Total size of the German and Soviet Armed Forces

[CJK1990]

and,what you heard about the WM formations on the other fronts,is irrelevant :they were not on the eastfront,because they were unfit,but because they were needed elsewhere .
Again,in october 1943,do you think that there were 6 million of German soldiers stationed elsewhere,because they were unfit for the eastfront ?
Of the 9.36 million,there were 1.525 million of the field army in the OKW theaters of operation (=everywhere except the eastfront)
Most,but not all of the WSS(300000) and the LWFielddivisions (200000) were stationed in the east .
The reserve army:2.3 million,were these men unfit for the east ? Some,yes,others,no But,that's irrelevant,they were in Germany,because the Germans needed a reserve army .
The LW:1.8 million,unfit for the east ? maybe,maybe not ,but irrelevant,unless you think Germany could do without a LW.
The KM (670000):idem .

Well, I did read that on the eve of D-Day less than half the divisions in France were considered fit for east duty by high command. Nevertheless, I have been somewhat suspicious of this judgement because the Soviets could not have been fielding only pristine units either.

[ljadw]

that there would be a difference between being fit for the east,or being fit for the other TOO,maybe.But,I have not yet seen an acceptable explanation for a difference between fighting in Normandy and fighting in the West ..
But I think you are confusing :there were in France a lot of divisions (so called bodenstandige),who were not unfit for the east,but unfit for active service (=also for the Normandt fighting,most of them belonging to the 15th army .)These divisions were only usefull for occupation duties .

[Art]

Your Soviet figures hardly indicate a broader inclusiveness in the Soviet casualty figures than the German.

I can't agree with it. They were broader than Abgange simply by definition, which I said earlier.

You're giving 4.4 million force addition, if I read you correctly.

4.8-4.9

And there were 7.9 million recorded casualties.

7.55 including Navy losses (which were small though)

This adds up only if you're prepared to assume that there were something like 4 million sick and wounded of a kind who wouldn't end up being included in German Abgänge, which would leave a rather funny structure to Soviet "Abgänge" as it would leave a maximum of 1.5 million sick and wounded to go along with nearly 2 million killed in action or missing.

Let's see. The number of replacements from the replacement units of the operational army by 25 September 1943 was 2 053 800 (see the post above). Projecting this number to the end of the year we will have some 2.8 millions. 4.8+2.8=7.6. So losses were nearly equal to replacements, as one should expect. It's a pretty good fit for such a rough estimate. Then we can assume that the number of men leaving the fronts' strength was roughly equal to replacements received from external sources. That would be 4.8-4.9 millions again. Of them some 2 millions were killed, missing and "other losses". Of 5 550 000 wounded and sick 300 thousands wounded (Krivosheev) and some 30 thousands sick (estimate) died in hospitals. About 5.2 millions stayed alive. Of them 4.8-0.3-2.0=2.5 millions left the operational army in this or that way, and the remaining part or 2.7 must stay there.
Then you can take total replacements not "Zugange"-type numbers. I'm less certain about calculation in this case, but it appear that in this case the German number could be close to 2.5 millions, which gives us a 3:1 ratio.

I also note that roughly twice as many replacements came from the hospitals of the operational army as from the rear.

Only as far as you take what Smorodinov called "march replacements". There were other categories as can be seen from the document.

I also wonder why they were recorded as replacements if they were still on their units' strengths?

I don't fully understand the question. Who were?

The volume of non-combat losses in the Soviet casualty figures are very low compared to the German.

From the last discussion I brought an impression that I'm not really sure that we talk about comparable values. What Krivosheev gives is a number of hospital admissions, so it should be compared with German hospital admissions. The same applies to the comment on the KOSAVE study. It seems possible that the German number was proportionally higher, but what then - it's a fact that should be accepted. But speaking frankly I'm not sure what "sick" meant in various German documents. For example, German divisions regularly submitted monthly status reports, which included information on losses, for example this one:
http://www.wwii-photos-maps.com/germano ... /0242.html
From what I can see the level of losses through sickness was usually rather moderate, normally far smaller than the number of wounded, while from what you say one might expect completely different proportion. I don't understand why it is so.

what we know of the subdivision of German Abgänge (and of army medical installations for the matter) suggests that the overwhelming mass of combat losses ended up included there

And what do we know about it? The most informative thing I saw was that table from the KTB OKW, the rest are just sum numbers.

[Qvist]

4.8+2.8=7.6. So losses were nearly equal to replacements, as one should expect.

Okay, I interpreted you to argue that the 2.8 should not be considered.

But replacements, if they include new formation should not be nearly equal to replacements - they should be considerably higher. Otherwise, it would be hard to see how the operational strength would be considerably higher at the end of 1943 than it was at the beginning of the year.

7.55 including Navy losses (which were small though)

Not with sickness losses included.

Then we can assume that the number of men leaving the fronts' strength was roughly equal to replacements received from external sources. That would be 4.8-4.9 millions again. Of them some 2 millions were killed, missing and "other losses". Of 5 550 000 wounded and sick 300 thousands wounded (Krivosheev) and some 30 thousands sick (estimate) died in hospitals. About 5.2 millions stayed alive. Of them 4.8-0.3-2.0=2.5 millions left the operational army in this or that way, and the remaining part or 2.7 must stay there.

You mean, Soviet "Abgänge" calculated by this method in essence includes only killed, missing and those wounded and sick who died or were dismissed/left the operational army, which amounted to less than half the sick and wounded?

The obvious point that you are then missing in terms of comparability with the German figures is that compared to the German Abgänge, this has the practical effect of reducing both losses and replacements. A much greater proportion of the casualties doesn't leave strength, and so don't re-enter the picture as replacements either. That makes no difference from the point of view of internal balance, although it is demanding to source. But it has a very large effect for comparative purposes.

Which again underlines the usefulness of a more generalised model to supplement approaches that are wholly reliant on the way each army structured their reporting. Strength development + casualties is not merely a way of assessing force addition, it is a viable definition of force addition. If you end up with a Soviet force addition that is closer to the German than the losses are AND in a situation where Soviet strength has increased while the German has declined, then I'm sorry, that result by definition shows that you have a flawed calculation. If you lose 5 times as many men and your force addition is only 3 times larger, then your strength relative to the enemy declines. If that is not the case, then there is something wrong with your data or its applicability.

From the last discussion I brought an impression that I'm not really sure that we talk about comparable values. What Krivosheev gives is a number of hospital admissions, so it should be compared with German hospital admissions. The same applies to the comment on the KOSAVE study. It seems possible that the German number was proportionally higher, but what then - it's a fact that should be accepted.

Er, that is too simple. The difference is vast, when you take into account force size. So vast that just the Abgänge German sick exceed the Soviet.There is also the point that Krivosheev's data includes hardly any sickness cases during the first 1 1/2 years of the war. This clearly points to differences in the way sickness losses were treated and recorded in the two armies, unless RA recruits were exceptionally healthy.

But speaking frankly I'm not sure what "sick" meant in various German documents. For example, German divisions regularly submitted monthly status reports, which included information on losses, for example this one:
http://www.wwii-photos-maps.com/germano ... /0242.html
From what I can see the level of losses through sickness was usually rather moderate, normally far smaller than the number of wounded, while from what you say one might expect completely different proportion. I don't understand why it is so.

'

Why would you expect the opposite proportion? I haven't written that. Moderate they may have been, that depends on the measure. But as recorded, they were far, far more numerous than in the (much larger) Red Army. But it is perhaps not really such a radical problem. With the Germans ,it does seem that by far the most of the WIA went into Abgänge and out of strength. It is also probably fair to assume that seriousness on the whole had quite a lot to do with who got evacuated and who stayed in the operational zone among the sick, meaning that the sick who stayed most likely had a relatively brief effect on strength (average recovery time for sickness cases was not more than a month or so, in any case). This fairly certainly makes Abgänge a reasonable approximation of personnell loss on the German side. As would the recorded losses on the Soviet side, including the sick. Given that the NCL portion of Abgänge actually exceed the number of Soviet recorded hospitalised sick, there doesn't seem to me good grounds for regarding the latter as a more inclusive category - the mismatch of the figures are grotesque enough as it is. Maybe hundreds of thousands of soviet soldiers soldiered on with frostbitten toes or sick from cholera without being hospitalised, I don't know, but equivalent they clearly are not on some level and for some reason.

And what do we know about it? The most informative thing I saw was that table from the KTB OKW, the rest are just sum numbers.

Of course not. Just because I or you have never seen a definition document of Abgänge doesn't mean that not a great deal is known about it. It is a measure of my confidence in the discussion that I allow myself to speculate about conceivable issues regarding its content - on the whole and within reasonable limits of certainty, there is no very significant doubt about the general magnitudes they represent, which present a pretty consistent picture, also relative to other data.

What do you mean "sum data"? There are many, many reports giving Abgänge in considerable detail. And anyway, if you dislike sum data you shouldn't put too much store on that OKW report, which is built exactly on that approach.

[Art]

But replacements, if they include new formation should not be nearly equal to replacements - they should be considerably higher. Otherwise, it would be hard to see how the operational strength would be considerably higher at the end of 1943 than it was at the beginning of the year.

I don't see that it was considerably higher. According to the official 12-volumes history operational forces had 6 160 thousands men (without Navy and PVO) on 20 November 1942, on 1 January 1944 according to the same source - 5 895 thousands men. I can't find certain numbers for 1 January 1943 right now. Looks like a small decrease in fact. On the other hand one can argue that since Smorodinov counted replacements sent to Stavka reserve, its strength should be added too. Anyway It seems that any changes were relatively small and withing limit of accuracy of my estimate, so assuming that losses were equal to replacements doesn't make much difference.

Not with sickness losses included.

You can check my calculations:
http://s44.radikal.ru/i106/1104/81/0586f214633b.jpg
That is Army and Navy, Army alone according to Krivosheev accounted for 1 977 727 irrevocable and 5 506 520 sanitary losses, total 7 483 647. Everything seems to be Ok.

You mean, Soviet "Abgänge" calculated by this method in essence includes only killed, missing and those wounded and sick who died or were dismissed/left the operational army

Yes. But wasn't the German equivalent the same thing?

The obvious point that you are then missing in terms of comparability with the German figures is that compared to the German Abgänge, this has the practical effect of reducing both losses and replacements

I don't fully understand, reducing compared with what? Compared with total losses? Yes, that's true. But Abgäange in the way they were calculated reduced them as well. At least here were compare equivalent things. If you don't like it, we can take total replacements and total losses, it would be even better from the methodical point of view. In this case we would have a somewhat different ratio, but hardly well beyond 3:1. However, it would be wrong to compare total losses from one side and Abgange from another. These are different values by the very definition.

If you lose 5 times as many men and your force addition is only 3 times larger, then your strength relative to the enemy declines.

"If". I can repeat the point made earlier. Soviet total losses in 1943 were 7.5 or 7.6 millions (depending whether your take army and navy or army alone). German Abgänge, which were not total losses, but a more narrow category - about 2 millions. So the ratio of total losses which included all hospital admissions must be below 3.75:1. Most probably well bellow.

So vast that just the Abgänge German sick exceed the Soviet.

I don't see it, honestly speaking. We have 450 thousands for the period November 1942 - October 1943 versus 920 thousands sick in the year 1943 from Krivosheev. In absolute numbers they are smaller, proportionally it is roughly the same level.

There is also the point that Krivosheev's data includes hardly any sickness cases during the first 1 1/2 years of the war.

600 000 is not hardly any case. Anyway it's not relevant for the discussion of 1943.

What do you mean "sum data"?

I mean that I didn't see breakdown by category: killed, wounded, missing, sick.

Why would you expect the opposite proportion? I haven't written that. Moderate they may have been, that depends on the measure. But as recorded, they were far, far more numerous than in the (much larger) Red Army.

Em, if we take this 4 PzD than it had 13 469 men on strength as of 1 November 1944, and lost 207 men as sick during the previous month. Which is 1,53 % or 18,5% a year. Krivosheev's numbers for the same year are 1 135 thousands sick from 6 550 thousands average strength or 17,3 % I'm not going to make calculation for every division, of course, but in general my impression that these reports doesn't indicate the higher level of noncombat casualties in the German Army. From which follows the question was there any difference in definition of sickness of German documents which could account for different level of noncombat casualties? It's just a note a propos, you can ignore it if you think that it's not relevant for the discussion.

[Qvist]

Art,

Interesting points. Rather than reply hurriedly I'll take some time to consider them. Also we are moving, which limits my access to the neccessary data.

[thom]

Perhaps of interest to confirm the German term "Abgaenge" is this part of an original document and its translation/explanation by the US archivist:

Abgaenge2.jpg (24.48 KiB) Viewed 502 times

[thom]

The handwriting may be hard to read, it says:

"Abgänge" (= troops withdrawn from the battle area)
Abgänge are composed of: dead, missing, and wounded and sick men removed from the (army) battle zone

Thus those cases where "Blutige Verluste" exceed "Abgänge" are (probably) cases where there were an unusually large number of men lightly wounded but not so seriously damaged as to have to be sent back from the battle zone.