"Quantity has a quality all of its own".
Was this comment by Stalin after Kursk in 1943 an oversimplification as to why Germany lost WW2?
Why did Germany lose the war on the Eastern front?
More or less. Stalin realized that all he had to do the defeat the Germans after Kursk was to take it slow and let his overwhelming numerical superiority do the rest.
Once he had sufficiently drained the German's of their experienced front line troops and canceled out most of their tanks with 2-3 times the same number of his own he could then make real progress and move from operational warfare (attacking a specific area and advancing the front line by a few kilometres) to real mechanized warfare (deep penetrations and encirclements).
With the germans fighting on 2 front up until 44, then 3 fronts after that, the Soviet tanks and personelle superiority would ensure that even the most skilled Soldiers and Tankers could hardly make a dent in the Soviet resolve.
Stalin probably saw it like this. Even the world's greatest boxer can be taken out by a few guys who are properly motivated.
Once he had sufficiently drained the German's of their experienced front line troops and canceled out most of their tanks with 2-3 times the same number of his own he could then make real progress and move from operational warfare (attacking a specific area and advancing the front line by a few kilometres) to real mechanized warfare (deep penetrations and encirclements).
With the germans fighting on 2 front up until 44, then 3 fronts after that, the Soviet tanks and personelle superiority would ensure that even the most skilled Soldiers and Tankers could hardly make a dent in the Soviet resolve.
Stalin probably saw it like this. Even the world's greatest boxer can be taken out by a few guys who are properly motivated.
Hitler forgot two important rules that history had shown
1 Dont fight a war on two fronts at the same time
2 Remember the size of Russia, eventually you will outrun your supplies.
Hitler could not make up his mind as to which he wanted first, Moscow, Leningrad or Stalingrad and he virtually tried to take all three virtually at the same time
Philmil
1 Dont fight a war on two fronts at the same time
2 Remember the size of Russia, eventually you will outrun your supplies.
Hitler could not make up his mind as to which he wanted first, Moscow, Leningrad or Stalingrad and he virtually tried to take all three virtually at the same time
Philmil
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UnterKroon
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I think that the start of defeat was taken place in Stalingrad. When the russia winter came germans did not have winter equipment but Hitler not allowed to withdrawal. it was very hard to suply german forces. Therefore a lot of germans died. Their moral was very low and they surrendered.
Losts were very huge. About 300,000 men.
Losts were very huge. About 300,000 men.
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Owain Glyndwr
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UnterKroon
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Germany failed to start up war production before or right after the invasion. Assumptions lead to German military and leadership to believe the war would be over like in France and else where in a few months at most.
1. Failed to go on war production
2. Vastly underrating the Soviet Soldier and his will to fight
3. Underrating Soviet armor, T34 was best in the world in 1941
4. To many objectives with minimal manpower and resources to complete
5. Manipulation by Nazi leadership of strategy
6. The shear size of the USSR
7. Underestimating the UK will to fight until the end (yes they caused problems)
8. Well there are many more reasons including above all arrogance.
1. Failed to go on war production
2. Vastly underrating the Soviet Soldier and his will to fight
3. Underrating Soviet armor, T34 was best in the world in 1941
4. To many objectives with minimal manpower and resources to complete
5. Manipulation by Nazi leadership of strategy
6. The shear size of the USSR
7. Underestimating the UK will to fight until the end (yes they caused problems)
8. Well there are many more reasons including above all arrogance.
Agree with the abovementioned.
Some other factors that come to mind :
- Awkward timing of operation Barbarossa (helping out Mussolini in Greece resulting in postponing the operation, as a result of which German forces got stuck in the winter in summer uniforms)
- The "no retreat" policy. Sometimes it's better to retreat and regroup.
- Underestimating the near-infinite production capacity of the US
- Underestimating the soviet policy of dismantling entire factories and relocating them eastwards
- Focusing on Stalingrad rather than pushing through to the oil fields in the south
- the relentless repression and extermination of the Slavic peoples in all of the USSR'republics, resulting in an increasingly solidified nationalist awareness and fanatical anti-German sentiments, rather than playing out anti-Soviet sentiments that may possibly have been manouvred into some kind of cooperation with Germany, against Stalin...
Ya know, stuff like that ...
Some other factors that come to mind :
- Awkward timing of operation Barbarossa (helping out Mussolini in Greece resulting in postponing the operation, as a result of which German forces got stuck in the winter in summer uniforms)
- The "no retreat" policy. Sometimes it's better to retreat and regroup.
- Underestimating the near-infinite production capacity of the US
- Underestimating the soviet policy of dismantling entire factories and relocating them eastwards
- Focusing on Stalingrad rather than pushing through to the oil fields in the south
- the relentless repression and extermination of the Slavic peoples in all of the USSR'republics, resulting in an increasingly solidified nationalist awareness and fanatical anti-German sentiments, rather than playing out anti-Soviet sentiments that may possibly have been manouvred into some kind of cooperation with Germany, against Stalin...
Ya know, stuff like that ...
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Mauser K98k
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The Germans did not count on the dogged tenacity of the Russian soldier. They were expecting the Russians to lose heart and quit like the French had.
As the reality of their situation soaked in, a German Colonel Bernd Von Kleist, penned the following analogy in his diary:
"The German Army in fighting Russia is like an elephant attacking a host of ants. The elephant will kill thousands, perhaps even millions, of ants, but in the end their numbers will overcome him, and he will be eaten to the bone."
Prophetic, indeed.
As the reality of their situation soaked in, a German Colonel Bernd Von Kleist, penned the following analogy in his diary:
"The German Army in fighting Russia is like an elephant attacking a host of ants. The elephant will kill thousands, perhaps even millions, of ants, but in the end their numbers will overcome him, and he will be eaten to the bone."
Prophetic, indeed.
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Gwynn Compton
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If I recall correctly Oleg has some conflicting figures on the significance of Lend Lease, and I believe in recent years, the notion of Lend-Lease being the backbone of the Russian army has taken somewhat of a beating, as historians realise that it merely supplimented Russian supplies, rather than superceded them.UnterKroon wrote:1 more.
In eastern front almost every second plane and tank was american one.
Or made by american steel.
America sent to Russia
427 284 "Studebaker" trucks
2 541 008 tons oil
2 317 694 tons steel
12 537 tanks
18 865 planes
473 000 000 missiles
and so one...
Gwynn
never ?
Perhaps the question should be framed: Could Germany have won the war in the East? Using June 1941 as the baseline, my view has changed decidedly on this question. My conclusion is Germany could have won but only under these circumstances: 1- In August 1941, the capture of Moscow and not the destruction of Soviet armies is the strategy; 2- Successful capture of the Moscow industrial basin, up to Gorky in October/November 41; 3- The surrender, capture, abdication, or death of Stalin and his government before December 7, 1941.
These pre-June 1941 scenarios change this conclusion to Germany’s favor:
1- Gearing the entire German economy to war and the destruction of the Soviet Union, in 1940, at the time the decision to attack was made.
2- Strategic collaboration with Japan where Japan joins Germany in the fight in summer 1941, with the objective to obtain its 'lebensraum' in Siberia instead of the SE Asia and the Pacific b employ real-politic and try to keep the USA neutral.
3- Hitler is pragmatic and played to the anti Stalinist feelings in the Ukraine and elsewhere for military and political gain.
But Hitler's racial fanaticism and belief in the superiority of the Herrenfolk never wavered. Hitler was ignorant about Russia and the world. Stalin was the pragmatist, not Hitler.
Paul Carell offers a gripping German centered prospective on the war but his conclusions about how close the outcome was to being a German victory are flawed.
These pre-June 1941 scenarios change this conclusion to Germany’s favor:
1- Gearing the entire German economy to war and the destruction of the Soviet Union, in 1940, at the time the decision to attack was made.
2- Strategic collaboration with Japan where Japan joins Germany in the fight in summer 1941, with the objective to obtain its 'lebensraum' in Siberia instead of the SE Asia and the Pacific b employ real-politic and try to keep the USA neutral.
3- Hitler is pragmatic and played to the anti Stalinist feelings in the Ukraine and elsewhere for military and political gain.
But Hitler's racial fanaticism and belief in the superiority of the Herrenfolk never wavered. Hitler was ignorant about Russia and the world. Stalin was the pragmatist, not Hitler.
Paul Carell offers a gripping German centered prospective on the war but his conclusions about how close the outcome was to being a German victory are flawed.
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Alternative Scenario
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I agree with everything USA-Finn wrote!
But I would add - a third front! Defeat the UK in the Middle East between the surrender of France and mid 1941 would have released army (easily 25 divisions), navy (for operations in the Black Sea) and Luftwaffe units for use in Barbarossa.
Turkey would have entered the war on the German side, with their raw manpower (2m strong fully mobilised) and the best of the Italian army! This would have posed a significant military problem drawing key formations from the main fronts (dealing with thrust in the west and Japanese in the Far East). This allied to "hearts and minds" campaign to convince the citizens from the Central Asian USSR republics to rise up against Stalin - just could have been enough to tip the balance in late 1941.
But I would add - a third front! Defeat the UK in the Middle East between the surrender of France and mid 1941 would have released army (easily 25 divisions), navy (for operations in the Black Sea) and Luftwaffe units for use in Barbarossa.
Turkey would have entered the war on the German side, with their raw manpower (2m strong fully mobilised) and the best of the Italian army! This would have posed a significant military problem drawing key formations from the main fronts (dealing with thrust in the west and Japanese in the Far East). This allied to "hearts and minds" campaign to convince the citizens from the Central Asian USSR republics to rise up against Stalin - just could have been enough to tip the balance in late 1941.