German logistics in the east

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Der Alte Fritz
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Re: German logistics in the east

#91

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 26 Jan 2013, 13:19

steverodgers801 wrote:reading Tooze, the Germans were actually an food import country, largely because their farms were not mechanized like the US. In France the Germans did not suffer logisticly because of the distances and the road system. How much better could the German army have been in Russia if they had a better transport system. In contrast to the Germans look how effective the Soviets became in their mobility with the advent of lend lease. As you point out, especially during 1942, the rail system was not large to support the German advance and they did not haveenough trucks to transport both men and supplies.
Countries have to produce armies that are suitable to their economy, population and structure but have choices within these parameters. Germany could not produce a mass mechanised army like Britain did because she needed a large army. This army was quite capable of invading Russia using railways just as it had in the Great War.

And you are right Germany was able to invade France without repairing the railways because the distances were under 300 miles and the army was relatively small.

The problem facing Germany in 1941 was not shortage of trucks as even a larger truck fleet would not have been able to carry a larger German army past the 300 mile limit and Moscow was 600 miles away and the final A-V line 900 miles away. I agree Germany needed a better transport system in 1941 but what she needed was railway construction troops. This was the only way to carry the Heer all the way to Moscow. Trucks to move the invasion forward and then rapid re-establishment of the railways. The Eisenbahntruppe were too small, too low priority and Army officers did not understand railways and excluded the DRB from their planning.

Comparisons:
The British/US armies in Normandy/France had by July 227 GTR companies (40 trucks or 200 tonnes) 9,000 trucks plus another 108 GTR of railway equivalent and could support 32 Divisions 3-400 miles into France before they ran out of supplies. That is 70,000 tonnes of lift which is the same as the German Army 3 GTR Regts had on 22nd June 1941. The German Army had 170 divisions and had to travel 600 mile. I would argue that even the British/US Army would have been unable to reach Moscow at 600 miles using mainly trucks and their far smaller force. Both needed to establish mass transport such as shipping or railways before the next bound forward.

The Soviet advance in 1944. The degree of mechanisation of the Red Army is often overstated due to the Lend Lease argument. In Jan 1944, the Red Army has 496,000 trucks while the Germans have 435,600. Most of these trucks are assigned to Divisions and are pulling guns or hauling stores while around 35-40,000 are assigned to supply duties at Front/Army level, but this is to supply a field army of 6 million men in 280 division (US sized equivalents). On a per person basis the Red Army has half the degree of mechanisation of the Germans (2.5 million army). Even by Jan 1945 the number of trucks has only risen to 621,000. The Soviets advance is limited to 150 miles in advance of their railhead though they are able to send some units such as Tank Armies 300 miles in advance unsupported. So why do the Soviets succeed in Poland when they have many of the same problems as the Germans in 1941? The problem of changing the railway gauge over from standard to broad, destroyed facilities, bridges, tunnels, signalling etc. were the same problems as the Germans faced. But the Soviets put a million men into road and rail repair behind the lines and rebuilt the railways far quicker than the Germans did. They also ran the railways far better than the German military railways. Their high point was in 1943 when they ran 200 trains per day in Russia. In 1945 the Soviets were running 500 trains a day behind their fronts.

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Re: German logistics in the east

#92

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 26 Jan 2013, 13:32

Urmel wrote:
Der Alte Fritz wrote:Similarly another horse drawn army, the Soviet one was described by a US observer as being mobile despite being on foot and horse drawn, because it did not carry very much (light artillery pieces), it did not use much in the way of supplies (lived off the land) and did not use very much (direct fire weapons used a third of the ammunition of indirect.)
But the Red Army did not win because its divisions were lightweight. The key operational assets such as tank armies, independent heavy artillery or AT artillery were fully truck mobile, and that enabled them to carry out the rapid and deep operations of 1944/45.

The lack of appropriate mechanisation (i.e. with cross-country capable trucks) was a serious issue for the Germans.
As I have pointed out in the post above in Jan 1944 the trucks numbers for the Germans and Soviets was about the same but the Germans had an Army of 2.5 million and the Soviets one of 6 million. The Red Army even in 1945 did not have an equivalent level of mechanisation to the Germans. What they did was concentrate scarce assets at the point of decision ie Tank Armies. Your average Rifle Division has 1700 horses 700 wagons and only 60 trucks with another 60 from Army level if it is fighting. A German Infantry Division has 300 trucks and about 200 other vehicles plus 5000 horses and 600 wagons.

Agreed with regard to the war winning features of the Soviet forces. But those highly equipped units were balanced by a horse drawn army of the majority of Rifle Divisions. And credit needs to be given to the Soviets for their allocation of resources as a major part of their war winning potential. Lend lease cross country trucks were important but they way they were used was deadly.


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Re: German logistics in the east

#93

Post by ljadw » 26 Jan 2013, 13:34

One of the best posts I have read on this subject !!!

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Re: German logistics in the east

#94

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 27 Jan 2013, 13:07

I want to attempt something quite difficult which is comparison between the various armies. The problem with logisticts is that there are a large number of variables which make comparisons difficult. But it is worth a try even just to give a broad brush stroke overview of the various systems. For instance the so called 'standard' US Army GTR Company of 40 trucks carrying 200 tonnes started to change in late 1944 as 5 tonne trucks with 5 tonne trailers became available in place of the 2.5 tonne trucks. So by March 45, 227 GTR Companies were actually equivalent to 317.5 companies!
Supply.jpg

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Re: German logistics in the east

#95

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 27 Jan 2013, 17:48

These are the best figures that I can come up with and are open to question.

But from this we can see that the small US Army is able to sustain itself at a range of around 150 miles from its railheads pretty well. There is some variability about this as the planners used 800 tonnes/day per division but found in combat they used 650 tonnes and in pursuit 375 tonnes, so the supply demand can vary quite a lot.

The Germans in June 1941 have no hope of replacing the railway supply with Grosstransportraum lorries at the range they were attempting, the best they could hope for was 100 miles along main roads, beyond that they supply would decline. In reality they only managed to support a Panzer Corps from each Army Group. (Just noticed that the turnaround time should be '6') They would have needed three times the number of lorries just to get as far as Smolensk even with their low supply demand of 200 tonnes/day for an Infantry Division or 350 t/d for a Panzer Division.

The Soviets are interesting as overall it shows what a low level of supply (115 tonnes/day for a Rifle Division) they managed to get forward by lorry mainly due to the poor quality of the roads, especially during Operation Uranus/Saturn where they thought 60 miles a day was good going. Cf with the US 150 miles/day in France. Even when they have large numbers of trucks they are unable to sustain everyone at the same time. The number of divisions is in Western divisions equivalent and so is the level of supply at 150 tonnes/day. Some sources (Niepold quoting FHO) give 275 tonnes per day as the amount needed per Soviet Division on offensive to allow for the extra Army/Front level units (Divisional slice in US parlance.) and this would be nearer 370 tonnes/day in the scheme above.

The Soviet approach was not to maintain the entire front but rather to have around 4-5 axis' of advance who were maintained and the rest who were on subsistence level. With 11 Fronts and pairs of Front attacking and one or two quiet Front sectors, this gives you 30% of the entire front on subsistence. In 1942/43 it could be argued that the number of axis might only be three at any one time. Even within the attacking Fronts they did not deploy all the units, a Front with 4 Armies might only have 2 attempting a penetration, 1 making holding attacks and the other standing still. Similarly there is the difference between Tank Army led attacks like Operation Rumyantsev in August 1943 and Combined Arms only offensives such as the Smolensk Operation in August 1943. The former might plan to drive 300 miles into the German rear while the latter with only a Tank Corps and a Mech Coprs for local exploitation might only expect to penetrate 60-100 miles. Differences like this allowed the Soviets to achieve their supply goals in certain sectors using lorries to support Tank Armies and achieve similar goals at shallower depth by using rail and fewer lorries to support Combined Arms Armies.

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Re: German logistics in the east

#96

Post by Guaporense » 26 Jan 2015, 07:24

Excellent thread by the way. One of the best in the site, logistic difficulties were of massive importance in the eastern front for obvious reasons though they are usually ignored in most accounts.

Your US figures are a bit off, however, the comparable numbers to Heer and Soviet strength would be "field forces":

Image

By the end of the war they had 1.6 million men in 61 divisions, average manpower slice usually of 31,000-25,000 men per division, compared to the German average of 21,000 in June 1941 and 14,500 in June 1944.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German logistics in the east

#97

Post by Erwinn » 27 Jan 2015, 11:29

I always wondered, could the capture of Leningrad help with the German logistics? Like using sea transport and distributing supplies from the city?

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Re: German logistics in the east

#98

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 27 Jan 2015, 12:02

Not in 1941 and 1942 as there were fewer cross routes running north to south which remained undestroyed and the main routes ran from Germany to the major Soviet cities. So even if Leningrad had been available as a port it would not have helped HG Mitte and Sud in the early years. Later on cross traffic grew to a considerable extent.

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Re: German logistics in the east

#99

Post by Urmel » 27 Jan 2015, 12:41

Wouldn't that have opened a new direction for an advance on Moscow along the Moscow - Leningrad railway?
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: German logistics in the east

#100

Post by GregSingh » 27 Jan 2015, 13:45

It would be difficult to defend (and to keep in operation). It's long and parallel to the front line...

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Re: German logistics in the east

#101

Post by Art » 27 Jan 2015, 14:09

Erwinn wrote:I always wondered, could the capture of Leningrad help with the German logistics? Like using sea transport and distributing supplies from the city?
They could use (and actually did) Baltic ports, for example Tallinn and Riga. As I remember first transport ships were arriving to Riga already in July 1941.

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Re: German logistics in the east

#102

Post by Urmel » 27 Jan 2015, 14:36

Yes, but those supplies all went to feed the siege of Leningrad. Army Group North was as I recall the best-supplied army group in Russia throughout the war.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: German logistics in the east

#103

Post by GregSingh » 28 Jan 2015, 05:45

Army Group North was as I recall the best-supplied army group in Russia throughout the war.
Something to do with distances, perhaps.
From German mid 1941 border to Leningrad only 800km, more than 1200km to Moscow, more than 1600km to Stalingrad, even more to Caucasus!

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Re: German logistics in the east

#104

Post by Urmel » 28 Jan 2015, 11:11

GregSingh wrote:
Army Group North was as I recall the best-supplied army group in Russia throughout the war.
Something to do with distances, perhaps.
From German mid 1941 border to Leningrad only 800km, more than 1200km to Moscow, more than 1600km to Stalingrad, even more to Caucasus!
Distances, harbours, coastal shipping, railway infrastructure, mostly static operations cutting down on petrol needs.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: German logistics in the east

#105

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 28 Jan 2015, 11:55

Yes you and Art are right, a considerable amount of HG Nord supplies came by sea from quite an early period during the advance in 1941. One of the fears of the German leadership was that the strong Soviet naval forces at Leningrad would stopped them using the ports of Riga and Libau but this did not happen as the Germans deployed strong naval forces to cover the convoy routes. Soviet submarines remained a threat as did sea-mines.

HG Nord also had an advantage in that a part of the original Baltic States railway network remained uncoverted and so was found still to be in standard gauge standard and secondly was built to European standards so was more usual to German railway mens eyes. However HG Nord did capture fewer steam engines and wagons than the other HG so that as it moved north, its railway effort became harder as it moved into broad gauge territory and then into an area of sparse network coverage with the main railway route from Leningrad to Warsaw being the mainstay.

From Schuler: Logistik im Russlandfeldzug 1987:
"Until end of August, merely approximately 1.000 locomotives, of which approximately half were operationally - capable, and round 21.000 boxcars are captured and became German property. The number increased until to the 16.October with 1. 979 locomotives, of which only 1,109 were operationally-capable, as well as altogether 49.497 operationally-capable freight cars all the type and finally amounted at the 31.December 1941, 2.173 locomotives, of which merely 1.223 operation-capable, and 53. 850 operation-capable freight cars of all the type. In the area of the Heeresgruppe Sud, the loot was by far the biggest, in the area of the Heeresgruppe Nord lowest. "

Compared with HG Sud, the supply effort by road was quite difficult because of the forested and trackless terrain and they did not have a decent highway as did HG Mitte did with the Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow road, even if parts of it were not completed.

The net result was that the HG Nord was better supplied than the other two but not by much. They managed to move forward sufficient tonnage by the Grosstransportraum lorries and by 12 trains a day from the border (Leningrad-Warsaw route) and later during the advance an additional amounts by rail transport from the ports which were closer, to meet the rations and fodder and basic fuel requirements but still did not have sufficient tonnage to move forward replacement men and equipment nor new units. This is demonstrated by the stop-go advance as particularly fuel is fed forward to the Panzer Gruppen but the Infantry Korps have to cease their advance from time to time as they run short of fuel. There was not sufficient supply capacity to provide all the units of HG Nord with sufficient supplies to all move forward together at full pace.
Last edited by Der Alte Fritz on 28 Jan 2015, 12:23, edited 1 time in total.

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