Taifun - Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

[LWD]

So if they had defeated The Soviets on the first day of Fall it would not have been important?

[ljadw]

As the possibility to defeat the SU on the first day of the fall was inexistant,it was also unimportant .

[Art]

1. Soviets did not expect German offensive.

Generally speaking they were. The advance to Moscow was considered possible, of course, and defensive preparations were under way. Then Stavka issued a warning several days before the "Taifun" start.

[LWD]

As the possibility to defeat the SU on the first day of the fall was inexistant,it was also unimportant .

Amaxing how dismissive you can be of any thing that dissagrees with your pet theory(s).

[GregSingh]

Sorry for confusion. Will try to clarify.

I should rather put "Soviets did not expect German offensive BEFORE THE WINTER"
This is based on interrogation reports of Soviets prisoners (officers) from October.
Further to that Soviets were aware of losses inflicted on German army, so they thought aggressor will need more time to get some strength. Typhoon right after Kiev battle happened 'too soon'.
Of course they knew war will continue and they made preparations, etc. but that was not my point there.

Now to the 'spare' force.
What I meant was: Ostheer was the strongest on the 22nd of June, later it was all downhill (let's limit this to the end of 1941). Soviets - the opposite. While Germans were getting weaker, Soviets were getting stronger.

Now numbers.
Soviet Army:
22.06.41 - 5.373.000 men
31.08.41 - 6.889.000 men
31.12.41 ca. 8.000.000 men

Opponent:
22.06.41 motor vehicles ca. 600.000
30.09.41 motor vehicles losses ca. 200.000. Replacement from Germany (war booty not counted) - 3.500

31.08.41 soldiers losses 534.952 (15%), replacements 385.000

15.09.41 irrecoverable tanks losses - 50% (ca. 1600). Replacement - 306 new production + 450 (2nd and 5th Panzer divisions)
Guderian group 256 tanks (out of 904 on 22.06)
Hoth group 280 tanks (out of 707 on 22.06)
Hoepner group 250 tanks (out of 626 on 22.06)

So with tanks, von Bock had eight panzer divisions with 1530 tanks on 22.06 and on 30.09.41 fourteen panzer divisions with ca. 1480 tanks. Further to that, those twelve panzer divisions to take part in Typhoon (excl. new 2nd and 5th) lost 70% of their tanks (from 2476 on 22.06.41 to 750 on 02.10.41) with only 306 new production replacement.

[steverodgers801]

sorry Ljadw, that is from the Germans themselves. Halder was stating they had beaten the Soviets in two weeks in his diary. They knew they could not sustain a long campaign so they had to defeat the Soviets quickly. The German objective was to reach the A-A line before winter set in.

[ljadw]

This confirms what I am saying :the plan was to defeat the Red Army in a quick campaign between the border and the Dnepr-Dvina line,and THAN with light,mobile forces to advance to the A/A line .

This failed (after a month,there was already panic in Rastenburg).

It is amazing that people still stick to the theory that what the Germans could not do in the summer,they could do in the autumn .Every one knew that in the autumn it was no longer possible to defeat the SU and to advance to the AA line before the winter . This was excluded .Even before the start of Taifun,the Germans were preparing the campaign of 1942,which means that what happened in the autumn,not would be decisive .

[BDV]

Sorry for confusion. Will try to clarify.
22.06.41 motor vehicles ca. 600.000
30.09.41 motor vehicles losses ca. 200.000. Replacement from Germany (war booty not counted) - 3.500

All the more reasons to be aware of the fact that the mobility of the infantry has been critically impaired, and to be satisfied with the 150-200 km advance of the first two weeks of Taifun, and use the rainy weeks to switch to winter gear.

Rather than wading deeper in big muddy away from the Rzhev-Bryansk railway, burning up people, equipment, ammo and fuel.


PS.

LJADW:
It is amazing that people still stick to the theory that what the Germans could not do in the summer,they could do in the autumn .Every one knew that in the autumn it was no longer possible to defeat the SU and to advance to the AA line before the winter . This was excluded .Even before the start of Taifun,the Germans were preparing the campaign of 1942,which means that what happened in the autumn,not would be decisive .

Exactly, so the foolishness of forcing things to a head end-October and November, while operating at a significant disadvantage, AND after Taifun demonstrated that operationally germans still had a significant upper hand, when operating in the proper circumstances.

[steverodgers801]

The only advantage the Germans had was the fact that due to Stalins no retreat rule and his insistence on attacking regardless meant the Soviet army available at the start had been wiped out. Add in the lack of trained officers and serious equipment shortages the Soviets were not capable of effective offensive action. Still the German army was also suffering from three serious problems, infantry replacements, equipment shortages of their own and a severe lack of mobility for about 85% of the army and a significant for even the mobile arms and German did not have the advantage they thought they did.

[BDV]

The only advantage the Germans had was the fact that due to Stalins no retreat rule and his insistence on attacking regardless meant the Soviet army available at the start had been wiped out.

Does not really apply to Taifun (lesson from the Kiev pocket?), as the on the north flank of Taifun the 22nd and 29th (and surviving elements of 30th) Soviet Army, and around Briansk the 50th Army did withdraw quite a long way during early-October battles. During later battles, withdrawals when under significant pressure was the rule rather than the exception across the entire Soviet line from Kursk to Klin.

For example:
Map of the Moscow Defensive Operation

[werd]

In the middle of november temperature was -10 - 15. In such weather fights are conducted mainly for settlements, not to spend the night on the street. Germans have to attack Russians on all front, but they, having seen the village, all there came. Then Russians counterattacked that to get warm in the village. War is ineffective in the winter. From the middle of april to the middle of october Germans surpassed Russians. During other periods forces were equal.

From Manstein's memoirs about fights of February 1943 in Ukraine:

40 pk began the offensive along a valley Krivoj Torets and to the east of it is almost frontal. As happens almost always in severe Russian winter, it is impossible to leave parts to spend the night out of settlements, and operations of this corps led to that fights were in essence played in a valley Krivoj Toretz only for settlements. First of all, it was a question of mastering the large industrial city of Kramatorsk. In such fight it was impossible to expect fast success so necessary for us against enemy group at Slavyansk. Operating here 11 pd moved ahead slowly.

[GregSingh]

Well, somehow winter and frost did not stop Soviets from starting Moscow counter-offensive in December, in severe -40C frost.
They did not wait for summer. What about Stalingrad? We all know what season of year it was...
Both sides had problems with weather, but winter never caused military operations to stop.

[BDV]

One factor that may have played a part is that soviet forces may not/could not have been attacking in the coldest of days, leaving them to the germans to attempt to "disengage", by fleeing through the cold, and creating the correspondingly fond memories.

Details about the weather around Moscow region were posted on the forum a while back. There were plenty of days with temperatures above -10C and even a few with temperatures above 0C. The Axis forces with Germans, who controlled Norway, and the Finns should have had better weather prognosis than the soviets, given that the weather fronts propagate in a NW to SE direction.

Also neither AGS nor AGN (which presumably operated in even worse weather) got their skulls bashed in quite like AGC, despite RKKA trying everywhere.

This leaves post-October 15 over-extension and overuse of motorized forces as the likely explanations for AGC's debacle.

P.S.

AHF thread on the topic of Moscow weather 1941.

[werd]

Well, somehow winter and frost did not stop Soviets from starting Moscow counter-offensive in December, in severe -40C frost.
They did not wait for summer. What about Stalingrad? We all know what season of year it was...
Both sides had problems with weather, but winter never caused military operations to stop.

Offensive in December 1941 was ineffective. In tanks and cars fuel froze. The Russian tanks on diesel fuel, German synthetic gasoline. Greasing wasn't for artillery and guns. Even such weak Germans couldn't destroy, only push aside to the west.
Rokossovsky considered continuation offensive after December 20 erroneous.

In Stalingrad on flanks attacked badly armed and trained Romanians and Italians. If there were Germans,offensive could will come to the end without results.

http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov2/08.html

Rokossovsky in 1962 in conversation with teachers and listeners of academy of the name Frunze critically estimated a course of the Soviet counterattack near Moscow: "on December 20 after liberation of Volokolamsk it became clear that the opponent recovered, organized defense and that cash forces it is impossible to continue approach. It was necessary to prepare for summer campaign seriously. But, to a great regret, the Rate it was ordered to continue approach and to exhaust the opponent. It was the most gross blunder. We exhausted ourselves. Zhukov didn't take numerous reports on losses into account. With the cash forces it was impossible to achieve resolute results. We simply pushed out the opponent (not only pushed out, but also got to an environment! — B.S) .There were no tools, tanks, especially ammunition. The infantry came on snow under strong fire with weak artillery support. There came five fronts, and, naturally, forces didn't suffice. The opponent passed to strategic defense, and we should have made the same. And we came. In it there was Stalin's most gross blunder. Zhukov and Konev couldn't overpersuade it". However, there are no reliable certificates that Georgy Konstantinovich and Ivan Stepanovich tried to make it.

[werd]

One factor that may have played a part is that soviet forces may not/could not have been attacking in the coldest of days, leaving them to the germans to attempt to "disengage", by fleeing through the cold, and creating the correspondingly fond memories.

Details about the weather around Moscow region were posted on the forum a while back. There were plenty of days with temperatures above -10C and even a few with temperatures above 0C. The Axis forces with Germans, who controlled Norway, and the Finns should have had better weather prognosis than the soviets, given that the weather fronts propagate in a NW to SE direction.

Also neither AGS nor AGN (which presumably operated in even worse weather) got their skulls bashed in quite like AGC, despite RKKA trying everywhere.

This leaves post-October 15 over-extension and overuse of motorized forces as the likely explanations for AGC's debacle.

P.S.

AHF thread on the topic of Moscow weather 1941.

At the end of November was a thaw. On December 1 sharply became cold. At Germans 1 tank from 5 was started. The majority of cars was thrown for the same reason.Many German divisions had no winter clothes.

http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6631

Weather in December:

3 - 25-30
4 - 25
5 - 22, night-28-30
6 - 23, -28
8 - 15-18
9 - 24, -27
12 - 28
13 - 23-25
15 - 17
17 - 25-30
20 - 30-33

http://worldwar2blog.ru/nemcy-i-russkie ... oskvu.html