Polish offensive at the Bzura 1939 - Polish lost victory?

[tigre]

Hello to all ; it follows.............

The battle of Bzura.

The annihilation of the Armies Pomorze and Poznan.

Sep 11 1939.

The attack went on. The right wing pressed on slowly but the left wing, especially the 14 DP, gained ground quickly against only weak German resistance. Unfortunately the polish lacked reserves in order to reinforce the attackers and exploit the success hence the heavy artillery groups of the 17 DP were attached to the 14 DP.

The attack carried out by the Cavalry Brigade “Wielkopolska” (Great Poland) was halted when the unit met important German forces reinforced with light tanks; in order to avoid infiltrations on the Army Corps Knoll communications’ lines, the Brigade was reinforced with one battalion of the 14 DP acting as reserve so far.

Meanwhile, the Army Corps Boltuc carried out its task; the 4 DP which should get across the Bzura between Orlow and Sobota pushed on southeastwards and around 11:00 hours it was in contact with weak enemy resistance (24 ID) between Bielawy and Glowno, to the west the cohesion with the Cavalry Brigade “Wielkopolska” was maintained so far. The 16 DP could seize its objectives approaching up to 7 kms of Lowicz which was occupied by German troops (IR 102 of 24 ID).

It was indeed the 24 ID which had advanced quickly from Skiernewice towards Lowicz. The 16 DP of Boltuc’s Army Corps had a problem now for it was to re-take the town winning ground towars Skiernewice. At 22:00 hours after fighting two hours the 64 pp seized Lowicz taken a great quantity of equipment and armament; the enemy withdrew in disorder but unfortunately it was not chased due to lack of reserves.

To the north in the Pomorze Army the situation was, at least, confuse; light hostile elements could ford the Vistula river by Plock meanwhile others enemy fractions attacked the 27 DP east of Brest-Kujawski.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; it follows.............

The battle of Bzura.

The annihilation of the Armies Pomorze and Poznan.

12 Sep 1939.

The Army Corps Knoll proceeded its advanced; the right wing surpassed Ozorkow and Wolo-Makolicki but the enemy resistance stiffened and it brought forward heavy artillery. On the left wing, the 14 DP, had been shaken due to heavy artillery fire and German reinforcements. The Army Corps Boltuc was was resting and it did not carry out any offensive action during this day. The Cavalry Brigade “Wielkopolska” fought hard during the morning but by noon its situation was critical hence the Brigade’s Commanding Officer call for help to both General Boltuc and the Army Commander.

General Bortnowski issued an order to the 4 DP which never became truth because that Division was resting within the Bielawo’s woods.

At the day’s end, General Kurtzeba could ascertain that it was time to stop the offensive in order to resume the withdrawal to Warsaw.

A new meeting was held by both Army’s Commanders and there General Bortnowski stated that both armies should proceed together with a strong defense along the Bzura river (at least from Sochaczew or better from Sabota to Wysogrod) and General Kurtzeba agreed with him hence he outlined the operation as follows:

Army Pomorze would be split in two in order to carry out its defensive mission in the north Group Bortnowski: composed of Army Corps Boltuc, 26 DP and the Cavalry Brigades “Wielkopolska” and “Podolia” (of Army Poznan) having as its mission to secure the lower Bzura .

Group Tokarzewski: composed of 15 DP, 27 DP, 19 pp and a light artillery group; having as its mission to protect northwards in the area stretched from Gostynin to Strzelce.

Shortly afterwards a third group was organized under General Grzmot-Skotnicki with the Cavalry Brigade “Pomorze” and several ON battalions to furnish cover westwards.

Therefore, for covering the three infantry divisions of General Knoll, it were employed six infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades it was a serious mistake increased by the fact of giving Warsaw as final objective. In this case Modlin would be a better point for crossing to the Vistula’s right bank.

Here my two "patacones" (an old Argentine money) so I can't agree with you but with General Kurtzeba for he knew for sure that there were large german troops on the far bank of the Bzura and heading to Warsaw fastly; also he knew his rearguard was heavily engaged at Brest-Kujawski as well his flank guards to the west then the only way left was east and for short time as he could see (remember the fightihng at Sochaczew). He was right this time but I think he was wrong before when he halted the retreat towards the Vistula's eastern bank; on the other hand we never know what would happened if the chosen course of action would be that ones of General Bortnowski (local counterattacks and fast withdrawal to the other bank of the Vistula or warsaw).

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; it follows.............

The battle of Bzura.

The annihilation of the Armies Pomorze and Poznan.

13 Sep 1939.

The beginning of this operation was set for next day Sep 13 1939. Several movements took place before as follows:

The Cavalry Brigade “Wielkopolska” was shifted north of Sochaczew in order to reinforce the General Switalski’s troops and to maintain the Bzura’s left river bank around Brochow.

The Cavalry Brigade “Podolia” was sent to reinforce the Cavalry Brigade “Wielkopolska” being subordinated to General Abraham; this movement was done during the night of 12 to 13 Sep 1939.

Army Corps Boltuc started its movements on Sep 13 1939 (4 DP to the right, between Orlow and Lowicz - both excluded -; 16 DP from Lowicz along the road Rybno – Nieborow). In order to extend the Army Corps Boltuc line eastwards, General Bortnowski deployed the 26 DP between the Army Corps and both cavalry brigades; the 26 DP reached the Bzura on Sep 13 1939.

Meanwhile the General Tokarzewski and General Grzmot-Skotnicki organized the rearguards for their own withdrawal and the Army Poznan, by now reduced to Army Corps Knoll, was preparing for turning back the columns that so far were fighting against the Germans between Lodz and Lowicz.

On Sep 13 1939, began the second phase of the Bzura’s battle; from 07 to 12 Sep 1939, the poles had had the initiative, but from now on they were to react before the Germans assaults, more and more vicious every day, because the German High Command had regained the battle control.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; it follows.............

The battle of Bzura.

The annihilation of the Armies Pomorze and Poznan.

13 Sep 1939.

But what about the Germans in that Sep 13 in the morning?:

Some elements belonging to the 4 AOK (Generaloberst v. Kluge) could get across the Vistula during the night from 12 to 13 Sep 1939 a little upwards of Plock and held the ground gained in spite of a counterattack carried out by the 19 pp; besides the enemy carried out some reconnaissance against Lack. The bulk of the 4 AOK advanced in broad front between Wloclawek and Kolo.

The 8 AOK (General v. Blaskowitz) had had a hard time; two of its Army Corps (30 ID, 17 ID, 24 ID and 10 ID) were stretched along a broad front hence suffered several crisis. The 30 ID, deployed along 30 kilometers had received the mass of the attack and after suffering serious casualties could restore its lines thanks to its commander efforts (General v. Briessen, who was WIA during those battles).

However, the Army Group H.Q., however, was by no means disposed to see the situation of Eighth Army restored by a reinforcement of its front. Even if a local crisis- and possibly a serious one at that- were to arise here, it would have not the least bearing on the operations as a whole. On the contrary, it actually offered us the chance of winning a big victory, since strong enemy forces had now been committed to a battle west of the Vistula, and this, if the right actions were taken on our own side, would end in their destruction.

Instead of acceding to Eighth Army's request for the additional support of a panzer corps, therefore, Army Group H.Q.. started making preparations for the enemy's encirclement. The two divisions following Eighth Army as an Army Group reserve were anyway still approaching from the west, and these could be presented against the western flank of the
enemy now attacking Eighth Army from the north. For the same purpose a light division was ordered over from the battle now drawing to a close around Radom. What the Army Group desired above all was to compel the enemy to fight a battle with reversed front.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Thanks for new posts, Tigre!

Incredible input, but I have got some remarks:

The 30 ID, deployed along 30 kilometers had received the mass of the attack and after suffering serious casualties could restore its lines thanks to its commander efforts (General v. Briessen, who was WIA during those battles).

Myth - von Briesen's efforts did not restore the defensive lines of 30. Inf.Div. The defensive lines of 30. Inf.Div. completely ceased to exist - moreover it was partially von Briesen's fault - because of his bravery (he personally arrived to the first frontline of his forces near Piatek) he was heavily wounded and his division lost its commander.

What restored the German lines at the Bzura (German lines - but not lines of 30. Inf.Div.) - were other divisions.

Kurt von Briesen was seriously wounded by Polish artillery (14. DAC) fire at the very beginning of the Polish attack - yet on 10.09.1939 in the early morning (and the biggest crisis for 30. Inf.Div. came later), while trying to stop his retreating units. As the result of this wound von Briesen was not able to lead his division any longer and he lost his left forearm - Generalmajor Basler took over temporary command of the division until the end of the Polish Campaign.

I think that what von Briesen managed to do was that he managed to stop some of his retreating units near Piatek (as combats there lasted for few hours more until Poles finally captured the town), but nothing more. So just a very local and very illusive "success". Cohesive defensive lines were restored near one small town and only for several hours.

The Führer and Germany's Chancellor talking to General v. Briessen – Sep 1939.

I bet that the photo was taken after September of 1939 - no sooner than in October.

Instead of acceding to Eighth Army's request for the additional support of a panzer corps, therefore, Army Group H.Q.. started making preparations for the enemy's encirclement.

I see that you quote Manstein here.

But - anyway - Army Group H.Q. took away XI. A.K. from 10th Army and attached it to 8th Army. Rundstedt also requested for the quickest possible support of Luftflotte 4. and also ordered his chef of staff - Manstein - to order the III. A.K. belonging to AOK 4. to immediately intensify its pressure against the Poles from the North-Eastern direction.

Cheers!
Domen

[tigre]

Thanks Domen ; I really have not idea if the photo was taken at the same time but the visit was in mid-September 1939 (see below)..

Source: In the Service of the Reich. Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel. Edited by Walter Görlitz. Translated by David Irving.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi my friend!,

"Who had been in the middle of the weakly-defended flank of Blaskowitz's army and had, with just his one division, beaten back a mass of break-out attempt by a cut-off Polish army in a bitter struggle against enormous odds."

Translated by David Irving.

Heh. Almost every word here is not true, beginning from "cut-off", going through "break-out attempt", "just his one division" and "enormous odds" - and finally ending on "beaten back".

But I seriously think that maybe original German version is a bit more reliable (considering who translated it).

PS:

Not exactly - there is one true statement in this fragment - the one about the "real Prussian general".

Von Briesen was of old, good Prussian (not Nazi) school indeed. He was a man of honour and not a Nazi criminalist.

but the visit was in mid-September 1939 (see below)

Nowhere in the quoted text the exact date of this event is given and it is not clearly stated that it was in September.

There is only something about hostile artillery range which can suggest that it was yet before the end of the campaign.

And Hitler indeed visited German forces at the Bzura (rather forces around Lodz, but this is quite near) - but it was on 13.09.1939 and later - so certainly von Briesen's H.Q. was no longer within the range of Polish artillery then.

So Hitler wasn't as "brave" as stated in the above - very pompous, by the way - piece of propaganda.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Btw - here is a fragment of the report of H.Q. of GO of gen. Knoll-Kownacki from the evening of 10.09.1939 about the situation of enemy forces (Knoll didn't fully realize then that yet on 10.09.1939 Germans brought in new divisions):

„[…] During the action carried out by the Operational Group [GO] the following enemy units were recognized:

In front of units from 25 DP and 17 DP – units of 6 Inf.Rgt. and 46 Inf.Rgt.
In front of units from 14 DP – units of 6 Inf.Rgt. and 26 Inf.Rgt.

These units belong to the [German] 30. Inf.Div. Moreover from the enemy side participated in the action: heavy artillery units and armoured units operating during the night in the light of headlights [it is about I./Pz.Rgt.23 which entered the battle near Ozorkow on 10.09.1939 – Domen].

Arrangement of units of 30. Inf.Div. indicates that the division was cut in half by our attack in several places from the North to the South and separated groups of this division are retreating towards the South.

The highest casualties were suffered by the enemy in front of 25 DP, where he lost apart from the great number of killed, wounded and captured – 2 heavy artillery guns *. Also 14 DP inflicted to the enemy casualties expressed in great numbers of killed and wounded.

In my opinion in the present moment 30. Inf.Div. does no longer represent a cohesive, organized unit and as our advance towards the South will progress, it will be losing its remaining combat value more and more. […] In the face of great casualties suffered [by the enemy] in men and war material and in connection with the deprivation of 30. Inf.Div. of her combat cohesion I expect considerable decrease of enemy resistance in front of the GO during the following days as well as the complete impariment of the combat strength of 30 Inf.Div., unless enemy units are strengthened by major reinforcements. […]”

Simultaneously he noticed that during combats leading to this Polish success, 30. Inf.Div. and artillery units which were supporting it were trying to put up fierce resistance against the attacking Polish units in many places:

“[…] On the base of previous combats it should be stated, that units of 30. Inf.Div. are delaying firmly, in which [their / German] quite numerous heavy artillery is very helpful. […]”

Source: “Wojna obronna Polski 1939, Wybór źródeł”, Warszawa 1968, page 673

* In fact more heavy guns (plus some light ones) were captured, but Knoll didn’t have full reports from the front about this. For example in the locality Gaj III./70 pp captured 2 horse-drawn guns (probably light or infantry) and in the forest near Gieczno and Sypin 12 guns calibre 15 cm were captured by the squadron of divisional cavalry supported by one company of TK tankettes. Both victories were achieved by units from 17 DP (not mentioned in the report).

Source: "70 pułk piechoty w Wojnie Obronnej 1939 roku" (“70 Inf.Rgt. in the defensive war of 1939”) article:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=5326

Best regards!
Peter

[tigre]

Thanks Peter ; I really appreciate that Knoll's report. In the other hand, I did not discuss the source but just the fact that at the time of that visit ,the 30 ID was still fighting around warsaw (the next Hitler's visit was at that front). Besides I think the 30 ID did not fight any more on Oct 1939. Cheers. Raúl M .

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

And I really appreciate your last attachment mainly because there is a clear confirmation of the information that von Briesen had lost his left forearm during the battle at the Bzura - I wasn't sure about that before.

In the photo it can also be seen that he has got a prosthesis of his left forearm (it doesn't look like a real hand).

Cheers,
Peter

[tigre]

Hello to all ; hey Domen (or anyone else) do you have the history about the 30 ID, does it mentions something on the Commanding Officer wounding anf the Führer visit?. TIA. More follows..............

But what about the German in that Sep 13 in the morning?:

Around Lowicz, the 24 ID was heavily shaken by the poles but eventually the situation was improving owing to the reserves brought there by the German High Command and because the opponent (poles) did not exploit the initial success.

The German High Command (Heeresgruppe Süd), took the following measures:

Committed the 18 ID between the 10 ID and the 24 ID (a little westwards of Lowicz).

Sent at once the 19 ID, so far held as reserve, from Skiernawiecze to the 24 ID’s right (east of Lowicz).

Broke off the operations against Warsaw, and then relieved both Pz Divisions there.

Shifted the 1 Pz towards Sochaczew and the 4 Pz from Gora-Kalwaria – Grojec-Zyrardow to Bolimow and Wiskitki.

After gathering this force, and taking in account that seemingly the poles were breaking off the counteroffensive, the German High Command was ready to encircle and then annihilate both polish armies.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Richard Hargreaves]

From 30 ID history, pp.30-1

[September 10th 1939]

The noise of the infantry battle rises with growing clarity, and around 6.30am there's suddenly strong enemy artillery fire. One of the first salvoes badly wounds the divisional commander in the arm, then the regiments report an attack along the entire front. In fact, during the night the Poles thrust an entire division across the Bzura and are now attacking Piatek from the west and north, as well as south of Sobota at Bielawy at the same time...
This is the hour of Generalleutnant Kurt von Briesen: he appears, his arm bleeding in the torn uniform, and with his staff officers steps out into the heart of the retreating infantry. His example works. The retreat stops, news of the general's presence quickly spreads; everywhere units make for the front again and launch a counter-attack under the personal leadership of their commander. But the attack does not succeed in closing the front again everywhere.
The withdrawal movement which began towards mid-day is immediately spotted by the Polish artillery spotter plane constantly circling the battlefield. He stays beyond the range of the flak gun and there's no sight of our Luftwaffe. The flight of the numerous baggage and rearward units in and around Piatek has to take place on the sole road to Lodz which runs through Zgierz. Under the well-directed Polish fire, command of the movement threatens to slip from the grasp; it comes to a stop, columns make their way over open ground, become bogged down, under fire still-moving carts spread confusion, rumours spread, the first signs of panic appear and can only be put down with great difficulty.

And Hitler's visit from Blitzkrieg Unleashed, pp.157-8:

On an airfield west of Lodz, Johannes Blaskowitz waited for a three-engined Junkers 52 to touch down. At 10am on Wednesday, 13 September, the leviathan rolled to a stop. In a dark grey jacket and brown cap, Adolf Hitler stepped down from the aircraft, greeted the general, then climbed into a beige open-top Mercedes G4, its engine idling. Eighth Army’s commander joined his Führer in the car. Hitler was keen to see the latest city to fall to his all-conquering armies, but Blaskowitz could not guarantee his safety. On the city’s narrow streets with row-upon-row of houses, the chances that a Pole might try to assassinate Hitler were too great. The column of Mercedes made a wide detour of the city before pulling up outside Blaskowitz’s headquarters on the eastern outskirts.
Inside the Army’s command truck, Hans Felber, Blaskowitz’s nervy Chief-of-Staff, was worried. The Bzura battlefield was far from safe. The Führer might be in danger. But when Hitler entered, Felber steeled himself. Standing next to his Führer, Felber gave a concise account of Eighth Army’s achievements. Hitler nodded, evidently satisfied by the Army’s efforts. As he departed, Hitler’s slavish Chief-of-Staff Wilhelm Keitel clasped both of Hans Felber’s hands. ‘Your Army has had the most difficult task up to now,’ the normally taciturn general imparted in him. ‘We all know that.’
The Führer climbed back into his Mercedes for a tour of the Bzura battlefield. First to 10th Infantry Division, then to 17th Infantry, next to XIII Corps’ headquarters and finally to a run-down schoolhouse which served as 30th Infantry Division’s temporary command post, where the imposing figure of Kurt von Briesen greeted him. His right arm in plaster squeezed into his feldgrau jacket and his chiselled face partially hidden by his steel helmet, Kurt von Briesen explained how his men had fought to the last round at Piatek and Leczyca. The Poles had attacked repeatedly, regardless of their losses. The 30th Infantry had fought bravely, it had prevented an enemy breakthrough, but it had paid a heavy price. ‘Our losses are grave,’ von Briesen concluded. The Führer listened intently to the Generalmajor’s report. Von Briesen had done his best to hide his wounded arm, but there was no mistaking it. The Führer was impressed. ‘And you continued to lead?’ Yes, the general told him, he had continued to command his division. ‘That was my duty.’ Hitler turned to his Army liaison officer, Oberstleutnant Nikolaus von Vormann. ‘That’s how I imagined a Prussian general to be when I was a child.’ [To Keitel, the Führer was even more fulsome with his praise. ‘You can’t have enough soldiers like him. He’s a man after my own heart. He saved Blaskowitz’s army by his gallantry and drive.’ See Keitel, p.95]
On the return journey to the airfield west of Lodz, Hitler’s convoy raced through the sprawling industrial city at upwards of forty miles an hour. The roads had been cleared of traffic and people. The city was deserted. The Führer turned to his chief adjutant, the jug-eared Oberst Rudolf Schmundt, clearly still in awe of von Briesen. ‘Schmundt, I’m looking for hard men,’ he told him. ‘I need fanatical National Socialists. If their ability is somewhat lacking, put a trained General Staff officer at their side. See to it that such officers are brought forward.’ Johannes Blaskowitz, however, had made a very different impression. ‘He didn’t seem to have realised his mission,’ Hitler smouldered. [Hitler’s visit to Eighth Army is based on Hans Felber’s diary entries of 13/9/39 and 20/9/39 in BA-MA RH20-8/1, Eighth Army’s diary in BA-MA RH20-8/11, Vormann, pp.120-4 and Heusinger, pp.63-5]

[tigre]

Thank you very much Richard; great help, as usual . Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows..............

13 Sep 1939.

On Sep 13 in the morning, the German 8 AOK, went to the attack against the Army Corps Boltuc and Knoll. A crisis along the front of the 17 DP and 24 DP was solved due to a counterattack carried out by General Knoll’s forces. The 15 DP and 27 DP could not break the enemy contact which was attacking from Brest-Kujawski, the same happened with the ON battalions eastwards of Kolo. In front of Sochaczew the Germans were reinforced without a pause.

During that very afternoon, General Kutrzeba tried to get in contact with his own High Command or at least with the Armies “Lodz” and “Modlin” but without success. Two reports had reached the General Kurtzeba’s HQ; first one officer of the supply trains of the 10 DP (Army Lodz) told that several elements of his division had past near Lowicz on Sep 10 1939 and second a squadron commander who had been sent to reconnoiter the Vistula river upwards to the east of Modlin told he met General Cehak (CO 30 DP) and gave a report on the divisions 30, 28 and 2 which had arrived at Modlin as he was told by General Cehak.

During the night from 13 to 14 Sep 1939, the Army Corps Knoll successfully broke contact and fulfilled its withdrawal to the north bank of the Bzura River.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows..............

14 Sep 1939.

On Sep 14 1939 the Army Corps Knoll proceeded its withdrawal heading northeast while the Army Corps Boltuc did the same a little far to the east.; the withdrawal was accomplished well by the 4 DP but the 16 DP was heavily engaged as it was getting across the river hence losing equipments, weapons and men.

That very day at 10:00 hours German troops could enter into Lowicz but the attack could be halted due to the help of two armored trains of Army Posen. The Cavalry Brigade Wielkopolska (Great Poland), followed by the Cavalry Brigade Podolia reached Sochaczew and it was ordered to be ready to seize a bridgehead over the Bzura there.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more follows..............

In Army Corps Tokarzewski, the 27 DP withdrew towards Kowal-Maryzin and the 15 DP was launched against Dobrzykow at dawn on Sep 14 1939, in the middle of a thick fog and without reconnaissance; the attack was broken and the polish division suffered heavy casualties. There was not a second attempt. Meanwhile a new order stated that the 15 DP should proceed towards the low Bzura; that movement was accomplished in the afternoon by Gombin-Sanniki and Budy Stare - Brochow.

Durnig that day General Bortnowski sent engineers’ troops in order to build bridges over the low Bzura at Brochow; the reconnaissance carried out a little far to the east showed that there was not enemy along the Vistula and within the Kampinoska Forest.

Meanwhile General Kurtzeba adopted two resolutions:

- There would not be resistance against the Germans around Plock and……..

- He was to change the active protection carried out by the Pomorze Army on the low Bzura in a counterattack towards Lowicz – Skiernewice.

Once again he wish to fulfill the mission with weak forces for only the three divisions of General Bortnowski were to knock the Germans.

According to General Kurtzeba’s order, General Bortnowski arranged his forces as follows:

16 DP: was to seize Lowicz and then proceed towards Skiernewice (main effort).
26 DP: was to attack east of the 16 DP (left wing).
4 DP: was to attack west of the 16 DP (right wing).

The counterattack would be supported by the 7 pac (heavy artillery regiment). The reconnaissance reported enemy troops east of Lowicz but confirmed that the ground west of it and the road Nieborow – Rybno was free of enemy.

Source: La Campaña de Polonia. Robert Jars. Círculo Militar. Buenos Aires.
The German Campaign in Poland 1939 – Army Pamphlet Nº 20-255. CARL. Fort Leavenworth.
The battle of Bzura. Lost Victories. Erich v. Manstein.
http://niewiarowicz.republika.pl/szkic2.jpg
FOTOALBUM Lowicz Poland WW2Polski-Fiat Warschau. Artikelnummer: 130288769089. eBay auction (finished). Viernes, 20 de Febrero de 2009.

Cheers. Raúl M .