Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[ljadw]

I'd say the bigger, meaner opponent. Because underdogs are never asked their opinion about.

That's not a good argument : on december 7 1941 Japan (the underdog) attacked the US and no one will say that the US were the aggressor .

[BDV]

My case was that If Romania was justified in returning lost territories by force then the Soviet Union was justified too. Lost territories meaning Bessarabia.

And if Romania was in the wrong by reason of 11 months of "lack of war", even moreso Soviet Union by reason of 24 times longer "lack of war".


However the difference between Soviet Union and Romania is even more prominent by account of Soviet Union breach of peace coming first (1940 being earlier than 1941).


Also => hilarious argument " because some victims (Ukraine, Caucasian republics) did not escape Bolshevik torment; Bessarabia/Romania should be faulted for doing so?" regarding 1918 actions.

[David Thompson]

A post from Alixanther, containing finger-wagging personal comments about another poster, was removed.

Alixanther -- It is not your place here to rebuke another member for "daring" to discuss historical events, or to reason by analogy. If you think there's something wrong with a comparison, point it out, and let it go at that. If you lose your temper, wait until you have regained your self-control before posting a response.

[BDV]

... on december 7 1941 Japan (the underdog) attacked the US and no one will say that the US were the aggressor .

OTOH, US did not strong-arm Japan in forking over a home island, or even a colony.

[David Thompson]

An off-topic post from Alixanther was removed. It contained the following:

Now, we both know what will happen next. You'll erase this post, too and accuse me of "finger-wagging" again. Since you will always erase my posts, it's your word against mine - since you're the moderator, you're always right. Thank you for putting me in my place, that's all I expect from you. Nothing more. Nothing else.

For the last ten years or more, removed posts are not "erased," but are placed in a special file in the forum, so that posters who feel that a moderator's decision is unfair or arbitrary, can appeal to Marcus Wendel personally. If you feel like doing so, step right up.

[Zinegata]

Late spring rains serves as a genuine (part) explanation as to why the start date was postponed. The Balkan adventures are more a post-failure excuse for that failure - to deflect blame away from the military itself and onto Hitler by the military themselves. In effect, one answers to a delay, the other to a consequence.

I feel that Churchill, who cited the delay as "saving" the Soviet Union in "The Second World War", was a more likely originator of the myth since he was trying to find a way to justify the whole Balkans fiasco.

[KDF33]

I've never understood why people think that 1 more month of campaigning would have defeated the Soviet Union. What prevented the Germans from defeating the Soviets in a single campaign were the tyranny of distance and their low force generation / the large Soviet force generation. IMO, it's all part of a certain viewpoint according to which the capture of specific territorial features, i.e. Moscow, would have sealed the deal. I don't see how that is the case.

Regards,

KDF

[BDV]

I've never understood why people think that 1 more month of campaigning would have defeated the Soviet Union. What prevented the Germans from defeating the Soviets in a single campaign were the tyranny of distance and their low force generation / the large Soviet force generation. IMO, it's all part of a certain viewpoint according to which the capture of specific territorial features, i.e. Moscow, would have sealed the deal. I don't see how that is the case.

The weaknesses of Unternehmen Barbarossa preparation, plan and implementation/execution are ongoing hot debate, sure. The "one trick pony" aspect is one that draws my attention the most, but opinions on which was the most glaring mistake may vary.

But with Soviet Russia obviously mobilizing for war, any single day is a day of Soviets can delay the post-DOW mobilization of workers (who can be operating a lathe/plow or holding a gun, but not both), further the military training of the conscript class, and so on. OTOH the Reich was already in a "war economy" status, so delays not as likely to help them.

[MarkN]

Late spring rains serves as a genuine (part) explanation as to why the start date was postponed. The Balkan adventures are more a post-failure excuse for that failure - to deflect blame away from the military itself and onto Hitler by the military themselves. In effect, one answers to a delay, the other to a consequence.

I feel that Churchill, who cited the delay as "saving" the Soviet Union in "The Second World War", was a more likely originator of the myth since he was trying to find a way to justify the whole Balkans fiasco.

Many people have claimed that Unternehmen Marita and "25" were the reasons why Germany failed to defeat the Soviet Union and thus ultimately lost the war. The biggest cheers for this theory flow from the Greeks and Yugoslavs themselves whenever they feel that a 'debt' needs repaying.

However, as I posted back on the first page, even the German generals who compiled the "Ostfeldzug" came round to that as a reason/excuse.

Churchill, for what it's worth, at the beginning of 1941 (maybe earlier too but that's the earliest reference I have) wrote that the war would be won by the economic and industrial might of the Empire and the US who he assumed would eventually join in. I reakon he was right. The Germans lost the war because the strategic corporal running Germany had let ideology get in the way of solid arithmetic.

[ljadw]

I've never understood why people think that 1 more month of campaigning would have defeated the Soviet Union. What prevented the Germans from defeating the Soviets in a single campaign were the tyranny of distance and their low force generation / the large Soviet force generation. IMO, it's all part of a certain viewpoint according to which the capture of specific territorial features, i.e. Moscow, would have sealed the deal. I don't see how that is the case.

The weaknesses of Unternehmen Barbarossa preparation, plan and implementation/execution are ongoing hot debate, sure. The "one trick pony" aspect is one that draws my attention the most, but opinions on which was the most glaring mistake may vary.

But with Soviet Russia obviously mobilizing for war, any single day is a day of Soviets can delay the post-DOW mobilization of workers (who can be operating a lathe/plow or holding a gun, but not both), further the military training of the conscript class, and so on. OTOH the Reich was already in a "war economy" status, so delays not as likely to help them.

The SU was not mobilizing for war .

[stg 44]

I've never understood why people think that 1 more month of campaigning would have defeated the Soviet Union. What prevented the Germans from defeating the Soviets in a single campaign were the tyranny of distance and their low force generation / the large Soviet force generation. IMO, it's all part of a certain viewpoint according to which the capture of specific territorial features, i.e. Moscow, would have sealed the deal. I don't see how that is the case.

The weaknesses of Unternehmen Barbarossa preparation, plan and implementation/execution are ongoing hot debate, sure. The "one trick pony" aspect is one that draws my attention the most, but opinions on which was the most glaring mistake may vary.

But with Soviet Russia obviously mobilizing for war, any single day is a day of Soviets can delay the post-DOW mobilization of workers (who can be operating a lathe/plow or holding a gun, but not both), further the military training of the conscript class, and so on. OTOH the Reich was already in a "war economy" status, so delays not as likely to help them.

The SU was not mobilizing for war .

They secretly mobilized 800k men in the 2nd strategic echelon, but were not mass mobilizing all their armed forces.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... eparations

] But on 22 June 1941 the first echelon only contained 171 divisions,[c] numbering 2.6–2.9 million;[2][89][90] and the second strategic echelon contained 57 divisions that were still mobilizing, most of which were still seriously understrength.[91] The second echelon was undetected by German intelligence until days after the invasion commenced, in most cases only when the German ground forces bumped into them.[91]

At the start of the invasion, the manpower of the Soviet military force that had been mobilized was 5.3–5.5 million,[2][92] and it was still increasing as the Soviet reserve force of 14 million, with at least basic military training, continued to mobilize.[93][94]

Mentioned also by Glantz here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... ode=fslv19

From last May through early June the General Staff called up for service 800,000 reservists to fill out 100 divisions and numerous fortified regions. Finally, on 14 June formations within the border military districts secretly regrouped, most into positions between 20-80 kilometers from the border. This regrouping had been only partially completed on 22 June, when German forces struck. First echelon forces of covering armies, however, were forbidden to regroup. Instead, they required special orders to occupy wartime defensive positions.38

[BDV]

The SU was not mobilizing for war .

SU was switching industrial production to armaments, building new armament production capacity, and increasing its armed forces.

Every day switching conscripts from their civilian jobs into uniforms can be delayed is a day those people can be doing work either building weapons or building weapon production capacity; which they were doing at the time under the direction of and supervised by the Bolshevik State apparatus.

[MarkN]

The SU was not mobilizing for war .

So what were they mobilizing for if not war?

[ljadw]

They were not mobilizing : they had called up 3 % of their population : not enough for an offensive strategy and even not enough for a defensive strategy .It would take them at least a year for a defensive strategy with the existing forces and several years for an offensive strategy .

They were simply increasing their manpower,understandable given the circumstances .If they had not been able to mobilize AFTER 22 june 1941,the Germans would be at the Urals .

[ljadw]

The SU was not mobilizing for war .

SU was switching industrial production to armaments, building new armament production capacity, and increasing its armed forces.

This is not mobilisation .