Polish offensive at the Bzura 1939 - Polish lost victory?

[tigre]

Hello Domen ; glad to greet you, as per your request here you can find the source.

http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/war_1939.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Thanks for answering Raul!

Btw - I wrote:

In fact more heavy guns (plus some light ones) were captured, but Knoll didn’t have full reports from the front about this. For example in the locality Gaj III./70 pp captured 2 horse-drawn guns (probably light or infantry) and in the forest near Gieczno and Sypin 12 guns calibre 15 cm were captured by the squadron of divisional cavalry supported by one company of TK tankettes. Both victories were achieved by units from 17 DP (not mentioned in the report).

Even more guns were captured and destroyed. Here something recent from Ebay.de:

Guns of 6th battery / Art.Rgt.30 captured and destroyed by III./57 pp (14 DP) near Janowice - Piatek:

PS:

Photos are described as Nowy Gaj - Piatek, but in fact it was closer to Janowice (between Janowice and Nowy Gaj there is 1 village - Stawy). Captured guns are 10,5cm from 6./AR.30 and near Nowy Gaj there was 2./AR.66 (15cm).

Here the description of capturing these guns from the Forum Odkrywca, written by Gebhardt:

"Photos show guns of 6th battery of Art.Rgt.30 captured on their posts by III/57 pp from 14 DP.

Battalion was operating on the right wing of the regiment. After artillery preparation against recognized nests of enemy resistance, Polish assault started around 6 o'clock. Battalion captured Goslub after which it striked Janowice. During the first phase of combats German counteratack repulsed the Poles but the barrage of Polish artillery on Janowice softened German defensive positions enough that another Polish assault could capture the locality. III battalion started to chase the Germans towards the south, reaching its target - road Piatek-Leczyca. Exactly there it overran and captured the 6th battery of Art.Rgt.30 still located on its firing post.

The only thing which doesn't fit is "Nowy Gaj" in the description of this photo. There was in fact a German artllery unit near Nowy Gaj, but if believing sketches, it was 2nd battery of AR.66 (heavy artillery) and in the above photos we can see "light" guns. 2nd battery [of AR.66] was standing in the gap betwen Polish 14 DP and 17 DP thus it wasn't captured but managed to escape towards Stefanow. Positions of II/AR.30 to which the 6th battery belonged were located closer to Janowice and they were divided from Nowy Gaj by another village - Stawy. But in the end the road Piatek - Leczyca was also crossing Nowy Gaj so mistakes are very likely.

Source: PSZ w II WŚ [ http://www.odk.pl/polskie-sily-zbrojne- ... ,7242.html ]"

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

From the German newspaper:

http://www.archiwum.zgora.pl/wystawy/Ag ... azy/20.JPG

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

at the time of that visit ,the 30 ID was still fighting around warsaw

That visit was on 13.09.1939 near Łódź, not near Warsaw.

And 30 Inf.Div. was not fighting at the Warsaw front.

Fighting at the Warsaw front (24 - 28 September) were:

18, 19, 31, 10, 46, 11, 61 and 217 divisions.

Kurt von Briesen explained how his men had fought to the last round at Piatek and Leczyca.

He forgot to tell his Führer how his men escaped in panic after the Poles had laid an artillery barrage and how he himself was wounded by Polish artillery while trying to stop those escaping soldiers. But I'm not surprise - I'm sure Adolf wouldn't be very pleased if he told him the truth. And von Briesen's fate wouldn't be pleasant after that...

This is how the legend of von Briesen being wounded "on the frontline" while leading "his last reserve battalion to the last counterattack" was born. While in fact von Briesen was wounded by artillery fire of Polish 14. Inf.Div. while desperately trying to stop his escaping men, about one kilometer behind the actual frontline.

Von Briesen had done his best to hide his wounded arm, but there was no mistaking it. The Führer was impressed. ‘And you continued to lead?’ Yes, the general told him, he had continued to command his division. ‘That was my duty.’ Hitler turned to his Army liaison officer, Oberstleutnant Nikolaus von Vormann. ‘That’s how I imagined a Prussian general to be when I was a child.’ [To Keitel, the Führer was even more fulsome with his praise. ‘You can’t have enough soldiers like him. He’s a man after my own heart. He saved Blaskowitz’s army by his gallantry and drive.’ See Keitel, p.95]

Apparently he lied to Adolf that he continued to lead. The fact is that Generalmajor Basler took command of the division after von Briesen was wounded. Generalmajor Basler probably couldn't correct von Briesen's words and tell Hitler the truth, because while von Briesen was having a cup of tea with Hitler and Keitel and von Vormann on 13.09.1939, in some school several kilometers behind the front, Basler was with remnants of von Briesen's division closer to the front and was doing his best efforts to restore the lost combat value of this division.

At least now we can see how the myth of von Briesen was born. Von Briesen himself contributed, Hitler believed him - and then Keitel and others had to obey what Hitler said, what Hitler said about von Briesen's performance was true. Hitler was of course "infallible", and von Briesen became "the man after his own heart" on 13.09.1939.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

When it comes to the Polish success in combats against 1. Pz.Div. and 4. Pz.Div. on 16.09.1939:

Instructions of gen. Knoll-Kownacki concernig repulsing tank attacks from 15.09.1939:

Ruszki Kiernozia 1.jpg (156.98 KiB) Viewed 2910 times

Ruszki Kiernozia 2.jpg (139.52 KiB) Viewed 2910 times

Report of the commander of 25 DP saying that on 16.09.1939 25 DP repulsed all attacks of enemy Pz.Div.:

"I. SITUATION.

The enemy during the entire day was attacking along all directions, introducing into combats numerous tanks and bomber aircrafts. The division repulsed all enemy attacks along its own direction, destroying over 20 enemy tanks.
In the evening enemy forces were reported in the region of farm Łęk, strength unspecified. This enemy is to be liquidated by an escapade of 60 pp. This night own units are to cross the Bzura river, march into the Kampinos Forest, from which break through to Warsaw. Army "Pomorze" provides cover of the departure from the West.

II. TASK.

25 DP is to cross the Bzura river in the region of Brochow and operate along the axis: Brochów-Myszory-Stara Dąbrowa.

III. INTENTION.

To gather the entire division as quickly as possible in the region Młodzieszyn-Biała Góra from which to enter the Kampinos Forest by insured march in one column, across Brochów-Janówek-farm Tułowice-Myszory. If necessery to open the way by force.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION.

(...)"

Ruszki Kiernozia 3.jpg (108.91 KiB) Viewed 2910 times

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Instruction of Marschall Rydz-Smigly concerning combats against enemy armoured units, 09.09.1939:

Instrukcja NW.jpg (246.18 KiB) Viewed 2910 times

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

If it comes to that instruction of gen. Knoll-Kownacki from 15.09.1939, I suppose Richard has its English translation as he quoted 3 statements from this instruction in his book (as source providing R. Elble, pp. 181 - 182)

Richard if you have the translation then it would be excellent if you could post it here! Could you?

=========================

About the results of those combats on 16.09.1399:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8#p1455596

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Combat strength of armies "Poznan" and "Pomorze" in Warsaw on 25.09.1939:

Army "Poznan" - 457 officers and 11654 soldiers (including 25 DP and cavalry brigades)
Army "Pomorze" - 302 officers and 8031 soldiers (including 15 DP)
Total - 759 officers and 19685 NCOs and men (= in total 20444 soldiers)

Wounded, sick, etc. are not included in these numbers - only combat ready soldiers. This is according to Wladyslaw Rezmer (he quotes reports of Zbiorcza BK, 15 DP and 25 DP, etc. - all of them written on 25.09.1939).

After reorganization, on 25.09.1939, infantry divisions (15 and 25) consisted of:

15 DP - 302 officers and 7222 soldiers, 38 HMG, 18 AT guns, 15 artillery guns
25 DP - 297 officers and 7279 soldiers, 33 HMG, 11 AT guns, 5 artillery guns

25 DP had 3 infantry regiments (2 battalions each), 25 sapper battalion, 25 pal (light artillery rgt.) liaison company, cyclist company, gendarmerie platoon and divisional cavalry squadron. 15 DP had 3 infantry regiments (2 battalions each), 15 pal, 15 sapper battalion, liaison company and divisional cavalry squadron.

15th sapper battalion numbered 25 officers, 332 soldiers and 25th - 15 officers, 119 soldiers.

According to the order of gen. Knoll-Kownacki from 23.09.1939, "best soldiers" from remnants of 14 & 17 DP which broke through to Warsaw reinforced 25 DP, while those selected from remnants of 4, 16 & 26 DP reinforced 15 DP.

Apart from divisions there was also "pozostałość piesza" under ppłk. Święcicki - 21 officers, 1724 soldiers.

And cavalry brigades were merged into one brigade. Collective CB (Zbiorcza BK), 25.09.1939:

Command
Headquarters

- staff squadron: 7 officers, 206 soldiers, 2 HMG, 2 AT guns, 163 horses
- 9 puł: 26 officers, 304 soldiers, 3 HMG, 2 AT guns, 334 horses
- 14 puł: 24 officers, 342 soldiers (366), 4 HMG, 1 AT gun, 348 horses *
- 15 puł: 18 officers, 389 soldiers, 3 HMG, 2 AT guns, 357 horses
- 17 puł: 17 officers, 338 soldiers, 6 HMG, 1 AT gun, 345 horses
- dak: 35 officers, 558 soldiers, 5 HMG, 15 artillery guns, 533 horses
- pioneer squadron: 7 officers, 49 soldiers, 4 HMG, 54 horses
- liaison squadron: 5 officers, 65 soldiers, 5 HMG, 66 horses

Total: 139 officers, 2251 soldiers, 32 HMG, 8 AT guns, 15 artillery guns, 2200 horses

* And according to different data 14 puł numbered (also on 25.09.1939!):

14 officers, 29 NCOs, 388 uhlans (431), 280 horses, 7 HMG, 2 AT guns, 5 wagons, 2 field kitchens

We have to add also Command and HQ to these numbers. Staff squadron consisted of one line platoon from 15 puł, one HMG squad from 7 psk and one AT platoon from 7 psk. Each regiment (9, 14, 15, 17 puł) had leader's group, liaison platoon, pioneer squad, 2 line squadrons (3 platoons each), HMG platoon, 1 - 2 AT guns and combat train.

6 puł was dissolved (soldiers reinforced 9 and 14 puł) as well as 7 psk (reinforced 15 and 17 puł).

Before being merged and reorganized both brigades reported the following strength (on 23.09.1939):

Wlkp. BK - 110 officers, 2193 soldiers, 10 HMG, 11 AT guns, 11 artillery guns, 2 tankettes, 1371 horses
Pod. BK - 50 officers, 1261 soldiers, 8 HMG, 10 AT guns, 4 artillery guns, 780 horses

Both - 160 officers, 3454 soldiers, 18 HMG, 21 AT guns, 15 artillery guns, 2 tankettes, 2151 horses

And this doesn't yet include strength of the "collective regiment" of Pomorska BK.

I already wrote about it on the previous page of this thread - about regiments:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1392689

15 puł - 18 officers, 389 uhlans, ca. 400 horses, 2 AT guns
17 puł - 17 officers, 46 NCOs, 406 uhlans, over 400 horses, 1 AT gun
7 psk - 14 officers, 530 NCOs and riflemen, over 550 horses, 5 AT guns + additionally some 200 - 250 wounded

9 puł - 15 officers, 400 NCOs and uhlans (415), 390 horses, 2 AT guns **
14 puł - 24 officers, 342 uhlans, 348 horses, 1 AT gun
6 puł - 11 officers, 519 NCOs and uhlans

In case of 17 puł, 9 puł and 7 psk these numbers are quoted after gen. Abraham and refer to 20.09.1939:

"Stany, z jakimi doszliśmy do Warszawy 20 września wynosiły:
17 pułk ułanów: 17 oficerów, 46 podoficerów, 406 ułanów, 400 koni.
9 pułk ułanów: 15 oficerów, 400 podoficerów i ułanów, 390 koni.
7 pułk strzelców konnych: 14 oficerów, 530 podoficerów i strzelców, 550 koni.''

** And according to: http://www.kawaleria.marcin-lewandowski.xip.pl/9pul.php - even more, because "500 uhlans [so without NCOs and officers!] and only 390 horses". And later, after the capitulation of Warsaw, the regiment was divided for two groups: "western group numbering around 200 men under ppłk dypl. Rudnicki went to POW camps in the Reich. Eastern group, numbering around 360 [so in total this gives yet 560!], under mjr Tomaszewski, was transported to Piaseczno where Germans detached officers from this group, while handed over soldiers to the Red Army. From both groups parts managed to escape from captivity and strengthened the rising resistance".

Not even mentioning that according to book "Lance do boju" (P. Bauer, B. Polak) compared to strength from days 20 - 23 September, numerical strength "during the next days increased due to further soldiers breaking through to Warsaw". Similar statement can be found on this website about 7 psk - http://www.7psk.com.pl/historia.php.

So why numerical strength of those units after reorganization was reported smaller than before it?

Probably this can partially explain why combat units after reorganization had less men:

Fragment of gen. Abraham's organizational order from 23.09.1939:

"(...) 4. I would like the brigade to consist of element providing full warranty of high moral and combat value. Commanders of units are going to conduct a detailed selection of soldiers [for combat units] and take appropriate care of them (...)".

What happened with other soldiers? Probably they were sent to the rears, to rear and support units.

Maybe they are not included in the overall amount of soldiers of Armies "Poznan" and "Pomorze" in Warsaw on 25.09.1939 that is quoted by Rezmer from those reports. Rezmer didn't write anything about other reports so it seems that he only studied those from 25.09.1939 and he didn't check earlier reports from 23.09.1939.

Now question remains if the same (such a selection of best soldiers) was done with infantry divisions?

Maybe also only the strongest (psychically, physically, medically) soldiers were incorporated into frontline, combat units of both infantry divisions after reorganization (so between 23.09.1939 and 25.09.1939) and real numbers of soldiers of Armies "Poznan" and "Pomorze" who broke to Warsaw before 23.09.1939 were higher?

Probably gen. Knoll-Kownacki did similar thing with infantry as gen. Abraham did with cavalry.

And apart from that certainly a high number of WIA who made it to Warsaw together with combat troops is not included (after all 7 psk alone managed to bring ca. 200 - 250 wounded on regimental wagons to Warsaw).

============================================

In total Zbiorcza BK, 15 DP and 25 DP after reorganization - on 25.09.1939 - numbered 12 infantry battalions (with - on average - 48 - 49% of authorized number of HMG), 10 cavalry squadrons (counting only line and divisional), 1 cyclist company, 2 sapper battalions (357 and 134 men), one pioneer squadron, 37+ AT guns and 35 artillery guns.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Polish advance on 9 and 10 September and areas where German reinforcements (17., 10., part of 24. ID, MG.Btl.6, I./Pz.Rgt.23, Korpstruppen, etc.) established new defensive lines & counterattacked since 10 September:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Some good maps in divisional-regimental scale. Polish counterattack at the Bzura:

Plan of the attack and situation before the battle (German 10. Inf.Div. is approaching Lodz from the south):

Battle of Bzura - combats on 11.09.1939:

Combats on 12.09.1939 and situation after the Polish withdrawal back behind the Bzura on 13.09.1939:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Some good maps in divisional-regimental scale.

Often battalions are also marked. Especially in case of Polish forces. Battle of Bzura:

Situation on 15.09.1939:

Situation on 17.09.1939:

Situation on 18.09.1939:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Combats on 12.09.1939 and situation after the Polish withdrawal back behind the Bzura on 13.09.1939:

As can be seen, simultaneously with the Polish withdrawal behind the Bzura in the night from 12 to 13 September, Germans also retreated towards Lodz - neither side knew that the other side also ordered withdrawal.

So a paradoxical situation took place when both sides retreated in opposite directions.

Had the Poles continued their offensive also on 13.09.1939, they would have advanced further south.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more........................

The Battle of Bzura. Some places at that time....

Source: http://www.odkrywca.pl

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little complement....................

Numerous German soldiers KIA on September 12, 1939.

On August 26, 1939, the soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the 55th Infantry Regiment (17. ID) were taken to the German eastern border. They crossed the Polish border on September 1. General Loch recalled: on Sep 10 at 02:00 hours came the Army Corps' order: the 17. ID rotate due north as once and proceed towards the area of Zgierz at Army disposal (8 AOK). The division marched via Lodz to Ozorkow and became involved in hard fighting with the enemy who tried to break through there.

Minister Weitbrechts recalled: "on September 23 it came the first death notice. Stephan, only child of the Gärtners (Deppisch) in Bad" In quick succession came more bad news. In the local newspaper the last week of September, you will find one or more ads for the 15 fallen soldiers who came from the county of Mergentheim, from Gefr. Ernst Hohl from Weikersheim on 25 September to Lt. Richard Wurst from Bad Mergentheim on 30 September.

"The city got the news that the 10th Company was wiped out in a night battle," noted the minister. For the first time we hear the name of the place, Solka Wielka which lies about 30 kilometers northwest of Lodz.

Sources: Wiedersehenst der 17. ID Nürnberg Oktober 1958.
http://www.fnweb.de/region/main-tauber/ ... -1.1879527
http://odkrywca.pl/wrzesien-1939-zdjeci ... 50461.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more............................................. ......

Surroundings of Piatek - September 1939.

The advance continued without pause. It was thus arrived at the ninth day of march, September 9, 1939. The division was overextended. The unit had to cover a distance of 30 km. Now it was approaching the area between Kutno and Lodz. On the left flank was the Polish army coming from the north, which had gathered around Kutno, and its breakthrough towards the south should be avoided. Farther on the right flank were the own troops in a hard battle; for them the Division represented the only cover against the Poles in the north, near Kutno. As a long chain marched the division between both sides with its double mission, entirely on its own and without the support of special weapons. But it had the weapons and equipment of an active infantry division and knew how to make good use of it.

In the afternoon of September 8, 1939, the leader of the 2nd Platoon of the 3rd Company (Pi. Btl 30) was given the task of exploring from Piatek, about 20 kilometers east of Leczyca, heading north to no man's land in order to check the location and nature of the bridges over the Bzura, located about 7 kms north of Piatek. With a force of 4 soldiers the patrol left in a light vehicle. Without resistance the patrol reached the heights south of the Bzura. The river valley was about 1 kilometer wide. The path ran along an embankment approximately 1,20 meters high and with a lot of vegetation at the edges. The valley was dry. A first bridge over a tributary was intact, the second about 100 meters as well. On the third bridge, near the far end of the valley were soldiers. Assuming the soldiers were German, the patrol approached the bridge. Both sides were surprised to be face to face with the enemy. The German patrol was able to escape with one WIA, the vehicle received several shots, mainly in the pneumatic boat in the back of the car.

On September 9, 1939, the platoon commander was ordered to prepare for demolition the three bridges on the Bzura reconnoitered the day before without infantry cover. However, it was only possible to reach the first bridge. On the other two bridges there was already strong Polish security. Under a strong hostile fire the bridge was prepared for a demolition with electric detonators. The cable was about 200 meters long, the demolition device was at the southern end of the valley. By the 18:00 hours arrived an infantry company, the 9 or 10./ IR 6 under Oberleutnant Lübbe, and occupied a defensive position. The platoon of the 3rd Company was replaced by a Platoon of the 1st Company under Leutnant Kaiser.

The ignition line was still intact. As night fell, on 9 September 1939, the Poles attacked in strength in order to force the breakthrough towards Lodz (Litzmannstadt). The demolition of the bridge failed. The cable was apparently destroyed by artillery fire. On the night of September 10, 1939, the infantry company was overrun, Oberleutnant Lübbe was KIA. The Poles continued the penetration towards Piatek during the night ...................

Sources: Männer der Nordmark an der Bzura Dr. Christian Kinder.
PIONIER BATAILLON 30. GESCHICHTE 1936-45. PIONIER KAMERADSCHAFT LÜBECK.
Http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... at30-R.htm
Http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1870476

Cheers. Raul M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo!!!