Paulus had spent months concentrating on trying to fulfil Hitler's demands for the city to be taken, leaving Sixth Army with weakened flanks. On 20 November he was even less aware than Weichs of what was happening to the armies off his flanks. It is difficult to imagine that any other commander could have done more on 21-22 November to prepare Sixth Army for a breakout or to have otherwise mitigated the impending disaster. After that the orders from OKH (Hitler) and from Army Group HQ were increasingly explicit with regard to the army staying put on the Volga. Hoth, arguably the best of the German army commanders, was on the scene, and his forces were swept away by the Soviet offensive. Given the situation of Sixth Army on the morning of 21 November (when the scale and significance of what was happening became clear) and the orders subsequently received from OKH (which no German general would have defied) the fate of Sixth Army was sealed, no matter who the army commander may have been.Erwinn wrote:I wonder if the situation somewhat differed if the commander of Stalingrad area was a Front-Lead Type General like Guderian or Rommel.
Paulus known to stick to his Headquarters. Therefore he never witnessed situation with his own eyes.
Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
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Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
"For what a man had rather be true he more readily believes."
Francis Bacon 1620
Francis Bacon 1620
Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
Torsten Doedrich has the following to say on the matter about the 23rd of November, in his book Paulus: Das Trauma von Stalingrad, page 254 (rough translation):Max Payload wrote:Paulus had spent months concentrating on trying to fulfil Hitler's demands for the city to be taken, leaving Sixth Army with weakened flanks. On 20 November he was even less aware than Weichs of what was happening to the armies off his flanks. It is difficult to imagine that any other commander could have done more on 21-22 November to prepare Sixth Army for a breakout or to have otherwise mitigated the impending disaster. After that the orders from OKH (Hitler) and from Army Group HQ were increasingly explicit with regard to the army staying put on the Volga. Hoth, arguably the best of the German army commanders, was on the scene, and his forces were swept away by the Soviet offensive. Given the situation of Sixth Army on the morning of 21 November (when the scale and significance of what was happening became clear) and the orders subsequently received from OKH (which no German general would have defied) the fate of Sixth Army was sealed, no matter who the army commander may have been.Erwinn wrote:I wonder if the situation somewhat differed if the commander of Stalingrad area was a Front-Lead Type General like Guderian or Rommel.
Paulus known to stick to his Headquarters. Therefore he never witnessed situation with his own eyes.
"From a present-day point of view Paulus should at that point, like Rommel had done a few days earlier in North Africa, cut his radio communications and make independent action. However, his character neither like a Reichenau or a Rommel, just as his position in the Wehrmacht too was a different one. Most of all he feared not to be able to assess the overall situation correct and with independent action, which was neither the way of a conscientious or faithful soldier, to bring a whole lot more problems to the Heeresgruppe."
It has to be remembered that a breakout was the only option considered by AOK 6 up till the 24th of November, when the Umbau plan was abandoned, due to Hitler's promises, Manstein's assessment, the condition of the army (lack of ammunition and fuel, combined with the XI. Corps and XIV. Panzer Corps being stuck on the western bank of the Don River) and the limited insight Paulus and Schmidt had into the general situation of the army group.
I think that the most important thing to stress on the Battle of Stalingrad is how crucially the Red Army defeated the Ostheer. When you look through all the books and documents on the battle, it becomes increasingly clear that Paulus's army was doomed from the moment Operation Uranus was launched, possessing a relative combat power not experienced by the Ostheer earlier.
Cheers,
Sean
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Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
I disagree, the two situations were hardly comparable. Rommel was the theatre ground force commander, he understood his operational and strategic situation precisely, and his forces were not surrounded. On the Volga a Reichenau or a Rommel would have faced the same constraints and dilemmas as Paulus. They may have acted with more dynamism than Paulus after 20 November, but their options for 'independent action' would have very limited and I don't believe either would have ordered a breakout on 23/24 November without specific approval from OKH/Heeresgruppe; and consequently the outcome would have been much the same.Mr.No one wrote: Torsten Doedrich has the following to say on the matter about the 23rd of November, in his book Paulus: Das Trauma von Stalingrad, page 254 (rough translation):
"From a present-day point of view Paulus should at that point, like Rommel had done a few days earlier in North Africa, cut his radio communications and make independent action. ..."
I agree. But only because, at Hitler's insistence, so much resource had been put into taking the city. With stronger flanks and the panzer divisions held back as a mobile reserve, Sixth Army's penetration into the city during the autumn would have been minimal but any Soviet attempt to encircle the German forces on the Volga would probably have been successfully resisted.Mr.No one wrote: When you look through all the books and documents on the battle, it becomes increasingly clear that Paulus's army was doomed from the moment Operation Uranus was launched ...
"For what a man had rather be true he more readily believes."
Francis Bacon 1620
Francis Bacon 1620
Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
What was the tank strength of 14, 16, 24th Pz Divs at 20 Nov? 80 or 100 runners?
Also on the southern wing was not the withdrawal of 29 pz gr div back into the pocket rather crucial? Was that decision made by Hoth?
29th had some success in counterattack and its commander wanted to continue. Wasn't this a rather good opportunity lost ?
29th was pretyy strong at that point
Also on the southern wing was not the withdrawal of 29 pz gr div back into the pocket rather crucial? Was that decision made by Hoth?
29th had some success in counterattack and its commander wanted to continue. Wasn't this a rather good opportunity lost ?
29th was pretyy strong at that point
Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
In the middle of November 1942 the three Panzer divisions had 36, 28 and 53 tanks available, respectively, including StuGs. Total = 117 tanks. See Kehrig, pp. 662-663 and 668.lufty1 wrote:What was the tank strength of 14, 16, 24th Pz Divs at 20 Nov? 80 or 100 runners?
Also on the southern wing was not the withdrawal of 29 pz gr div back into the pocket rather crucial? Was that decision made by Hoth?
29th had some success in counterattack and its commander wanted to continue. Wasn't this a rather good opportunity lost ?
29th was pretyy strong at that point
By the end of November, they cumulatively possessed only 64 tanks. See Glantz, Companion, p. 253.
At the same time, 29. ID (mot.) had 42 tanks in its ranks.
- Sean
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Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
According to this document, 6. Armee have 141 Pz. on 19.11.1941 (4. Pz.Armee = 71), 3. rum.Armee (177).
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/4
Boby
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Boby
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Re: Breakout vs Halt at Stalingrad: The Historical Record
Hitler's order for 6 Army to hold was very important because of its psychological effect on the various HQ. Senior German officers knew Hitler's previous decisions were directly responsible for the disaster unfolding in Stalingrad, yet few would officially express this, and to do so could have very grave personal consequences. To openly disagree with the Fuhrer's "solution" to his own disaster meant stirring up a great deal of s**t in Berlin. Hitler could take a certain amount of this, silently fuming, but he could not contain his temper indefinitely. Very few Generals were willing to risk an open confrontation with Hitler over issues like this one!
This left them with few choices. Their hands were tied. They could simply obey - against their better judgement - or they could choose to indirectly justify Hitler's orders by asserting any other future course of action was not militarily feasible for one reason or another.
Whether they actually believed this requires careful research into their other actions, orders, letters, and memoirs.
This is the severely dysfunctional atmosphere which undermined any sensible direction of German strategy. At the time, it was not so much about whether Hitler's command style and decisions were "right" or not (although after the war it was clear his leadership was a disaster for Germany, militarily + socially, from beginning to end), it was his irrational hostility and inflexible attitude towards German generals (w some exceptions) as a class, and his decision to 'take over' whenever he felt like in July 1941. This is at the root of Germany's relatively rapid slide into defeat after a string of victories.
This left them with few choices. Their hands were tied. They could simply obey - against their better judgement - or they could choose to indirectly justify Hitler's orders by asserting any other future course of action was not militarily feasible for one reason or another.
Whether they actually believed this requires careful research into their other actions, orders, letters, and memoirs.
This is the severely dysfunctional atmosphere which undermined any sensible direction of German strategy. At the time, it was not so much about whether Hitler's command style and decisions were "right" or not (although after the war it was clear his leadership was a disaster for Germany, militarily + socially, from beginning to end), it was his irrational hostility and inflexible attitude towards German generals (w some exceptions) as a class, and his decision to 'take over' whenever he felt like in July 1941. This is at the root of Germany's relatively rapid slide into defeat after a string of victories.
Re: psychological effect
Fig leaf to cover the lack of vision and initiative among GROFAZ's bootlickers.
Just because the Fuhrer wasn't in agreement with the plans of his over-promoted underlings does not mean those plans were preferable to what historically transpired.
Von Sponneck's fate is as much to be pinned on Erich "120 wristwatches" Manstein as on the GROFAZ.
Just because the Fuhrer wasn't in agreement with the plans of his over-promoted underlings does not mean those plans were preferable to what historically transpired.
Von Sponneck's fate is as much to be pinned on Erich "120 wristwatches" Manstein as on the GROFAZ.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion