Importance of Artillery

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stg 44
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Importance of Artillery

#1

Post by stg 44 » 12 Feb 2017, 19:44

I've been reading about Soviet artillery lately and came across some references to Soviet artillery being pretty bad overall due to heavy losses of trained personnel early in the war, while German artillery was much more efficient and the primary killer of Soviet troops. Apparently 70-80% of Soviet losses were due to artillery while only about 50% of German losses were to Soviet artillery. What was the difference between the two systems that resulted in such disparities? Also was the infantry gun something that was really worthwhile or would it have been better to have more regular field artillery instead?

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#2

Post by Stiltzkin » 12 Feb 2017, 20:16

This was posted a long time ago in the forums:
The Russians, like the artillerymen of the Western Powers, have always placed great emphasis on the achievement of heavy concentrations of fire as well as of weapons. But during the crucial phases of the Second World War they were unable or unready to create the sort of fire-direction system, which enabled Americans, British, and German artillery to concentrate fires of widely dispersed batteries upon a single target. Therefore, they achieved the same effect by concentrating artillery pieces. The West emphasized flexibility of fire coupled with comparatively rigid command structures. The Russians, on the other hand, combined relative inflexibility of fire with highly flexible command structures. In the US forces, the army artillery formed groups consisting of several battalions in roughly regimental or brigade strength. These groups were, however, more or less permanent organizations, which held the bulk of their firing battalions for long periods, although they were, in theory at least, ad hoc formations. The Russians also formed artillery groups for specific combat operations, but the composition of these groups was very fluid. Different groups were sometimes formed for each successive phase of a single attack operation, and in general, the detachment of battalions and batteries from the individual groups began as early as the end of the preparatory fires preceding the assault. This process of decentralization continued throughout the attack, with the result that initial artillery groups underwent a constant process of shrinkage. The Soviets found it preferable to shift pieces rather
than to shift fires in many situations. The theoretical dangers inherent in a course such as this were to a large extent cancelled by Soviet dominance in the air over the battlefield. Detailed planning at army level was another important characteristic of Soviet Artillery. Eventually, a detailed artillery fire-plan was drawn up on the basis of the information available about the enemy and the over-all Soviet attack plan. Targets were assigned to
individual batteries, battalions, or groups. Barrages were laid out and “on call” signals arranged for firing them. Especially important targets in the forward areas were singled out for destruction by direct-fire guns where possible, or by heavy concentrations of indirect fire where direct fire was not feasible. Subordinate artillery commanders were assigned portions of the fire-plan to fulfill. They were also assigned blocks of ‘empty’ concentration numbers, which they could assign to targets they wished to destroy or neutralize. But, while they could add targets to those assigned from above, they were not permitted neglect assigned targets in favor of ones they selected. They could embroider the fire-plan, but not delete anything from it.
Finally, every artillery commander was required to make a command reconnaissance of the front sector in which his units were to fire, personally observing all possible targets and explaining their duties in detail to his unit commanders and other immediate subordinates. By planning at army level, the initial phases of the artillery action in a given offensive or defensive operation, the Russians were able to reduce the chances that errors of inefficient subordinates would ruin the development of the operation at very outset. Also, meticulous and carefully integrated planning of fires reduced the initial effect of weaknesses in technique to a minimum. Another major characteristic of Soviet Artillery was the combination
of direct and indirect fires. Indirect fires of conventional artillery, mortars and rocket-launchers were employed primarily for area fire, although, in some instances destruction of point targets was ensured by sheer weight of metal. Where possible, however, the Russians preferred to utilize direct fire of individual field artillery pieces, anti-tank, or anti-aircraft guns, or even assault guns to eliminate point targets of significance.
The system worked out very well in practice; it not only reduced the effect of Soviet fire-control weaknesses, but also helped to conserve ammunition. One or two rounds from a direct-fire gun could do the work of twenty rounds fired by area weapons. It is important to note in this connection that while Russians were extremely lavish in their expenditures of ammunition whenever and wherever a main effort was being made, they were extremely parsimonious in doling out ammunition to the batteries at other times. Even as late as the autumn of 1944, the German batteries, although greatly outnumbered, often fired more rounds in a given week on the Eastern Front than did their foes – and neither expended the ammunition that American troops did. The Soviet artillery preparation for an attack became increasingly shorter as regards time and more intense as regards weight of metal
fired. Such fires sometimes lasted no more than forty minutes. No regular timetable was followed, and all sorts of ruses were employed to deceive the enemy as to the course of preparation. In many cases a lull would occur in the middle of preparation, by which the Russians hoped to lure local German reserves forward, where they would under the intensive fires of the remainder of the preparation. Another favorite trick employed by the Russians was the creation of ‘channels’ of safety in their preparatory fires by halting the fire of one or more batteries or battalions. Infantry units then advanced swiftly through these lanes to the very edge of the enemy’s position and often caught his troops still in their holes, deceived into
believing that their area was still under fire. The support of the attack phase began when the infantry assault was launched. The artillery then passed over from preparatory fire to direct support fire-which normally took the form of an accompanying rolling barrage combined with area concentrations. At this time the mortar units of infantry formations reverted to local control and some field artillery units were assigned close direct-support
missions, which called for them to follow the infantry and deliver support fires from the nearest defilade behind them. Other light artillery pieces were manhandled along with the infantry and together with the antitank guns, helped to knock out point targets. The accompanying rolling barrage consisted of a series of linear barrages spaced 50 to 100 meters apart. The barrage moved deeper into enemy position as the infantry advanced. The rolling wall of fireconformed to the enemy’s defensive system as it moved, and was subject to control by the infantry who were expected to advance closely behind it and catch the enemy still shaken and under cover. The Russians believe-with the Rangers-that it is better in the long run to suffer some casualties from their own artillery fire than to allow the enemy’s troops to recover from initial shock and disorganization resulting from the action of the Soviet artillery fires.
Once the breakthrough of the main German battle position accomplished, and Soviet operational armor was committed, the final phase of the artillery attack began. This amounted to support of the attack in the depth of the enemy position. In this phase the control of artillery was highly decentralized, with each combined arms formation commander having full control of organic and attached artillery and assault gun units.
At each chelon from regiment up, anti-tank mobile reserves of increasing strength were formed. These reserves, which were normally composed of anti-tank artillery, engineers, infantry tank-killer teams, and heavy field-pieces or assault guns, were used to break up German tank and infantry counter –attacks. Employed successfully in depth, such reserves proved their worth time and time again.


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Re: Importance of Artillery

#3

Post by Art » 12 Feb 2017, 20:22

stg 44 wrote: Apparently 70-80% of Soviet losses were due to artillery while only about 50% of German losses were to Soviet artillery.
I wonder what is the source for that. According to a Soviet medical statistics fragments of shells, mines and bombs accounted for about 50-60 % of all wounds (1st year of the war - 50.4% in the first 2nd - 54.5%, 3rd - 57.8%, 4th - 61.5%). Which leaves about 30-40% losses caused by bullets.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#4

Post by Art » 12 Feb 2017, 20:26

Stiltzkin wrote: Another favorite trick employed by the Russians was the creation of ‘channels’ of safety in their preparatory fires by halting the fire of one or more batteries or battalions. Infantry units then advanced swiftly through these lanes to the very edge of the enemy’s position and often caught his troops still in their holes, deceived into
believing that their area was still under fire.
It's curios that no Soviet document or account ever mentioned that allegedly "favorite" trick from Middeldorf. I guess that is just a myth, and I would consider the whole text above skeptically.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#5

Post by stg 44 » 12 Feb 2017, 20:52

Art wrote:
stg 44 wrote: Apparently 70-80% of Soviet losses were due to artillery while only about 50% of German losses were to Soviet artillery.
I wonder what is the source for that. According to a Soviet medical statistics fragments of shells, mines and bombs accounted for about 50-60 % of all wounds (1st year of the war - 50.4% in the first 2nd - 54.5%, 3rd - 57.8%, 4th - 61.5%). Which leaves about 30-40% losses caused by bullets.
Granted a poor source as it was not foot noted:
https://www.amazon.com/War-East-Russo-G ... 0917852001

Edit:
pardon looking back at what the source says it was that in WW1 the Allies suffered 70-80% of their casualties from artillery and in WW2 just that the majority of Soviet casualties were due to artillery, while the German suffered around 50% of their from artillery. It doesn't note where the claims on that come from, just generic sources for the chapter.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#6

Post by Stiltzkin » 12 Feb 2017, 21:01

Thats not hard to guess.
15cm s.FH 18 shell expenditure on average: 257,000 tons
10cm le.FK 18 370,000 t
These alone accounted for ca. 50% of total gun ammo expenditure during ww2, anything above 2cm.
For the Soviets it were 122, 152mm guns and 82mm mortars.
On average, Artillery inflicted more tan 60-65% of all casualties. In Attrition https://www.amazon.com/Attrition-Foreca ... 096386923X, Dupuy gives a value of 55%.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#7

Post by Art » 13 Feb 2017, 18:01

There was an older topic here:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &p=1462210
I don't remember that I've seen anything like global stats for the Wehrmacht. Muller-Hillebrand ("Spastics system) has many numbers on location and fatality of wounds, but doesn't say anything about proportion of bullet/explosive wounds, which is surprising.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#8

Post by stg 44 » 13 Feb 2017, 18:06

Art wrote:There was an older topic here:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &p=1462210
I don't remember that I've seen anything like global stats for the Wehrmacht. Muller-Hillebrand ("Spastics system) has many numbers on location and fatality of wounds, but doesn't say anything about proportion of bullet/explosive wounds, which is surprising.
Thanks for the link.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#9

Post by Stephan » 17 Feb 2017, 22:22

I had read an report from a swedish SS-officer (there werent that many) whom held the soviet 76mm field cannon in high estime. He being guest lecteur told on his lessons in the swedish officers school they handled the 76mm cannons alike virtuoses.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#10

Post by stg 44 » 18 Feb 2017, 00:09

Stephan wrote:I had read an report from a swedish SS-officer (there werent that many) whom held the soviet 76mm field cannon in high estime. He being guest lecteur told on his lessons in the swedish officers school they handled the 76mm cannons alike virtuoses.
As an indirect fire weapon or as an direct fire one?

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#11

Post by Art » 27 Feb 2017, 23:56

Just some numbers for information:

German powder production:
1939 - 53 000 tons
1940 - 75 000
1941 - 111 000
1942 - 145 000
1943 - 238 000
1944 - 258 000
1945 (Jan-Feb) - 27 000

Soviet powder production:
1939 - 51 000
1940 - 59 000
1941 (2nd half) - 43 000
1942 - 68 000
1943 - 113 000
1944 - 127 000
1945 (Jan-May) - 49 000
Total Jul 41- May 45 - 400 000 tons of powder. Also 123 000 tons Lend-lease powder received 1942-1945.

German production of explosives, tons:
1939 - 73 000
1940 - 100 000
1941 - 144 000
1942 - 161 000
1943 - 241 000
1944 - 256 000
1945 (Jan-Feb) - 20 000

Soviet production during the war - 505 000 tons (mostly TNT). Production of TNT in 1942-1944 - 273 000 tons (91 000 annual). Also 89 000 tons of TNT received from LL:
1942 - 3 500
1943 - 19 000
1944 - 61 000
Total about 105 000 tons LL explosives received during the war.

German numbers from USSBS, Soviet from Vernidub (1998), also articles by Gavrilov and Balysh

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#12

Post by Sheldrake » 28 Feb 2017, 01:33

Art wrote:Just some numbers for information:

German powder production:
1939 - 53 000 tons
1940 - 75 000
1941 - 111 000
1942 - 145 000
1943 - 238 000
1944 - 258 000
1945 (Jan-Feb) - 27 000

Soviet powder production:
1939 - 51 000
1940 - 59 000
1941 (2nd half) - 43 000
1942 - 68 000
1943 - 113 000
1944 - 127 000
1945 (Jan-May) - 49 000
Total Jul 41- May 45 - 400 000 tons of powder. Also 123 000 tons Lend-lease powder received 1942-1945.

German production of explosives, tons:
1939 - 73 000
1940 - 100 000
1941 - 144 000
1942 - 161 000
1943 - 241 000
1944 - 256 000
1945 (Jan-Feb) - 20 000

Soviet production during the war - 505 000 tons (mostly TNT). Production of TNT in 1942-1944 - 273 000 tons (91 000 annual). Also 89 000 tons of TNT received from LL:
1942 - 3 500
1943 - 19 000
1944 - 61 000
Total about 105 000 tons LL explosives received during the war.

German numbers from USSBS, Soviet from Vernidub (1998), also articles by Gavrilov and Balysh
Interesting statistics but are these comparison s on a like for like basis?

Nor does it appear to be reconciled with the balance of forces in the field.

What does "powder" mean? WW2 era artillery ammunition used more modern propellent than gunpowder

How much of the German figures was expended as flak over the Reich?

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#13

Post by stg 44 » 28 Feb 2017, 01:55

Sheldrake wrote: What does "powder" mean? WW2 era artillery ammunition used more modern propellent than gunpowder

How much of the German figures was expended as flak over the Reich?
Exactly my questions too. I mean FLAK was resulting massive artillery ammo shortages in 1944 from all the artillery stuff I've come across.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#14

Post by Cult Icon » 28 Feb 2017, 03:20

stg 44 wrote:I've been reading about Soviet artillery lately and came across some references to Soviet artillery being pretty bad overall due to heavy losses of trained personnel early in the war, while German artillery was much more efficient and the primary killer of Soviet troops. Apparently 70-80% of Soviet losses were due to artillery while only about 50% of German losses were to Soviet artillery. What was the difference between the two systems that resulted in such disparities? Also was the infantry gun something that was really worthwhile or would it have been better to have more regular field artillery instead?
I personally don't think that artillery should be compared soley on a casualty basis. It should be compared on a tactical/operational one as well. As well as doctrine.

The Soviet infantry did not have a lot of fire support. It was generally hoarded for offensives. The Soviets were the most aggressive users of infantry attacks.

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Re: Importance of Artillery

#15

Post by Cult Icon » 28 Feb 2017, 03:35

It often seems like the allies the least efficient users of artillery due to the sheer volume expended to create a casualty.

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