Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

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KDF33
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#106

Post by KDF33 » 12 Jan 2016, 17:17

Max Payload wrote:Moscow was (is) a major industrial centre.
Soviet industry had been largely evacuated, IIRC.
If the Moscow communication hub had been lost, then moving reserves/supplies by rail from SE of Moscow to NE of Moscow would have been the equivalent of having to move reserves/supplies from SE of Paris to NE of Paris via Berlin.
Why would the Soviets move reserves from SE to NE of Moscow? Besides, there were alternative north-south arteries. Look at Tambov-Rostov, for instance, on this map.

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Max Payload
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#107

Post by Max Payload » 13 Jan 2016, 01:15

KDF33 wrote:
Soviet industry had been largely evacuated, IIRC.
Much of it had been but by no means all, and before the winter little of the evacuated plant was back in production. The loss of the capital would have meant that during this time almost the whole of the pre-war industrial capacity of the Moscow conurbation would have been unavailable to the Soviets.
KDF33 wrote:
Max Payload wrote: If the Moscow communication hub had been lost, then moving reserves/supplies by rail from SE of Moscow to NE of Moscow would have been the equivalent of having to move reserves/supplies from SE of Paris to NE of Paris via Berlin.
Why would the Soviets move reserves from SE to NE of Moscow?
Because if Moscow had been lost, these would have been combat zone rear areas, and the inability of Stavka to rapidly transfer resources between them would have limited its ability to respond effectively to subsequent German operations on the Moscow axis.


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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#108

Post by BDV » 13 Jan 2016, 21:44

Appleknocker27 wrote:The main supply routes (MSRs) that were feeding the lead elements you are referencing were a muddy mess and lacked the trafficability to allow 2wd trucks to meet demand. In basic logistical terms, when demand exceeds capacity the offensive combat capability of the lead elements is greatly hindered. Regardless of their strength relative to the enemy, if they are out of fuel, ammunition, etc. they are combat ineffective. A lack of critical supply due to the MSRs being choked by mud is what made the difference of success and failure during Typhoon. A month earlier and this situation is unlikely.
All this whining about mud does not answer the questions I already raised. Some more:

How did Manstein's infantry Army and Romanian infantry get to cross the entirety of Crimea? How did the Germans manage to get to Tikhvin?! How did Kleist manage to take Rostov? How did Rotmistrov manage to reposition from Malaya Vishera to Torzhok? How did the soviet troops in the Rzhev non-kessel manage to withdraw? How did they manage their 1942 operation, when November was positive temperatures throughout?

OKH declared a halt to all offensive movement on 31 Oct due to the mud, that was in effect until the ground froze. In the weeks leading up to that the logistical situation on the MSRs was almost impossible.
?That would be quite big news. Any evidence on this "Halt Order"?

Very nice photo, BTW. But you know who had to deal with that mud? RKKA.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#109

Post by ljadw » 13 Jan 2016, 22:56

Max Payload wrote:
KDF33 wrote:


Because if Moscow had been lost, these would have been combat zone rear areas, and the inability of Stavka to rapidly transfer resources between them would have limited its ability to respond effectively to subsequent German operations on the Moscow axis.
1) A lot but not most of the Soviet industry was evacuated, but most of the losses were replaced by increase of production in the terrirories that were not occupied

2)After the loss of Moscow (let's say :november) there would be NO subsequent German operations east of Moscow .The Germans never planned operations east of Moscow, because they had not the forces to do it .

3) Moscow was NOT the aim of Typhoon : the aim of Typhoon was to destroy what the Germans expected to be the remainings of the Red Army .

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#110

Post by BDV » 14 Jan 2016, 18:40

ljadw wrote: 3) Moscow was NOT the aim of Typhoon : the aim of Typhoon was to destroy what the Germans expected to be the remainings of the Red Army .
Depends on who you ask. German actions and statements during and after the act leave room for interpretation. Why would the 1st Panzer be sent to Kalinin? Why would Guderian try to dash ahead to Tula (only to get stuffed at Mtsensk)? The book "The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank" of Jack Radey, Charles Sharp raises some interesting issues.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#111

Post by Max Payload » 15 Jan 2016, 00:52

ljadw wrote:
2)After the loss of Moscow (let's say :november) there would be NO subsequent German operations east of Moscow .
In the absence of a suspension of military activity on the Moscow axis, which would have been highly unlikely without a Soviet capitulation or an armistice, there would inevitably have been German operations to the north, east and south of Moscow.

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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#112

Post by Max Payload » 15 Jan 2016, 01:52

BDV wrote:
ljadw wrote: 3) Moscow was NOT the aim of Typhoon : the aim of Typhoon was to destroy what the Germans expected to be the remainings of the Red Army .
Depends on who you ask. German actions and statements during and after the act leave room for interpretation. Why would the 1st Panzer be sent to Kalinin? Why would Guderian try to dash ahead to Tula (only to get stuffed at Mtsensk)? The book "The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank" of Jack Radey, Charles Sharp raises some interesting issues.
Directive 35 seems fairly unambiguous.
"2. On the Central front, the operation against the Timoshenko Army Group will be planned so that the attack can be begun at the earliest possible moment (end of September) with the aim of destroying the enemy forces located in the area east of Smolensk by a pincer movement in the general direction of Vyazma, with strong concentrations of armor on the flanks.
For this purpose mobile focal points are to be established with motorized units as follows:
On the southern flank (probably in the area southeast of Roslavl, the direction of the thrust being northeast), from the available forces of Army Group Center and 5th and 2nd Divisions, which will be released for the purpose.
In the 9th Army sector (the thrust being probably towards Bjeloj), by bringing the strongest possible forces from the area of Army Group North.
Only when Army Group Timoshenko has been defeated in these highly coordinated and closely encircling operations of annihilation will our central Army be able to begin the advance on Moscow with its right flank on the Oka and its left on the Upper Volga."
(My emphasis)

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#113

Post by ljadw » 15 Jan 2016, 06:07

This translation is not fully correct : the German text is :zur Verfolgung RICHTUNG Moskau ,which means : a PUIRSUIT IN DIRECTION OF Moscow .

The aim of Weisung 35 is also indicated in the first section where Moscow is not mentioned,but where is indicated that the aim is the annihilation of the Armygroup Timochenko .This must be done (section 2) by an encirclment operation from the north and the south.Only after this has been done,could the central forces of AGC advance on their turn .

It is also nowhere indicated that after the annihilation of AG Timochenko and the fall of Moscow, AGC would further advance to the east .This would be obvious as Typhoon started only in the first days of october and Moscow would only fall in november,the winter would block any further advance east of Moscow .

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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#114

Post by Max Payload » 15 Jan 2016, 11:56

ljadw wrote:This translation is not fully correct : the German text is :zur Verfolgung RICHTUNG Moskau ,which means : a PUIRSUIT IN DIRECTION OF Moscow .
The full sentence is, "Erst dann, wenn die Masse der Heeresgruppe Timoschenko in dieser scharf zusammengehaltenen eng umfassenden Vernichtungsoperation geschlagen ist, wird die Heeresmitte zur Verfolgung Richtung Moskau - rechts angelehnt an die Oka, links angelehnt an die obere Wolga - anzutreten haben."

I am no linguist, so I can't comment further other than to note that -
Only when Army Group Timoshenko has been defeated in these highly coordinated and closely encircling operations of annihilation will our central Army be able to begin the advance on Moscow with its right flank on the Oka and its left on the Upper Volga.
- is the most frequently quoted English language translation of the sentence.

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#115

Post by ljadw » 15 Jan 2016, 12:52

I forgot : anzutreten haben does not mean :will be able,but : must,or can .

This is obvious if one is looking at the conception of Typhoon: it would be a new Cannae : the Soviets would be annihilated WEST of Moscow by the 2 German pinchers, while the infantry divisions on the center would tie the opposing Soviets and prevent their withdrawal to Moscow,or even worse east of Moscow .That's why the central army could not advance to early,but had to wait till the pincers had destroyed the Soviets .

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#116

Post by Appleknocker27 » 15 Jan 2016, 20:09

BDV wrote: All this whining about mud does not answer the questions I already raised.
Whining? That's a juvenile faux pas in any forum setting, egg on your face (a dishonest debate tactic is actually what it is by definition, it erodes your credibility).

Some more:

How did Manstein's infantry Army and Romanian infantry get to cross the entirety of Crimea?

Probably because the average winter temp is 31 degrees and the average rainfall is about 15 inches leaving the area trafficable all year. Just a thought....
How did the Germans manage to get to Tikhvin?!


By their fingernails and held it for 30 days before being ejected since they couldn't get adequate supplies forward due to the weather.
How did Kleist manage to take Rostov?


By defeating the Soviet 12th Army in fair weather, then the rains came. The Soviets pulled back to Rostov, the Germans actually lost contact and it still took them 4 weeks to cover 100 miles in the mud without enemy resistance.
How did Rotmistrov manage to reposition from Malaya Vishera to Torzhok?


1- When did this happen? Prior to the rains? Check your data.
2- The scale of this is a Soviet corps or less that was lacking in motor vehicles and had access to repair facilities, supply points and rail service to Moscow.
How did the soviet troops in the Rzhev non-kessel manage to withdraw?


Check the map, look at distances and what formations you're talking about, you tell me:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... yphoon.jpg
How did they manage their 1942 operation, when November was positive temperatures throughout?
Not relevant to Typhoon
OKH declared a halt to all offensive movement on 31 Oct due to the mud, that was in effect until the ground froze. In the weeks leading up to that the logistical situation on the MSRs was almost impossible.
?That would be quite big news. Any evidence on this "Halt Order"?
Seriously??? Apparently you are out of your depth here... For easy internet accessibility: http://gutenberg.us/articles/Battle_of_ ... te_note-48

"On 31 October, the OKH ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided. "
"From 31 October – 15 November, the Wehrmacht high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive towards Moscow."
"By 15 November 1941, the ground had finally frozen, solving the mud problem."

There are numerous sources that go into great detail about this specific period, I suggest you look into one.
Very nice photo, BTW. But you know who had to deal with that mud? RKKA.
Sure, with less motorization, native horses and wagons/carts, a railnet, prepared Army supply depots and workshops, just to name a few advantages that their logistics community had over the Germans...
Who was falling back on their main logistical hub, the Soviets or the Germans?

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#117

Post by BDV » 16 Jan 2016, 13:58

Appleknocker27 wrote: All this whining about mud does not answer the questions I already raised.

Whining?
of the German generals. You may take their complaints at face value. I find THEIR "explanations" risible.

How did Manstein's infantry Army and Romanian infantry get to cross the entirety of Crimea?
Probably because the average winter temp is 31 degrees and the average rainfall is about 15 inches leaving the area trafficable all year.


What does the average winter temperature have to do with Rasputitsa? Please note the geographic and climatic closeness of Crimea and Taganrog Oblast.

How did the Germans manage to get to Tikhvin?!

By their fingernails and held it for 30 days before being ejected since they couldn't get adequate supplies forward due to the weather.
But Russians could? Not only the supplies, but troops, too? December 9 was long after Rasputitsa had ended.

How did Kleist manage to take Rostov?

By defeating the Soviet 12th Army in fair weather, then the rains came. The Soviets pulled back to Rostov, the Germans actually lost contact and it still took them 4 weeks to cover 100 miles in the mud without enemy resistance.
And that "explanation" does not bother you in any way? Especially given what horse-drawn infantry immediately to the South was able to do?

How did the soviet troops in the Rzhev non-kessel manage to withdraw?

what formations you're talking about
22nd, 29th, and elements of 30th and 31st. See map.. And check the book I posted.

How did they manage their 1942 operation, when November was positive temperatures throughout?
Not relevant to Typhoon
Plenty relevant to operations in November, though.
For easy internet accessibility: http://gutenberg.us/articles/Battle_of_ ... te_note-48

"On 31 October, the OKH ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided. "
"From 31 October – 15 November, the Wehrmacht high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive towards Moscow."
"By 15 November 1941, the ground had finally frozen, solving the mud problem."

There are numerous sources that go into great detail about this specific period, I suggest you look into one.
"All offensive operations" in what theater? What did the order actually SAY? Who signed the order?


P.S. To channel ljadw:
It is not true that if there would be no mud the Soviets would be defeated. If there would be no mud, Soviets would defend differently.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#118

Post by ljadw » 16 Jan 2016, 18:16

The Soviets were not defeated in the summer,when there was no mud, thus the mud can not be used for the failure of the Germans to defeat the Soviets .Besides, the mud did not stop the Germans: the Germans were stopped by the Soviets .

Of course, some people will argue that there was only mud on the German side. :P

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#119

Post by Appleknocker27 » 21 Jan 2016, 22:22

ljadw wrote:The Soviets were not defeated in the summer,when there was no mud, thus the mud can not be used for the failure of the Germans to defeat the Soviets .Besides, the mud did not stop the Germans: the Germans were stopped by the Soviets .

Of course, some people will argue that there was only mud on the German side. :P
A simpleton answer that you continue to offer up...

The Soviet plan for defensive operations in the case of a German attack was defeated in detail during the summer and the Red Army formations making up that plan in the Western Districts were destroyed almost entirely. What followed was not forseen, not planned for and was a matter of improvization due to circumstance (which is the key here);
Circumstance-
1. A condition or fact attending an event and having some bearing on it; a determining or modifying factor.
2. The sum of determining factors beyond willful control

When Typhoon was launched, circumstance in the form of weather intervened, this is undeniable. What is the definition of circumstance? Is weather predictable?

Offensive operational phases are exploitation, pursuit, and destruction of the enemy in order to break the opponent’s will for organized resistance. Weather created unforseen circumstances that prevented the pursuit phase, an undeniable fact of the campaign... The obvious issue here is that in fair weather at this time German offensive capabilities far outstripped Red Army defensive capabilities at the critical juncture of Typhoon when the rains came. The mud denied the Germans operational freedom that was required for the pursuit phase of the operation and to complete their task. In fair weather the Red Army lacked the strength to resist the German offensive, in the mud with greatly reduced mobility they did have the strength relative to the Germans. This is obviously not what you want to hear and you've never acknowledged it in the last 10-12 years. The Red Army was saved by the rains, its a provable fact regardless of semantic twisting.
To be clear, this thread is based on a hypothetical situation where the Germans start a month early, which we all know to be not possible. My point is merely that the Wehrmacht had the Red Army on the ropes ready for the knockout when the rains came and saved them just like a bell ending the round.

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#120

Post by Appleknocker27 » 21 Jan 2016, 22:42

BDV wrote:
Appleknocker27 wrote: All this whining about mud does not answer the questions I already raised.

Whining?
of the German generals. You may take their complaints at face value. I find THEIR "explanations" risible.
Fair enough... However, don't assume that I take explanations at face value. I analyze the explanations based on the verifiable facts, based on personal experience as a staff officer and filter it through common sense derived there from. If it sounds plausible and is consistent with facts and my own experience, I'll buy it.
How did Manstein's infantry Army and Romanian infantry get to cross the entirety of Crimea?
Probably because the average winter temp is 31 degrees and the average rainfall is about 15 inches leaving the area trafficable all year.


What does the average winter temperature have to do with Rasputitsa? Please note the geographic and climatic closeness of Crimea and Taganrog Oblast.
Please note the average rainfall and that Crimea is coastal and/or mountain/hills (different ground, less rain and better drainage).
How did the Germans manage to get to Tikhvin?!

By their fingernails and held it for 30 days before being ejected since they couldn't get adequate supplies forward due to the weather.
But Russians could? Not only the supplies, but troops, too? December 9 was long after Rasputitsa had ended.
Yes, understandable all things considered and no surprise here. The Soviets faced different circumstances and had different strengths.
How did Kleist manage to take Rostov?

By defeating the Soviet 12th Army in fair weather, then the rains came. The Soviets pulled back to Rostov, the Germans actually lost contact and it still took them 4 weeks to cover 100 miles in the mud without enemy resistance.
And that "explanation" does not bother you in any way? Especially given what horse-drawn infantry immediately to the South was able to do?
No, 30 days to move forces that large, that far cross-country in miserable conditions about 100 miles sounds perfectly fair.
How did the soviet troops in the Rzhev non-kessel manage to withdraw?

what formations you're talking about
22nd, 29th, and elements of 30th and 31st. See map.. And check the book I posted.
Moved on foot, piecemeal, sans heavy equipment? A retreat away from contact, towards supply centers, etc. is quite different than an attack over ever increasing supply lines that have to accomodate heavy traffic back and forth (as opposed to one way, once).
How did they manage their 1942 operation, when November was positive temperatures throughout?
Not relevant to Typhoon
Plenty relevant to operations in November, though.
Disagree, different set of circumstances...
For easy internet accessibility: http://gutenberg.us/articles/Battle_of_ ... te_note-48

"On 31 October, the OKH ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided. "
"From 31 October – 15 November, the Wehrmacht high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive towards Moscow."
"By 15 November 1941, the ground had finally frozen, solving the mud problem."

There are numerous sources that go into great detail about this specific period, I suggest you look into one.
"All offensive operations" in what theater? What did the order actually SAY? Who signed the order?
AGC, as ordered by von Bock per Halder's request.

P.S. To channel ljadw:
It is not true that if there would be no mud the Soviets would be defeated. If there would be no mud, Soviets would defend differently.
Sure, if you ignore that in fair weather the Soviet requirement for forces goes up exponentially in order to compensate for the German advantage in mobility. The Soviets had few forces left when the rains came, in dry weather they would have been overwhelmed by German mobile manuever forces. The main reason being that dry weather allows 2wd supply trucks to range much further, much faster and much easier (less breakdowns/maintenance) which enables the manuever elements to increase operational speed and combat power and gain full freedom of action.

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