, while Nord was able to resume its advance - but this was due much more favorable circumstances: Closer proximity to the border, much weaker opposition, relatively speaking the best transport situation of the three Army Groups and the smallest forces to feed from that transport infrastructure. Once Nord's advance ran to the distance Center's had achieved in mid-July, it too petered out.

And, there were no excess resources to draw from Nord. On the contrary, that Army Group was the recipient of a steady stream of reinforcements, as a result of which it steadily grew. Panzer Group 4 (with part of its forces) was only sent south once the advance to Leningrad was stopped. The Army group was heavily reinforced through autumn and winter, and still only barely managed to hold its own defensively. Its forces also, on average, suffered heavier casualties than either Army Group Center or South, during Summer and Fall 1941. It was, in short, badly overmatched relative to its tasks.

2 motorised divisions would not have made any essential difference to AG South's position, but the loss of a third of North's motorised formations would certainly have had an impact on the advance to Leningrad.

The Germans did not lack a reserve - nearly 30 divisions were fed to the commands in the East through the first 3 - 3 1/2 months of Barbarossa, from the OKH reserve. Nearly half of it (in other words, the equivalent of a fairly large army) went to AG South, mainly before it got bogged down on the Dnepr. It just wasn't enough.

cheers

[general g]

If we look at German Operations against (important civic targets) i.e large urban environments once the culminating point of victory was passed we will see a trend which shows that the Wehrmacht was not trained for in houses close fighting.

Outside Leningrad 2 Panzer Divisions with supporting Infantry moved sluggishly the Panzers losing there edge of fire and manouvere this though was Hoepners last chance at a devisive victory so mayde not a great choice.
Sebastapol: How long did it take manstein to reduse this with infantry and artillery:
Taking a city off the March may be possible as u keep those offensive elements inherant in 1932 Truppenruhrung
Even Panzers could be use in a supporting role.

My Point: Clausewitz`s culminating point of vicyory ended as typhoon kicked off/ although taking large prisoners it distracted those commanders already wavering into thinking pz regiments cut by half could bypass the political centre of the communist regime. What was typhoon a real bypass mission or a close investment ?with what forces
Realistically if the GGS had done its job they would have halted many miles from moscow and let the new Soviet Armies destroy themselves on ground of there choice as per Armoured warfsre tactics.

This is the legacy of the Nazi Sate it gave such added pressure that when a great victort was smelled it would boltkike a rabbid dog suddenly forgetting the strategic picture.

doogal

ps please send me private msgs if tnteresred in armour doctrine/ transformation/ general was studies please i am an open uni history student who is an amateur military historian between term i need to learn so much help

House to house fighting is always difficult.To be avoided if at all possible.Your statements about this are seriously exaggerated.

[general g]

.
The main problem for the German was the split goals of the general staff and Hitler
the first phase of the war had been successfully completed , the Soviet field armies had been effectively crushed
the generals were rather hot for Moscow as an objective while Hitler was cool on holding cities as such .
He perceived rightly that taking the means to wage war form the Soviet state would truly destroy its ability to carry the struggle , all the food was in the southern belt so was most of the raw materials , the Northern part was unable to feed itself , it would be a war of strangulation
For him , Kiev was much more important than Moscow , Stalin agreed with him , holding the Ukraine was so important he send a lot of troops there
I believe Hitler would have forfeited Moscow to hold Rostov ,but the situation looked so favorable ,the Soviets so witless ,
it was believed Germany could reach out for both
the net result was that both objectives were pursued ,
serious problems occurred on both and in the end neither of them were attained

The generals wanted to defeat the enemy army.Going for Moscow was a means to try to achieve that.

[piggychops]

The generals wanted to defeat the enemy army.Going for Moscow was a means to try to achieve that.

Why did the Soviets move a tank factory to Chelyabinsk, as Moscow would have been more convenient,& a warmer winter climate? The generals might not have known that in 41 but we know that now? This meant the Soviets planned to fight to the Urals, at least?

The only reason for enveloping Moscow was for the topology of the railway system, without it the Soviets would not be able to move or supply armies as easily. But maintaining and supplying a Ge army around Moscow over a winter would have been more difficult, than the eventual supply problem.

The Soviets could have lost an army around Moscow, left Moscow under seige and still fought on.

The Soviet people were aware that their system was cruel but might have suspected that the Ge plans for them were worse. For example the BBC had told them the Ge invaders were perpetrating an evil not seen since the middle ages, the BBC was not normally nice about the Soviets, but they had not said that about them.

Noel

[Appleknocker27]

The only reason for enveloping Moscow was for the topology of the railway system, without it the Soviets would not be able to move or supply armies as easily. But maintaining and supplying a Ge army around Moscow over a winter would have been more difficult, than the eventual supply problem.

The Soviets could have lost an army around Moscow, left Moscow under seige and still fought on.

Take a good look at that railnet you mentioned because without Moscow, Leningrad will fall and subsequently free Army Group North. That is pretty much a game changer for 1942 if it came to pass in late 1941.