Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[ljadw]

The Soviets were not defeated in the summer,when there was no mud, thus the mud can not be used for the failure of the Germans to defeat the Soviets .Besides, the mud did not stop the Germans: the Germans were stopped by the Soviets .

Of course, some people will argue that there was only mud on the German side.

A simpleton answer that you continue to offer up...

The Soviet plan for defensive operations in the case of a German attack was defeated in detail during the summer and the Red Army formations making up that plan in the Western Districts were destroyed almost entirely. What followed was not forseen, not planned for and was a matter of improvization due to circumstance (which is the key here);
Circumstance-
1. A condition or fact attending an event and having some bearing on it; a determining or modifying factor.
2. The sum of determining factors beyond willful control

When Typhoon was launched, circumstance in the form of weather intervened, this is undeniable. What is the definition of circumstance? Is weather predictable?

Offensive operational phases are exploitation, pursuit, and destruction of the enemy in order to break the opponent’s will for organized resistance. Weather created unforseen circumstances that prevented the pursuit phase, an undeniable fact of the campaign... The obvious issue here is that in fair weather at this time German offensive capabilities far outstripped Red Army defensive capabilities at the critical juncture of Typhoon when the rains came. The mud denied the Germans operational freedom that was required for the pursuit phase of the operation and to complete their task. In fair weather the Red Army lacked the strength to resist the German offensive, in the mud with greatly reduced mobility they did have the strength relative to the Germans. This is obviously not what you want to hear and you've never acknowledged it in the last 10-12 years. The Red Army was saved by the rains, its a provable fact regardless of semantic twisting.
To be clear, this thread is based on a hypothetical situation where the Germans start a month early, which we all know to be not possible. My point is merely that the Wehrmacht had the Red Army on the ropes ready for the knockout when the rains came and saved them just like a bell ending the round.

This is wrong :
1) The SU was not defeated in the summer : if it was defeated in the summer, why was Typhoon needed ?

2) There is no proof that a successful Typhoon would have resulted in the collaps of the SU

3) There is no proof that without the rain Typhoon would be successful

4) Success of Typhoon was founded on the assumption (necessity ) that the SU hah only small forces available to defend Moscow : Briansk/Viazma proved the opposite and the failure of Typhoon .

PS : the rain was predictable = every German meteorologist knew that the rasputitza was arriving .Thus weather did not create unforseen circumstances that prevented the pursuit .

If the Soviets were defeated, the rasputitza would not stop the Germans .The Germans were stopped by the Soviets .After B + V the Soviet defensive capacity was still stronger than the German offensive capacity .

[ljadw]

The German advantage in mobility is a myth . It took the Germans 5 months to go to the gates of Moscow :the daily average advance was 7 km .

The success of Barbarossa was founded on the possibility to defeat the Soviet Army on the border,which would result in the collaps of the Soviet regime . This did not happen and at the end of july 1941 all chances to defeat the SU had disappeared .

All the rest : there was mud on our side, it was winter on our side, there was Hitler on our side, we had no Lend Lease, are all ridiculous excuses to hide the fact that the Germans were defeated by the Soviets .

[Max Payload]

4) Success of Typhoon was founded on the assumption (necessity ) that the SU hah only small forces available to defend Moscow : Briansk/Viazma proved the opposite and the failure of Typhoon .

Yet on 13 January you stated that, "Moscow was NOT the aim of Typhoon : the aim of Typhoon was to destroy what the Germans expected to be the remainings of the Red Army."
By this I assume you mean the Red Army on the Moscow axis.
Unless you are suggesting that the V/B encirclement and destruction of the central and second echelon armies of Western/Reserve Fronts was somehow unsuccessful, then based on your definition of objectives, in what sense was Typhoon a failure?
To quote Lev Lopukhovsky (The Viaz'ma Catastrophe) "In the second ten days of October, almost every route leading into the country's deep interior was open." Even what you suggest was a secondary objective - that subsequently the central Army engage in, "a PURSUIT IN THE DIRECTION OF Moscow" - was accomplished.
As for assertion that the Germans had assumed only "small forces [were] available to defend Moscow", if you are referring to the initial Typhoon planning, by the end of September OKH had correctly identified eleven of the fourteen Soviet armies arrayed between Second and Third Panzer Groups on the Moscow axis.

Typhoon failed because the Germans exhausted themselves trying to achieve the operation's ultimate objective - taking Moscow. And that failure was largely due to the weather, slowing the advance and constraining it to predictable axes of advance, and allowing Stavka time to organise a credible defence of the approaches to the capital while turning the city itself into a fortress.

[MarkN]

Nazi Germany was beaten by its own hubris. Its leaders' inability to comprehend that their military, however successful it had been up until that point, was incapable of fulfilling their Nazi political and social policy. Barbarossa was never envisioned to completely defeat the Russians; it was assumed that they would 'win' enough to create a future status quo that they could control. A status quo that required 60 divisions as a border force and a large airfleet constantly bombing Russian targets not under their control.

They didn't get close to achieving that. Rain, mud, snow, Greece and Yugoslavia had no effect on the overall outcome. At best, they merely contributed to a thousand other factors that, combined, determined where on the map the Germans ground to a halt.

[ljadw]

4) Success of Typhoon was founded on the assumption (necessity ) that the SU hah only small forces available to defend Moscow : Briansk/Viazma proved the opposite and the failure of Typhoon .

Yet on 13 January you stated that, "Moscow was NOT the aim of Typhoon : the aim of Typhoon was to destroy what the Germans expected to be the remainings of the Red Army."
By this I assume you mean the Red Army on the Moscow axis.
Unless you are suggesting that the V/B encirclement and destruction of the central and second echelon armies of Western/Reserve Fronts was somehow unsuccessful, then based on your definition of objectives, in what sense was Typhoon a failure?
To quote Lev Lopukhovsky (The Viaz'ma Catastrophe) "In the second ten days of October, almost every route leading into the country's deep interior was open." Even what you suggest was a secondary objective - that subsequently the central Army engage in, "a PURSUIT IN THE DIRECTION OF Moscow" - was accomplished.
As for assertion that the Germans had assumed only "small forces [were] available to defend Moscow", if you are referring to the initial Typhoon planning, by the end of September OKH had correctly identified eleven of the fourteen Soviet armies arrayed between Second and Third Panzer Groups on the Moscow axis.

Typhoon failed because the Germans exhausted themselves trying to achieve the operation's ultimate objective - taking Moscow. And that failure was largely due to the weather, slowing the advance and constraining it to predictable axes of advance, and allowing Stavka time to organise a credible defence of the approaches to the capital while turning the city itself into a fortress.

[ljadw]

Weisung 35 (6 september 1941) said very clearly that the aim of Typhoon was the elimination of the Soviet forces east of Smolensk. ONLY AFTER this was obtained,could AGC start its pursuit in the DIRECTION of Moscow .

The destruction of these forces would result in the collaps of the SU which would result in the capture of Moscow .

Nowhere is it indicated that the capture of Moscow was essential for the collaps of the SU .

About Lopukhovsky : that routes were (TEMPORARILY ) open does not mean that the Germans could advance unhinderedly : after V/B the Germans were still far away from Moscow and the Soviets could faster move forces to defend Moscow than the Germans could advance .

Weather does not stop an army : if the Soviets were defeated and had no more forces to defend Moscow, the mud would not have hindered the Germans .

The reality was that the Soviets had and forces to defend Moscow AND forces to start on 5 december a big counter offensive . While the Germans were on their last batallions, the Soviets were NOT on their last divisions .

[Max Payload]

Weisung 35 (6 september 1941) said very clearly that the aim of Typhoon was the elimination of the Soviet forces east of Smolensk. ONLY AFTER this was obtained,could AGC start its pursuit in the DIRECTION of Moscow .

So I ask again, if those were the limited aims, how can you claim that Typhoon was a failure?

The destruction of these forces would result in the collaps of the SU which would result in the capture of Moscow .

Nowhere is it indicated that the capture of Moscow was essential for the collaps of the SU .

Nor does Directive 35 make any reference to an assumption that the destruction of 'the Timoshenko Army Group' (Western/Reserve Fronts) would lead to a collapse of the SU. On the contrary Directive 35 goes on to state -
"4. As regards further operations, [i.e. after the defeat of the Timoshenko Army Group] it is intended that the offensive towards Moscow by Army Group Centre should be covered by a flank guard composed of available motorised forces in the Army Group South sector ... and that forces from Army Group North should be moved forward on both sides of Lake Ilmen ..."
(My emphasis)

[ljadw]

Typhoon was a failure because the Soviet forces east of Moscow were not eliminated . At the end of november,the Germans were stopped east of Moscow .

[ljadw]

Nor does Directive 35 make any reference to an assumption that the destruction of 'the Timoshenko Army Group' (Western/Reserve Fronts) would lead to a collapse of the SU. On the contrary Directive 35 goes on to state -
"4. As regards further operations, [i.e. after the defeat of the Timoshenko Army Group] it is intended that the offensive towards Moscow by Army Group Centre should be covered by a flank guard composed of available motorised forces in the Army Group South sector ... and that forces from Army Group North should be moved forward on both sides of Lake Ilmen ..."
(My emphasis)

"Offensive towards Moscow" is a wrong translation :the German text is : Verfolgung RICHTUNG Moskau = a pursuit in the direction of Moscow(not in the direction of Vologda, or in the direction of Saratov ) .The capture or conquest of Moscow was even not mentioned, because ...it was assumed that the elimination of the Soviet forces east of Moscow would result in the fall of Moscow .

Simply : after the elimination of the forces of Timochenko,AGC would advance as far as possible to the east .

[Appleknocker27]

The Soviets were not defeated in the summer,when there was no mud, thus the mud can not be used for the failure of the Germans to defeat the Soviets .Besides, the mud did not stop the Germans: the Germans were stopped by the Soviets .

Of course, some people will argue that there was only mud on the German side.

A simpleton answer that you continue to offer up...

The Soviet plan for defensive operations in the case of a German attack was defeated in detail during the summer and the Red Army formations making up that plan in the Western Districts were destroyed almost entirely. What followed was not forseen, not planned for and was a matter of improvization due to circumstance (which is the key here);
Circumstance-
1. A condition or fact attending an event and having some bearing on it; a determining or modifying factor.
2. The sum of determining factors beyond willful control

When Typhoon was launched, circumstance in the form of weather intervened, this is undeniable. What is the definition of circumstance? Is weather predictable?

Offensive operational phases are exploitation, pursuit, and destruction of the enemy in order to break the opponent’s will for organized resistance. Weather created unforseen circumstances that prevented the pursuit phase, an undeniable fact of the campaign... The obvious issue here is that in fair weather at this time German offensive capabilities far outstripped Red Army defensive capabilities at the critical juncture of Typhoon when the rains came. The mud denied the Germans operational freedom that was required for the pursuit phase of the operation and to complete their task. In fair weather the Red Army lacked the strength to resist the German offensive, in the mud with greatly reduced mobility they did have the strength relative to the Germans. This is obviously not what you want to hear and you've never acknowledged it in the last 10-12 years. The Red Army was saved by the rains, its a provable fact regardless of semantic twisting.
To be clear, this thread is based on a hypothetical situation where the Germans start a month early, which we all know to be not possible. My point is merely that the Wehrmacht had the Red Army on the ropes ready for the knockout when the rains came and saved them just like a bell ending the round.

This is wrong :
1) The SU was not defeated in the summer : if it was defeated in the summer, why was Typhoon needed ?

Honestly, are you struggling with the English language (honest question, as I understand it's not your native language) or do you deliberately dodge what was stated, observe:
"The Soviet plan for defensive operations in the case of a German attack was defeated in detail during the summer and the Red Army formations making up that plan in the Western Districts were destroyed almost entirely"
Noun in this sentence = Soviet plan, NOT SU itself. Comments???

2) There is no proof that a successful Typhoon would have resulted in the collaps of the SU

Agreed, I never stated or implied that Typhoon would have been successful in the absence of rain/mud.

3) There is no proof that without the rain Typhoon would be successful

Well, actually there is proof, proof that that the Germans would have done more damage to the Red Army, taken more territory and been more successful in the attempt to encircle Moscow. That doesn't make Typhoon successful, it just provides proof that there is no guarantee of Soviet victory either. The issue would be in doubt, thats about it.

4) Success of Typhoon was founded on the assumption (necessity ) that the SU hah only small forces available to defend Moscow : Briansk/Viazma proved the opposite and the failure of Typhoon .

No, the Germans accurately estimated the size of the Soviet forces and destroyed 41% of their combat capacity at Vyazma and Bryansk. The 59% that were left lacked adequate tanks and artillery if mobile warfare had continued. The 28 German divisions that were tied down reducing the pockets were not enough to hurt the Germans chances against the remaining Red Army in fron tof Moscow -IF- the ground remained dry and solid. The force ratio and make up greatly favored the Germans, until mobility was removed by the rains/mud. If not for the mud, the Wehrmacht would have likely destroyed most of what remained of the Red Army in front of and around Moscow.

PS : the rain was predictable = every German meteorologist knew that the rasputitza was arriving .Thus weather did not create unforseen circumstances that prevented the pursuit .

Perhaps, but German commanders as well as meteorologists could not predict how the weather would effect operations until they actually experienced a full season of it in that particular theatre. Historical data drives assumptions in military planning, at that time the only data of that nature that existed would have been from WWI when motorization was minimal.

If the Soviets were defeated, the rasputitza would not stop the Germans .The Germans were stopped by the Soviets .After B + V the Soviet defensive capacity was still stronger than the German offensive capacity.

A simpleton answer that always ends up in a circular argument.... Its semantics, spin and continues to lend nothing to the conversation IMHO.

[Appleknocker27]

Typhoon was a failure because the Soviet forces east of Moscow were not eliminated . At the end of november,the Germans were stopped east of Moscow .

You say the Soviets stopped the Germans? The Germans forces stated that they could not advance due to lack of fuel and ammunition, so that begs the question to you:
Did the Soviets stop the German supply columns, or did the rains and mud?

[ljadw]

If the enemy is defeated, rain and mud do not stop the pursuer and his supply columns ,because if the enemy is defeated ,the pursuer does not need supplies : one batallion will be sufficient,and there will always supplies for one batallion .

That the German forces stated that they could not advance due to lack of fuel and ammunition is only an excuse : they were not stopped by lack of ammunition and fuel: after the battle of Wyazma,they still advanced till they were stopped by the Soviets . You don't need ammunition to advance, nor does the infantry need fuel .

Lack of fuel and ammunition is always used as an excuse to hide a failure: Rommel was an expert in such things, as was Patton who said that the Germans were defeated,but that he could not advance to Germany because Ike had given the supplies to Montgomery .the truth wa that the Germans were not on the run in september 1944 and that after Wyazma the Soviets were not on the run .

Besides, I like to see the proofs that German supply columns (with sufficient ammunition and fuel) were waiting to advance to Moscow.

If the German infantry could advance to Moscow, the supply colums also could . If they didn't, the reason was that there were no supply columns .And if the German infantry could advance to Moscow without the aid of the supply columns, that proves that the supply columns were not indespensable .

[Appleknocker27]

If the enemy is defeated, rain and mud do not stop the pursuer and his supply columns ,because if the enemy is defeated ,the pursuer does not need supplies : one batallion will be sufficient,and there will always supplies for one batallion ..

Gross over simplification in order to distort and dumb down the tactical reality of the period in question. This is a practical issue, not one of conceptual debate of what it means to be defeated.

That the German forces stated that they could not advance due to lack of fuel and ammunition is only an excuse : they were not stopped by lack of ammunition and fuel: after the battle of Wyazma,they still advanced till they were stopped by the Soviets . You don't need ammunition to advance, nor does the infantry need fuel .

No, but if you ignore daily requirements of ammunition and fuel to complex combat formations and try to dumb it down like you did then you lose sight of the tactical reality. Does an Infantry battalion need anything other than rifle bullets? Hmmmm, how about generators to run a battalion HQ, vehicles to drag all of that equipment, trucks to bring food, fuel, ammunition, etc.? Even a leg Infantry unit has a fuel requirement to go along with its ammunition requirement. Add up all of those units and there is a minimum requirement of a Corps, an Army and an Army Group to maintain its vital functions. German supply columns were hindered by mud and could only maintain a supply level high enough to meet minimum requirements. Without the mud a higher level of supply would have been achieved, thus AGC's combat effectiveness and operational reach would be greatly enhanced and have given them a decisive edge over the Red Army. What part of that don't you understand???

Lack of fuel and ammunition is always used as an excuse to hide a failure: Rommel was an expert in such things, as was Patton who said that the Germans were defeated,but that he could not advance to Germany because Ike had given the supplies to Montgomery .the truth wa that the Germans were not on the run in september 1944 and that after Wyazma the Soviets were not on the run .

No one could have "run" in the mud that was present at that time.

Besides, I like to see the proofs that German supply columns (with sufficient ammunition and fuel) were waiting to advance to Moscow.

Read any decent book on Typhoon then...

If the German infantry could advance to Moscow, the supply colums also could . If they didn't, the reason was that there were no supply columns .And if the German infantry could advance to Moscow without the aid of the supply columns, that proves that the supply columns were not indespensable

Your "logic" is what is stuck in the mud and going no where.

[ljadw]

The Germans were strong enough for one battle,thus they risked everything on the assumption that after this battle, the SU would collaps,that Ivan was on the run : he never was .The casualty figures after Briansk and Wyazma prove that the Red Ary was not defeated after these battles . The Germans had taken a chance and they had lost . If there was no one to stop the Germans, they would have been in Moscow .

To blame the weather is tthe usual tactic of the loser,it is proving that one is a bad loser .

The Germans had enough supplies for Briansk and Wyazma, if the Soviets were defeated,they would have enough supplies to conquer Moscow,because less supplies would be needed for the mop-up . As they did not conquer Moscow, this proves that the Soviets were not defeated .

QED .

[Appleknocker27]

The Germans were strong enough for one battle,thus they risked everything on the assumption that after this battle, the SU would collaps,that Ivan was on the run : he never was .The casualty figures after Briansk and Wyazma prove that the Red Ary was not defeated after these battles . The Germans had taken a chance and they had lost . If there was no one to stop the Germans, they would have been in Moscow .

To blame the weather is tthe usual tactic of the loser,it is proving that one is a bad loser .

The Germans had enough supplies for Briansk and Wyazma, if the Soviets were defeated,they would have enough supplies to conquer Moscow,because less supplies would be needed for the mop-up . As they did not conquer Moscow, this proves that the Soviets were not defeated .

QED .

You really just don't understand Typhoon do you... When the rains came and the mud reduced the road net to an impassable morass The Red Army was reeling on its heals and the Germans were in a position for the kill. The mud reduced mobility which basically saved the Soviets since the Germans could no longer move fast enough to take advantage of the tactical situation. What part of that is so hard to grasp? As far as German supplies are concered, all motorized vehicles struggled in the mud which doubled if not tripled their fuel consumption, greatly reduced their effectiveness and hugely increased their maintenance issues which left many unservicable (a further reduction in capacity). DONT IGNORE this and simply restate your tired simpleton argument, I want to see if you have an answer for this. Address it and stop avoiding legitimate points put to you...
The end result of greatly reduced rate of supply and mobility to the German manuever units was a loss of a very favorable tactical situation as the Soviets used the time to feed more reenforcements into the area as well as dig new defensive lines.

Edit: Since you like analogies; picture two sprinters about to run a race. One is clearly much faster than the other, but now instead of a dry track they are running in a half meter of sticky mud. Now speed is not the issue, only endurance since it is so difficult to move in the mud. The connection here is that German logistics failed in the mud, while the Soviets were falling back on their main strategic logistical hub. Perhaps you can see that the rain/mud played a critical role in Soviet victory but you just choose to ignore it?