Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

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steverodgers801
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#256

Post by steverodgers801 » 02 Mar 2016, 02:37

Jdaw, the Germans had a fairy good estimate of Soviet units in the western regions, what they had no clue on was the second and third echelon troops. These were the ones that upset German planning.

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#257

Post by ljadw » 02 Mar 2016, 12:11

Yes and no : in fact more no than yes .

Glantz writes the following on P 30 of "The initial period of war on the eastern front 22 june-august 1941 ":

There was a big difference between the intelligence assessment and reality.

On P 32 : he writes that there was an overestimation of the Soviet rifle forces by 40 % and that only 20/30 % of the mechanized forces had been counted .

On P 33 :the Soviet force deployment was much deeper than the Germans expected .
This means that there were less forces on the border than expected .

There were other gaps not mentioned by Glantz

on the strength side : the existence of the "invisible " divisions

on the weakness side : the number of tanks per division (some had no tanks at all) ,shortages of ammunition, fuel, trucks, drivers ,...

One should also not exahherate the importance of the second Soviet echelon which was moving west already before 22 june : 66 divisions,including (or not ,source is vague) only 2 mechanized corps .

But one can not blame FHO for the failure of Barbarossa : if the Germans knew of the second echelon,they also would have lost .


ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#258

Post by ljadw » 02 Mar 2016, 23:07

an other exemple about the low reliability of the reports from FHO :

In "FHO :Hitler's militärische Feindaufklärung" is mentioned on P 346 note 60 the following :

"On 3 february 1941 Halder told Hitler that the SU had some 10000 tanks of low quality . Reality was that they had more than 20000,of which the T 34,which was better than the German tanks " .

The last sentence is very questionable and irrelevant , but,whatever, it proves that the Germans had no "good" picture of the Red Army . The importance of these failing informations is an other thing .

The source for the statement of Halder is his War Diary Tome 3 P 267;the same thing is mentioned by Halder in his Erinnerungen 172.

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#259

Post by Appleknocker27 » 03 Mar 2016, 20:04

ljadw wrote:an other exemple about the low reliability of the reports from FHO :

In "FHO :Hitler's militärische Feindaufklärung" is mentioned on P 346 note 60 the following :

"On 3 february 1941 Halder told Hitler that the SU had some 10000 tanks of low quality . Reality was that they had more than 20000,of which the T 34,which was better than the German tanks " .

The last sentence is very questionable and irrelevant , but,whatever, it proves that the Germans had no "good" picture of the Red Army . The importance of these failing informations is an other thing .

The source for the statement of Halder is his War Diary Tome 3 P 267;the same thing is mentioned by Halder in his Erinnerungen 172.
It remains to be seen from your post whether or not Halder said he thought the Soviets had 10,000 tanks overall or that number was present in European Russia. Your post also doesn't state how Halder arrived at the number he did. Did FHO use an accounting method that only factored modern tanks? Clearly the 23,000 Soviet tanks counted tanks that were produced many years prior and were both obsolete and NMC (non-mission capable...aka -broken-). Just because the Soviets never threw anything away doesn't mean we should blindly count the garbage as part of the effective force. Brand new Soviet tanks lacked radios, effective maintenance, trained crews and just about everything else, so why should we count obsolete and broken equipment as part of the total that the Germans should consider when contemplating combat with the Red Army???
What proof of FHO's accounting method do you have? Just a vague Halder comment? No sale...
The reality was that the Soviets had about 12,000 in the WMD, of which about 1/3 were actually capable of operations. One way or the other, Halder ended up being correct. 1/3 in running order = about 4,000 poorly led, poorly supported and poorly equipped tanks (T34/KV or other older models).

steverodgers801
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#260

Post by steverodgers801 » 03 Mar 2016, 20:14

The Soviet BT series were better then the PZ 1 and 2, and not too far behind the PZ 3,

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#261

Post by Appleknocker27 » 03 Mar 2016, 20:49

On paper, sure. When it's deployed without proper equipment, maintenance, support and a poorly trained crew led by weak leadership how good is it really?
Most BT-5's were still in the inventory and were worn out and unserviceable (like many Soviet tanks at that time), how is that superior to the Pz 1 and 2's the Germans employed for Barbarossa?

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#262

Post by ljadw » 03 Mar 2016, 21:53

Appleknocker27 wrote:
ljadw wrote:an other exemple about the low reliability of the reports from FHO :

In "FHO :Hitler's militärische Feindaufklärung" is mentioned on P 346 note 60 the following :

"On 3 february 1941 Halder told Hitler that the SU had some 10000 tanks of low quality . Reality was that they had more than 20000,of which the T 34,which was better than the German tanks " .

The last sentence is very questionable and irrelevant , but,whatever, it proves that the Germans had no "good" picture of the Red Army . The importance of these failing informations is an other thing .

The source for the statement of Halder is his War Diary Tome 3 P 267;the same thing is mentioned by Halder in his Erinnerungen 172.
It remains to be seen from your post whether or not Halder said he thought the Soviets had 10,000 tanks overall or that number was present in European Russia. Your post also doesn't state how Halder arrived at the number he did. Did FHO use an accounting method that only factored modern tanks? Clearly the 23,000 Soviet tanks counted tanks that were produced many years prior and were both obsolete and NMC (non-mission capable...aka -broken-). Just because the Soviets never threw anything away doesn't mean we should blindly count the garbage as part of the effective force. Brand new Soviet tanks lacked radios, effective maintenance, trained crews and just about everything else, so why should we count obsolete and broken equipment as part of the total that the Germans should consider when contemplating combat with the Red Army???
What proof of FHO's accounting method do you have? Just a vague Halder comment? No sale...
The reality was that the Soviets had about 12,000 in the WMD, of which about 1/3 were actually capable of operations. One way or the other, Halder ended up being correct. 1/3 in running order = about 4,000 poorly led, poorly supported and poorly equipped tanks (T34/KV or other older models).
I know all this, but the point is that German informations were not reliable . A year later even Hitler admitted (in a conversation with Mannerheim) that German intelligence was wrong .

As I already said, the importance of this failure is something else,and IMHO, it was not important . The Soviet Army was not good, worse than the Germans thought and even worse than the expectations of the Stavka .

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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#263

Post by ljadw » 03 Mar 2016, 21:58

steverodgers801 wrote:The Soviet BT series were better then the PZ 1 and 2, and not too far behind the PZ 3,
That is irrelevant : The BT series were not built to be better than a German tank, they had to be better than German ATW, they had to be that good that they could be produced on an assembly line, speed ,armament and armour had to be in agreement, etc,etc

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#264

Post by Appleknocker27 » 03 Mar 2016, 22:34

ljadw wrote: I know all this, but the point is that German informations were not reliable . A year later even Hitler admitted (in a conversation with Mannerheim) that German intelligence was wrong .
German Intel had an accurate picture at the operational level in regard to the WMD, which is what I have been saying. German Intel failed at the strategic level, which cost them the war in the East and is also what I have been saying. For Hitler to admit to Mannerheim that German Intel was wrong about the Soviet union a year later is consistent with what I've been saying all along. You have yet to prove that the Germans did not have an accurate picture of Soviet strength and dispositions in the WMD, while I have quoted and linked multiple sources that support my position.

I have stated that the Germans knew what was in the WMD and that they made a reasonable assumption that the Soviets had few forces available beyond those and it would take them a long time to mobilize their reserves. Sources I've linked state exactly this.

You state that the Germans knew the Soviets had endless reserves but chose to ignore the information, but you have yet to prove it based on sources used in proper context.
Link a source
Quote a source
Post a pic of text from a source
As I already said, the importance of this failure is something else,and IMHO, it was not important . The Soviet Army was not good, worse than the Germans thought and even worse than the expectations of the Stavka .
I agree with the second sentence.

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#265

Post by BDV » 03 Mar 2016, 23:01

ljadw wrote:The Soviet Army was [...] worse than the Germans thought
Incorrect, Germans repeatedly mis-understimated RKKA and its battle ability. Not only before June 22nd, but repeatedly after.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#266

Post by ljadw » 04 Mar 2016, 09:59

BDV wrote:
ljadw wrote:The Soviet Army was [...] worse than the Germans thought
Incorrect, Germans repeatedly mis-understimated RKKA and its battle ability. Not only before June 22nd, but repeatedly after.
No : on 22 june 1941 the Red Army was very bad, worse than the Germans thought, worse even than the Stavka dared to think .And this explains the initial German successes : several tank divisions lost the majority of their tanks before even having seen one German .

Later the Germans intentionally assumed that the Red Army's capacity was very low, because this was the only way they could win . It was so for Barbarossa, for Typhoon, for Blau .

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#267

Post by BDV » 04 Mar 2016, 19:08

ljadw wrote:BDV: Incorrect, Germans repeatedly mis-understimated RKKA and its battle ability. Not only before June 22nd, but repeatedly after.

No : on 22 june 1941 the Red Army was very bad, worse than the Germans thought, worse even than the Stavka dared to think .And this explains the initial German successes : several tank divisions lost the majority of their tanks before even having seen one German .

No, the most reasonable explanation for the July abandonment of Barbarossa planning is that the RKKA was giving more resistance than expected. When was this expectation formed? Well, not in the June 22nd to July 10th, for sure.

Now why an RKKA which was already giving more resistance than expected would falter when Wehrmacht itself spreads out its forces and separates its mass component from its strike component; that is not rational. But that's why panic and underestimation comes to mind.

Now STAVKA, which was expecting to stop the Germans at the border and throw them back to across Vistula, might have been shocked.


Later the Germans intentionally assumed that the Red Army's capacity was very low, because this was the only way they could win . It was so for Barbarossa, for Typhoon, for Blau.
My point, exactly. "Smash and grab" versions 1, 1+1/2, and 2. The goofy thing is that it was (IMO) not needed.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

steverodgers801
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#268

Post by steverodgers801 » 04 Mar 2016, 20:47

The RKKA was worse then hoped for, yet the Germans were still bleeding to death from a thousand small battles. The Germans used up their reserves of 150 k by September. Even though the PZ won great victories, the infantry could not contain all the pockets and were constantly delayed fighting in areas that they thought they already secured

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#269

Post by BDV » 04 Mar 2016, 21:07

steverodgers801 wrote:Even though the PZ won great victories, the infantry could not contain all the pockets and were constantly delayed fighting in areas that they thought they already secured
No.

This style of "it's all infantry's fault" is the type of panzerjockey talk I came to regard with great reservation.

In retrospect, the more correct interpretation of 1941 battlefield is that the panzer jockeys made time and time again a mish-mash out of good opening moves and tactical victories obtained at great price in blood. As I am reading more on Guderian's 1941 exploits it becomes apparent that the follies perpetrated by vLeeb and Hoth in the North were duplicated by AGC.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#270

Post by BDV » 07 Mar 2016, 16:33

If RKKA was worse than hoped for (by OKW) in June-July 1941:
Why was there the need for dramatic departures from the plan of operations 3 weeks into the fighting; who was keeping the german infantry from joining the armored spearheads?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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