Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#31

Post by AJFFM » 22 Dec 2015, 21:55

MarkN wrote:
AJFFM wrote:To be fair to the Germans, those two humps were much larger than the small hump around Sedan in May 14th 1940, both of which happened around the 5th day of Operations. We all know how that turned out.

The Battle of the Dnieper was fought under different conditions and should not be compared with Kursk.
Op Citadel (can't call it the Battle of Kursk because they didn't get close) was fought under different conditions and should not be compared with Sedan. :wink:
Of course they were different, there were far more Soviet units, men and equipment deployed against the Germans than French units, men and equipment deployed in the Sedan region. The French resistance was a bit more successful in limiting the German gains.

The only difference is that while the Red army had at least 2 reserve Fronts deployed in depth, there was no depth to the French in Sedan. Once it fell as Reynaud said on May 15th, we lost the war.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#32

Post by Paul Lakowski » 22 Dec 2015, 23:38

Stalingrad feature the Soviets baiting the trap or "fixing" the German forces in Stalingrad, while they built up forces along the flanks that were stripped of axis forces until Soviets had sufficient local superiority to break through and encircle the German 6th Army.


Kursk was similar action with the Soviets baiting the trap around Kursk and building up forces along the flanks until the Germans were too invested to be able to disengage and mount any counter attack. At this point they unleashed their counter offensive.


It might be more accurate to say that the Soviets baited Hitler until his reserves were over committed and would be unable to counter attack these break through.


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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#33

Post by John Hilly » 23 Dec 2015, 17:07

The Finnish Defence Forces has at use concept of "fighting techniques", which describes lower level activity and use of troops than tactics. Perhaps this term could be used in describing German skills in use of armored units?

With best, J-P :milwink:
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#34

Post by MarkN » 23 Dec 2015, 17:51

AJFFM wrote:The only difference is that while the Red army had at least 2 reserve Fronts deployed in depth, there was no depth to the French in Sedan. Once it fell as Reynaud said on May 15th, we lost the war.
Really? The only difference?

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#35

Post by AJFFM » 23 Dec 2015, 20:46

MarkN wrote:
AJFFM wrote:The only difference is that while the Red army had at least 2 reserve Fronts deployed in depth, there was no depth to the French in Sedan. Once it fell as Reynaud said on May 15th, we lost the war.
Really? The only difference?
From a strategic PoV, yes, that was about the only major difference. Kursk was about the same size as the Battle of France albeit with less troop concentrations. Both had fixed and extremely dense defensive lines. The only difference was troop deployment. When the Germans broke through in France there was no 1914 style 6th Army in the Paris area ready to counter any penetration from the meagre German force, barely 2 Corps strong, it was empty. In 1943 the Germans in the Southern sector broke through every Soviet defensive line in the Kursk area. The only problem is the Red army had reserves, lots of them rendering any tactical breakthrough useless because the Germans had already used up all the reserves they had.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#36

Post by Paul Lakowski » 24 Dec 2015, 00:14

SO if these 6:1 kill ratio is consistent through out 1943 and probably more so in 1942 etc , why did Germany need the Panther Tiger and all the others? All it did was to force the allies to build their own heavies which they did . What did that achieved? Slow down German tank production and increase German loss rate being left behind due to maintenance etc etc.

I say to hell with Panthers and Tigers and Bears and instead develop and build thousand of the Pz IV K and the Jagd Pz-IV plus Nashorns and Hummels.

If anything the Hetzer and its Waffentragger offshoot ; should have been produced instead at the rate of 10,000 per year.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#37

Post by pintere » 24 Dec 2015, 01:07

AJFFM wrote:The correct way to compare the two is to compare the Soviet Counter-offensive against Citadel with the German offensive part in it, the second map. In that the Red Army was far more successful and demonstrated Operational and Strategic superiority.
Oh yes, of course. The battle proceeded exactly as the Russians planned it. And the comparison with the counter-offensive vs Citadel is instructive for other reasons as well. With figures from Krivosheev, the Russians lost 1,614 tanks in Citadel, 1,864 in the southern counteroffensive, and 2,586 in the northern counteroffensive (this last one had over 100% tank casualties). A total of 6,064 over a period of 50 days, or 121 every day. These are staggering losses, and confirm that even in the counteroffensive the Germans maintained their lower-level superiority. It also makes me curious as to what might have been possible if Model and Manstein were allowed to conduct defensive operations at their whim without exhausting their forces in Citadel.
John Hilly wrote:The Finnish Defence Forces has at use concept of "fighting techniques", which describes lower level activity and use of troops than tactics. Perhaps this term could be used in describing German skills in use of armored units?
That seems like a better term. Will keep in mind for future discussions.
Paul Lakowski wrote:SO if these 6:1 kill ratio is consistent through out 1943 and probably more so in 1942 etc , why did Germany need the Panther Tiger and all the others? All it did was to force the allies to build their own heavies which they did . What did that achieved? Slow down German tank production and increase German loss rate being left behind due to maintenance etc etc.

I say to hell with Panthers and Tigers and Bears and instead develop and build thousand of the Pz IV K and the Jagd Pz-IV plus Nashorns and Hummels.

If anything the Hetzer and its Waffentragger offshoot ; should have been produced instead at the rate of 10,000 per year.
I've actually already looked at that possibility elsewhere, I'll quote an excerpt from a paper I wrote that addresses that question.

"As some critics have suggested, would the resources used to build the Tiger been better used for other vehicles? The cheap and reliable Stug III, for instance, cost only about 80,000RM compared to 300,000RM for the Tiger. However, the evidence suggests such is not the case. For one, the Tiger was an excellent choice for preserving the skilled panzer crews so valuable to the German war machine. The Panzer IV was becoming increasingly vulnerable, with the soldiers of one division calling it the “moving coffin” (Jung 244). In addition, producing numerous lighter vehicles rather than one bigger one would not have helped in the long run because Germany simply did not have fuel reserves for increased numbers of lighter tanks. For example, four Stugs consuming 2.4 litres/km would end up guzzling 9.6 litres/km as opposed to the Tigers’ 4.32 litres/km. So if anything, the Tiger was more economical than larger numbers of cheaper tanks as it required less skilled crew and fuel to keep in the field."

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#38

Post by Paul Lakowski » 24 Dec 2015, 03:30

Can you link to this paper?

I have always suspected a high low mix would be better, but that would include TIGER/HETZER/HUMMEL or PANTHER/HETZER/HUMMEL and other variations. I have read Post war German generals observe that they had to fight Korps battles where front line infantry divisions had to be left to their own stripped of what ever AT/SPAT and heavy artillery, that was used to channeled the soviet break through into killing zones where their handful of panzer detachments could be mustered for counter attack.

In that situation 4 detachments of STUG III and one detachment of TIGERs would be more valuable than two detachments of TIGERs. It seemed that in their view the HUMMEL battalions would have been more valuable. In fact I got the impression that a couple of Marder battalions plus a couple of Hummel Battalions would have been better than the STUG-III detachments.

But what this does show is that defeat in the east was not determined just by tank superiority vs lack of numbers alone. The Soviets got a measure of the enemy and adjusted and tweaked ALL there forces and methods until they made it work.
Last edited by Paul Lakowski on 24 Dec 2015, 03:53, edited 4 times in total.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#39

Post by Cult Icon » 24 Dec 2015, 03:39

the condition of mobilized infantry was more important than armor at stopping their attacks towards kursk. The drawdown of firepower available (artillery and aerial bombs, etc.) was also influential.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#40

Post by MarkN » 24 Dec 2015, 11:22

AJFFM wrote:
MarkN wrote:
AJFFM wrote:The only difference is that while the Red army had at least 2 reserve Fronts deployed in depth, there was no depth to the French in Sedan. Once it fell as Reynaud said on May 15th, we lost the war.
Really? The only difference?
From a strategic PoV, yes, that was about the only major difference. Kursk was about the same size as the Battle of France albeit with less troop concentrations. Both had fixed and extremely dense defensive lines. The only difference was troop deployment. When the Germans broke through in France there was no 1914 style 6th Army in the Paris area ready to counter any penetration from the meagre German force, barely 2 Corps strong, it was empty. In 1943 the Germans in the Southern sector broke through every Soviet defensive line in the Kursk area. The only problem is the Red army had reserves, lots of them rendering any tactical breakthrough useless because the Germans had already used up all the reserves they had.
Is this meant to be a serious post based on historical facts?

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#41

Post by AJFFM » 24 Dec 2015, 18:29

MarkN wrote:
AJFFM wrote:
MarkN wrote:
AJFFM wrote:The only difference is that while the Red army had at least 2 reserve Fronts deployed in depth, there was no depth to the French in Sedan. Once it fell as Reynaud said on May 15th, we lost the war.
Really? The only difference?
From a strategic PoV, yes, that was about the only major difference. Kursk was about the same size as the Battle of France albeit with less troop concentrations. Both had fixed and extremely dense defensive lines. The only difference was troop deployment. When the Germans broke through in France there was no 1914 style 6th Army in the Paris area ready to counter any penetration from the meagre German force, barely 2 Corps strong, it was empty. In 1943 the Germans in the Southern sector broke through every Soviet defensive line in the Kursk area. The only problem is the Red army had reserves, lots of them rendering any tactical breakthrough useless because the Germans had already used up all the reserves they had.
Is this meant to be a serious post based on historical facts?
Hence the description "From a Strategic Point of View" was inserted above.

To make things clearer here is a general description and correct me if I am wrong:

Both had a salient, in France it was Belgium and in the USSR it was around Kursk.

From a geographic perspective, the area of the salient was about the same size in both, 40k sq kms.

From a defensive perspective, both had multi-echeloned defences supported by large formations of troops ready to strike against penetrations.

If you were a German how do you proceed? By outflanking the salient from the weak spots. In France it was Sedan and in Kursk it was the northern and Southern corners.

What was the result of the attacks? Breakthroughs.

What was the difference? The Red army was deployed in depth in multi-echeloned deployment while the there were no French deployments south of the Meuse-Marne-Somme line.

What was the strategic result? Tactical local German victories could not be translated into Operational ones because the success remained tactical. No major Red Army unit collapsed even the 5th tank Army which lost half its strength in 1 day remained a cohesive fighting unit. In France there was literally no one to fight after Sedan. 6th Panzer lost 40 men KIA if I am not mistaken while 1st SS Panzer lost nearly 300 KIA around the same period.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#42

Post by AJFFM » 24 Dec 2015, 18:40

pintere wrote:
AJFFM wrote:The correct way to compare the two is to compare the Soviet Counter-offensive against Citadel with the German offensive part in it, the second map. In that the Red Army was far more successful and demonstrated Operational and Strategic superiority.
Oh yes, of course. The battle proceeded exactly as the Russians planned it. And the comparison with the counter-offensive vs Citadel is instructive for other reasons as well. With figures from Krivosheev, the Russians lost 1,614 tanks in Citadel, 1,864 in the southern counteroffensive, and 2,586 in the northern counteroffensive (this last one had over 100% tank casualties). A total of 6,064 over a period of 50 days, or 121 every day. These are staggering losses, and confirm that even in the counteroffensive the Germans maintained their lower-level superiority. It also makes me curious as to what might have been possible if Model and Manstein were allowed to conduct defensive operations at their whim without exhausting their forces in Citadel.
You might be interested to know that this was about a quarter of all what the Red Army lost in 43 in about 1/8th of the year. This shows that the stavka had a much better strategic overview of the war than the German high command and that their tailored plans were superior to those of the Germans from 1943 onwards. Rather than losing my tanks and armoured support units, without which tank warfare would not happen, in piecemeal for little or no gain I would rather lose it in bulk and achieve permanent gains.

The German high command, including Hitler, knew this offensive was doomed to fail yet for some reason chose to follow through. This, more than anything else, caused the catastrophic losses in the battle of the Dnieper.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#43

Post by pintere » 24 Dec 2015, 23:54

Paul Lakowski wrote:Can you link to this paper?
I haven't uploaded that paper to the Internet, but if you send my a PM with your e-mail address I'll send you a copy of it.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#44

Post by MarkN » 25 Dec 2015, 14:44

AJFFM wrote:Hence the description "From a Strategic Point of View" was inserted above.

To make things clearer here is a general description and correct me if I am wrong:

Both had a salient, in France it was Belgium and in the USSR it was around Kursk.

From a geographic perspective, the area of the salient was about the same size in both, 40k sq kms.

From a defensive perspective, both had multi-echeloned defences supported by large formations of troops ready to strike against penetrations.

If you were a German how do you proceed? By outflanking the salient from the weak spots. In France it was Sedan and in Kursk it was the northern and Southern corners.

What was the result of the attacks? Breakthroughs.

What was the difference? The Red army was deployed in depth in multi-echeloned deployment while the there were no French deployments south of the Meuse-Marne-Somme line.

What was the strategic result? Tactical local German victories could not be translated into Operational ones because the success remained tactical. No major Red Army unit collapsed even the 5th tank Army which lost half its strength in 1 day remained a cohesive fighting unit. In France there was literally no one to fight after Sedan. 6th Panzer lost 40 men KIA if I am not mistaken while 1st SS Panzer lost nearly 300 KIA around the same period.
Wrong.

From a strategic point of view (that's what you've chosen to post about) Fall Gelb and Rot couldn't be more different to Citadel if you tried.

For starters, the objective of Citadel was to grab back a bit of fairly insignificant territory that had recently been lost to shorten the front line. Just another tactical offensive in a long list of tactical offensives.

Fall Gelb and Rot's objectives were to conquor and occupy four separate countries and to eliminate the land army of a fifth. Ie. Knock them permanently out if the war. Two of whom were major competitors/threats.

Hardly the same, is it?

And the differences keep flowing from that single strategic fact.

If you have a different undestanding of what strategic means, then perhaps it would help if you defined it first in order to at least give us an opportunity to understand what you mean even if we disagree with the terminology.

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Re: Tank Battle Analysis (Kursk) - Kill Claims, Armour Losses, and Tactical Supremacy

#45

Post by AJFFM » 25 Dec 2015, 17:18

MarkN wrote:
Wrong.
Your opinion and I respect it.
MarkN wrote: From a strategic point of view (that's what you've chosen to post about) Fall Gelb and Rot couldn't be more different to Citadel if you tried.
Fall Rot has nothing to do with what I am talking about. The Netherlands-Belgium-Northern France battles are all part of Fall Gelb.
MarkN wrote: For starters, the objective of Citadel was to grab back a bit of fairly insignificant territory that had recently been lost to shorten the front line. Just another tactical offensive in a long list of tactical offensives.
40k sq kms are not "insignificant". Kursk, in addition to being a springboard for future offensives against German position to the west, was the central hub of Soviet logistics and combat support for the battle of the Dnieper. Taking it while destroying the nearly 500k troops protecting it would have been a strategic blow to the Red Army not just because of the losses but also because it would free dozens of German divisions otherwise occupied in holding the bulge instead of fighting somewhere else.

The way to defeat the Red Army was, as in Fall Gelb, to create a strategic breakthrough behind the Soviet defensive echelon into its combat support echelon,which is least protective, and fan-out. In Fall Gelb it was the exact same thing. The thing was the existence of Soviet reserves meant the breakthrough was tactical while the absence of them in Fall Gelb made the breakthrough strategic. Hence the "Tactical Victory Strategic Defeat" Oxymoron.
MarkN wrote: Fall Gelb and Rot's objectives were to conquor and occupy four separate countries and to eliminate the land army of a fifth. Ie. Knock them permanently out if the war. Two of whom were major competitors/threats.
Again your mixing your battles and mixing Political objectives with military action. Only one county was slated for occupation, The Netherlands. Belgium in Fall Gelb was to be the seen of the feigned German offensive as well as the main battle aimed at distracting the Allied command of the real objective, outflanking the allied through the strategic breakthrough into the French rear at Sedan. The dash to the sea was not part of the battle plan.

Again, the same objective as Kursk.


MarkN wrote:
If you have a different understanding of what strategic means, then perhaps it would help if you defined it first in order to at least give us an opportunity to understand what you mean even if we disagree with the terminology.
The difference is not in understanding, it is in description. Combat on Army Group level that decisively alters the course of a war even for a short period of time (without affecting the general outcome) is what "Strategic" is all about in a military sense. Strategy in a political sense is totally different.

In this discussion Kursk and France while two different campaigns shared one strategic objective, outflanking the enemy to breakout into its rear areas. The breakthroughs were quite similar up to a certain number of days into the campaign. What differed is that the French had no reserves while the Red Army did. This is why one breakthrough with smaller forces, Sedan, was strategic and while the Breakthroughs in Kursk were Tactical.

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