Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

[michael mills]

Since you insist there were such plans tell me what armies were scheduled to attack when and where, what were their routes planned, phase objectives and other critical details,

The Timoshenko-Zhukov plan of May 1941 lists all the armies that were to be involved in the pre-emptive strike against the German forces massing in German-occupied Poland, it lists their objectives, it lists their required strength, it lists amount of ammunition each army would need for the initial phase of the offensive.

The only thing missing from the plan is a target date for launching the offensive, a point emphasised by Evan Mawdsley.

That would seem to indicate that Timoshenko and Zhukov were presenting Stalin, in response to an order given by him, a detailed strategic plan for a first strike against Germany, including a prescription of the forces that would be required to achieve victory, and were leaving it to him to nominate a target date for launching the first strike.

As Mawdsley points out, the required level of strength specified in the plan for the forces located in the Lwow salient that were to spearhead the pre-emptive strike had not yet been reached as of 22 June, which suggests that a target date had not yet been set, or if it had, it was some time later, perhaps the August/September time-frame mentioned by so many captured Red Army officers.

What is certain is that the Soviet forces were in the process of massing on the frontier, following the procedure laid down in the Timoshenko-Zhukov plan.

[steverodgers801]

Omergian, even when the Germans captured fuel there was still the issue of getting it where it was needed. The Zhukov proposal was not based on a real plan to attack Germany, it was a desperate attempt to get Stalin to allow basic defensive preparations and readiness to meet a German attack. You really think that considering how poorly the Soviets did at the start of the war that they would even consider launching an offense?? The battles after the capture of Smolensk showed just how unready the Soviet army was attack. The second wave of units were slaughtered trying to launch attack against the Germans.

[Omeganian]

Omergian, even when the Germans captured fuel there was still the issue of getting it where it was needed.

What's the relevance of that statement? And, BTW, what are you doing on this forum if you can neither remember nor copy nine letters? Shouldn't you finish kindergarten first?

The Zhukov proposal was not based on a real plan to attack Germany, it was a desperate attempt to get Stalin to allow basic defensive preparations and readiness to meet a German attack.

That statement is nothing but unsupported and obviously false speculation. Mark Solonin lists six earlier documents (plus the January games) which are all about an offensive operation and don't care one bit with action upon the Soviet territory. Here is a link to the first one.

http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/i ... oc/1010888

You really think that considering how poorly the Soviets did at the start of the war that they would even consider launching an offense??

How they performed in irrelevant. How Stalin believed they would have performed is. After all, the course of war has ultimately shown Hitler to be unprepared for war... so who, according to your logic, attacked the Soviet Union in 1941? Martians?

[ljadw]

When did dictators ever need a reason for that? Did Stalin have a "reason" to attack Japan in 1945?

1)YES : dictators need a reason to attack an other country .

Then describe the reasons Stalin had for attacking Japan. And then describe why they didn't apply to Germany.

2)The fact that in the first 10 days of Barbarossa ,the Germans captured only 54996 cbm of fuel means that only 54996 cbm of fuel was stored at the border,and as this was inadequate for an attack,this means that a Soviet attack in that period was excluded .

So, according to you, no fuel was stored in tank wagons and was pulled away? No fuel was lost due to bombardments? I am awaiting proof.

5)The fuel captured by the Germans in june/july could only support 7 days of fighting for the RKKA

So, considering the amount the Germans couldn't capture... well, the one month supply (10 days to 2.5 months, actually, depending on the type) stated to exist in Zhukov's May Report sounds about right.

According to the book "The Rear of the Soviet Military Forces", during the first days of the war, there were 8,500 tank-wagons with fuel on the railroads which couldn't be delivered because the situation crated traffic jams. The Wehrmacht, according to Halder, needed 22 trains of fuel per day according to pre-war estimates (in reality, somewhat more), so we're talking about a supply for at least a week or two.

This is totally meaningless: where were going these 8.500 tank-wagons with fuel ? That they were on the rail-roads does not mean that they were a possible supply for the WM .

According to the book, it went both ways. Some was being delivered to the forces, some was evacuated. In either case, this is fuel that would have been available to the forces if not for the German attack.

This is all irrelevant : to prove that the SU was planning an attack against Germany,you have to prove that on 22 june there were 8500 waggons going to the border with as destination the military,that these waggons all were full of oil,and that this oil was refined.

Besides,you have to prove that the number of waggons on 22 june 1941 was exceptional high= that on other days(21 june,6 may,1 april,etc,etc) there were no 8500 waggons with fuel circulating between Brest and Wladivostok,but only 1000 or 2000.

If you can't prove this,the story of the 8500 waggons has as much value as the story of Izvolsky (Russian ambassador in France in 1914) who was waiting for his train in Moscow to retrurn to Paris ,and who claimed that there would be a war ,because a lot of trains were passing through the station full of military .Which means that the value of the story of the 8500 waggons is ZERO .

Saying that this fuel would have been available to the forces if not for the German attack,is wrong,unless you can prove that the destination of this oil (how much ?) was the military .

[Omeganian]

This is all irrelevant : to prove that the SU was planning an attack against Germany,you have to prove that on 22 june there were 8500 waggons going to the border with as destination the military,that these waggons all were full of oil,and that this oil was refined.

Wrong. I need to prove nothing. Your argument is based on the claim there was no fuel, so you need to prove there was none. Zhukov's report says there was enough for a month. Where are your documents? Where is your proof that the Germans picked up every single drop the Soviet forces had?

[wm]

The problem is, in his report Zhukov doesn't say anything about any attack on Germany.
He says simply says: they are ready militarily and in higher state of reediness so they can deploy their forces and be ready for war faster than we can, gaining valuable strategic advantage.
His plan was to deploy Soviet forces at once, and attack the Germans at the most vulnerable stage of their preparations for attack - when their forces would be moved to the border.
So if we wait we will lose. If we deploy now and catch the German forces concentrating for the attack we will win. A right now, unprovoked attack is not even considered.

[ljadw]

This is all irrelevant : to prove that the SU was planning an attack against Germany,you have to prove that on 22 june there were 8500 waggons going to the border with as destination the military,that these waggons all were full of oil,and that this oil was refined.

Wrong. I need to prove nothing. Your argument is based on the claim there was no fuel, so you need to prove there was none. Zhukov's report says there was enough for a month. Where are your documents? Where is your proof that the Germans picked up every single drop the Soviet forces had?

What you are saying that Zhukov said,is meaningless :enough for a month does not mean that there was enough to sustain an attack with as aim the capture of Berlin .

[ljadw]

The problem is, in his report Zhukov doesn't say anything about any attack on Germany.
He says simply says: they are ready militarily and in higher state of reediness so they can deploy their forces and be ready for war faster than we can, gaining valuable strategic advantage.
His plan was to deploy Soviet forces at once, and attack the Germans at the most vulnerable stage of their preparations for attack - when their forces would be moved to the border.
So if we wait we will lose. If we deploy now and catch the German forces concentrating for the attack we will win. A right now, unprovoked attack is not even considered.

Besides,what Zhukov said was nonsens : he presented an alarming report of German preparations,which existed only in his dreams .Zhukov was crying wolf. Why ? To cover his behind,if something happened .

[Omeganian]

The problem is, in his report Zhukov doesn't say anything about any attack on Germany.
He says simply says: they are ready militarily and in higher state of reediness so they can deploy their forces and be ready for war faster than we can, gaining valuable strategic advantage.
His plan was to deploy Soviet forces at once, and attack the Germans at the most vulnerable stage of their preparations for attack - when their forces would be moved to the border.
So if we wait we will lose. If we deploy now and catch the German forces concentrating for the attack we will win. A right now, unprovoked attack is not even considered.

It is the only scenario considered in all the previous plans. No previous documents mentions anything about the possibility of German attack. They simply say "we are deploying our forces in a manner that is best for conducting a major offensive operation". The May Plan merely has a minor modification due to changing circumstances. So what?

This is all irrelevant : to prove that the SU was planning an attack against Germany,you have to prove that on 22 june there were 8500 waggons going to the border with as destination the military,that these waggons all were full of oil,and that this oil was refined.

Wrong. I need to prove nothing. Your argument is based on the claim there was no fuel, so you need to prove there was none. Zhukov's report says there was enough for a month. Where are your documents? Where is your proof that the Germans picked up every single drop the Soviet forces had?

What you are saying that Zhukov said,is meaningless :enough for a month does not mean that there was enough to sustain an attack with as aim the capture of Berlin .

Nor was there any need to. The technology of the time didn't allow for a sustained offensive 1000 km deep. Offensives were commonly conducted in steps of 200-300 km. That's how it went in 1943-45 for the Soviets.

[ljadw]

The whole report of Zhukov was based on false and inflated informations from the GRU : he said that on 15 may,Germany had on the border with the SU 120 divisions ,of which 25 mobile and that for the attack Germany would commit 180 divisions,of which 34 mobile,4 Cavalry and 5 airborne .

The truth is that on 14 may,Germany had in the east 72 divisions and that most mobile divisions arrived only ONE MONTH LATER : after 14 june .

The truth is also that Germany had in june 1941 only 1 cavalry and 1 airborne divisions .

The Zhukov report was fiction .

[wm]

It is the only scenario considered in all the previous plans. No previous documents mentions anything about the possibility of German attack. They simply say "we are deploying our forces in a manner that is best for conducting a major offensive operation". The May Plan merely has a minor modification due to changing circumstances. So what?

Well, this is the only document we have, the others are jealously guarded by pink unicorns, it seems...

Nor was there any need to. The technology of the time didn't allow for a sustained offensive 1000 km deep. Offensives were commonly conducted in steps of 200-300 km. That's how it went in 1943-45 for the Soviets.

But for the 1940 Soviets it was 50km, three months, and 300 thousand casualties - in a war against a country only slightly larger and slightly less defenseless than the Baltic States.

[Omeganian]

It is the only scenario considered in all the previous plans. No previous documents mentions anything about the possibility of German attack. They simply say "we are deploying our forces in a manner that is best for conducting a major offensive operation". The May Plan merely has a minor modification due to changing circumstances. So what?

Well, this is the only document we have, the others are jealously guarded by pink unicorns, it seems...

I posted above a link to the October 1940 plan. There is also the March 1941 plan, although that one seems to be published without the parts that interest us... suspicious by itself.

Nor was there any need to. The technology of the time didn't allow for a sustained offensive 1000 km deep. Offensives were commonly conducted in steps of 200-300 km. That's how it went in 1943-45 for the Soviets.

But for the 1940 Soviets it was 50km, three months, and 300 thousand casualties - in a war against a country only slightly larger and slightly less defenseless than the Baltic States.

The November 1940 directive gave the time needed to defeat Finland completely as 45 days, so I would say Stalin didn't expect the situation to repeat itself. Finland, BTW, is by no means a small territory - it's still twice the size of the three Baltic States put together.

[wm]

Sorry, I missed that.
But it looks like that document proposes a strategic deployment of the Soviet Forces in the various parts of the USSR. Their deployment seems to be based on the worst case scenario, i.e. a war with the strongest opponent present, identified as Germany, supported (or not) by Japan.
I see nothing sinister there, in case of war the Narkom of Defense proposes to respond with a deep incursion into German territory, the intention is to cut off Germany from the Southern Europe and Balkans. It was a reasonable and good defensive strategy - to bring the war to the aggressor and force him to beg for mercy. Better and more sophisticated than the French/British sit and wait, yield the initiative to the enemy 1940 strategy.
It fact it happened like that, they were attacked and responded with a powerful attack of their own - that reach Berlin eventually. Only it wasn't that easy as the plan assumed.

Of course it could be interpreted as a proof of some Soviet unprovoked attack, but I think it's unlikely. Using the same words, the same logic a war with Japan is described in that document. And it's hardly believable they planned to wage two wars of aggression simultaneously. It's much more probable they planned, and allocated forces for the worst case scenario, just in case.

[Omeganian]

Sorry, I missed that.
But it looks like that document proposes a strategic deployment of the Soviet Forces in the various parts of the USSR. Their deployment seems to be based on the worst case scenario, i.e. a war with the strongest opponent present, identified as Germany, supported (or not) by Japan.
I see nothing sinister there, in case of war the Narkom of Defense proposes to respond with a deep incursion into German territory, the intention is to cut off Germany from the Southern Europe and Balkans. It was a reasonable and good defensive strategy - to bring the war to the aggressor and force him to beg for mercy. Better and more sophisticated than the French/British sit and wait, yield the initiative to the enemy 1940 strategy.
It fact it happened like that, they were attacked and responded with a powerful attack of their own - that reach Berlin eventually. Only it wasn't that easy as the plan assumed.

I see nothing there about response. Zhukov's May Plan, in fact, is the first plan that has a single word about the possibility of a German attack.

It is true that offensive plans and an offensive doctrine are not quite the same as political aggressiveness, yes. But Stalin has shown plenty of the latter as well.

Of course it could be interpreted as a proof of some Soviet unprovoked attack, but I think it's unlikely. Using the same words, the same logic a war with Japan is described in that document. And it's hardly believable they planned to wage two wars of aggression simultaneously. It's much more probable they planned, and allocated forces for the worst case scenario, just in case.

Doesn't say simultaneously. Maybe same year; well, in reality Japan was defeated same year as Germany. Of course, schedules can be changed.

[steverodgers801]

Maybe no one has found them because they don't exist.