Hitler's Decision to Attack Poland

[Okyzm]

Hello,

just for the record: I've just demonstrated in http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1#p1441541 that Hiter's speech in Beuthen/Bytom in April 1932 had in no way an agressive character.

Forum users Okyzm and later uberjude have referred to this speech various times in this thread as a proof of Hitler's early intention to attack Poland. See for example (amongst others):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1430569
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1439352

Ryszard Wojna was obviously just one of the usual fakers that make a living by continuing to disseminate Allied atrocity propaganda ad infintium.
My advice: Get his "encyclopedia" from the nearest library, write 'Commie Fraud' over the page with red ink plus a reference to my thread above and hand it back. That should be enough for anyone to see what his book is worth.

Best regards
Torsten

Actiually the speech is very agressive, makes hints of destroying Poland, waging war across the whole world and so on.


There are omnious tones-he praises Bismarck that called for extermination of Poles(Polen ausrotten).

Then he goes to praise soldiers of Frederick the Great -Frederick the Great invaded Poland, pursued its Germanisation, and created Partitions of Poland.

After this statement he goes on to call for all German nation to be united together in Germany, so then the German border will defended.
Since this is in relation to Poland, then its clear he mentions German minority in Polish state. Combine that with praise for Frederick the Great soldiers and wars and Bismarck and it is no wonder Polish government was alarmed.

After praising Bismarck, Frederick the Great and caling for unification of all Germans, he says "What France supports will be our our death, what France hates- will be Germany's life"
France supported Poland in alliance since WW1. France feared for repeat of war with Germany. Clear hints of making war on Poland and expressing hatred towards French-Polish alliance that safeguarded Polish existance. Then calls thaht "what France hates will be our life"-destruction of Poland/war will be life of Germany ?

After this statement, he continues that Nazi fight is not contained to Germany-it will be a fight across the whole world.

This speech is very anti-Polish, and full of hints as to destruction of Poland, and waging war.

[Okyzm]

There was no Lebensraum in Poland,there were a lot of Poles
.

Hence they would be, and were subject to extermination. Slower then Jewish, it would take circa 15-20 years to make Poland a German province. In place of Poles 4 to 5 mln Germans would live.

[Led125]

Whilst Uberjude may have made mistakes in relying on other posters for information he has at least been willing to provide sources. Getting sources from you has proven as fruitless a task as trying to draw blood from a stone.

Of course there was a "Polish Problem", resulting from the Polish annexation of substantial German territory after the First World War, and the ambition of powerful anti-German political forces in Poland, primarily the extremist Endecja of Roman Dmowski, but also the less extremist Front Morges led by Ignacy Paderewski and Wladyslaw Sikorski, to seize even more German territory, essentially all the territory east of the Oder River, and even to the west of it.

Using the same standard we can say that Poland suffered a 'German problem' in that many in Germany sought to re-annex the lands Germany lost in 1919. Is there any evidence that any Polish diplomat sought to expand at Germany's expense? Many historians have looked at Polish foreign policy, none seem to have made this observation.

We know that Poland was the first to raise a revision of the status of Danzig (the exact document is in the papers of Herbert von Dirksen (Moscow, 1948)) yet at no point did they indicate a desire to annex it out right.

(Note that Sikorski, after he became head of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, implemented his aim of seizing all German territory east of the Oder, which was achieved even though after his death).

Using the same backward looking reasoning we can conclude Hitler was after significantly more than he said he was in the run up to the war.

The reality is that at the end of 1938, with Czechoslovakia having been transformed from an anti-German military power jutting into German territory and giving support to Hitler's enemies

This sounds an interesting argument. Is there any evidence that Czecho-slovakia had been an 'anti-German military power' before Hitler's bullying of Hacha in March?

Prazmowska believes that the British offer on 21 March of assistance to Poland to defy Germany over Danzig did not cause any change in Polish policy on the Danzig question. However, that is her opinion, and her arguments in support of it seem rather weak to me. It seems inconceivable that an offer by Britain to back Poland up in adopting a rejectionist approach to German proposals would not have made the Polish Government more obstinate and cocksure.

This seems an unconvincing counter argument. Prazmowska bases her argument on a detailed examination of Polish-German relations before and after Britain made advances to Poland. We know that Beck gave Lipski instructions in October of 1938 to tell Ribbentrop that any attempt by Germany to unilaterally alter the status by Danzig would ''inevitably lead to conflict'' between Poland and Germany.

Are you now arguing that Poland was aware she would get Britis support before March 31st or April the 6th? (
Would that mean that the statements made on April 1st (which, as far as the evidence, rather than speculations, suggests remained Polish policy throughout the last months of peace) can no longer be regarded as being made prior to the Poles knowing for sure that they had British support?

Such is the context in which Hitler commented to the General Staff of the wehrmacht that a situation might arise in which Poland would have to be "beaten down". The British approach to Poland was the obvious factor which caused Hitler to reverse his policy toward Poland, as he himself later stated.

Which makes it curious that Britain isn;t mentioned at all, don't you agree? Hitler had ribbentrop re-word one of the offers to Poland, because the wording presented Poland withthe option of 'friend or foe' and would drive her into Britain's arms. If memory serves this took place after March 21st. Clearly, Hitler wasn't speaking (on March 25th) in terms of Britain's involvement, as he didn't think that was decisive yet.

[ljadw]

If I am not wrong,Czecoslowakia was untill Munchen the staunchest ally of France (the Little Entente,you know ?)

[Led125]

Are countries not allowed to have alliances with somebody other than Germany? Did Czechoslovakia do anything that threatened Germany (not German expansion)?

[uberjude]

A bottom line with all of this is that Hitler was the one with the aggressive plan for foreign invasion and expansion, not the other way around. The French and Czechs had a defensive agreement, the French and Poles had a defensive agreement, the British and Poles had a defensive agreement, and until he abrogated it, Hitler had a non-aggression pact with Poland. In other words, Hitler wasn't threatened at all by his neighbors, and, as he made clear in the Hossbach protocols:

On the one hand there was the great Wehrmacht, and the necessity of maintaining it at its present level, the aging of the movement and of its leaders; and on the other, the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and of a limitation of the birth-rate, which left no choice but to act. If the Führer was still living, it was his unalterable determination to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943–45. The necessity for action before 1943–45 would arise in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2:

If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action against the Czechs had come.

Case 3:

If France is so embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot “proceed” against Germany.

For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in the war would, however, increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation could clearly take the form of an attack toward Silesia, toward the north or toward the west.

source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/doc ... ge_id=2322

Action against Czechoslovakia is therefore to be seen in the context of both the efforts to achieve space, and the plan to go to war against France by 1943. At no point does Hitler suggest that he fears a Czech--or later on, a Polish--aggression, and indeed, later in the protocol suggests that he doesn't even think the English and French will support the Czechs, so not only did he not fear aggressive war with the Czechs, he didn't even fear that they'd be able to fight a credible defensive war with France as an ally.

[Led125]

I found this interesting report by the German Ambassador to Poland to the Foreign Ministry written on April 4th 1939. I was only able to copy down the first paragraph because of time constraints, however it makes for a pretty interesting commentary on the effects of the British guarantee to Poland. The whole document can be seen in Documents on German Foreign Policy, voume 6, No. 154.

Chamberlain's statement on Britain's readiness to render assistance to Poland has been received with satisfaction by public opinion in Poland.The nervousness, which last week amounted to war-psychosis, has noticeably decreased,, even if a certain patriotic excitement remains, which is exploiated by war propaganda in the interests of the loan for air reaid precautions, towards which 140 million zloty have already been subscribed. The press, however, was instructed to observe a certain reserve as regards the attitude to the international situation as created by the British guarantee, probably not to irritate Germany unnecessarily, and not to arouse too great illusions here

The document then goes on to state that the Poles were putting out statements reiterating their foreing policy line: non-acceptance of ultimatums or threats yet a desire for positive relations with Germany.

There were no subsequent report from Moltke that suggests a substantial devaiation after the April 6th until April 11th (after which time I stopped looking). Moltke did report on April 6th that the Poles were not happy with the German press but that was it. Unsuprisingly this document wasn't included in the German White Book.

So we have a report from the German ambassador saying that the British Guarantee actually produced a calming effect on the Poles. Now confident that Britain would aid them in the event of a German attack they could afford to be more conciliatory with the Germans. There seems to be no report on April 6th saying all this changed.

[ljadw]

A bottom line with all of this is that Hitler was the one with the aggressive plan for foreign invasion and expansion, not the other way around. The French and Czechs had a defensive agreement, the French and Poles had a defensive agreement, the British and Poles had a defensive agreement, and until he abrogated it, Hitler had a non-aggression pact with Poland. In other words, Hitler wasn't threatened at all by his neighbors, and, as he made clear in the Hossbach protocols:

On the one hand there was the great Wehrmacht, and the necessity of maintaining it at its present level, the aging of the movement and of its leaders; and on the other, the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and of a limitation of the birth-rate, which left no choice but to act. If the Führer was still living, it was his unalterable determination to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943–45. The necessity for action before 1943–45 would arise in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2:

If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action against the Czechs had come.

Case 3:

If France is so embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot “proceed” against Germany.

For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in the war would, however, increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation could clearly take the form of an attack toward Silesia, toward the north or toward the west.

source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/doc ... ge_id=2322

Action against Czechoslovakia is therefore to be seen in the context of both the efforts to achieve space, and the plan to go to war against France by 1943. At no point does Hitler suggest that he fears a Czech--or later on, a Polish--aggression, and indeed, later in the protocol suggests that he doesn't even think the English and French will support the Czechs, so not only did he not fear aggressive war with the Czechs, he didn't even fear that they'd be able to fight a credible defensive war with France as an ally.

"The french and Czechs had a defensive agreement " Haha A good one .
Article V of the Alliance between France and Czechoslovakia from january 25 1924:
The High Contracting Parties solemly declare that they are in complete agreement as to the necessity,for the maintenance of peace (OF COURSE ),of taking common action in the event of any attempt to restore the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany,and they undertake to consult each other in such a contingency.
If the German people decided to testore the Hohenzollern,it was their right ,and no business of Paris and Prague:this article is a clear interference in the German interior affairs .
So far for this defensive agreement.

[uberjude]

Fair enough, but was Hitler planning to restore the Hohenzollern dynasty?

We know from the Hossbach memorandum that Hitler did not consider the Czechs to be a threat, and that his targeting of Czechoslovakia was strictly in keeping with his own offensive strategy. But don't take my word for it:

Case 1: Period 1943-1945.

After this date only a change for the worse, from our point of view, could be expected.

The equipment of the army, navy, and luftwaffe, as well as the formation of the officer corps, was nearly completed. Equipment and armament were modern; in further delay there lay the danger of their obsolescence. In particular, the secrecy of "special weapons" could not be preserved forever. The recruiting of reserves was limited to current age groups; further drafts from older untrained age groups were no longer available.

Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which would by then have been carried out by the rest of the world. If we did not act by 1943-45' any year could, in consequence of a lack of reserves, produce the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign exchange was not available, and this must be regarded as a "waning point of the regime." Besides, the world was expecting our attack and was increasing its counter-measures from year to year. It was while the rest of the world was still preparing its defenses [sich abriegele] that we were obliged to take the offensive.

Nobody knew today what the situation would be in the years 1943-45. One thing only was certain, that we could not wait longer.

On the one hand there was the great Wehrmacht, and the necessity of maintaining it at its present level, the aging of the movement and of its leaders; and on the other, the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and of a limitation of the birth rate, which left no choice but to act. If the Fuehrer was still living, it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 would arise in cases 2 and 3.
Case 2:

If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action against the Czechs had come.
Case 3:

If France is so embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in the war would, however, increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation could clearly take the form of an attack toward Silesia, toward the north or toward the west.

If the Czechs were overthrown and a common German-Hungarian frontier achieved, a neutral attitude on the part of Poland could be the more certainly counted on in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Our agreements with Poland only retained their force as long as Germany's strength remained unshaken. In the event of German setbacks a Polish action against East Prussia, and possibly against Pomerania and Silesia as well, had to be reckoned with.

On the assumption of a development of the Situation leading to action: on our part as planned, in the years 1943-45, the attitude of France, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Russia could probably be estimated as follows:

Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany. Difficulties connected with the Empire, and the prospect of being once more entangled in a protracted European war, were decisive considerations for Britain against participation in a war against Germany. Britain's attitude would certainly not be without influence on that of France. An attack by France without British support, and with the prospect of the offensive being brought to a standstill on our western fortifications, was hardly probable. Nor was a French march through Belgium and Holland without British support to be expected; this also was a course not to be contemplated by us in the event of a conflict with France, because it would certainly entail the hostility of Britain. It would of course be necessary to maintain a strong defense [eine Abriegelung] on our western frontier during the prosecution of our attack on the Czechs and Austria. And in this connection it had to be remembered that the defense measures of the Czechs were growing in strength from year to year, and that the actual worth of the Austrian Army also was increasing in the course of time. Even though the populations concerned, especially of Czechoslovakia, were not sparse, the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 6 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was practicable. The incorporation of these two States with Germany meant, from the politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new units up to a level of about 12 divisions, that is, 1 new division per million inhabitants.

Italy was not expected to object to the elimination of the Czechs, but it was impossible at the moment to estimate what her attitude on the Austrian question would be; that depended essentially upon whether the Duce were still alive.

The degree of surprise and the swiftness of our action were decisive factors for Poland's attitude. Poland -with Russia at her rear will have little inclination to engage in war against a victorious Germany.

[bf109 emil]

If the German people decided to testore the Hohenzollern,it was their right ,and no business of Paris and Prague:this article is a clear interference in the German interior affairs .

was Germany interior affairs and conditions not part of the treaty of Versailles? Hardly none of Paris and Prague's affairs should Germany now wish to rebuild an empire or Monarchy such as the second Reich had previously inflicted her wrath upon France earlier.

Action against Czechoslovakia is therefore to be seen in the context of both the efforts to achieve space, and the plan to go to war against France by 1943. At no point does Hitler suggest that he fears a Czech--or later on, a Polish--aggression, and indeed, later in the protocol suggests that he doesn't even think the English and French will support the Czechs,

evidence and plans for Germany to conquer Czechoslovakia date back to early 1938 and was part of a program Hitler had set forth as early as 1937 from page 4 reads at the conference in the Reichs
Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937. Hitler had set forth the
program which Germany was to follow. the full 39 pages for Germany on this action and to reasons etc. can be read herehttp://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/d ... _01_02.pdf

[ljadw]

If the German people decided to testore the Hohenzollern,it was their right ,and no business of Paris and Prague:this article is a clear interference in the German interior affairs .

was Germany interior affairs and conditions not part of the treaty of Versailles? Hardly none of Paris and Prague's affairs should Germany now wish to rebuild an empire or Monarchy such as the second Reich had previously inflicted her wrath upon France earlier.

Action against Czechoslovakia is therefore to be seen in the context of both the efforts to achieve space, and the plan to go to war against France by 1943. At no point does Hitler suggest that he fears a Czech--or later on, a Polish--aggression, and indeed, later in the protocol suggests that he doesn't even think the English and French will support the Czechs,

evidence and plans for Germany to conquer Czechoslovakia date back to early 1938 and was part of a program Hitler had set forth as early as 1937 from page 4 reads at the conference in the Reichs
Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937. Hitler had set forth the
program which Germany was to follow. the full 39 pages for Germany on this action and to reasons etc. can be read herehttp://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/d ... _01_02.pdf

Was there any article of the Treaty of Versailles preventing a return of the Hohenzollerns ?

[Panzermahn]

And in April, 1939, Poland did not join "an alliance against Germany." Poland, which had a non-aggression Pact with Germany, made a mutual defense agreement with Britain. It would only go into effect if Germany was the aggressor. The Anglo-Polish Agreement provided for no support unless Poland was being threatened, and of course, until Hitler renounced it, Poland and Germany had a non-aggression pact. The alliance was for Poland, not against Germany.

I beg to differ. No nation (especially in the context of the politics in european states especially in the beginning of 20th century) would simply create an alliance without any particular reason except for the perceived notion of real/imagined possible threats from another country. Why do you have a mutual defense agreement if you believed that there is no real or imagined threat at all? Poland's alliance with countries (for example the Prometheus League) are intended to aim at either Germany or Soviet Russia. Josef Pilsudski believed that Hitler and Germany is the lesser of two evils. Hitler is known to have a great respect for Pilsudski. If the Polish government continued with Pilsudski's entente policy with Germany and focus on the Prometheus League of creating anti-Bolshevik nations bloc aimed against Bolshevik Russia, perhaps the history would turn out otherwise.

If Poland truly believes that Danzig was part of Polish territory, why rely on military guarantees from Britain and France since any move by Germany towards Danzig would be considered cassus belli for a German-Polish War? The fact itself show that most likely without British military guarantees, Poland would have probably accept German offers for access to Danzig ports in return for giving back Danzig to Germany.

In this context, it was Mr. "peace-in-our-time" Chamberlain is the one who opened the gates for the warbull to charge at the waving cape. Nobody in Britain believed that Britain would go to war for Danzig. In fact, initially, the first British Government guarantees only covered Polish sovereign territory, not Danzig and this only changed to include Danzig much later on

[Led125]

Actually there is no evidence whatsoever to support the notion that Poland would have accepted German demands had there been no British guarantee. Just because Pilsudski believed something several years before doesn't mean Beck believed the same thing in 1939. While we are on it Pilsudski wasn't particularly 'pro-German', and Poland's non-aggression pact with Germany was part of her policy of equilibrium policy. It nicely balanced out her non-aggression pact with the USSR.

Some measure of how far Poland would have accomodated German demands can be seen in the discussions before British involvement:

"In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gesamtloesung) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra- territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers."

"Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you."

"Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the government of the German Reich, the Polish government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.

"In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future."

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/nca/nca- ... 08-05.html


It was the Poles who first approached the Germans with the idea of altering the Danzig status. They did NOT have in mind German taking Danzig, and were appalled at this suggestion.

We know that British involvement in Polish affairs began earlier than March 31st; here is how someone close summed up Polish policy several days after the Poles had knowledge of British interests there:

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bi ... M&page=102

We also know that prior to the British Guarantee Poland was in a virtual state of ''war psychosis'' and was psychologically preparing itself for war. After the British Guarantee, Poland calmed itself down ''noticeably'' and put its press on a leash.

We can all claim that Poland would have been more conciliatory without British involvement, however until any evidence is offered for this assertion (rather than saying ''facts show this'' or ''Hitler said this'') it is difficult to accept it.

[uberjude]

Panzermahn, you wrote:

If the Polish government continued with Pilsudski's entente policy with Germany

It did. Up until 1939, the status quo was that Danzig was an open city, and that Germany and Poland had a non-aggression pact. Hitler, fresh from his victories over Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, tried to change the status quo by demanding Danzig, and Hitler, upset that the Anglo-Polish agreement threatened his future plans for war, cancelled the non-aggression pact.

And the absurd thing about this whole thread is that we've been arguing about how Germany only responded aggressively after the Anglo-Polish agreement, but the Anglo-Polish agreement was only signed because Poland feared German expansion.

If the status quo had stayed where it was, there would have been no Anglo-Polish Agreement, and if the non-aggression pact had stayed in force, there could have been no war, and if Germany hadn't invaded Poland, there would have been no war.

It was Germany, not Poland, that ended the policy of entente.

[Panzermahn]

And yes, Pilsudski's successors did continue the entente policy with Germany, when it has the Interventionary Force and station un-uniformed Polish reservists in the postal office (wearing Polish Army underwear), provoking Germany by conducting rigorous custom restrictions.

There would be no Anglo-Polish agreement if Poland herself willing to return to the negotiating table with Germany. Germany did indeed offer Poland access to Danzig ports but thanks to Polish intransigence as being embolden by British military guarantees, who cares the rights of the Danzigers as long as Danzig remains in Polish control.