Hitler's Decision to Attack Poland

[michael mills]

[This thread was split off from the discussion "Fuehrer Conference 8 Mar 1939" at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=162067 and recaptioned by the moderator - DT.]

Some have mentioned that there are grounds for doubting the documents because Hitler did not consider striking Poland prior to April 1939, this is not true. As his statements to Walther von Brauchitsch show he had decided to ''knock Poland down'' from March 25th at least. It is possibly that when Hitler here talks about occupying Poland he is talking about some time in the future. Likewise the intention to attack ''dollar jews'' may not be grounds for doubting it; Hitler viewed Bolshevism and Capitalism as two sides of the same coin-a Jewish conspiracy to achieve world domination. His hostility towards America can be seen in his Second Book, for example.

The above contains quite a few distortions of documented historical fact, apparently for the purpose of providing a spurious defence of the authenticity of the alleged record of a Fuehrer Conference on 8 March 1939, even respectable historians such as Kershaw reject it.

First to Hitler's statement to the Commander in Chief of the Army on 25 March 1939. This is Document 99 in "Documents on German Foreign Policy" Deries D Volume VI, March-August 1939. The title given to the document by the editors of DGFP is "Directive from the Fuehrer to the Commander in Chief of the Army on March 25, 1939", but it is far from clear what the status of the document is, ie whether it was a firm directive or a record of Hitler's ruminations made at a meeting on that day.

At the foot of the document is this notation:

(Original written by hand by LT. Col. Siewirt, 1st Officer of the General Staff.)
Certified correct.
[signature illegible]
Colonel of the General Staff

It appears that Siewirt was making a note of what Hitler said during this meeting.

The document is divided into seven sections of unequal length, with the headings:

Danzig question
Polish question
Slovak question
Engerau is intended to become a permanent Garrison
Czech Protectorate
Britain-France
Balkans

The section headed "Polish question" reads:

For the present the Fuehrer does not intend to solve the Polish question. However, it should now be worked on. A solution in the near future would have to be based on especially favourable political conditions. In such a case Poland would have to be so beaten down that, during the next few decades, she need not be taken into account as a political factor. In a solution of this kind the Fuehrer envisaged an advanced frontier, extending from the eastern border of East Prussia to the eastern tip of Silesia. The questions of evacuation and resettlement still remain open. The Fuehrer does not wish to enter the Ukraine. Possible a Ukrainian state might be established. But these questions too still remain open.

It is clear that Hitler is here canvassing options for future action regarding Poland and Ukraine, within the context of the strategic situation as at the end of March 1939, which was that Britain was trying to draw Poland into an anti-German coalition, along with the Soviet Union and Romania (an initiative resulting from an alleged threat to Romania that turned out to be netirely false). Presumably Hitler was thinking about what to do if Poland actually joined that coalition, or some other alliance set up to confront Germany.

This was the first occasion on which Hitler canvassed the possibility of military action against Poland. It is noteworthy that he does not speak about destroying Poland as a state, but only about reducing it to a condition where for the foreseeable future it cannot pose a military threat by becoming an ally of one of Germany's enemies.

Previous to this, Hitler's policy had been predicated upon a gaining Poland as an ally for the purpose of confronting the Soviet Union. That policy had been frustrated by the Danzig issue, on which the Polish Government had proved to be unexpectedly intransigent, and it now appeared that Poland might well change from a friend of Germany into an enemy, if it yielded to the blandishments coming from Britain. Furthermore, the strong anti-German political elements in POland, which had been repressed while Pilsudski was still alive, were starting to re-emerge; a telegram of 17 March from the German ambassador in Warsaw, Moltke, to the Foreign Ministry had reported "renewed anti-German street demonstrations" in Poland (Document 12 in DGFP 6 VI).

On 24 March, the day before Hitler made his statements to the Commander in Chief of the Army, the German consul Gneral in Danzig, von Janson, had informed the German Foreign Office of various defensive military measures being taken by Polish forces in the northern part of the Corridor (Document 85 in DGFP 6 VI), including:

- mounting machine guns on the bridge over the Vistula at Dirschau
- calling up reservists of the 1912-16 age groups in Torun and transferring them to Bromberg
- cancelling leave in the garrisons
- despatching railway rolling stock from Danzig to Poland.

On 25 March, Admiral Canaris informed Bismarck, the Deputy Direcro of the Political Department of the german Foreign Office, about Polish mobilisation measures (Document 90 in DGFP 6 VI), including:

- concentrating some 4000 Polish troops at Gdynia
- transfer of troops from a garrison in the southern part of the Corridor to the immediate vicinity of the Danzig frontier
- mobilisation of three age groups.

In that document, Bismarck wrote the following:

General Keitel does not believe in any aggressive intentions on the part of the Poles, neither, therefore, does he believe that Poland wishes rather to forestall us by a military occupation of Danzig, but attributes these measures to the generally noticeable nervousness of the Poles. In the General Staff, on the other hand, the tendency is to take a somewhat more serious view of the situation.

Note what is said about the General Staff taking a more serious view of Polish military measures. It was the General Staff which produced the record of what Hitler said on 25 March 1939. It is probable that at the meeting on that day, the Coomander in Chief of the Army had been asking Hitler his opinion on a number of matter affecting Wehrmacht planning, and the record by Siewirt records Hilter's answers. It is also probable that Brauchitsch had received the same information from Canaris as Bismarck had, and that he told Hitler that the General Staff took a serious view of the Polish military measures. In that case, Hitler's words could be seen as moderating the sense of alarm among the Wehrmacht leaders (and perhaps reflecting Keitel's view); there was no need to take action against Poland at the present time, but if the Poles became too stroppy they could be "beaten down".

That is the context within which Hitler's statements of 25 March 1939 must be understood.

As for the so-called "Second Book" of Hitler, it by no means expresses hostility toward the United States. That country is seen as posing a challenge to Europe (much as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber saw it), but it is also held up as a prime example of geopolitical success, due on the one hand to its possession of vast "Lebensraum", on the other to the high "racial value" of its population, resulting from the selective effect of voluntary migration.

[Led125]

Michael,

It is yourself who is distorting the document, not I.

''For the present the Fuehrer does not intend to solve the Polish question. However, it should now be worked on. A solution in the near future would have to be based on especially favourable political conditions. In such a case Poland would have to be so beaten down that, during the next few decades, she need not be taken into account as a political factor. In a solution of this kind the Fuehrer envisaged an advanced frontier, extending from the eastern border of East Prussia to the eastern tip of Silesia. The questions of evacuation and resettlement still remain open. The Fuehrer does not wish to enter the Ukraine. Possible a Ukrainian state might be established. But these questions too still remain open.''

Several things stand out:

1) There is a ''Polish problem''
2) Hitler doesn't want to solve it at the moment
3) The solution to be implemented in the future would be to beat Poland down.

Motivations you attribute to Hitler are unsupported. Just because the General Staff took a serious view of the situation does not count a strong evidence that Hitler was actually trying to moderate their opinions. More likely is that in the face of difficulties with Poland from October 1938 he had accepted the need to beat Poland down and reclaim more territory from her.

It is a half truth that Hitler wanted Poland an Ally. Carl Bruckhardt reported Hitler's intentions as wanting Poland a puppet state. The exact quotation is given in Newman's March 1939, and Hitler said he wanted Poland to ''conform to our foreign policy''.

And actually, I didn't defend the document. In fact I was the one who informed you that Kershaw doubted its authenticity.

[michael mills]

Led125,

You need to examine any document in its context. I provided the context for the statements made by Hitler on 25 March 1939, but you seem not to want to accept that context, perhaps because it does not fit your preconceived notions.

On that day, the General Staff was concerned about Polish military activities near Danzig, which might indicate an intention to move in and take control of the Free State so as to prevent its reunification with Germany (although Keitel did not agree with that interpretation). Hitler's reaction is that a situation might arise where Poland would need to be "beaten down", ie its military force would have to be eliminated, and prevented from being rebuilt.

The reason why such a situation might arise is that Poland had proved to be totally intransigent over Danzig, and appeared to be moving toward an anti-German alliance with Britain and France.

The term "Polish question" refers to the whole complex of the relationship between Germany and Poland, which had improved greatly in 1934, but was now starting to deteriorate. That is why Hitler said that it now needed to be "worked on", ie the General Staff needed to start preparing contingency plans for a military confrontation with Poland, in case such a confrotnation proved inevitable.

The problem is that Siewirt has recorded only Hitler's statements during the meeting with the General Staff, not the discussion in the course of which those statements were made. If we knew what was said at the meeting, what Brauchitsch and other General Staff officer's present said, we would have a better understanding of what exactly Hitler meant.

Hitler certainly did want Poland as an ally, but of course as a junior partner to Germany, in much the same way as, say, Egypt is a partner of the United States. And as such, Hitler expected Poland to "conform to our foreign policy", in the same way as, say, Britain conforms to US foreign policy.

[michael mills]

Hitler first ordered the beginning of planning to attack Poland in a directive of 11 April, that is after the Anglo-Polish Military Agreement of 6 April, which provided for Britain to go to war with Germany if Poland sent its military forces into Danzig in order to counter an development there that it claimed posed a thret to its independence.

Eclosure II to that directive described "Operation White", the code-name for an attack on Poland. Enclosure II began:

The present attitude of Poland requires, over and above the plan "Frontier Security East" the initiation of military preparations, to remove if necessary any threat from this direction for ever.

1.) Political Requirements and Aims

German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principles of avoiding any disturbances. Should Poland, however, change her policy toward Germany, a final settlement might become necessary in spite of the treaty in force with Poland.

The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defence. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of hostilities, at the latest.

The political leaders consider it their task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

The development of increasing internal crises in France and resulting british restraint might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia, if she were in a position to intervene, cannot be expected to be of any use to Poland, because this would mean Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military demands.

Germany cannot count on Hungary as a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis.

There follow detailed instructions on the tasks of the various branches of the armed services in the case of war.

It can be seen that "operation White" was a contingency plan, to be activated in a particular circumstance, namely that of Poland's adopting a "threatening attitude toward Germany", which presumably means Poland making military preparations directed against Germany, in concert with Britain and France.

The above quote from Document 185 in DGFP 6 IV.

[Led125]

You need to examine any document in its context. I provided the context for the statements made by Hitler on 25 March 1939, but you seem not to want to accept that context, perhaps because it does not fit your preconceived notions.

On that day, the General Staff was concerned about Polish military activities near Danzig, which might indicate an intention to move in and take control of the Free State so as to prevent its reunification with Germany (although Keitel did not agree with that interpretation). Hitler's reaction is that a situation might arise where Poland would need to be "beaten down", ie its military force would have to be eliminated, and prevented from being rebuilt.

The reason why such a situation might arise is that Poland had proved to be totally intransigent over Danzig, and appeared to be moving toward an anti-German alliance with Britain and France.

The term "Polish question" refers to the whole complex of the relationship between Germany and Poland, which had improved greatly in 1934, but was now starting to deteriorate. That is why Hitler said that it now needed to be "worked on", ie the General Staff needed to start preparing contingency plans for a military confrontation with Poland, in case such a confrotnation proved inevitable.

It is of course important to examine the document in its context, however I dispute your interpretation. The General Staff were concerned about Polish preparations at the present, Hitler is telling them that at the moment he doesn’t desire to solve the ‘’Polish question’’. This to me doesn’t suggest he is trying to assuage the General Staff. In fact there is nothing in the document that suggests that this is the case, as Hitler discusses a great deal more than Poland it is just as likely he was informing the General Staff of his goals. There is no evidence at all that he is saying Poland must be beaten down if they become ''stroppy'', he makes no such qualifications. He does say he doesn't want to force the issue on Danzig as it might drive Poland into Hitler's arms. And he is separating the two ''problems'', suggesting they were different to each other and would need to be solved eventually.

Your reasoning is based wholly on circumstantial evidence.

The problem is that Siewirt has recorded only Hitler's statements during the meeting with the General Staff, not the discussion in the course of which those statements were made. If we knew what was said at the meeting, what Brauchitsch and other General Staff officer's present said, we would have a better understanding of what exactly Hitler meant.

Agreed, as such we cannot do anything but honestly take Hitler's statement's reflect of his own opinions. Even if he was trying to calm the General Staff, he still states he would knock Poland to the ground.

On Poland and Danzig: There is in fact evidence that she was willing to compromise on this issue. By ''compromise'' I do not mean give in to German demands fully. See Documents in British Foreing Policy vol iv no. 164 (June 28 1939). Kennard reported that he had been told by the Poles that before March 15th a plan to partition the city had been considered by the Poles, yet it had not been worked out fully and had not been thus presented and finally it was dropped. Anthony Drexel Biddle also reported such a plan in June 1939.

Hitler certainly did want Poland as an ally, but of course as a junior partner to Germany, in much the same way as, say, Egypt is a partner of the United States. And as such, Hitler expected Poland to "conform to our foreign policy", in the same way as, say, Britain conforms to US foreign policy.

Not an appropriate analogy; Douglas Haig didn’t conform to American policy in the early 1990’s and Harold Wilson did not during the Vietnam war. What Hitler would have no doubt wanted from Poland is for her to become a puppet state, not even a ‘’junior partner’’. Even what Hitler was going to conceed to Poland did not satisfy them. In his diaries Goebbels described guaranteeing Poland's frontiers as a ''sour apple''. This doesn't suggest that Hitler wanted Poland a junior ally in his struggle with the USSR.

You have removed Case White from its context. Case White was issued in conjunction with Hitler severing all attempts to negotiate with Poland. Historians such as Walther Hofer, Ian Kershaw and Gerhard Weinberg have viewed this and other evidence and concluded that Hitler was set on war with Poland.

1st. End of March 1939:
The Fuehrer decides to make preparations for the gradual, seemingly unavoidable conflict with Poland, in such a manner that they can be executed in late summer 1939.Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to have to wage war on one front.

Quoted in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Volume IV page 370

[michael mills]

This doesn't suggest that Hitler wanted Poland a junior ally in his struggle with the USSR.

If you hold to that view you are ignoring a lot of evidence.

In fact, the deal offered to the Polish Government by Ribbentrop included Polish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, in other words a German-Polish alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

The German Foreign Ministry's analysis of the political situation in Poland was that there two groups contending for power. One group, consisting of Pilsudski's followers who were actually in power, was a "moderate" group that wanted to continue Pilsudski's policy of detente with Germany, and was considered prepared to accept the deal offered by Germany, namely a Polish-German alliance, return of Danzig to Germany, an extra-territorial road and rail link between Germany and East Prussia, and a German guarantee of Poland's frontiers. Foreign Minister Beck was considered part of that group.

The other group, which was in opposition to the Polish Government, consisted of strongly anti-German political parties and organisations, anti-German militias and veterans' groups, and elements in the military. The German Foreign Office considered that it was pressure from this group that prevented the Polish Government from accepting the German offer; that is, the Polish Government feared that if it accepted the german offer, the oppositional groups would rouse such unrest in the population that it might be overthrown.

Hitler did not consider the Danzig issue to be a casus belli, since various British politicians, including Chamberlain, had expressed the view that Danzig should eventually return to Germany. Accordingly, he was prepared to wait, believing that eventually the Polish Government would agree to the German proposals. He even considered instigating a coup d'etat in Danzig as a solution; the Danzig Government would simply declare its reunion with Germany, and repudiate Polish control of its foreign relations and overseas trade. Hitler believed that the Polish Government would accept a coup d'etat, since it would then be seen as accepting the inevitable, rather than making a choice.

It was the Anglo-Polish military agreement of 6 April 1939 that turned the Danzig issue into a casus belli. It provided that Britain would join Poland in military action against germany if Poland first used its military forces to counter an "indirect" threat to its independence; an indirect threat was defined as any action occurring in Danzig that the Polish Government considered as a threat to its independence, eg a unilateral declaration of reunification with Germany by the Danzig Senate.

That development ruled out the option of a coup d'etat, since that would automatically lead to war with Poland and Britain. Furthermore, it made armed conflict between Germany and Poland virtually inevitable, since it could be triggered by any incident in Danzig that Poland decided to respond to by sending in its army. It was from that point that Hitler began to give serious consideration to an all-out assault on Poland, so as to knock it out quickly and present Britain and France with a fait accompli, and ordered his military commanders to begin planning "Case White". Hitler's actions are best explained by a belief that it would be better to start the conflict with a sudden blow, rather than "slide into war" over an incident in Danzig, which would prolong the fighting between German and Poland and thereby not deter Britain and France from joining in.

[Led125]

Michael,

It was the Anglo-Polish military agreement of 6 April 1939 that turned the Danzig issue into a casus belli. It provided that Britain would join Poland in military action against germany if Poland first used its military forces to counter an "indirect" threat to its independence; an indirect threat was defined as any action occurring in Danzig that the Polish Government considered as a threat to its independence, eg a unilateral declaration of reunification with Germany by the Danzig Senate.

We know what the Polish response to a coup in Danzig would have been thanks to a Conference in Minister Beck's office on April 1 1939 (Doc. 140, Papers and emoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland: Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939 (Columbia University Press, 1968).

II An interntal Danzig putsch, that is, a case where the initiate remains in the hands of the senate or the Danzig party.
Verson A. Political declaration for reunion with the Reich. In the first stage only a diplomatic incident is created. On our side a protest is lodged in Danzig and in Berlin. Note to German government should be forumlated as follows: the Polish government supposes it to be only a sally of the local authorities; the German government should recognise that this cannot be tolerated by the Polish government. If the German government does not take this declaration under consideration, we shall consider this a violation of Polish rights and interests. Recognition by the Reich results in a Polish-German incident and our reaction [immediate counteraction follows in accordance with principles established by the General Staff] (hypothetically).

So, in the evnt the Danzig senate voted to unite with German Poland would treat it as a diplomatic incident. If Germany recognised the unification Poland would react to this in the same way it would direct German military intervention. Given that Beck had made this clear to Hitler, had Hitler recognised this coup d'etat he would have brought war upon himself.

In fact, the deal offered to the Polish Government by Ribbentrop included Polish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, in other words a German-Polish alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

Alliance in which Poland would play a subservient role, presumably just prior to when Hitler ''beats'' her down one day.

Hitler did not consider the Danzig issue to be a casus belli, since various British politicians, including Chamberlain, had expressed the view that Danzig should eventually return to Germany. Accordingly, he was prepared to wait, believing that eventually the Polish Government would agree to the German proposals. He even considered instigating a coup d'etat in Danzig as a solution; the Danzig Government would simply declare its reunion with Germany, and repudiate Polish control of its foreign relations and overseas trade. Hitler believed that the Polish Government would accept a coup d'etat, since it would then be seen as accepting the inevitable, rather than making a choice.

This shows Hitler's ignorance of international relations rather than anything else. If Poland couldn't accept the return of Danzig to the Reich for popular considerations, why would the reaction be any different if a coup in Danzig, presumably followed by recognition by Germany, be anything short of the ''conflict'' that Polish diplomats warned him about?

[henryk]

This doesn't suggest that Hitler wanted Poland a junior ally in his struggle with the USSR.

If you hold to that view you are ignoring a lot of evidence.

In fact, the deal offered to the Polish Government by Ribbentrop included Polish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, in other words a German-Polish alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

The German Foreign Ministry's analysis of the political situation in Poland was that there two groups contending for power. One group, consisting of Pilsudski's followers who were actually in power, was a "moderate" group that wanted to continue Pilsudski's policy of detente with Germany, and was considered prepared to accept the deal offered by Germany, namely a Polish-German alliance, return of Danzig to Germany, an extra-territorial road and rail link between Germany and East Prussia, and a German guarantee of Poland's frontiers. Foreign Minister Beck was considered part of that group.

The other group, which was in opposition to the Polish Government, consisted of strongly anti-German political parties and organisations, anti-German militias and veterans' groups, and elements in the military. The German Foreign Office considered that it was pressure from this group that prevented the Polish Government from accepting the German offer; that is, the Polish Government feared that if it accepted the german offer, the oppositional groups would rouse such unrest in the population that it might be overthrown.

http://www.pogonowski.com/display.php?textid=1096
Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski

The defensive doctrine of Poland, was applied in earnest starting on January 26, 1939 when German minister von Ribbentrop was told in Warsaw that Poland will not join the pact against Russia. Poles followed the advice of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who wrote in his last will and testament, that in order to preserve not only the independence of Poland, but in fact Poland’s very existence, the government of Poland had “to veer between Germany and Russia as long as possible and then bring the rest of the world into the conflict, rather than subordinating Poland to either one of its two neighbors.” The choice of the verb “to veer” indicated that Piłsudski was fully aware of the reality, that Poland formed a barrier between two main protagonists and most powerful contenders on the European continent: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union.

Poles, threatened by Hitler with complete eradication of the Polish state in the historic Polish lands, knew that Stalin threatened Poland with terror and enslavement. However, Nazi Germany then was the worse of the two evils. Poles made a rational decision and refused to help Germany to defeat Russia. Poland’s refusal to attack Russia saved the Soviet Union from destruction. The Russians so far do not want to admit this fact and they revive the cult of Stalin.
Hitler’s plan to create “Greater Germany” populated by “racial Germans from the River Rhine to the Dnepr River in the Ukraine,” was known to marshal Piłsudski, who understood that Hitler planned eventual eviction and mass murder of Poles and Ukrainians in their historical lands. Earlier, on March 3, 1918, in Brest Litovsk, a town occupied by Germans, Lenin’s government signed a humiliating capitulation, which yielded to German dictate and agreed to make Russia a vassal state of Germany. Berlin planned to treat Russia like Britain treated India and make a colonial empire ruled by Germany from the Rhine River to Vladivostok. In 1939 the territory of Poland blocked Germany from the direct access to the Ukraine and to Russia.

Already on August 5, 1935 Hitler started pressing the government of Poland to sign a pact with Germany against Russia. This is described in detail, by Józef Lipski, the ambassador of Poland to Germany, during the years 1933-39. Stalin’s government was aware of Hitler’s plans and of the pact between Germany and Japan against Russia signed in 1936. Stalin feared a two front war, Japanese attack from the east and German attack from the west. When Poland refused to join Germany on January 26, 1939 Stalin thought that he had a chance to entangle Germany in a long lasting war on the western front, as had happened during WWI.
Thus, Poland’s decision to defend itself ruined Hitler’s “best case scenario” and his plans to defeat Stalin in a two-front war against Russia. Instead Stalin managed to entangle the Germans in a two-front war. The “great game” consisted of competition between Hitler and Stalin who defeats whom in a two-front war by means of attacks from the east and from the west.

Hitler furious with the Poles for ruining his best-case scenario, ordered his generals on August 22, 1939 to use utmost ferocity against all ethnic Poles and as an act of vengeance to complete carefully planed destruction of Warsaw. The site of the Polish capital was to become a German provincial administrative town.

In 1939 Friedrich Pabst was nominated by Hitler as the chief architect of the New Warsaw for which he produced on February 6, 1940 a complete plan, drawn up with help of the nazi architects Hubert Gross and Otto Nurnberger. Detailed plans were made to destroy systematically all the buildings of Warsaw including all archives, museums, and monuments, while the armament industry and railroad facilities were to be enlarged. Detailed plans were made including the replacement of the Royal Castle with a Parteivolkshalle and the Column of King Sigismund with a huge statue called Niederwald Germania or Nieredwalddenkmal. Piłsudski square was renamed Adolf Hitler Platz.

[michael mills]

So, in the event the Danzig senate voted to unite with German Poland would treat it as a diplomatic incident. If Germany recognised the unification Poland would react to this in the same way it would direct German military intervention. Given that Beck had made this clear to Hitler, had Hitler recognised this coup d'etat he would have brought war upon himself.

Without the British guarantee, Poland would not have dared to risk war with Germany over Danzig. It would not have sent troops into Danzig to put down a coup d'etat, since it would not have had British backing.

If Chamberlain had not issued the guarantee, or it he had declared that it applied only to an attack on actual Polish territory, and therefore did not cover Danzig which was not Polish sovereign territory, then a unilateral declaration of reunification with Germany, followed by the movement of German troops into the territory of Danzig but not of Poland, then it is likely that the Polish Government would have accepted the situation, and there would have been no war.

Chamberlain was panicked into issuing the guarantee by false reports of German preparations to invade Poland that were given to him personally by Vansittart's agent, the journalist Ian Colvin. It is possible that those false reports were a conspiracy by Vansittart to create a casus belli.

There are indications that Chamberlain regretted his rash action, and wanted to exclude Danzig from the coverage of the guarantee, so as to ensure that war did not erupt over a minor incident in that place. A few days after the issue of the guarantee, an article in the British press suggested that the guarantee did not cover Danzig; it is thought that that article might have been a plant by Chamberlain or his office. There was an immediate outcry orchestrated by the opponents of Chamberlain's policy, and he was pressured into issuing a statement that the guarantee did in fact cover the territory of Danzig.

Once it was officially announced by the British Government that the guaramtee covered Danzig, the Polish Government began to declare that it would regard any unilateral attempt to change the status of Danzig as a casus belli, and would send troops into the Free City to prevent such a change. The Polish Government knew that such a move would probably involve it in hostilities with Germany, but it was no longer afraid of that outcome, as it knew that Britain would join it against Germany.

Thus it was the British Government that created a casus belli out of the Danzig issue, which might have been solved by a fait accompli that Poland would have accepted.

[Led125]

Without the British guarantee, Poland would not have dared to risk war with Germany over Danzig. It would not have sent troops into Danzig to put down a coup d'etat, since it would not have had British backing.

This is speculation unsupported by any evidence. It would be equally valid to state that Poland would defend what she believed to be her rights with or without any promise of British support. Anita Prazmowska writes:

n reality...the period 1933-1938 is interestingly a period of stability in German-Polish relations. This state of affairs extended to dealings over Danzig. It is important to note that the British Guarantee of March 31st 1939 did not, on its own account, cause a dramatic change in German-Polish relations and therefore did not lead to the emergence of an impasse over Danzig, and most certainly did not cause the Poles to be less conciliatory hitherto.
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.
.
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The intriguing feature of Polish foreign policy in the run up to war was the steadfastness with which it was maintained. Neither the British Guarantee or the abrogation of the Nazi-Polish non-aggression pact caused the Poles to alter this policy of brinkmanship. It is difficult to pin point precisely the moment when Beck finally abandoned hope of maintaining some sort of cooperation with Germany. Since January 1939 he took into account the possibility of war with Germany if German demands became menacing. During the spring and the summer it was increasingly accepted by the Poles that they would have face war with Germany, either to stop German aggression or in order to forewarn her.
In his memoirs Beck?s personal secretary Pawel Starzenski referred to Beck?s determination to remain conciliatory towards the Germans even after he had received the British guarantee. Similarly Michal Lubienski, Beck?s chef de cabinet, bears witness to Beck?s willingness to continue negotiations with Germany over Danzig. Beck apparently believed that this would enable the states to postpone conflict even if it did not remove bone of contention. He did change his mind, nevertheless, and after a conference with Marshal Rydz-Smigly, the Minister for Defence, decided not to make concessions on Danzig. This change was due to an analysis of Germany?s attitude to Poland, not just the Danzig issue.
While taking into account the possibility of war breaking out, the Polish military leaders seemed to have assumed that Germany was not yet able to wage war and on the whole believed that the Nazi leaders would seek to avert it. This was a view expressed by Rydz-Smigly on April 6 and Beck on 30 May

Source: Anita Prazmowska in The Baltic and the Origins of the Second World War

Indeed, the Poles told the Germans that their position was incompatible with Poland's view on the matter way before any inclings of a British guarantee.

If Chamberlain had not issued the guarantee, or it he had declared that it applied only to an attack on actual Polish territory, and therefore did not cover Danzig which was not Polish sovereign territory, then a unilateral declaration of reunification with Germany, followed by the movement of German troops into the territory of Danzig but not of Poland, then it is likely that the Polish Government would have accepted the situation, and there would have been no war.

Again, conjecture. It is however likely that the British wouldn't have been satisfied with Hitler gaining Danzig through force. Happy they were witn negotiations but not with force.

Chamberlain was panicked into issuing the guarantee by false reports of German preparations to invade Poland that were given to him personally by Vansittart's agent, the journalist Ian Colvin. It is possible that those false reports were a conspiracy by Vansittart to create a casus belli.

Possible but not likely in my opinion. I have never seen anything more than circumstantial evidence offered for this position. In fact Chamberlain didn't believe Colvin's reports. Maurice Cowling in The Impact of Hitler cites a letter from Chamberlain to his sister which "makes clear that the account given by Colvin to Halifax seemed so highly coloured that he did not really believe them until confirmed by other (presumably more reliable) sources". Taken in the context of guarantees to other nations it seems likely that the Guarantee was given to stop a German attack whenever it might occur.

There are indications that Chamberlain regretted his rash action, and wanted to exclude Danzig from the coverage of the guarantee, so as to ensure that war did not erupt over a minor incident in that place. A few days after the issue of the guarantee, an article in the British press suggested that the guarantee did not cover Danzig; it is thought that that article might have been a plant by Chamberlain or his office. There was an immediate outcry orchestrated by the opponents of Chamberlain's policy, and he was pressured into issuing a statement that the guarantee did in fact cover the territory of Danzig.

I don't recall him issuing a statement that it [the guarantee] covered Danzig. Sir John Simon informed them that it was unofficial and was not inspired from any government source. Sir John was telling a big fat lie. The editorial probably came from Chamberlain's press secretary or the head of Conservative Party Research Department and was well received in government circles, Halifax describing it as ''just right''.

Once it was officially announced by the British Government that the guaramtee covered Danzig, the Polish Government began to declare that it would regard any unilateral attempt to change the status of Danzig as a casus belli, and would send troops into the Free City to prevent such a change. The Polish Government knew that such a move would probably involve it in hostilities with Germany, but it was no longer afraid of that outcome, as it knew that Britain would join it against Germany.

The British never officially annouced that the guarantee covered danzig. In fact they went to efforts to try and get the Poles to give it up. They did, in a secret protocol to the agreement signed on August 25 state that a direct or indirect threat against Poland included Danzig, but this was covered with statements that Britain still wanted the Poles to negotiate. Clearly the British would not allow Hitler to get away with another victory through threats of violence. As far as I know the Poles never altered their position stated on April 1st; that military action would not follow a coup in Danzig unless the Germans refused to consider the Polish position.

Thus it was the British Government that created a casus belli out of the Danzig issue, which might have been solved by a fait accompli that Poland would have accepted.

It seems fairly illogical to assume that these anti-German elements would let Beck give up Danzig were there to be a Nazi coup, yet they couldn't let him give it up peacefully. Perhaps we will hear some evidence for this position.

[michael mills]

It seems fairly illogical to assume that these anti-German elements would let Beck give up Danzig were there to be a Nazi coup, yet they couldn't let him give it up peacefully. Perhaps we will hear some evidence for this position.

it is of course impossible to know what would have happened if Chamberlain had not issued the guarantee to Poland, and the Danzig Senate had declared unification with Germany and invited German troops in for protection.

Certainly there would have been enormous outrage on the part of the radical anti-German elements in Poland, and most probably they would have put pressure on the Polish Government to react by sending military forces into Danzig to expel the Germans.

However, Beck could have argued that such military action would lead to war with Germany without any guaranteed aid from outside, which would lead to Poland's destruction. it is possible that the threat of such destruction would have been sufficient to intimidate the anti-German elements into accepting the fait accompli. On the other hand, maybe the Polish Government would have yielded to pressure and gone to war on its own, thereby committing suicide.

While pressure from the anti-German elements to refuse German demands (which were not presented as an ultimatum and not backed by threat of war) was something that Beck found impossible to resist, it is likely that the pressure for actual war with Germany, after a coup d'etat in Danzig, would have been considerably less and voiced by only the most extreme anti-German elements, and therefore easier to resist.

The above of course is just speculation, since Britain did issue the guarantee which made the Poles totally intransigent and foolhardy (even if that was not the British intention), but it is speculation based on the actual political situation in Poland in early 1939.

[michael mills]

By the way, when you talk about "war", you should specify exactly which war you mean.

Without the British guarantee to Poland, war might have erupted between Germany and Poland over Danzig, but it would not have been a general European war or a world war.

Furthermore, such a war would not have begun with a German invasion of Polish territory, but rather with an attack by Polish forces on German forces that had moved into Danzig in response to an invitation by the Danzig Senate. The war might have been limited to the area of the Corridor, with German forces repelling the Polish attack, and perhaps occupying the whole northern part of the Corridor. The spread of the war to the whole of Poland would most likely only have occurred if the Polish Government insisted on continuing to fight.

Thus, it was the British guarantee and the subsequent military agreements that turned the dispute over Danzig into the trigger for a general European war.

Britain also issued a guarantee to Romania, but Romania rejected it, and was not invaded by Germany. In fact, Romania ended up as a German ally, exactly the outcome that Hitler wished for from Poland.

[Led125]

Michael,

You are right, we cannot know what Beck would have done without British support, but we do have a great deal of evidence that leads one to conclude it would have been no different. Firstly your speculation is based on no eveidence whatsoever, aside from German documents which were inaccurate (Beck refused the German offer because he wanted to, not because his hands were tied). We have memoirs from people close to Beck such as Pawel Starzenski and Michal Lubienski which indicate Beck's willingness to compromise on Danzig even after the British guarantee, and we know he was turning down German offers prior to that. Beck could have argued that to not agree to Germa demands would be to court with disaster (which it was) but he didn't; I don't see any reason to assume that in the event of a coup in Danzig his response would be any different to what he stated it would be.

By war I mean a Germano-Polish war. I doubt that the war would have been limited to the corridor; we know Hitler had been planning to beat Pland down one day, so why not during a war over Danzig? Whilst you are technically correct, the British and French guarantees allowed the conflict to spread, there would have been no guarantees had Germany not adopted such a threatening attitude after the Munich agreement, and even after the guarantees only one power in Europe decided that she would pick a fight: Germany. All the others believed negotiations and compromise could work.

[Okyzm]

Hitler certainly did want Poland as an ally, but of course as a junior partner to Germany, in much the same way as, say, Egypt is a partner of the United States.

No, Hitler at best wanted Poland as very dependent puppet state with direct German control over its decisions. Also it was to be stripped of majority of its territory. I don't see USA annexing half of Egypt.


Diemut Majer. "Non-Germans" under the Third Reich: The Nazi Judicial and Administrative System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 1939-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
page 188

As early as the fall of 1933 Hitler had laid out before his most intimate circle his concept of a future Europe from the Atlantic to the Caucasus: Around Greater Germany(including Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Western Poland), he envisioned not a federation of equal partners but a Bund of "auxillary nations" without economies and polities of their own.

So as early as 1933 Hitler planned to annex Western Poland. Obviously this would require agression, not even the best diplomacy would allow Germans to get such territorial concessions from Polish state. Also of note is that any concept of equal status of those states was disregarded.

[michael mills]

So as early as 1933 Hitler planned to annex Western Poland.

What source did Dietmut Majer give for his claim? Was it an actual recorded statement by Hitler?

What were Hitler's exact words? Who recorded them?

So far, all you have given is a claim by Dietmut Majer. What we need is an actual statement by Hitler in 1933 in which he said that his firm aim was to annex Western Poland.