Reasons for the failure of Zitadelle

[sunbury2]

This is a very interesting thread. Zitadelle failed before any troops crossed their start lines. The Russians knew in April of the impending attack and the Germans knew that the Russians knew. Put simply what idiot attacks the enemy at their strongest point knowing full well that the enemy out numbers your own forces and is fully prepared and waiting?

The only other 20th Century battle that matches that level of prior enemy knowledge was the Nivelle Offensive, April 1917.

The extra time from April to July meant the Russians packed the bridgehead with enough defences that it was impossible for any attack to succeed. Rearranging tin soldiers and toy tanks cannot disguise that simple fact. Zitadelle failed to "straighten" the line and it failed to cripple the Red Army. Thus the two reasons given for the battle were both complete failures.

An example that isn't raised much is, May 16th, the anti partisan Operation Gypsy Baron (Zigeuner Baron) was undertaken to try and clear the areas behind the Zitadelle front. It lasted 3 weeks and involved the 4th and 18th Panzer Divisions, the 10th Panzergrenadier Division, the 7th and 292nd Infantry Divisions, and the 102nd Hungarian Light Infantry Division. They killed approximately 1500 "partisans" and captured 1500 prisoners, they captured few weapons though. Within weeks of the Operation ending, there were 4000+ partisans still operating in the area.

I agree Zitadelle was not the death knell of German Armour,that happened later and was not any "one moment", rather it was a death of a 1000 cuts, the forces whittled away trying to defend a to large front.

Edit. I wanted to add some figures to demonstrate that there was never any chance for a German Victory.

German Forces were 625,271 combat troops, 2699 armoured vehicles (128 Tigers and 200 Panthers), 9467 artillery guns and 1372 aircraft.

Russian Forces were 1987,463 combat troops, 8200 armoured vehicles, 47,4196 artillery guns and 5965 aircraft.
There were 8 separate defensive lines fully manned.

Source. OstKrieg by Stephen Fritz p 343

[Dili]

I have being wargaming the Kursk and what suprises me is the Army Kempf Panzer Divisions and its objectives. It just doesn't make sense their operation south of Belgorod.

Also from a German perspective i would say also that a less ambitious drive along the ditches to collect all Soviet troops in first echelon could destroy several Soviet divisions. Instead of trying to reach Kursk.

[Dutto1]

A very interesting topic with many good points.

One of the reasons that Zitadelle failed i feel was the qualtiy of the German soldier at that time.Its quality had started to decline after the fighting of 1942-43,the loss of so many experienced Officers and NCO's during this time was very hard to replace.
Officer's and men were being brought in from places like France and Norway,men who had been on occupation duty and had little or no combat experience.To supplement them replacements who had been drafted and were ''Green Troops''.The German Army was still a strong capable force but the decline had started.

Regards

Ron

[Qvist]

A very interesting topic with many good points.

One of the reasons that Zitadelle failed i feel was the qualtiy of the German soldier at that time.Its quality had started to decline after the fighting of 1942-43,the loss of so many experienced Officers and NCO's during this time was very hard to replace.
Officer's and men were being brought in from places like France and Norway,men who had been on occupation duty and had little or no combat experience.To supplement them replacements who had been drafted and were ''Green Troops''.The German Army was still a strong capable force but the decline had started.

Regards

Ron

Well, that was no different than at any other time after August 1941. On average about 100,000 men reached the eastern front every month as replacements. Maybe 40,000 were typically returning convalescents, the rest were all by definition green and untested, It was no different in the spring of 1943 than it had been a year earlier or would be a year later, so this seems to me a somewhat lazy hypothesis which is little more than an assumption made on the most general grounds.

[Dutto1]

A very interesting topic with many good points.

One of the reasons that Zitadelle failed i feel was the qualtiy of the German soldier at that time.Its quality had started to decline after the fighting of 1942-43,the loss of so many experienced Officers and NCO's during this time was very hard to replace.
Officer's and men were being brought in from places like France and Norway,men who had been on occupation duty and had little or no combat experience.To supplement them replacements who had been drafted and were ''Green Troops''.The German Army was still a strong capable force but the decline had started.

Regards

Ron

Well, that was no different than at any other time after August 1941. On average about 100,000 men reached the eastern front every month as replacements. Maybe 40,000 were typically returning convalescents, the rest were all by definition green and untested, It was no different in the spring of 1943 than it had been a year earlier or would be a year later, so this seems to me a somewhat lazy hypothesis which is little more than an assumption made on the most general grounds.

Before Operation Zitadelle the Waffen SS Division ''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' received 2,500 replacements from the Luftwaffe they were jokingly referred to as the ''Hermann Goring donation''.These men kept the same ranks that they held in the Luftwaffe.So we have NCO's who are now leading men into combat and in reality these NCO's have no or very little combat experience.
From 1941 onwards The Ostheer was taking heavy casualties including many experienced Officer's and NCO's and by Summer 1943 the Ostheer was struggling to make good these losses.Good Officer's and NCO's cannot be replaced easily and that is a fact,an Feldwebel who has spent most of the War in France or Norway on occupation duties is not going to have the same experience as an Feldwebel who has served in Poland, France ,and Russia for example.

Regards,

Ron

[Qvist]

A very interesting topic with many good points.

One of the reasons that Zitadelle failed i feel was the qualtiy of the German soldier at that time.Its quality had started to decline after the fighting of 1942-43,the loss of so many experienced Officers and NCO's during this time was very hard to replace.
Officer's and men were being brought in from places like France and Norway,men who had been on occupation duty and had little or no combat experience.To supplement them replacements who had been drafted and were ''Green Troops''.The German Army was still a strong capable force but the decline had started.

Regards

Ron

Well, that was no different than at any other time after August 1941. On average about 100,000 men reached the eastern front every month as replacements. Maybe 40,000 were typically returning convalescents, the rest were all by definition green and untested, It was no different in the spring of 1943 than it had been a year earlier or would be a year later, so this seems to me a somewhat lazy hypothesis which is little more than an assumption made on the most general grounds.

Before Operation Zitadelle the Waffen SS Division ''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' received 2,500 replacements from the Luftwaffe they were jokingly referred to as the ''Hermann Goring donation''.These men kept the same ranks that they held in the Luftwaffe.So we have NCO's who are now leading men into combat and in reality these NCO's have no or very little combat experience.
From 1941 onwards The Ostheer was taking heavy casualties including many experienced Officer's and NCO's and by Summer 1943 the Ostheer was struggling to make good these losses.Good Officer's and NCO's cannot be replaced easily and that is a fact,an Feldwebel who has spent most of the War in France or Norway on occupation duties is not going to have the same experience as an Feldwebel who has served in Poland, France ,and Russia for example.

Regards,

Ron

You don't say. What I'm attempting to draw your attention to is that this was also the case in, say, February or October 1942, or September 1943, or April 1944, or any time you care to think of. Hence it was not a phenomenon that affected Zitadelle particularly, more than it affected any other battle in the East. For that matter, it wasn't something that affected the Germans any more than it affected other armies. In fact, since the Red Army had a much higher turnover of personnel than the Germans did, by your logic it should affect them more than it did the Germans.

This is just the normal rhytm of modern warfare. Experienced soldiers get killed, wounded or captured and are replaced by less experienced soldiers. Somehow, this generally fails to lead to a steady deterioration in capabilities, so if you want to make some sort of meaningful argument that there had been a significant qualitiative decrease in the Ostheer due to reduced quality of the manpwoer, you're going to have to come with something better than stating the obvious and coupling a couple of anecdotes on to that.

[Michate]

Before Operation Zitadelle the Waffen SS Division ''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' received 2,500 replacements from the Luftwaffe they were jokingly referred to as the ''Hermann Goring donation''.These men kept the same ranks that they held in the Luftwaffe.So we have NCO's who are now leading men into combat and in reality these NCO's have no or very little combat experience.

You might turn your attention to how the lull before the attack was used. Hint: tough and realistic indivdual training, small unit and large unit exercises, as described in the literature (Ernst Klink, George Nipe).

I would also argue that some technical-tactical procedures were refined, based on combat experience, which counteracts deterioration of the soldier "material".

[Dutto1]

A very interesting topic with many good points.

One of the reasons that Zitadelle failed i feel was the qualtiy of the German soldier at that time.Its quality had started to decline after the fighting of 1942-43,the loss of so many experienced Officers and NCO's during this time was very hard to replace.
Officer's and men were being brought in from places like France and Norway,men who had been on occupation duty and had little or no combat experience.To supplement them replacements who had been drafted and were ''Green Troops''.The German Army was still a strong capable force but the decline had started.

Regards

Ron

Well, that was no different than at any other time after August 1941. On average about 100,000 men reached the eastern front every month as replacements. Maybe 40,000 were typically returning convalescents, the rest were all by definition green and untested, It was no different in the spring of 1943 than it had been a year earlier or would be a year later, so this seems to me a somewhat lazy hypothesis which is little more than an assumption made on the most general grounds.

Before Operation Zitadelle the Waffen SS Division ''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' received 2,500 replacements from the Luftwaffe they were jokingly referred to as the ''Hermann Goring donation''.These men kept the same ranks that they held in the Luftwaffe.So we have NCO's who are now leading men into combat and in reality these NCO's have no or very little combat experience.
From 1941 onwards The Ostheer was taking heavy casualties including many experienced Officer's and NCO's and by Summer 1943 the Ostheer was struggling to make good these losses.Good Officer's and NCO's cannot be replaced easily and that is a fact,an Feldwebel who has spent most of the War in France or Norway on occupation duties is not going to have the same experience as an Feldwebel who has served in Poland, France ,and Russia for example.

Regards,

Ron

You don't say. What I'm attempting to draw your attention to is that this was also the case in, say, February or October 1942, or September 1943, or April 1944, or any time you care to think of. Hence it was not a phenomenon that affected Zitadelle particularly, more than it affected any other battle in the East. For that matter, it wasn't something that affected the Germans any more than it affected other armies. In fact, since the Red Army had a much higher turnover of personnel than the Germans did, by your logic it should affect them more than it did the Germans.

This is just the normal rhytm of modern warfare. Experienced soldiers get killed, wounded or captured and are replaced by less experienced soldiers. Somehow, this generally fails to lead to a steady deterioration in capabilities, so if you want to make some sort of meaningful argument that there had been a significant qualitiative decrease in the Ostheer due to reduced quality of the manpwoer, you're going to have to come with something better than stating the obvious and coupling a couple of anecdotes on to that.

First of all while i agree that the quality of the German soldier at Kursk was not a major reason for the failure it is one of many reasons.The blood letting of the Ostheer goes all of the way back to Barbarossa in 1941,to deomonstrate the heavy losses incurred here are some figures for the Ostheer's KIA during the initial stages of Barbarossa.

22,June 1941-30June 1941-524 Officers and 8,886 men.

July 1941-2,443 Officers,46,470 men.

August 1941-1,563 Officers 41,019 men.

September 1941 920 Officers 29,422 men.

October 1941-968 Officers 24,056 men.

November 1941-802 Officers 17,806 men.

December 1941-424 Officers 14,949 men.

January 1942-656 Officers 17,544 men.

February 1942 584 Officers 19,319 men.

Source Kreigstagebuch des OKW.1940-41 and 1942.

While these initial losses maybe did not effect the overall performance and quality of the German Soldier in the East by 1942-43 the losses incurred up until before Zitadelle started to tell.No amount of realistic training of inexperienced Offcers and NCO's can replace an experinced Officer or NCO who has a few years of combat experience behind him.

The late Heinz Macher who served in ''Das Reich'' at Kursk admitted during an interview in 1993 that the Ostheer was losing to many good Officers and NCO's and by the time of Kursk and after they were struggling to replace them with men of the same calibre.

Regards,

Ron

[Mr.No one]

A very interesting topic with many good points.

One of the reasons that Zitadelle failed i feel was the qualtiy of the German soldier at that time.Its quality had started to decline after the fighting of 1942-43,the loss of so many experienced Officers and NCO's during this time was very hard to replace.
Officer's and men were being brought in from places like France and Norway,men who had been on occupation duty and had little or no combat experience.To supplement them replacements who had been drafted and were ''Green Troops''.The German Army was still a strong capable force but the decline had started.

Regards

Ron

Well, that was no different than at any other time after August 1941. On average about 100,000 men reached the eastern front every month as replacements. Maybe 40,000 were typically returning convalescents, the rest were all by definition green and untested, It was no different in the spring of 1943 than it had been a year earlier or would be a year later, so this seems to me a somewhat lazy hypothesis which is little more than an assumption made on the most general grounds.

If I take use your numbers then you must say that the quality of the German soldiers wasn't the same in September '41 as in July '43 just because it was the same number of replacements which reached the front.
You have to take into account the growing casualties and the declining percent of experienced German troops which on average only declined from Barbarossa until the end of the war.

Séan

[Michate]

No amount of realistic training of inexperienced Offcers and NCO's can replace an experinced Officer or NCO who has a few years of combat experience behind him.

The problem with this line of thinking is that at the start of Barbarossa most of the officers may have had good and superior training, but many actually had little combat experience.
There is a prevailing myth that the German army started the war as a bunca factor which caused a good deal of anxiety among the army's higher commands.
And while the continuous bloodletting starting then caused a continous loss of experienced men, the continuous fighting causing this bloodletting also meant that the survivors among the replacements had ample opportunity to become combat experienced themselves.
What may be said is that the expanding casualty bill forced taps into additional manpower reservoirs of lower fitness standards, like older or younger year classes, family fathers and so on. This certainly had an adverse effect on combat performance, but overall the story is much more complicated than the "supermen followed by steady decline" notion suggests.

The late Heinz Macher who served in ''Das Reich'' at Kursk admitted during an interview in 1993 that the Ostheer was losing to many good Officers and NCO's and by the time of Kursk and after they were struggling to replace them with men of the same calibre.

Hm yes, veteran statements in a TV interview 50 years after (no pun intended against any veteran, they deserve our highest respect for what they had to go through, and besides, they often have very insightful stories to tell).

Certainly it was difficult to maintain individual quality levels and an inexperienced replacement initially is always of lesser quality than the experienced casualty it replaces, but I would argue, just from the combat performance record, that "Das Reich" and the other two divisions of II. SS-Pz.-Korps may have been at the peak of their tactical combat capability during the attack on Kursk.

[Dutto1]

No amount of realistic training of inexperienced Offcers and NCO's can replace an experinced Officer or NCO who has a few years of combat experience behind him.

The problem with this line of thinking is that at the start of Barbarossa most of the officers may have had good and superior training, but many actually had little combat experience.
There is a prevailing myth that the German army started the war as a bunca factor which caused a good deal of anxiety among the army's higher commands.
And while the continuous bloodletting starting then caused a continous loss of experienced men, the continuous fighting causing this bloodletting also meant that the survivors among the replacements had ample opportunity to become combat experienced themselves.
What may be said is that the expanding casualty bill forced taps into additional manpower reservoirs of lower fitness standards, like older or younger year classes, family fathers and so on. This certainly had an adverse effect on combat performance, but overall the story is much more complicated than the "supermen followed by steady decline" notion suggests.

The late Heinz Macher who served in ''Das Reich'' at Kursk admitted during an interview in 1993 that the Ostheer was losing to many good Officers and NCO's and by the time of Kursk and after they were struggling to replace them with men of the same calibre.

Hm yes, veteran statements in a TV interview 50 years after (no pun intended against any veteran, they deserve our highest respect for what they had to go through, and besides, they often have very insightful stories to tell).

Certainly it was difficult to maintain individual quality levels and an inexperienced replacement initially is always of lesser quality than the experienced casualty it replaces, but I would argue, just from the combat performance record, that "Das Reich" and the other two divisions of II. SS-Pz.-Korps may have been at the peak of their tactical combat capability during the attack on Kursk.

Michate,

You make some very good points about the manpower of the Ostheer and i agree regarding older and lower level of fitness in some of the replacements. I used to collect and owm a large number of Wehrpasses and some of them were men who were aged from mid 30s-to late 30s ending up in frontline units which as you point out caused problems

Regarding Heinz Macher i think he means the what he says although he probably did not think that at the time.

Regards,

Ron