Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

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Philip S. Walker
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Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#1

Post by Philip S. Walker » 13 Apr 2011, 12:10

The famous Finnish military historian Ohto Manninen writes in his book "The Soviet Plans for the North Western Theatre of Operations in 1939-1944":
The Soviet Union's assessment of the threat to its territory remained quite constant throughout the late 1930s, and the operative plan for 1939 began on the assumption that Germany and Poland would attack the Soviet Union simultaneously from the west - with the probable participation of the Italian navy - while Japan would attack from the east. It was estimated that Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Finland would join the war only if the operations of the Red Army and the Red Navy did not meet the success from the outset.
While Finland isn't seen as a probably aggressor from the beginning of an attack on the Soviet Union, the country is nevertheless suspected of potentially wanting to join the Germans as soon as it would appear that the invasion became successful. The Soviets also lumped Finland together with a number of East European states which, at the time, had dictatorial or at least semi-dictatorial governments with more than just a streak of Fascism (I wonder why Lithuania isn't mentioned, but we'll let that rest for now).

This seems highly surprising. Finland in 1939 was a democratic state with strong left-wing leanings. The biggest party was the Social Democrats, gaining in general some 40 pct. of votes at elections. Of course, there is a vast difference between Social Democrats and pro-Soviet Communists, but the thought of a country like this jumping on the Nazi bandwagon in an invasion of the Soviet Union seems positively absurd. We know how difficult it was to carry though such a project in Finland even after the Winter War when political and public support for it was much higher. Furthermore, we know that the Finnish army in 1939 was relatively small, under-equipped and geared mainly for defense, and though there was a long-standing historical bond between Finland and Germany, that bond had become considerable less important during the 1920s and 1930s, when Finland turned more towards Britain and, of course, the other Nordic countries while engaging strongly in the work of the League of Nations.

Still, it was this suspicion of an attack from Finland aimed at primarily Leningrad that led to the Soviet demands of a border adjustment in the autumn of 1939 and subsequently to the Winter War.

So how and why did the Soviets end up with this false impression of Finland, leading to so much misery on both sides?

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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#2

Post by Vaeltaja » 13 Apr 2011, 13:57

Can't claim to be expert of relations between Finland and Soviet Union but...

Molotov's rise to power ended and reversed pretty much every gain or agreement that had happened between Finland and Soviet Union. That could be one thing - as after Molotov's rise to power at foreign relations there was very little of anything going on between Finns and Soviets. Also its good thing to remember that Stalins informants - especially after the purges - only forwarded (and often embellished) the news or reports that they believed would be received favorably by their superiors. Add couple of layers of bureacracy all doing the same and you end up with Soviet leadership getting reports that are at times totally contradictory to what had actually happened in Finland.

And 'vast difference' does not really even begin to describe the gap between Finnish Social Democrats and Soviet Communists - that is there was vast difference between Finnish and Soviet Communists - from Soviet POV the Finnish Social Democrats were about the worst things in existance (bolshevik vs menshevik). Having class enemies was one thing but having enemies within own class was even worse.

Problems and memories of the 1921 - 22 didn't do anything to ease the tension.

In addition given that the initial Soviet goals were the occupation of Finland and installing fully Soviet puppet government into Finland there might be no real need to have a 'valid reason' to fear for attack via Finland if the idea was just to have 'a sound pretext' for conquering FInland.


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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#3

Post by Philip S. Walker » 13 Apr 2011, 15:49

Vaeltaja: Also its good thing to remember that Stalins informants - especially after the purges - only forwarded (and often embellished) the news or reports that they believed would be received favorably by their superiors. Add couple of layers of bureacracy all doing the same and you end up with Soviet leadership getting reports that are at times totally contradictory to what had actually happened in Finland.
It seems that the Kremlin was led to believe that Finland was a totally divided society where part of the population was dreaming of invading Russia, while the other was just dreaming of becoming a Soviet puppet state under Otto Kuusinen. Otho Manninen puts it this way:
The military and political leadership of the Soviet Union did not expect Finland to put up serious resistance [against a preemptive Soviet attack]. This was partly based on wishful thinking, and partly it was calculated that the weapondry of the Finnish arrmed forces was old, since it had been inherited from the Tsar's army, that there would be desertions, and that fighting against the Red Army would be considered an overwhelming task. The workers and the poorest peasants were thought to be secretly unhappy with the government's policy, and it was expected that they would demand improved relations with the Soviet Union and threaten to punish those whose policy was hostile to the Soviet Union.
Looking at the election results should be enough to show anyone a different picture, except for the fact that the Communist Party had been made illegal, i.e. it could be claimed that the general population was really Communist but couldn't show it publicly. (Still, takes quite a bit of imagination I would say.)
Vaeltaja: And 'vast difference' does not really even begin to describe the gap between Finnish Social Democrats and Soviet Communists - that is there was vast difference between Finnish and Soviet Communists - from Soviet POV the Finnish Social Democrats were about the worst things in existance (bolshevik vs menshevik). Having class enemies was one thing but having enemies within own class was even worse.
Well put! This is a very important truth that people on the right wing often forget (though perhaps not so often in Finland). But I would still say that the possibility of a country with such a large and powerful Social Democrat Party should join Nazi Germany in an invasion of Russia at this time seems crazy.
Vaeltaja: Problems and memories of the 1921 - 22 didn't do anything to ease the tension.
And the Civil War as well, I would say. If the Soviets to a large extent formed their views of Finland on information passed to them via exiled Finns, it is very likely that these people had not updated their views on their old country properly. A very common mistake to make among immigrants - you retrain the images of your nation at the time you left it.
In addition given that the initial Soviet goals were the occupation of Finland and installing fully Soviet puppet government into Finland there might be no real need to have a 'valid reason' to fear for attack via Finland if the idea was just to have 'a sound pretext' for conquering Finland.
It doesn't seem that the Kremlin at this point was into the idea of occupying Finland just for the sake of it. The attacks they considered were merely seen as preemptive and borne out of fear of a German - or perhaps even British - attack directed at them going THROUGH Finland. However, this view only developed (according to Manninen) during 1939. Until then the assumption was as stated in my first post, i.e. that the Finns would join a German invasion if such a venture showed signs of being successful and hence increase the pressure on the Soviet Union and Leningrad in particular. I suppose one doesn't necessarily exclude the other.

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Hanski
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Finland as a potential attacker throughout history...

#4

Post by Hanski » 13 Apr 2011, 19:08

Perhaps the idea of Finland as an attacker in the eyes of Moscow has even longer roots than one might come to think about - maybe it is it simply derived out of the basic geographic facts...

Maybe Bishop Olaus Magnus was not that wrong in his Carta Marina from A. D. 1539 when depicting the nature of the interaction across the then Swedish eastern border... :lol:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carta_marina
Attachments
Aggressio Fennorum.jpg

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skywarp
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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#5

Post by skywarp » 14 Apr 2011, 23:57

What Manninen is describing in that paragraph (and you'll have to forgive me, as I don't have that book) is probably accurate when it comes to describing the Soviet plans of 1939. Or, a specific plan or set of plans. I'm not even sure that Finland wouldn't have joined in a combined German-Baltic attack on a crumbling USSR. However, i don't think that particular scenario as put forth by Manninen relates directly to why the USSR ended up deciding to invade later in the year.

The proximity of the border to Leningrad had been bothering the Kremlin since the city was founded there (the border was considerably older than the city). Further, and possibly more importantly, Stalin saw the Gulf of Finland as a major weak point in the "buffer" of friendly territory that he wanted to create. Don't forget that British warships used the Gulf during their intervention during the Russian civil war. Stalin didn't forget that, especially since he was involved in some minor actions in that region at the time. In the early 30s, Stalin was afraid of further British aggression and through the Gulf was the most convenient path of attack. Then, through the late 30s Stalin and his foreign minister Litvinov were worried -- very worried -- about future German aggression in the region. In fact I would argue that their statements in the League of Nations in the 30s better anticipate German actions later in the decade than any of those by the other "allies".

Stalin's idea of defense in 1939 was all about "buffer" nations. He wanted "friendly" border countries that could stall or even impede an attack. Obviously, to touch on Manninen's point again, if the Baltics were friendly to or controlled by the Kremlin, they wouldn't join in an attack with Germany. Stalin also wanted the right to move the Red Army into and through these nations in the event of an attack, to fight the attacker before he got to Soviet soil. This was the major sticking point in the 1938-1939 Russo-Anglo-Franco discussions. The British and French could not agree to a treaty that would allow Stalin a free military hand in the Baltic region, while that was all Stalin really wanted. He seriously doubted promises that Britain and France would or could come to his aid militarily if Germany attacked. (Another astonishingly astute foreign-policy observation from Uncle Joe.)

When secret talks in Germany resulted in the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, Stalin got almost everything he wanted. He got his free hand in the Baltic (including Finland) to build a buffer against what he still thought would be an eventual German attack. He then moved on to securing treaties with the Baltic nations, which came very easily after the fall of Poland. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all gave in and agreed to a Soviet military presence. (By the end of 1941 all three nations were Soviet puppets/satellites.) The Finns did not give in.

If Stalin could get Finland to agree to his demands, which were a bit more than just a "border adjustment," he would have been able to seal off the Gulf of Finland via new naval bases and shore batteries (that would compliment new ones on the Estonian coast). Through the "military assistance" part of his demand, he would have also been able to stall a foreign attack in Finland's wilderness rather than on Leningrad's doorstep. These measures would have made a German attack through Finland very difficult, and likely would have led to Finland's becoming another Soviet satellite as well (though there isn't yet any documentation out there that this was an explicit goal of Stalin's).

The Finns couldn't allow any of these concessions, of course. They relied on their "Scandinavian neutrality" both to try to assure the Soviets that they wouldn't allow such an invasion and also to claim that they couldn't possibly agree to military bases/assistance as it would violate their neutrality. Stalin countered that Finland without assistance wasn't powerful enough to stop a German or British attack, neutral or not.

This essentially was the impasse, and Finland wouldn't blink, for many reasons, foolish or not. Couple this with the Kremlin's mistaken belief that the Finnish worker was ready to rise up against his upper class, their accurate assessment of Finnish military capability, a desire to flex a little of the Leningrad Army Group's muscle, along with some very bad road maps of the Karelian countryside, and Stalin decided to invade.

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Hanski
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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#6

Post by Hanski » 16 Apr 2011, 11:57

Skywarp, you present some very valid observations.

The idea of Finland being a "buffer" between greater powers dates far back in history, to times long before Stalin was even born. My post above with reference to the map of Olaus Magnus with the cavalry riding to battle is therefore not merely a joke: the Finns had to accept for centuries their land becoming battleground whenever it was so decided in Stockholm, Moscow etc.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Northern_War

For example, the Greater Wrath in the early 1700's meant horrific massacre and devastation to the population in the buffer zone and generated accounts of events that were passed on for generations with the concept of an arch-enemy.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Wrath
skywarp wrote:... These measures would have made a German attack through Finland very difficult, and likely would have led to Finland's becoming another Soviet satellite as well (though there isn't yet any documentation out there that this was an explicit goal of Stalin's).
I agree the most likely outcome would have been Finland ending up "in the happy family of Soviet states" just like the Baltic countries -- but for their part, is there any different existing documentation that making Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania Soviet satellites was an explicit goal of Stalin's? - Lack of available documentation does not imply lack of intention, does it?

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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#7

Post by Philip S. Walker » 16 Apr 2011, 12:44

@Skywarp and Hanski.

Interesting posts, but haven't you lost track a bit of the questions I was asking? We know that Finland in the 1920s and 1930s did not in any way constitute a threat to the Soviet Union, so why was the country perceived that way by the Kremlin as shown by Manninen?

It don't think there is one single explanation for this, but one of several might be connected to this suggestion by Vaeltaja:
Problems and memories of the 1921 - 22 didn't do anything to ease the tension.

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John Hilly
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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#8

Post by John Hilly » 16 Apr 2011, 16:20

As is well known, Stalin had a long and unexuseble memory. A probabilty in SU's attitude could be found from this politics:
http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reunavaltiopolitiikka
Attempts to form a alliance, Poland being the mastermind in these doplomatic efforts.

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Juha-Pekka :milwink:
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"

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skywarp
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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#9

Post by skywarp » 28 Apr 2011, 18:03

Philip S. Walker wrote:@Skywarp and Hanski.

Interesting posts, but haven't you lost track a bit of the questions I was asking? We know that Finland in the 1920s and 1930s did not in any way constitute a threat to the Soviet Union, so why was the country perceived that way by the Kremlin as shown by Manninen?
I don't think that Manninen shows the Soviet Union perceiving Finland as a threat. He shows the Soviet Union predicting war, and assuming that they have no friendly neighbors. Which is accurate enough on both counts. You are making a leap to a conclusion in your question, and that is why we have lost track of it.

What Manninen shows and I agree with is that the USSR did not expect any of its neighbors to abstain from a general war against them. If you want to single Finland out, we can -- I would say that the USSR considered the Finnish attitude toward them as "unfriendly." However, I will not agree, as I think you are implying, that this perception directly led to the Soviet invasion in 1939.

If you will accept my modification of your question to: Why did the USSR consider the Finns "unfriendly?" then:
I see three major reasons.

First, the Finn-German relationship . In the 1930s, it was more cultural than political/military, but it was still a significant factor in Finnish politics and had to have weighed heavily on Stalin's mind. The Germans aided the Finns in their war for independence and aided the White Finns in the civil war. After the civil war, the Finns almost crowned a German prince their new king! Many, if not most, of Finnish military leadership were decorated veterans of German WWI volunteer units and there was a lot of admiration and imitation of German tradition and structure in the Finnish military. Much of their soldier's gear from helmets to trench shovels
were WWI surplus German equipment. The Finnish people traditionally looked toward and admired Germans as a friendly, like-minded people. It is also notable that the Finnish government enjoyed the balancing power all this had in their dealings with the Soviets in the interwar years.

Second, the outcome of the Finnish civil war was a significant setback and annoyance to the Soviets. Finland had been a favorite getaway for Bolshevik revolutionaries before their revolution, and the "fall of Finland" to "imperialists" rather than the Bolshevik-supported Red Finns was a direct offense, given the early Bolshevik support of Finland's independence. And as the years passed, Finland became more westernized, economically successful, and socially progressive; they also outlawed the communist party and exiled Finnish communists; this all served to further annoy the Soviet regime. Much harder to study and quantify but still significant is the social and political tension that existed (and still exists) as a result of the bloodiness of the Finnish civil war.

Third was the kernel of a problem that would grow into the strategic solution Stalin pursued: that is Finland's control of and refusal/inability to secure (for the USSR) the strategically critical Gulf of Finland, and the location of Leningrad. The vulnerability of the Russian/Soviet frontier and the Gulf of Finland was a problem as old as Peter the Great, if not older (since he is the one who chose the spot for St. Petersburg/Leningrad within artillery-shot of the Finnish border). The Winter War of 1939 would not be the first war fought because of that border issue.

Continuous anti-Finn propaganda and pressure regarding border issues were the norm for Soviet-Finn relations during the 20s and 30s. Living in the shadow of the Bear was formative for the Finnish people, and the Kremlin surely knew it.

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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#10

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 28 Apr 2011, 23:33

This is the response from the old thread written by me:
During the 20s Soviet military intelligence indeed came to the conclusion that Finland would probably remain neutral for all sake and purposes. However Leningrad Security was real pain in the ass for the Soviet military. For instance 1929 maneuvers were conducted with a purpose to see how RKKA and RKKF could defeat aggression launched from Finnish territory.
The interplay of these and other factors in the Red Army's strategic calculations is most clearly illustrated in an exchange of internal documents between Svechin and Chief of Staff Shaposhnikov in early 1930. The dialogue between the two former czarist officers and imperial academy graduates regarding the possible contours of a future war and the army's proper strategy provides a fascinating insight into the thinking of the army's best minds.
Svechin opened the discussion with a detailed report to War Commissar Voroshilov in early March. Svechin outlined a future war against the USSR as a coalition affair, led by Britain and France, in which Poland and Romania would bear the brunt of the fighting as the coalition's cat's paw in the west. To the north, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland would maintain an "armed neutrality" in order to tie down Soviet forces along their borders. The Soviet Union would enter such a war much the weaker party against opponents who possessed significant technical advantages over the Red Army and who could mobilize their forces more quickly. Svechin sharply criticized Tukhachevskii and Triandafillov for overselling the technological benefits of the army's reconstruction program and predicted that the armed forces would not achieve a technical parity with its likely enemies for another fifteen years. Nor could the USSR count on significant support from working-class uprisings within the enemy camp, he said, because these could be easily suppressed.49
Svechin predicted that the capitalist coalition would make its main effort in the south, along the Black Sea coast, with the aim of creating a continuous front from the Caspian Sea to the Pripyat Marshes. The British, according to this scenario, would land in the Trans-Caucasus, with the object of seizing the oil centers of Baku and Groznyi. The French would land in the Crimea and seize the Donets Basin and the lower Dnepr River area, while Poland and Romania would join in the attack along their own frontiers. Svechin predicted that the achievement of these objectives would put the enemy in possession of the USSR's chief industrial and extractive areas and render a subsequent advance on Moscow relatively easy, or even unnecessary.
.
Finland raised question of East Karelia in 1934 when USSR applied for membership in the League of Nations – that was classified as interdiction into Soviet internal matters. Mannergeim visit to Germany in the same year and then in 1935 did not help much either. To illustrate it – 1935 Finland again was put in the ranks of “most probable enemies” – alongside with Germany, Japan, and Poland. Soviet military intelligence concluded that Baltic region was the most likely place for German aggression against USSR to take place, and in that occurrence Germans could sent at least 2 divisions in Finland for such purposes.
During 1937 Holsti’s visit to USSR Litvinov told him that USSR was wary of idea that third party could use Finnish territory as foothold for the aggression against USSR. And so on and forth. The idea that Leningrad security question just popped out of nowhere is far from the reality.

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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#11

Post by Philip S. Walker » 04 May 2011, 00:40

@Oleg

A delayed thanks. I had overlooked this post from you due to being pelted with snowballs elsewhere.
Finland raised question of East Karelia in 1934
Can you elaborate a bit on this?

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#12

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 04 May 2011, 10:56

Philip S. Walker wrote:@Oleg

A delayed thanks. I had overlooked this post from you due to being pelted with snowballs elsewhere.
Finland raised question of East Karelia in 1934
Can you elaborate a bit on this?
From the top of my head - some noise made by Finnish press upon Soviet bid to join the league of nations. To quote Ike_FI
(too bad he does not post here anymore)
What it comes to question of East Carelia in the League of Nations, my understanding is that the idea (to urge USSR to grant autonomy to East Carelia as agreed in Tartu Peace) was discussed in Finnish press but government abandoned the issue after soviets made their strong opposition to it known, so it did not rech any official stage.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8&start=15

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idea of Finland as an attacker

#13

Post by Dave Bender » 04 May 2011, 20:03

What makes you think Stalin viewed Finland as a threat?

The Soviet Union was expansionistic. Spreading communism to the entire world was part of their doctrine from 1917 onward. And Soviet diplomacy was extremely successful. Thanks to the help of Britain, France and the USA the Soviet Empire extended over most of Europe by 1945.

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: idea of Finland as an attacker

#14

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 04 May 2011, 20:10

Dave Bender wrote:What makes you think Stalin viewed Finland as a threat?

The Soviet Union was expansionistic. Spreading communism to the entire world was part of their doctrine from 1917 onward. And Soviet diplomacy was extremely successful. Thanks to the help of Britain, France and the USA the Soviet Empire extended over most of Europe by 1945.
Spreading communism ceased to be a doctrine with a death of Trotskiy. Dave Bender, Finalnd as a stand alone state was not seen as threat. Finland as part of larger system, consisting of capitalist state was deemed a potential threat. How much of the threat is another matter.

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Re: Why did the Kremlin see Finland as a potential attacker?

#15

Post by Juha Tompuri » 04 May 2011, 23:11

Philip S. Walker wrote:The famous Finnish military historian Ohto Manninen writes in his book "The Soviet Plans for the North Western Theatre of Operations in 1939-1944":
The Soviet Union's assessment of the threat to its territory remained quite constant throughout the late 1930s, and the operative plan for 1939 began on the assumption that Germany and Poland would attack the Soviet Union simultaneously from the west - with the probable participation of the Italian navy - while Japan would attack from the east. It was estimated that Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Finland would join the war only if the operations of the Red Army and the Red Navy did not meet the success from the outset.
skywarp wrote:What Manninen is describing in that paragraph (and you'll have to forgive me, as I don't have that book) is probably accurate when it comes to describing the Soviet plans of 1939.
Yep.


As quoting Manninen at more broad view.
The headline:
Manninen wrote:The first phase of the Winter War
...and also:
Manninen wrote:...In a memo that he drew up in 1937, Marshall M.N. Tukhatshevski foresaw that if war broke out, the Soviet Union would first have to seize Estonia, Latvia and Lithuanis ans then advance to the line Grodno - Slonim in Poland. Battleships would have to be builtfor the Navy, and naval bases would have to be procured for these (Tallinn, Riga, Vindave and Libau). These plans bear a close resemblence to the action that Stalin took in September 1939, when the Second World War had broken out. On the other hand, Tukhatshevski concidered Finland to be a separate issue from the events of Central Europe, and one for which a separate war plan would have to be made.
It was not widely believed in th Soviet Union that Finland would attempt an invasion. Finland's total population was 3 650 000 people i.e. equal to that of Leningrad, and it was not capable of any extensive offensive actions on its own. However as the threat of a world war grew, the Soviet Union did take Finland into account as a route for an attack directed at it. According to the memoirs of K.A. Meretskov, who was Commander of Leningrad Military District at that time, Stalin's description of the situation at the end of June 1939 was that Germany was "ready to attack her neighbourd, e.g. Poland and the Soviet Union, from any direction. Finland could easily become the bridgehead of the anti-Soviet actions of either of the main bourgeois-imperialist groups - the Germans or the British-French-American bloc. It was also possible that the blocs might agreee on a joint attack against the Soviet Union, whereupon Finland would become small change in a game in which others would urge it to attack us as the champion of the Great War."
Certain writers have maintained that the Soviet Soviet leadership suspected the Finnish government of being ready "to benefit at the Soviet Union's expence if Japan were to attack the Soviet Union, or if any intervention against the Soviet Union were to take place." Moscow held the belief that the Finnish army would act only in a protective capacity, it's most important task being to secure the free strategic concentration and organisation of strong foreign troops for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and especially for the seizing of Leningrad. On the other hand - as noted above - the directives issued to the Leningrad Military District started out in 1939 from the assumption that Finland was likely to join the war only if the situation was disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. The Finns had been told several times in threatening terms that the Soviet Union would not wait for the intervening troops at the Finnish border.
Regards, Juha

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