Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record

[Mr.No one]

Just some thoughts and semi-conclusions after reading in Manfred Kehrig's Stalingrad and David M. Glantz's Endgame at Stalingrad Book 1:

On November the 19th the Soviet Southwestern and Don Fronts launched the long awaited Operation Uranus. The following day (20.11) Stalingrad Front launched its part of the offensive, constituting the second pincer of a grand encirclement.

Soon after the attack on November the 19th the German Sixth Army (Armeeoberkommando 6 = AOK 6) had begun sending several divisions that had until then been fighting in the Stalingrad area westwards. These included the 14th, 16th, 24th Panzer-Divisionen, as well as the 3rd and 60th Motorizierte Divisionen.

Now we get to the important stuff!

On the morning of the 21st of November 1942, there existed optimism in AOK 6. Reports from the subordinate units weren't that bad, 22nd Panzer-Division had succeeded in slowing down the offensive, and it was hoped that with the commitment of the whole of XIV Panzer Korps (the above-mentioned divisions), that the situation would be reversed.

AOK 6 was forced to relocate their headquarters to Nizjne Tjirskaja during the day, upon their arrival at 16.00-17.00 they received an order from Hitler from 15.25. In it, it was ordered that AOK 6 should stand fast and would later receive orders concerning an aerial supply.

After Paulus and Schmidt (Ia of AOK 6) had read this order they proposed to pull back the front lines to the Don and Tjir rivers, so that they would be in a position to strike the advancing Soviet forces on their flanks. This proposal was rejected by higher headquarters.

During the evening of the 21st the critical situation was realised at AOK 6. The XIV Panzer Korps wouldn't be able to engage the advancing Soviet forces from the west and there weren't any troops to block the pincers converging on the town of Kalatj (and Sovetskij). Therefore AOK 6 decided that, as the situation was now about the very survival of the Sixth Army, the most important thing was to build a new defensive front on the southern wing of AOK 6. As such it was decided (for final on the 22nd) that the Sixth Army would stay at Stalingrad, but it didn't matter if they after a couple of days would break out or stay at Stalingrad. At the same time, it was realised that a breakout would require at least a couple of days for regroupings, so there simply was no possibility of the Sixth Army breaking out immediately.

In conclusion, the "halt order" of Hitler didn't have the crucial importance as it is often credited with, as it would have been practically impossible, not least because a breakout would have resulted in the destruction of the nabour armies (3rd Romanian + 4th panzer).

This is not to say that Hitler's later orders didn't bear part of the responsibility for Sixth Army's later destruction, but that was only in the post-encirclement situation.

Feel free to comment, discuss, reject, or further add insight into this topic!

All the best,
Sean

[Mr.No one]

22nd November 1942:

The 16th PzD reports about a lack of fuel, and at the AOK 6 it is realised that it shall not count on any counterattack west of the Don anymore, due to a lack of fuel, too weak forces, and because of an ostensible encirclement of the XI AK.

Fiebig had declared both on the evening on the 21st and again on the morning of the 22nd while speaking with Schmidt, that an aerial supply is out of the question.

During the morning of the 22nd a meeting that lasted several hours began at 07.00. The attendants are primarily Paulus, Schmidt, and Hoth. The conclusions of this meeting are the following: The situation is deteriorating, due to a lack of fuel XIV PzK isn't able to conduct its planned counterattack, and the encirclement cannnot be avoided anymore by this time.

Between 07.00 and 08.00 hours the decision to stay put at Stalingrad is made because of the situation in the rear areas of the Sixth Army and due to Hube's proclamation (commander XIV PzK). At the same time a breakout is being contemplated. The best area to carry it out lies between the Chir and the Don rivers. But before any such operation can be initiated the XI AK and the XIV PzK has to be regrouped, in order to concentrate enough strength for the breakout to be successful. After the commander of 9th Flak-Division, Generalmojor Wolfgang Pickert, had required an immediate breakout upon his arrival at the headquarters of the Sixth Army at Nizhne-Chirskaja by 8 o'clock (in the morning), the following plan was developed at AOK 6:

To establish an all-round (hedgehog) defense at Stalingrad, under the prerequisite that it would enable a later breakout to be carried out toward the southwest.

An immediate breakout was deemed impossible due to the following reasons: The heavy fighting in the sectors of the XI AK and the XIV PzK, the necessity of closing the southern front, the lack of fuel, as well as the — as yet — still unknown state of cooperation on the part of the Heeresgruppe.

See Manfred Kehrig Stalingrad: Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht page 173-174.

To be continued...
All the best!

[Mr.No one]

Continuation of the 22nd of November:

By this time both Paulus and Schmidt had been made fully aware of the fact that an aerial supply by the Luftwaffe was totally inconceivable due to both the availability of aircraft, the presence of the VVS as well as the deteriorating weather conditions. But at the same time it was necessary to re supply Sixth Army with both fuel and ammunition if a breakout was to be attempted, so they had to be flown in by a limited air supply. Again, the reasons for not breaking out immediately were listed: due to the tactical situation of the army an immediate breakout wasn't possible, and until it was possible, an aerial supply was to be attempted.

There certainly exists no doubt what-so-ever that Paulua and Schmidt were adequately informed about the limited capabilities of the Luftwaffe with regard to the aerial supply, and Paulus used it as a reason as to why he still perceived a breakout as being necessary in a report to Heeresgruppe B on 22 November.

After Paulus and Schmidt had been informed by Hube that the planned counterattack couldn't be performed (due to a lack of fuel), as the encirclement was becoming conceivable, and after AOK 6 accordingly ordered to stay put at Stalingrad, Schmidt sent out the first orders to the respective corps concerning how to prepare for the all-round defense. These orders were sent out between 08.30 and 10.00 hours.

After the decision had been made to stay at Stalingrad and thereby postpone the breakout for the time being, contemplating the breakout became the first priority in Paulus's decision making.

The commander of Heeresgruppe B, Maximillian von Weichs, couldn't allow Paulus's request to be carried out though and simply ordered that he should follow what had already been ordered. There's a possibility that the imminent take-over of command of Sixth Army by Heersgruppe Don (under von Manstein) played a role in von Weichs' passivity here.

Afternoon 22.11:
Paulus and Schmidt are in full agreement that a breakout is necessary due to the development of the situation.

To be continued...

Cheers,
Sean Hansen

[Mr.No one]

Continuation of the 22nd of November:

During the day Paulus contacted all the corps commanders of the army as well as several divisional commanders. They all supported his belief concerning the breakout and agreed upon that this represented the only way out. As they were all in agreement they decided to send an appeal to Hitler pleading for "freedom of action". This appeal wasn't finished by the end of the day, and consequently was first send on the evening of the 23rd of November.

Report by AOK 6 to Heeresgruppe B and Oberkommando des Heeres 22.11.42, 1900 hours, regarding the Situation and Intention of the Army:
In the opening of this report Paulus precipitously claimed "Armee eingeschlossen" — Army encircled. This would first happen for final during the following afternoon of the next day. Nevertheless, Paulus reported about the situation of the army and pointed to the fact that the southern front of the army had yet to be closed. This was to be done by significantly weakening the northern front and regrouping forces southward, but in the opinion of Paulus it was questionable if this would succeed in establishing a thin line from Karpowka to Marionovka/Golubinka. Furthermore, he reported that fuel would soon be used up so that tanks and heavy weapons would become immobile, the situation regarding the level of ammunition was strained, and supplies only stretched for six days. The intention of the army was as such to hold on to the area of Stalingrad to both sides of the Don, and countermeasures for this had already been initiated. The execution of this depended on the closing of the southern front and the flying in of adequate supplies, though. As such, the army requested "freedom of action" in case the establishment of an all-round defense should not materialise. This situation could force the abondonement of the northern front as well as Stalingrad proper, so as to break out with all of its troops between the Don and the Volga aiming at reestablishing contact with the 4th Romanian Army. Finally, a breakout inWestern direction toward Bokovskaia was deemed unfavourable, due to strong opposing forces as well as a difficult terrain.

Führerfunkspruch 22.11.42, 2215 hours (the third since 19.11)
During the evening Hitler sent a message to AOK 6, saying that the Sixth Army was temporarily encircled by "Russian" forces, and that he knew that the Sixth Army in this "difficult situation" would hold on bravely. He also promised that he would do everything to help and relieve the Sixth Army. Finally, (further) orders would be given in due time.

As such, AOK 6's plan of forming a hedgehog-position and consequently break out when possible by its own force was now invalid, as Hitler's proposed relief of the Sixth Army in reality meant staying at Stalingrad.

Regardless, during the night between the 22nd-23rd November AOK 6 began preparing the breakout under the name of "Umbau" — conversion. In addition to the forces forces that had to be tied up in defensive positions, the internally ordered regrouping of Sixth Army's forces sought to relocate and assemble all of its panzer and motorised divisions in the southwestern corner of the pocket. The aim of this was to be capable of breaking out by itself and to commence the operation as soon as possible.

For example, LI AK was ordered to gather the 3rd Motorisierte-Division in the Gumrak region and to send an anti-tank battalion to the southwestern corner of the pocket at 2100 hours. This shows that the different preparations made for the breakout under the rubric "Umbau" in several aspects also proved to be an integral part in the process of securing the pocket, especially with regard to the southern front.

Finally, here you have got it: the dilemma and events of breaking out versus staying put at Stalingrad, as it played out during the 22nd of November 1942!

See Manfred Kehrig Stalingrad: Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht, page 173-184.

All the best,
Sean Hansen

[BDV]

How about the Salsk - Stalingrad railconnection? Was that re-established by the Axis on November 20?!

[Mr.No one]

How about the Salsk - Stalingrad railconnection? Was that re-established by the Axis on November 20?!

According to Glantz, this rail line was cut by dawn on the 21st, after an advance by Vol'sky's 4th Mechanised Corps' 60th and 59th Mechanised Brigades, as well as 55th Separate Tank Regiment, when these forces captured Tinguta Station, 74-Kilometer Station, and Abganerovo Station, after a night advance.

[steverodgers801]

Due to supply difficulties, most German transport had been withdrawn from the Stalingrad area. It would take time to gather up the equipment and move it back, which would require fuel which was limited, the troops would probably have to abandon most heavy equipment, making them vulnerable to attacks by the units surrounding them

[BDV]

"BDV":How about the Salsk - Stalingrad railconnection? Was that re-established by the Axis on November 20?!

According to Glantz, this rail line was cut by dawn on the 21st, after an advance by Vol'sky's 4th Mechanised Corps' 60th and 59th Mechanised Brigades, as well as 55th Separate Tank Regiment, when these forces captured Tinguta Station, 74-Kilometer Station, and Abganerovo Station, after a night advance.

Point being, if that railine was functional, Paulus had the option of trying to defend that lifeline.

P.S. Pity if it would turn out that the lifeline hold-out attempt turns out to be the break-out opening, no?

[Mr.No one]

Here are four reasons why Sixth Army didn't break out in the time period before the 27th of November, according to Generalleutnant Arthur Schmidt, who was Chef des Generalsstabs der 6. Armee:

Reason nr.

1.)
MAIN REASON
The AOK 6 didn't possess an overview of the situation of the nabouring armies. Paulus would never have carried a breakout through, if it would eventually endanger those armies on its flanks.

2.)
In this time period a relief operation was assessed to be favourable by AOK 6.

3.)
An order from Heeresgruppe Don on the 24th of November explicitly ordered that Sixth Army must hold on to the Volgafront and the northern front.

4.)
An order from Hitler was clearly against conducting a breakout. This was NOT the main reason.

See the unpublished monograph Konnte die 6. Armee vor ihrem Untergang in Stalingrad aus der Einschließung ausbrechen oder welche Faktoren verhinderten den Ausbruch? page 10-11 by Oberst Ulrich Freytag, Kassel 1988

Cheers,
Sean

[Mr.No one]

How wonderful the Danish libraries are!

Here is the whole collection of Manfred Kehrig Stalingrad books from the Danish libraries — in my hands

[Paul_Atreides]

How wonderful the Danish libraries are!

Here is the whole collection of Manfred Kehrig Stalingrad books from the Danish libraries — in my hands

Three volumes?! This is not original edition, is it? I took one-volume book (almost 750 pages) in a local library.

[Mr.No one]

Haha, no

These are the original ones, just different editions. Sorry for being a bit unclear in my wording. What I meant was that these represent all of Manfred Kehrig's "Stalingrad" books (the only one published, in several editions) that the Danish libraries possess. As such, I have all of the Stalingrad books of Kehrig that are to be find in the Danish libraries. Demand for them isn't exactly great here...

I will later on this topic try and analyse the command decisions taken on the 22nd of November as documented above and maybe do an analysis of the decision to airlift. This is all a preparation for a year-project that I will commence on next March about Operation Wintergewitter. As part of this project, though, I also plan to also analyse and write about the decision to stay put at Stalingrad, as a sort of introduction to the operation.

Cheers!
— Sean

[Mr.No one]

Analysis of the events of the 22nd of November 1942:

• During this day AOK 6 realised that the hoped-for counterattack by XIV Panzer Korps wouldn't materialise due to insufficient strength of own forces, the overwhelming strength of the Soviet forces, as well as the — by now — characteristic lack of fuel.

• All the higher ranging officers in 6th Army agreed upon that a breakout was necessary to survive. At the same time, though, AOK 6 had to face the fact that an immediate breakout also wasn't possible due to necessary regroupings, a lack of fuel, and because to just survive, the army had to first establish a hedgehog-position.

• The discussion of an aerial supply continued. There is no doubt that Paulus and Schmidt were adequately informed on the impossibility of a prolonged supply, but at the same time they needed some time to establish the new defensive positions, to regroup their mobile forces within the Kessel, as well as get resupplied with fuel.

• Even though they were ordered by Hitler to stay put at Stalingrad, during the evening of the 22nd November AOK 6 began planning the breakout plan (Umbau). As such, even though ordered to put a halt to any such plans they were in fact planning and physically regrouping the necessary forces for exactly such an operation — a breakout in a southwesterly direction, with the goal of reestablishing connection with Axis forces outside of the limits of the Soviet encirclement front.

• In an attempt to change Hitler's mind, the army from this point on and onwards would on several (if not innumerable) occasions pledge for "freedom of action", which in reality meant freeing the army's scruples for conducting a breakout if the situation should force a such.

Final comments:
On the 22nd of November 1942 a breakout was still not operationally possible, no matter what was ordered from Hitler. As such, it was the situation of the Sixth Army — and not the orders of Hitler — that hindered a breakout in the early period of the encirclement (19th to 22nd of November 1942). Later events would result in new appreciations of the situation, but up till this point Hitler could just as well have ordered a breakout and there still wouldn't have been conducted one during those days, due to the Soviet forces' strength and the weakness of the German Sixth Army, in combination.

— Cheers,
Sean!

[Erwinn]

Paulus is an incompetent General. His plan, Barbarossa was overextended the German Army a year ago. He always failed to asses critical situations. That's because he choose to stay behind a desk and rely on reports, never goes out to check how his frontline is doing. He's a chair general, nothing else. The entire reason he got attacked, encircled and lost is because his anibility to spot Soviet movements East of his position. Under his nose Soviets massed 1.2 million troops for he Counter attack. Surely somebody who is as close to Soviets as he is should already knew that before the attack. This thing alone shows his underestimation of enemy forces.

[Cult Icon]

I am currently reading Endgame I and will give an opinion later (in a week, or weeks).