Taifun - Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

[BDV]

There is a stark contrast between German victories of Vyazma and Bryansk in October and the Soviet success in December and January. I think a gaggle of german missteps in the mid-October led to germans snatching the defeat from the jaws of victory.


The one I'm most familiar with is the decision to send the 1st Panzer to Kalinin (followed by a strike towards Torzhok - Bologoye), along the right bank of Volga foregoing a chance of forming and closing a third pocket around Rzhev. To which Soviets answered by simly pulling back the 29th Army and the left flank of the 22nd army and falling on their lines of communication. Then, simulataneously and at the same time, the german commander who was supposed to attack towards Bologoye-Torzhok from the other direction (vLeeb) simply said "screw this" redirected his offensive units to Tikhvin. Which freed Rotmistrov for action against the Kalinin trust. On top of it Luftwaffe, instead of increasing support of the strike to Kalinin, pulls units for Crimea.


In the center of the mess, Volokolamsk-Mozhaisk area, there is vKluge resting/resuppling his infantry while the armored units go at it alone, making gains that are expensive in personnel and materiel. In the south of the Taifun theater, some more panzer-only strikes, probably also of questionable wisdom.


And in the South, vKleist making a beeline for Rostov.


I think that the "Taifun snatching of defeat from the jaws of victory" picture can be understood as a multiplicity of local missteps by the army group/army/corps commanders - and with the OKW losing control amidst the confusing situation. As a result, the Ostheer's fighting ability decreased sharply, but in a way that did not fully make it into their commenders and particularly OKW's consciousness. Am I barking up the wrong tree?

[werd]

Season of bad roads and frost prevented fight. Greasing in guns stiffened, synthetic fuel decayed on components.

http://waralbum.ru/150153/
http://www.off-road-drive.ru/archive/46 ... Eh__dorogi

[Marcus]

Please post the source (website, book etc) of the images you post.

/Marcus

[steverodgers801]

Taifun was a desperate attempt by a German army that had already failed in its objective. According to the plan the German should have been past Moscow by September. It was actually Von Bock who convinced Hitler that AGC could reach Moscow and take it.

[AJFFM]

The German army (as it stood around Oct. 41) would have been defeated in Dec. 41-Jan. 42 regardless of mistakes or lack there of.

It was basically a spent force by then, a shadow of its former glory, divisions were already heavily mauled before the battle with no reserves left and to add insult to injury dangerously overstretched to the point that the real miracle of Taifun is how the German are survived to lauch the attack. It has already been defeated in the North (Tikhvin) and in the South (Rostov). Fighting any further was basically impossible.

Now had the Germans concentrated on Moscow after Smolensk instead of going after Kiev I think they did indeed have a very good chance to take Moscow. The Smolensk diversion as Glantz pointed out not only bled AGC out for two months, it allowed the Red army some respite to reorganised and collect its breath especially in the Moscow area. It also helped bleed out AGC even more when the offensive commenced in Sep.

[Art]

There is a stark contrast between German victories of Vyazma and Bryansk in October and the Soviet success in December and January. I think a gaggle of german missteps in the mid-October led to germans snatching the defeat from the jaws of victory.

To start with the original operation plan was too grandiose and contemplated attack on a too wide frontage. Especially the southern group (2 Army and 2 Panzer Group) was separated by a very long distance from the central (4 Army and 4 Pz Group) and from Moscow itself. Besides it was to weak to finish opposing Soviet forces fast enough. The events in October confirmed it rather clearly. Narrowing the front of operation would work much better IMO.

[werd]

On the map it is well visible that 2 tank group could attack to the north with good chances to take Moscow. But then all the same retreat on all east front. 228 thousand frost-bitten lost. Germans were absolutely unprepared to war in the winter.



Germans in a frost -30



http://waralbum.ru/58640/

[BDV]

So the argument was that on Oct 1st german army was not able to fulfill its task if it went patiently about it, but instead HAD to go all out.

But it doesn't jive with the evidence on hand, not only was Kiev pocket just clobbered, and the Vyazma and Bryansk soon to follow. And then, there were the 1st panzer and 36th motorized in the 29th/30th/31st armies rear in position to inflict another disastrous encirclement. The Wehrmacht, was in a good position vs RKKA.

Now, it was not positioned for further advances, in particular for the infantry. IMO trying to force those advances anyway between October 10th and 30th is what got them hyperextended and exhausted (both armor and infantry), just in time for the Soviet December punch.

[werd]

Now, it was not positioned for further advances, in particular for the infantry. IMO trying to force those advances anyway between October 10th and 30th is what got them hyperextended and exhausted (both armor and infantry), just in time for the Soviet December punch.

The climatic factor was the main thing in a battle of Moscow. Wehrmacht without artillery, tanks, cars. Soldiers without winter regimentals and the weapon.

http://www.aif.ru/society/history/18077

On November 15 snow dropped out, and practically at once struck frosts. The German artillery was absolutely useless as had no necessary lubricants to protect mobile parts of tools.

Only 30% of mobile equipment were in working order. The most part of tanks too stayed idle as their riflescopes were unsuitable for so low temperatures. The infantry which didn't have the corresponding winter regimentals, hardly moved ahead.

[GregSingh]

Mid November frost actually helped to restart the offensive, which was stopped in mud in second half of October. In late October mostly infantry units were going forward, as there was no way to deliver fuel to panzer/motorised units or delivery was extremely slow (with some exceptions).
Stunning early October victories were possible because:
1. Soviets did not expect German offensive.
2. The weather was perfect.
I recommend Stahel's "Operation Typhoon". It deals with the subject in detail and is supported by 'hundreds' of primary sources.

And as already mentioned by others, weather was just 'a hindrance'. Wehrmacht was already a 'spent' force...

[werd]

about weather conditions

http://www.rulit.net/books/war-without- ... 5-114.html

Distribution from railheads was through the available Grosstransportraum of lorried transport. Many of these had been stuck fast for three weeks with mud up to their axles. When the mud froze they were hauled out but hundreds were severely damaged in the process. By the middle of November, 50% of the Army Group Centre lorry fleet was out of action. Fourth Army had been reduced to one eighth of its original complement of trucks. Panzergruppe 4, which had relocated from the Leningrad front to the centre, had only half its motorised transport running, even before Operation ‘Taifun' at the beginning of October. Many vehicles failed to receive timely deliveries of anti-freeze and broke down. Meanwhile the Minsk-Moscow ‘Autobahn' had its concrete covering stripped away between Smolensk and Vyazma during the difficult weather. A whole infantry division was required to expedite sufficient repairs to get traffic moving again.(16) Artillery soldier Franz Frisch with Panzergruppe 4 summed up the problems:

‘We started the offensive on Moscow with dilapidated equipment, and we lost a lot of it. 30% of the leaf [suspension] springs in our trucks broke later in the cold, robbing them of braking power. There was such confusion that even officers started to question the logic of pushing ahead despite transportation problems. "What stupidity is this - starting an attack with units whose trucks will not move, and ammunition trucks with cold brakes and no springs?"'

Resupply by rail, vital to sustain any operational advance of consequence, began to disintegrate in freezing conditions. Ninth Army received only four fuel trains between 23 October and 13 November, while Second Army gained only one of three required from late October. As temperatures plummeted to minus double figures, 70% to 80% of German steam locomotives, whose water pipes - unlike Russian types - were outside their boilers, froze and burst. This provided the prelude to a transport crisis that dwarfed all those that had preceded it. Virtually no trains reached Second Army between 12 November and 2 December and only one fuel train reached Ninth Army between 9 and 23 November. When the latter arrived, its contents could not be distributed because waiting lorries were also out of petrol. Despite awesome difficulties, it was these lorry columns that kept units intermittently resupplied. Von Bock complained as early as 11 November that the number of trains reaching his army group was down to 23 per day. If the 30 originally promised could not be maintained, he assessed that stockpiling ‘even for an attack with limited objectives, cannot be contemplated before 11 December; that means in my opinion the attack will not take place!' At the end of November only an average of 16 trains per day were reaching the army group.

Paradoxically the intensity of fighting, and as a consequence casualties, diminished, due to the physical difficulties of manoeuvring and fighting in adverse weather. Formations on both sides had, in any case, been much reduced by attrition. Flexible and mobile operations were no longer achievable, further blunting the Auftragstaktik-based leadership edge the Ostheer enjoyed relative to its more inflexibly led foe in the summer months. The Ostheer was neither trained, equipped nor psychologically prepared for winter operations. These, by physical necessity, were degraded to man-against-man frontal attacks, as conditions denied flanking options, favouring the Russian defender more conditioned to the climate in which he lived. German tactical expertise could no longer compensate for the technological superiority of heavy Russian tank types. German casualties, likewise, meant fewer experienced officers and NCOs available to exploit rapid-moving situations, leading to an imperative to control and centralise assets in the hands of the few who could.

Winter weather applied its own peculiar attrition rate through adverse conditions and accidents, which resulted in a decline of the sortie rate. The 2nd Stuka Geschwader reported in November: ‘winter weather; sleet; only dive-bombers fly at 100m altitudes against a Soviet tank counter-attack into the flank of the 110th Infantry Division'. On 7 November the temperature fell below −20° and the Ju87 Stuka engines failed to start. Major Hozzel, the Geschwader commander, wrote in his diary that ‘in spite of the efforts of all personnel, we can only sortie on a few days'. As a result, only one dive-bombing attack was mounted on 13 November, another on 18 November and some others on the 26th and 28th, when four sorties were flown. At the end of the month another sortie was mounted in support of Panzergruppe 4 about 20km north-west of the outskirts of Moscow.(23) Support deteriorated almost completely at the beginning of December when temperatures plummeted to −30°. Oberleutnant Hans Ulrich Rudel, a Stuka pilot, declared ‘a sudden cold snap of below −40° freezes the normal lubricating oil. Every machine gun jams'. He ruefully commented, ‘the battle with the cold is tougher than the battle with the enemy'.(24) German airstrips were hardly usable, whereas the Russians used permanent Moscow bases. Russian sources claim a five-fold sortie superiority rate of 15,840 against 3,500 German during the three-week period 15 November-5 December.(25)

Temperatures hovered between −8° and −22°C on average, offering little respite. A higher than usual number of logistic trains arrived in the Army Group Centre area on 24 November. This shipment of 24 trains permitted the first winter clothing issue to be distributed. On average one man from five received an overcoat. They were not issued to the men of the rear services. Russian tank driver Benjamin Iwantjev on the Central Front wrote on 17 November, ‘the Germans are still wearing summer clothing'.

‘The wind was forever howling and blowing in our faces,' recalled German machine gunner Walter Neustifter, causing ‘ice to crystallise all over our faces, in front, behind, and on the nose'; the cold was all-pervasive. Weapon systems began to malfunction and vehicles did not start. ‘It is freezing again,' declared Leutnant Georg Richter on 5 November, ‘Will the campaign now go on?' All the wheels of his artillery towing vehicles had frozen fast, with ‘mud frozen like granite between the wheels and brake drums'. Hard work was required to clear it. They tried to dig bunkers around the artillery positions when a failure of fuel resupply obliged a halt. ‘It's not so easy to stay outdoors without gloves and head protection,' Richter commented. He noted the average temperature was −15°C, and the ground had frozen hard to a depth of 20cm.(32)

General Guderian, speaking with soldiers from 167th Division on 14 November, observed:

‘The supply situation was bad; snow-shirts, boot polish, underclothes and above all woollen trousers, were not available. A high proportion of the men were still wearing [summer] denim trousers, and the temperature was eight degrees below zero!'

He continued on to the 112th Infantry Division, ‘where I heard the same story'. Around him stood soldiers wearing captured Russian overcoats and fur caps. ‘Only the national emblem showed that they were Germans.' Driving on to a Panzer brigade he saw only 50 tanks were left of the 600 which had originally been available to three divisions. ‘Ice was causing a lot of trouble,' he remarked, because calk grips needed to prevent tracks skidding had yet to arrive. ‘The cold made the telescopic sights useless' and the optic salve to remedy this had also not been delivered. Fires were burning beneath the Panzers in preparation for starting them up. ‘Fuel was freezing on occasions,' he was told, ‘and the oil was becoming viscous… This unit, too, lacked winter clothing and anti-freeze mixture'.

[werd]

And as already mentioned by others, weather was just 'a hindrance'. Wehrmacht was already a 'spent' force...

On October 2 in GA "Centre" were 78 divisions, 1 929 406 people. Fighting losses for october 62 870. With cold weather approach the number of the diseased increased. In November losses 145t, from them fighting 46t.
For october GA lost 5% of structure. Taking into account replenishments decrease 2-3%. Only the Russian weather could stop huge on scales the German approach. In warm weather on dry soil Russians had no chances.

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlacht_um_Moskau

[BDV]

Stunning early October victories were possible because:
1. Soviets did not expect German offensive.

They were not?

2. The weather was perfect.

Or was it because it employed repaired and furnished armor, acting together with properly positioned and rested/furnished german infantry which was in the proper position to adequately support the panzer spearheads. A need for support one would have hoped that the OKW and field commanders had became accustomed with in July. Instead, after brilliant initial successes, most of the advantage is pissed away in wasteful armor spearhead (but no infantry shaft) showmanship in second half of October and pigheaded stubbornness in November resulting in a over-extended, tired fighting force by December 1st.

I recommend Stahel's "Operation Typhoon". It deals with the subject in detail and is supported by 'hundreds' of primary sources.

Will do.

And as already mentioned by others, weather was just 'a hindrance'. Wehrmacht was already a 'spent' force...

As to "spent" ... as of 10 October germans just completed the Kiev-Vyazma-Bryansk pocket trifecta in the prior 3 weeks, and were in position to add another pocket in Rzhev for a "no week without encirclement" performance. Maybe OKW got bored of encirclements :roll: ? IMO the discombobulation of October 10th-December 1st was the root cause of the December-January predicaments, which were augmented by a few specifics (the relative inadequacy of german winter gear for the exactions of the Russian winter, and the rarely mentioned collapse of hygiene).

[werd]

Germans in planning didn't consider features of the Russian climate. Otherwise they could narrow the approach front. The task was to take not so much Moscow, it is possible to destroy as bigger number of the Soviet armies.

[ljadw]

The aim of Barbarossa was to defeat the SU in the summer. This failed. All that happened later was unimportant .
Taifun was a secundary operation on a small level that never could have the successes which were its aim .