When did the Germans lose the war in the East?

[Cult Icon]

summer of 1941 or bust

[imi912]

first rains of autumn then the winter frost was stopped in the first wave of the german offensive, the second time the second time they were better prepared as early as 1942 it has been due to Hitler's attack Western powers could not send reinforcements

[dgfred]

summer of 1941 or bust

Hey Cult, good to see ya. I can't get on ACG at the moment.

I agree with you... I think they started too late. Maybe should have been not at all.

[Appleknocker27]

They lost in Sep/Oct of 1942 when they were exhausted/over extended from Blau and kept going when they should have quit for the year to defensive positions.

[Cult Icon]

ACG is not working ATM.

I've read most of "Caucasus and the Oil" as of late- this and other books (like the Stalingrad trilogy) completely squash the idea that the defeat was in late 1942.

summer of 1941 or bust

Hey Cult, good to see ya. I can't get on ACG at the moment.

I agree with you... I think they started too late. Maybe should have been not at all.

[Appleknocker27]

Considering the peace feelers that the Soviet filtered through Stockholm up until Kursk, there seems to be some room for debate about Axis defeat in the East.

[stg 44]

Considering the peace feelers that the Soviet filtered through Stockholm up until Kursk, there seems to be some room for debate about Axis defeat in the East.

After Kursk their peace terms weren't particularly pallatable, as they demanded the 1941 border and it seems that was more to threaten the Allies in to moving faster in engaging the Germans.

[Alixanther]

Bagration was the moment when the war was irrevocably lost in the East. However, the chance of winning the war was lost at Voronezh in 1942. Seeing that not winning the Eastern conflict would not allow an exit from the Western conflict as well, Voronezh might stay the focal moment.

[stg 44]

Bagration was the moment when the war was irrevocably lost in the East. However, the chance of winning the war was lost at Voronezh in 1942. Seeing that not winning the Eastern conflict would not allow an exit from the Western conflict as well, Voronezh might stay the focal moment.

Bagration is far too late. I think David Glantz is right when he said: "Moscow determined the Germans wouldn't win, Stalingrad that they would lose, and Kursk how fast".
Bagration was such a crushing success based on the enormous mismatching in fighting power between the Axis and Soviets by 3rd quarter 1944; they were able to mount several near simultaneous multi-front offensives and had complete domination of the air in the East. The Wallies had killed the Luftwaffe in Spring 1944, had smashed up their oil industry, and had landed in Normandy drawing off 2200 AFVs that would be crushed there, while Hitler had thrown away his last bomber reserves in the Baby Blitz in Spring 1944. Factor in all the defeats of 1943 into summer 1944 and the Wehrmacht (all German armed forces) ware beaten, the corpse was just still kicking and the body blows of the last 10 months of the war were just forcing it to lay still.

[Cult Icon]

summer 43- Spring 1944 were a series of defeats and retreat. The Ukraine/Crimea were lost and leningrad was no longer threatened with soviets at the gates of the baltics.

[Alixanther]

Bagration was the moment when the war was irrevocably lost in the East. However, the chance of winning the war was lost at Voronezh in 1942. Seeing that not winning the Eastern conflict would not allow an exit from the Western conflict as well, Voronezh might stay the focal moment.

Bagration is far too late. I think David Glantz is right when he said: "Moscow determined the Germans wouldn't win, Stalingrad that they would lose, and Kursk how fast".
Bagration was such a crushing success based on the enormous mismatching in fighting power between the Axis and Soviets by 3rd quarter 1944; they were able to mount several near simultaneous multi-front offensives and had complete domination of the air in the East. The Wallies had killed the Luftwaffe in Spring 1944, had smashed up their oil industry, and had landed in Normandy drawing off 2200 AFVs that would be crushed there, while Hitler had thrown away his last bomber reserves in the Baby Blitz in Spring 1944. Factor in all the defeats of 1943 into summer 1944 and the Wehrmacht (all German armed forces) ware beaten, the corpse was just still kicking and the body blows of the last 10 months of the war were just forcing it to lay still.

I don't agree with Glantz.
First, Moscow '41 is not at all decisive. It becomes somewhat "decisive" because of German DoW against US, but it's definitely not an end for East operations.
Second, Stalingrad was a required defeat for the Germans to extricate their Group A from Caucasus, otherwise the encirclement would have been far greater. The problem was that the OKW became fixated on saving both and in the end fell short of accomplishments. Soviets were dealt heavy blows, though. They were in no bright conditions to claim victory after Stalingrad. To quote myself, Stalingrad was an all-important victory for Soviets because it removed a sense of impending doom which they had since 22 June '41 but for Germans it mattered little.
Third, Kursk would have been a resounding succesful operation IF Italy would not have been invaded and threatened with capitulation. Hitler got scared that his Southern ally was that much politically unstable and considered it was worth losing a decisive battle on the Eastern Front to save his friendly regime and avoid a dread scenario in which turncoat Italy invaded undefended German belly (Tirol and the like).

[KDF33]

The theory about the Sicily landings leading to German failure at Kursk is a well-bebunked myth.

As for Stalingrad, it was truly decisive. It had a massive impact on German strength in the East. The encirclement + the retreat led to massive equipment wastage, not to speak about manpower losses. Thus, in February 1943 the Germans wrote-off 2,069 AFVs, which compares to 3,105 for the whole of 1942 (source is Mueller-Hillebrand).

The same applies for other categories of equipment. IIRC MG stocks dropped from 250,000 on 1.1.43 to something like 170,000 after Stalingrad. Rocket launchers dropped from 3,000 to 2,000, etc.

Basically, the dislocation of the German front around Stalingrad led not only to the destruction of the Sixth Army (as well as all the Axis allied armies, which were quite significant in terms of manpower), but also to truly massive losses of equipment along the entire southern section of the German front during the retreat.

German defeat at Stalingrad was far more than merely psychological, either for the Soviets or for the Germans themselves.

Regards,

KDF

[BDV]

summer of 1941 or bust

July 1940 or bust.

Throws a mighty wrench in the Soviet mobilization schedule, while the German mobilization schedule had been mangled by AngloFrench DOW anyway.