Feasability of Operation Pike, 1940

[phylo_roadking]

Split off from viewtopic.php?f=112&t=181329

As far as the French plans for bombing Baku and Batum. It seems like a good idea, but the reality would most likely have been negligible damage. I cant the oil production being completely destroyed by one raid of such limited capacity. Considering the potential attrition rate how many raids were even realistic and the Soviets would be very ready for any further raids.

1/ if you check the link I posted - the Allies planned a night and daybombing campaign, not one raid;

2/ What attirition rate? What exactly were the early-1940 Soviet air assets in the area??? And they hadn't been so successful again very similar if not identical aircraft (uch as the Blenheim) in the Winter War a month or two earlier, had they?

3/ I'm not aware of the Soviets having radar or any other kind of early warning net in the region....so they face the old problem (that Fighter Command sought successfully to eradicate with radar etc.) that fighters without any form of early warning reacting to a raid only get to try to attack them on the way out from the target...and thus only at best can venture half the attrition they otherwise could!

4/ This wasn't an era when for example U.S. oil firefighting expertise could rapidly be airlifted into a liberated Kuwait; the Russians would be attempting to fight rig fires and repair damage and restore supply with 1940s Soviet expertise and capability - and the constant threat of ongoing raids disrupting everything.

[JonS]

2/ What attirition rate? What exactly were the early-1940 Soviet air assets in the area??? And they hadn't been so successful again very similar if not identical aircraft (uch as the Blenheim) in the Winter War a month or two earlier, had they?

It would take very little in the way of mission-to-mission attrition - from whatever cause - to render a force of a few squadrons impotent, especially at the end of such a tenuous supply line. The Russians don't even need to shot any a/c down, just damage a few on each raid. Meanwhile the Allied pilots would probably end up damaging and destroying more all on their own through landing and takeoff accidents, faulty navigation, etc.

[phylo_roadking]

It would take very little in the way of mission-to-mission attrition - from whatever cause - to render a force of a few squadrons impotent, especially at the end of such a tenuous supply line.

The supply line was long, yes - but not tenuous - until Italy entered the war But by then the plan was moribund anyway.

It would take very little in the way of mission-to-mission attrition - from whatever cause - to render a force of a few squadrons impotent

How long did it take to render the FInns' Blenheims etc. impotent?

The Russians don't even need to shot any a/c down, just damage a few on each raid. Meanwhile the Allied pilots would probably end up damaging and destroying more all on their own through landing and takeoff accidents

Operations in the colonial @rse end-of-nowhere, on airfields that were nothing more than cleared desert, with minimal spares backup? That's what the Bonmber Command of 1939-40 had grown up on in the Interwar period - operations bombing bits of terrain in the corners of Empire, with bits falling of airplanes that were 15-20 years obsolete...and they did it well.

As they did when faced with the similar level of spares backup, obsolete aircraft etc. in the war in East Africa...

[Jon G.]

Bomber Command didn't aim for other countries' oil installations in their various inter-war operations as far as I know. Nor did they in East Africa. Early war Allied (and then British) planning was certainly optimistic about what could, and what could not, be achieved with bombers - see f.e. the very meager returns from RAF attacks on Ruhr oil targets in 1940. In any event, what the Allies could have done against Soviet oil targets in 1939-1940 is a matter of pure speculation.

[phylo_roadking]

Bomber Command didn't aim for other countries' oil installations in their various inter-war operations as far as I know.

True, but I was talking more about how the RAF ran a very extensive "bomb the natives into submission" policy around the world on an absolutely shoestring budget, obsolete aircraft etc. - not the targeting priorites of it. The scale/targets of Operation Pike might have been new - but not the actual mounting of "medium" bomber ops in the middle of nowhere. Again, John James' The Paladins is worth a look on this aspect and how it segue'd into the early-war Bomber (and Fighter!) Command...especially in terms of personnel; a lot of both branches' senior officers had spent their time having undercarriages held together with baling twine and coathangers collapse under them in places with not enough vowels in their name...

see f.e. the very meager returns from RAF attacks on Ruhr oil targets in 1940.

But then again - remember the "hands off" policy on German private property for a suprisingly long time, even for a few months under Winston...

In any event, what the Allies could have done against Soviet oil targets in 1939-1940 is a matter of pure speculation

Whereas we do know from comparison how the Soviets would have defended against such an operation... Not necessarily very well...

[Jon G.]

We can't know how it would have fared, though to me circumstantial evidence suggests that it would not have been succesful, and also a political blunder of the highest order.

You'll be interested to learn that the German Abwehr - via its Ankara Meldekopf - as late as 1938 completed a plan on how to capture the Soviet oil fields at Baku. The plan was to strike across the Soviet-Persian border with two mountain divisions, apparently with Turkish aid for the operation implied.

The plan to strike for Baku and Soviet oil fields there should be seen in a wider perspective. The intention was not just to destroy Soviet oil production - the Allies knew full well that far from all of Germany's oil needs were covered by them; see the text I posted upthread - but also to pull away German attention and effort from France and Benelux by establishing peripheral fronts far away from the main theater.

The Allied invasion of Norway can be seen in the same light. There was an economic blockade element (by denying Swedish iron ore to the Germans), but also a hope of drawing German forces into battle on terms more favourable to the Allies with their stronger navies and greater experience in conducting military campaigns over long distances via sea-borne lines of communication and supply.

Another Allied plan which never came to fruition was the re-opening of the Salonika front as it known from WW1 - mainly a brainchild of the French navy.

[steverodgers801]

Its one thing to bomb natives, its another to bomb a modern army. The Soviets had quite a few units and I will look for the OB. My main point is look at how much trouble both sides had knocking out industry, so why all of a sudden would the allies be able to knock out the Soviet industry. Another question which country would the allies fly over, would they risk crossing Turkey.

[phylo_roadking]

We can't know how it would have fared, though to me circumstantial evidence suggests that it would not have been succesful, and also a political blunder of the highest order.

We can look at certain elements however - such as comparing Finnish Blenheim successes and duration against the Soviets in early 1940, with prospective operations by British Blenheims against a smiliar (tho' I wonder how effective the Soviet air assets in the Caucasus in Spring 1940 were? It was somewhat of a backwater...) Soviet defence in the Near East.

You'll be interested to learn that the German Abwehr - via its Ankara Meldekopf - as late as 1938 completed a plan on how to capture the Soviet oil fields at Baku. The plan was to strike across the Soviet-Persian border with two mountain divisions, apparently with Turkish aid for the operation implied

Actually at this point in the discussion I'd far rather find out if the Soviets became aware in 1940 of the preparations for PIKE And if so, did they react and make any concrete preparations? And what was the Red Air Force's strength in the area...

[Jon G.]

What Finnish Blenheim succeses are you referring to, and how would they compare to a hypothetical operation against oil targets in the Caucasus?

[phylo_roadking]

Its one thing to bomb natives, its another to bomb a modern army.

This wasn't their intention.

My main point is look at how much trouble both sides had knocking out industry, so why all of a sudden would the allies be able to knock out the Soviet industry.

They weren't intending to attack soviet "industry", but an exposed oilfield - you know, wooden drilling drricks, tanks farms, refineries, miles and miles of pipeline?

Have you actually read the article yet???

Subsequent analysis of the photography by the PDU revealed that the oil infrastructure in Baku and Batum were particularly vulnerable to air attack as both could be approached from the sea, so the more difficult target of Grozny would be bombed first to exploit the element of surprise. Oil fields were to be attacked with incendiary bombs, while tests conducted at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich revealed light oil storage tanks at the oil processing plants could be detonated with high explosives

[phylo_roadking]

What Finnish Blenheim succeses are you referring to

Their apparent durability, for one thing?

Forty-two Blenheims flew 423 missions during the Winter War; by the outbreak of the Continuation War, the survivors had been added to by 55 home-built Blenheims and 20 partly-completed Yugoslavian items from the Germans. These flew nearly 3000 missions during the Continuation and Lapland Wars, and lost 37 aircraft...against mid- and late-war fighter opposition.

The British moved 48 Blenheims to the area, and the French intended a final night-bombing force of ~89 aircraft...against which at night the Soviets would have had a minimal defence if any at all...

If an RAF Blenheim force half the size had half the success of the Finns in the Winter War - that's ~200 missions flown against Baku

And, as I said before - the Winter War proved how unready for modern air war the Soviets were for some time; how more obsolete and unprepared were they in a backwater like Baku???

[phylo_roadking]

Another question which country would the allies fly over...

Using specially modified and unmarked Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra aircraft painted in a special blue camouflage scheme developed by Cotton himself (who led the RAF's Photographic Development Unit or PDU), the Secret Intelligence Service launched the high-altitude reconnaissance flights from RAF Habbaniya, a Royal Air Force station in Iraq. One such mission was flown on 30 March 1940. Flying over the mountainous region of southeastern Kurdistan, across the coast of the Caspian Sea then north towards Baku, the flight entered Soviet airspace at 11:45 after a four-hour flight. Loitering for an hour whilst making six photographic runs with its 14 in (36 cm) aerial camera, the aircraft left Baku at 12:45 and returned to RAF Habbaniya

..., would they risk crossing Turkey

Only for one of the targets...

Another reconnaissance sortie was flown on 5 April from RAF Habbaniya, this time crossing Turkish airspace to reach Batumi...

...tho' approaching from a Neutral country may just have been a way to get in fast without too much time for the now-alerted Soviets to react -

This flight encountered Soviet anti-aircraft fire and a Soviet fighter attempted to intercept it. However, the British had obtained everything they needed for photo-interpretation purposes and for mapping the Soviet petroleum centres.

[Jon G.]

...
If an RAF Blenheim force half the size had half the success of the Finns in the Winter War - that's ~200 missions flown against Baku

...assuming that Finnish Blenheims were flying missions of comparable difficulty. Later in the war, larger bombing forces, flying larger and better-equipped aircraft had only conditional success against oil targets.

In any event, it's speculative what would have happened. There's a whole sub-section reserved for dead-ends like these. We might be able to draw more solid conclusions from the undisputable fact that the Allies decided not to go ahead with Operation Pike, rather than speculate what the results might have been.

And, as I said before - the Winter War proved how unready for modern air war the Soviets were for some time; how more obsolete and unprepared were they in a backwater like Baku???

...or how well-prepared the Finns were for modern air war, in addition to not flying strategic missions? As I understand it, the opening rounds of the Winter War were fought by the comparatively ameteur Leningrad military district - after initial disappointments, command of the Finnish front shifted to a purpose-designated front, which also meant better results.

What makes you think that Baku was a backwater? As I understand it, the VVS did rather well against the Japanese AAF in the comparative backwater of Khalkin Gol.

[phylo_roadking]

...or how well-prepared the Finns were for modern air war, in addition to not flying strategic missions? As I understand it, the opening rounds of the Winter War were fought by the comparatively ameteur Leningrad military district - after initial disappointments, command of the Finnish front shifted to a purpose-designated front, which also meant better results.

But how many "initial disappointments" in the defence does it take to allow the Allies to do major damage before remedial action can be taken? How long actually did it take the Soviets to change tack in the air in the WInter War?

What makes you think that Baku was a backwater? As I understand it, the VVS did rather well against the Japanese AAF in the comparative backwater of Khalkin Gol.

IIRC, Zhukov's major air successes came in August after the events of May June and July...

http://www.warbirdforum.com/nomonhan.htm

The 2nd Hikoshidan was worn down by August. In July, the Japanese had claimed 481 Russian planes while losing 14 of their own. In August they claimed 134 while losing 23. On the Russian side, Soviet AF officer A. B. Vorozheikin says the loss ratio was 4 Russ to 1 Jap in May but improved to 1:3 in June, 1:4 in July, and 1:10 in August.

Just like Finland - early major losses followed by slowly increasing success. Perhaps one of our Finnish members or Winter War experts would tell us where the Soviets got the forces from to improve the situation in Finland during the Winter War - did, as in Khalkin Gol, they have to be transferred in from elsewhere? And how long did this take?

[phylo_roadking]

We might be able to draw more solid conclusions from the undisputable fact that the Allies decided not to go ahead with Operation Pike

Well, according to Osborn, it was nothing more than the French end of the operation vanished in a puff of smoke....and security was suddenly VERY compromised -

The German blitzkrieg and the swift fall of France on 10 May 1940 derailed the plans when the French military failed to hold back the Nazi advance. The Germans captured a train stalled at the village of La Charité-sur-Loire that contained boxes of secret documents evacuated from Paris. Amongst these were documents dealing with Operation Pike.

On 4 July, in a propaganda campaign to justify the invasion of France, the German News Bureau (DNB) released excerpts of the captured documents relating to Operation Pike, asserting that "Germany must be credited with saving these other states [including the Soviet Union] from being drawn into this chaos by Allied schemings .... because she took timely counter-measures and also crushed France quickly."

Thus, the operation was compromised and the strategic Anglo-French bombing campaign against Soviet targets was postponed and eventually abandoned

...but as for the practicalities of the actual plan...they don't seem to have been regarded as insurmountable!

After the attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, Operation Pike was revived as a contingency plan to be invoked in the event that German forces occupied the Caucasian oil fields