Greatest German victory on the Eastern front?
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Greatest German victory on the Eastern front?
[Moved from the Polls section]
I voted for Kiev.It was truly a impressing victory but it took the precious time from Germans on their drive to Moscow.
I voted for Kiev.It was truly a impressing victory but it took the precious time from Germans on their drive to Moscow.
- Musashi
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Its a very difficult choice. Kiev was the greatest victory, however Kharkov was more impressive, because the Germans overcame advantageous Soviet forces.
Last edited by Musashi on 01 Jul 2003, 16:44, edited 1 time in total.
- Benoit Douville
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Great poll! I also agree that the victory in Kharkov in 1943 was an astonishing victory if you considered the fact that the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad a month earlier and everyting seems to be lost. The Germans beat overwhelming Soviet forces. Give credit to Von Manstein for that.
It is also amazing that on the Eastern Front, the Germans were unable to capture the 3 most important cities:
-Moscow
-Leningrad
-Stalingrad
It is also amazing that on the Eastern Front, the Germans were unable to capture the 3 most important cities:
-Moscow
-Leningrad
-Stalingrad
- Oleg Grigoryev
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Germans had significant numerical advanate in battle of Khaekov in 1943 - there is nothing super-duper about beating overextnedes spreadheads that were at the end of their run anyway.Benoit Douville wrote:Great poll! I also agree that the victory in Kharkov in 1943 was an astonishing victory if you considered the fact that the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad a month earlier and everyting seems to be lost. The Germans beat overwhelming Soviet forces. Give credit to Von Manstein for that.
It is also amazing that on the Eastern Front, the Germans were unable to capture the 3 most important cities:
-Moscow
-Leningrad
-Stalingrad
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/battles.htmRussia
Kharkov February 16 - March 15, 1943 Germany vs. Russia 350 German tanks
250 Russian tanks
But the timing of the victory was very significant. Coming on the heals of Stalingrad, German desperately needed a victory to regain its lost prestige and rejuevinate German morale (which was devestated after the fall of Stalingrad).oleg wrote:Germans had significant numerical advanate in battle of Khaekov in 1943 - there is nothing super-duper about beating overextnedes spreadheads that were at the end of their run anyway.Benoit Douville wrote:Great poll! I also agree that the victory in Kharkov in 1943 was an astonishing victory if you considered the fact that the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad a month earlier and everyting seems to be lost. The Germans beat overwhelming Soviet forces. Give credit to Von Manstein for that.
It is also amazing that on the Eastern Front, the Germans were unable to capture the 3 most important cities:
-Moscow
-Leningrad
-Stalingrad
Althought I agree this was not a tremendous military victory, I would rank it as one of the most significant morale victories for the Germans. (Just think, without this victory, it is doubtful Kursk would have taken place).
- Redbaron1908
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- Major Linden
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Not so amazing when you consider that none of the cities were ever given much priority until late in their respective campaigns.Benoit Douville wrote:It is also amazing that on the Eastern Front, the Germans were unable to capture the 3 most important cities:
-Moscow
-Leningrad
-Stalingrad
Hitler even went so far as to declare Moscow irrelevant (largely based on the fact that Napoleon had suffered bitter defeat even after taking the capitol).
Clearly the plan was to encircle and destroy the Red Army as far west as possible, rather than drive toward and capture "the 3 most important cities."
This being the case, I don`t consider it all that surprising that the Germans never took any of the 'big three'. (Especially as Barbarossa allowed the enemy ample opportunity to mobilize their vast reserves of manpower; just in time to check the final German surge).
Regards,
The Major
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Here is a depiction of the battle of Kerch, but through a Romanian perspective (I already had this written so it was easier to copy and paste ) so search the web for a German perspective.
Gen. Wolfram von Richtofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII was assigned to support von Manstein's future offensive in the Kerch Peninsula: Operation "Trappenjagd" (Bustard hunt). For this the 11th Army deployed 3 corps in the Parpach Isthmus: from north to south the 7th Romanian Corps (19th Infantry Division and 8th Cavalry Division), the 42nd Corps (46th and 50th Infantry Division) and the 30th Corps (132nd Infantry Division, 28th Light Division and 170th Infantry Division). The reserve was made up of the 22nd Panzer Division, the "Groddek" Motorized Brigade and 3 German infantry regiments. The "Groddek" Brigade was an ad-hoc unit, which contained the few motorized formations of the 11th Army. Its the main unit was the "Korne" Detachment (2 motorized cavalry regiments). It also contained the German 22nd Recon Group, the 6th Company from the Brandenburg Regiment and the 560th AT Company. This unit will play a very important part in the coming offensive.
The Crimean Front had at its disposal 3 armies: 44th, 47th and 51st, totaling 17 infantry divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 4 tank brigades and 1 cavalry brigade. The VVS forces that supported them had 176 fighters and 225 bombers, but the majority of obsolete types.
According Gen. Erich von Manstein's plan the 7th and 42nd Corps had to tie down the Soviet forces in the northern sector, while the 30th Corps and the 22nd Panzer Division broke the front in the south and swept towards north, trying to encircle the Soviet forces. The "Groddek" Brigade was supposed to secure the 30th Corps’ flank by advancing as quickly as possible towards Kerch and preventing the Soviets from creating a new defensive line. This plan was favored by the fact that the Crimean Front had concentrated most of its troops in the northern part, because it expected an attack aimed at recovering the terrain lost in early March, by the 18th Infantry Division.
The assault was launched early in the morning of 8 May, with devastating air attacks. The 30th Corps penetrated the Soviet defenses and, through the breach, the "Groddek" Brigade began its advance east and reached Kipchak by nightfall. However, in the evening, the weather conditions worsened and the roads became quagmires, making the advance, but also the retreat, difficult. The rain stopped the second day at noon, so the brigade wasn’t able to move too much, but reinforced its forward positions at Bikech and Chenkishel. On 11 May, the Axis troops in Bikech were attacked by Soviet forces, which were trying to get to Saraymin, but were repulsed. The advance was resumed and they soon reached Saraymin, which they tried to take, but failed. Col. Korne was lightly wounded in the action. The brigade took defensive positions near the city, so that it could control the traffic on the Saraymin-Kerch highway. The following days the retreating Soviet forces tried desperately to fight their way to Kerch, but every attack was repulsed. If they had succeeded a large part of the Red Army troops that were captured, would have escaped. During the afternoon of 13 May, a part of the brigade was left to defend the positions near Saraymin, while another part continued the advance to Kerch through Ortaely, which was reached later that day. The assault on this final strongpoint was carried out during the morning of 14 May, under the command of Col. Korne, the new commander of the brigade (Col. Groddek was severely wounded that day and had to be evacuated; he died a few days later). There were few losses, mainly because of the accuracy of the artillery fire and of a Romanian squadron from the 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment, which managed to go around the Soviet defenders and attack them from behind. A few hours later, the "Groddek" Brigade linked with the 132nd Infantry Division at Kamish Burun, a few kilometers south of Kerch. The brigade’s rapid advance “prevented the enemy’s attempts to form a new front behind the existing one”, as von Manstein wrote in his memoirs. This was crucial for the outcome of the battle. He then praises Col. Groddek and mentions the fact that the brigade also had Romanian forces, but doesn’t say that they were in fact the majority. That would probably contradict his previous statements of the “limited offensive potential” of the Romanian units.
The 7th Romanian Corps had the task of simulating attacks in the first days of the offensive, in order to deceive the Soviets and make them think that the assault in the southern part of the front was not the main offensive. As the operation progressed, the corps received the order to start the actual attack on 10 May, but because of the weather, it was postponed with one day. In the morning of 11 May, the 19th Infantry Division and 8th Cavalry Division started to advance after 30 minutes of artillery bombardments. By nightfall they had reached Djantora. During the night the 8th Cavalry Division was pulled out of the front line and sent into the southern sector, where its mobility was better used. Its place was taken by 19th Light Infantry Battalion, from the corps reserves. The next day, the division assaulted the city and by 5:30 it had fallen into Romanian hands. The day's objective, Arabat, was taken only two and a half hours later. The advance continued towards Ak Monay, contributing to its fall to the 28th Light Division. From 13 May, the Soviets were on the retreat and the pursuit started. It ended in the evening of 15 May, when the 19th Recon Group and two platoons from the 94th Infantry Regiment captured the Mama Ruskaya port and taken 3000 prisoners.
The 8th Cavalry Division was assigned to the 30th Corps on 12 May. It was then used to destroy pockets of resistance on the southern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. On 16 May it received the "Korne" Detachment, because the "Groddek" Brigade was disbanded, and was assigned to the defense of the coast south of Kerch.
Operation "Trappenjagd" was a total success. The Red Army lost 162,282 soldiers (dead and prisoners), almost all the heavy weapons and equipment and 417 airplanes.
Gen. Wolfram von Richtofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII was assigned to support von Manstein's future offensive in the Kerch Peninsula: Operation "Trappenjagd" (Bustard hunt). For this the 11th Army deployed 3 corps in the Parpach Isthmus: from north to south the 7th Romanian Corps (19th Infantry Division and 8th Cavalry Division), the 42nd Corps (46th and 50th Infantry Division) and the 30th Corps (132nd Infantry Division, 28th Light Division and 170th Infantry Division). The reserve was made up of the 22nd Panzer Division, the "Groddek" Motorized Brigade and 3 German infantry regiments. The "Groddek" Brigade was an ad-hoc unit, which contained the few motorized formations of the 11th Army. Its the main unit was the "Korne" Detachment (2 motorized cavalry regiments). It also contained the German 22nd Recon Group, the 6th Company from the Brandenburg Regiment and the 560th AT Company. This unit will play a very important part in the coming offensive.
The Crimean Front had at its disposal 3 armies: 44th, 47th and 51st, totaling 17 infantry divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 4 tank brigades and 1 cavalry brigade. The VVS forces that supported them had 176 fighters and 225 bombers, but the majority of obsolete types.
According Gen. Erich von Manstein's plan the 7th and 42nd Corps had to tie down the Soviet forces in the northern sector, while the 30th Corps and the 22nd Panzer Division broke the front in the south and swept towards north, trying to encircle the Soviet forces. The "Groddek" Brigade was supposed to secure the 30th Corps’ flank by advancing as quickly as possible towards Kerch and preventing the Soviets from creating a new defensive line. This plan was favored by the fact that the Crimean Front had concentrated most of its troops in the northern part, because it expected an attack aimed at recovering the terrain lost in early March, by the 18th Infantry Division.
The assault was launched early in the morning of 8 May, with devastating air attacks. The 30th Corps penetrated the Soviet defenses and, through the breach, the "Groddek" Brigade began its advance east and reached Kipchak by nightfall. However, in the evening, the weather conditions worsened and the roads became quagmires, making the advance, but also the retreat, difficult. The rain stopped the second day at noon, so the brigade wasn’t able to move too much, but reinforced its forward positions at Bikech and Chenkishel. On 11 May, the Axis troops in Bikech were attacked by Soviet forces, which were trying to get to Saraymin, but were repulsed. The advance was resumed and they soon reached Saraymin, which they tried to take, but failed. Col. Korne was lightly wounded in the action. The brigade took defensive positions near the city, so that it could control the traffic on the Saraymin-Kerch highway. The following days the retreating Soviet forces tried desperately to fight their way to Kerch, but every attack was repulsed. If they had succeeded a large part of the Red Army troops that were captured, would have escaped. During the afternoon of 13 May, a part of the brigade was left to defend the positions near Saraymin, while another part continued the advance to Kerch through Ortaely, which was reached later that day. The assault on this final strongpoint was carried out during the morning of 14 May, under the command of Col. Korne, the new commander of the brigade (Col. Groddek was severely wounded that day and had to be evacuated; he died a few days later). There were few losses, mainly because of the accuracy of the artillery fire and of a Romanian squadron from the 10th Motorized Rosiori Regiment, which managed to go around the Soviet defenders and attack them from behind. A few hours later, the "Groddek" Brigade linked with the 132nd Infantry Division at Kamish Burun, a few kilometers south of Kerch. The brigade’s rapid advance “prevented the enemy’s attempts to form a new front behind the existing one”, as von Manstein wrote in his memoirs. This was crucial for the outcome of the battle. He then praises Col. Groddek and mentions the fact that the brigade also had Romanian forces, but doesn’t say that they were in fact the majority. That would probably contradict his previous statements of the “limited offensive potential” of the Romanian units.
The 7th Romanian Corps had the task of simulating attacks in the first days of the offensive, in order to deceive the Soviets and make them think that the assault in the southern part of the front was not the main offensive. As the operation progressed, the corps received the order to start the actual attack on 10 May, but because of the weather, it was postponed with one day. In the morning of 11 May, the 19th Infantry Division and 8th Cavalry Division started to advance after 30 minutes of artillery bombardments. By nightfall they had reached Djantora. During the night the 8th Cavalry Division was pulled out of the front line and sent into the southern sector, where its mobility was better used. Its place was taken by 19th Light Infantry Battalion, from the corps reserves. The next day, the division assaulted the city and by 5:30 it had fallen into Romanian hands. The day's objective, Arabat, was taken only two and a half hours later. The advance continued towards Ak Monay, contributing to its fall to the 28th Light Division. From 13 May, the Soviets were on the retreat and the pursuit started. It ended in the evening of 15 May, when the 19th Recon Group and two platoons from the 94th Infantry Regiment captured the Mama Ruskaya port and taken 3000 prisoners.
The 8th Cavalry Division was assigned to the 30th Corps on 12 May. It was then used to destroy pockets of resistance on the southern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. On 16 May it received the "Korne" Detachment, because the "Groddek" Brigade was disbanded, and was assigned to the defense of the coast south of Kerch.
Operation "Trappenjagd" was a total success. The Red Army lost 162,282 soldiers (dead and prisoners), almost all the heavy weapons and equipment and 417 airplanes.
But that wasn't one of the choicesVictor wrote:Well the battle of Kerch in May 1942, may very well be a "rival" for Sevastopol.Sam H. wrote:Sevastopol(1942)
With what Manstien had to work with, he did a hell of a job and proved that he belonged with the elite of the German generals.
Ok, I'll give Kerch its due ... also a grand victory
Re: Greatest German victory on the Eastern front?
Regarding the battle of Kerch, Soviet failure was caused by panic among its troop when their southern defence was broken by German and the rear of 44th Army was attacked by 902nd Assault group formed by German 132. infanterie division further caused panic in Soviet 44th Army. Then German used its only Panzer unit : 22. Panzer Division to swing north to cut off the LOC of Soviet 51st Army.
Perhap, the troop from Crimean Front was inequate as German neither had superiority in manpower nor did she had an edge in panzer. Given relative less manpower, I don't know how can destroy 51st Army. Soviet troop had 41 x KV- 1 tanks which 22. Panzer divsion rarely had tank match to this monster.
For 51st Army, it was annhilation battle, but for the whole Crimean Front, it was not. Crimean Front had over 270,000 men and about 110,000 had been evacuated to Taman Peninsula.
Perhap, the troop from Crimean Front was inequate as German neither had superiority in manpower nor did she had an edge in panzer. Given relative less manpower, I don't know how can destroy 51st Army. Soviet troop had 41 x KV- 1 tanks which 22. Panzer divsion rarely had tank match to this monster.
For 51st Army, it was annhilation battle, but for the whole Crimean Front, it was not. Crimean Front had over 270,000 men and about 110,000 had been evacuated to Taman Peninsula.