Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[ljadw]

The fact that initially the RKKA was worse than everyone hoped/feared,was not the reason for the departures from the operational plan .
The reason was that the RKKA continued to fight after july, something the Germans feared, but could not do anything about it .

Brauchitz had said the following :

"Massive frontier battles to be expected ,duration up to four weeks,but in firther development only minor resistance is then still to be reckoned with..

Translation :
We will defeat the RKKA on the border in 4 weeks,and after this, the RKKA will collapse and it will only be a question of clean-up .

The RKKA was defeated in 4 weeks, but the SU did not give up and the Germans had to do it again, something for which they had not the strength .

I doubt that in the first 4 weeks the ID could not join the armored spearheads, and, if it happened later, it was not very important,the reason why it happened was very clear : it happened in may 1940 during the advance to Dunkirk: the infantry could not advance at the speed of the motorized units,and when Guderian complained that Kluge was to slow, Kluge replied that Guderian advanced without considering the speed of the infantry .

[BDV]

The fact that initially the RKKA was worse than everyone hoped/feared,was not the reason for the departures from the operational plan .
The reason was that the RKKA continued to fight after july, something the Germans feared, but could not do anything about it .

No, but they had no preparations for a multi-year campaign, so relied on continuous improvisation. That long war was not possible it is speculative.

If Bolshevik Russia's defeat would take 1,2, or 3 years, Nazi Germany should have ready to do that, or not start the war altogether.

The RKKA was defeated in 4 weeks, but the SU did not give up and the Germans had to do it again, something for which they had not the strength .

They did have the strength. But they never changed the strategy, going on to repeat in October the errors of July, and then again next summer.

I doubt that in the first 4 weeks the ID could not join the armored spearheads, and, if it happened later, it was not very important,the reason why it happened was very clear : it happened in may 1940 during the advance to Dunkirk: the infantry could not advance at the speed of the motorized units,and when Guderian complained that Kluge was to slow, Kluge replied that Guderian advanced without considering the speed of the infantry .

1st Infantry Corps cooperated with 41st Panzer into taking the Pskov on July 10th. At this rate of advance Moscow can be attacked on August 1st either from Konigsberg or Bialystok. It was RKKA resistance (and the fact that the infantry had very little heavy artillery as a result of the logistical trade-offs) that was the problem.

[steverodgers801]

its not about their fault, its about the missions were too much and the German lack of motorization meant the infantry couldn't keep up with the tanks, especially Guderian who thought he could march to Moscow with no assistance

[ljadw]

That Pskov was captured on 10 july does not mean at all that Moscow could be attacked on 15 august, one can not project in the future the initial rate of advance .

Besides: the strategy was NOT to attack Moscow : Moscow would fall if the Red Army had been defeated in de border battles and if this caused the collaps of the Soviet state .

It was not possible to go to Moscow (1000 km away) to defeat there the Red Army . It had to happen close to the border .

[ljadw]

its not about their fault, its about the missions were too much and the German lack of motorization meant the infantry couldn't keep up with the tanks, especially Guderian who thought he could march to Moscow with no assistance

The PzD had not enough manpower and firepower, they needed the ID ;mobility was not decisive in the east . Distance would defeat mobility, as it mostly does .

[BDV]

That Pskov was captured on 10 july does not mean at all that Moscow could be attacked on 15 august, one can not project in the future the initial rate of advance.

The reason I bring up Pskov is that without Soviet resistance battle-ready infantry could move very quickly. Axis infantry had trouble during Barbarossa due to Soviet (RKKA) resistance, not inability to march.

The armored strikes destabilized the defender, and put the RKKA individual formations in a position where defeat was certain sometime in the future, but RKKA formations refused to acknowledge that fact until actually physically destroyed; which destruction took time and blood for the Axis infantry formations. This was made worse by the fact that infantry had prepared for (light) travel, not (heavy) fighting. RKKA resistance delayed the infantry, not that infantry could not march. Infantry formations could get to Moscow in 4 weeks, with rest on Sundays!

P.S. German infantry got to Pskov, but did not get to Smolensk. That is similar distance and climate from Konigsberg to Pskov like from Bialystok to Smolensk. So unless one proposes that there was different infantry in the two army groups, the only difference is soviet resistance.

[steverodgers801]

ljadw, there were motorized infantry but far too few.

[BDV]

ljadw, there were motorized infantry but far too few.

That's why the "quick campaign" concept in the opening statement of Directive 21 is sheer lunacy, and opened the door for all kinds of shenanigans by over-promoted bootlickers.

[ljadw]

No : it was not lunacy, but necessity : quick campaign does not mean motorisation .The quick campaign did not fail because of lack of motorisation.

Even with more motorised units ,it was impossible to go to Moscow to defeat there the Soviets .

A mobile division needed 500 tons of supplies a day ,which means ,considering wear and tear ,300 trucks.The mobile division could not advance faster and farther than the supply colums, neither could do the supply columns.

If a mobile division advanced 30 km each day ,what would happen ?

Day 1 : no problem

Day 2 : trucks would need to drive 30 km X 2 = 60 km

Day 3 : trucks would need to drive 30 km X 3 = 90 km

Day 4 : trucks would need to drive 30 km X 4 = 120 km

Day 10 : 300 km .

As 60 km would be the maximum ,already after 2 days, the mobile division would be blocked and would need to wait till the supply depots could advance close enough .

The Germans knew it and looked for a solution ,which was (IF the quick campaign succeeded) that after the quick campaign,the Ostheer would stop,and light armed units would go,without fighting, by train to the AA line .

If there were more trucks, the situation would not change fundamentally :there was no way that the Ostheer could advance to the AA line,besides,there was no need .

[BDV]

No : it was not lunacy, but necessity : quick campaign does not mean motorisation .The quick campaign did not fail because of lack of motorisation.

That is not so, more motorization is able to also support more artillery, if we consider same amount of motorized infantry and armor. Then infantry can keep up with the armor much better, when facing resistance.

A mobile division needed 500 tons of supplies a day ,which means ,considering wear and tear, 300 trucks.The mobile division could not advance faster and farther than the supply colums, neither could do the supply columns.

That is, if engaged in fighting.

More motorization means more firepower available to the Axis.

[steverodgers801]

I understand that Germany couldn't motorized more, but the planned for rate of advanced could only have been accomplished by either the Soviets collapsing as hoped for or the Germans being able to advance much faster then they did. The advantage motorization would have had is allow the infantry to advance to meet the armor much faster then they could after clearing up the pockets.

[BDV]

I understand that Germany couldn't motorized more, but the planned for rate of advanced could only have been accomplished by either the Soviets collapsing as hoped for or the Germans being able to advance much faster then they did. The advantage motorization would have had is allow the infantry to advance to meet the armor much faster then they could after clearing up the pockets.

It was the fighting - not the marching - that delayed the infantry.

[ljadw]

The infantry never could go to the AA line, neither would the tanks and trucks . Distance would beat mobility in the east,as it did in the OTL .

[BDV]

The infantry never could go to the AA line, neither would the tanks and trucks . Distance would beat mobility in the east,as it did in the OTL .

Obviously, they could not get to AA without the collapse of Bolshevik State. But with light resistance German infantry covered 600 km in 3 weeks.

Allowing for 1 week of rest for each 3 weeks of advance, reaching the Archangelsk Astrakhan line is possible in 3 months of march from the starting points (Archangelsk-Samara-Astrakhan is roughly 2000 km from Kaliningrad-Bialystok-Iasi).


The only thing that can derail this plan is RKKA resistance, which was higher than anticipated by Adolf's henchmen FROM THE START, hence panzerjockeys whines about "lost victories". It's never panzerjockeys' fault...

[steverodgers801]

BDV, and exactly how were those troops to be supplied? German supply was near the breaking point in front of Moscow and you are talking in some cases as twice the distance.