Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#826

Post by paspartoo » 04 Feb 2013, 09:40

Urmel wrote:This is probably one of the more useful links for the Panzer III.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Waffen/panzer3.htm

Based on this I would surmise that most if not all Panzer III in Russia were either H or J variants. Production numbers in 1940 were low (and already included the H), and out of 381 present on 1 May 1940 155 were lost. 80 - 100 pre-H variants or so were sent to North Africa.

My conclusion would be that the Germans had a very clear technical advantage over the Russian tanks, especially at what were typical combat ranges (about 800m).
I'm tired of writing the same things.

From http://www.amazon.com/Encyclopedia-Germ ... 1854095188 the Pz III J and Pz IV F1 were first sent with the reinforcements in September -October.

At the start of Barbarossa the only Panzers having frontal hull protection that negates the Soviet 45mm gun would be Pz III H (308 built from October ’40 to April ’41) and Pz IV E (223 built from September ’40 to April ‘41 )

Keep in mind that all the figures I gave were for hull/superstructure not turret. All Pz III had 30mm turret front and side, Pz IV B,C version had 30 front/15 sides, D and E version 30 front/20 sides , F1 has 50 front/30 sides. Pz 35 has 25 front /16 sides, Pz 38 has 25 front /15 sides or in the E-F versions 50 front /30 sides.

As i said earlier German and Soviet tanks can destroy each other at ranges up to 500m. From 500m onwards German tanks have the advantage due to the weak armor of the T-26 and BT. Meanwhile the Germans have nothing to deal with the 1.500 T-34 and KV.
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#827

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 11:34

Chris

I am sure the tiredness is mutual. You are too hung up on tank numbers and protection. The evidence from the border battles is clear, even IF the T-26 and BT series were as good as the German tanks, it didn't matter, they got wiped out in no time. So the whole discussion about their quality is a red herring.

You also presume that 500m was a typical engagement range. That is not my understanding, I believe 800m was far more likely.

Finally, as for the Germans having nothing to deal with 1,400 T-34s and KV-1, again, that's a red herring. Apart from tactical setbacks (e.g. 1.PD at Siauliai/Schaulen in the opening days), these monster tanks had ZERO operational impact. They either broke down, ran out of fuel, or were overrun and left behind, providing a great picture opportunity for the Landser (my grandfather took a great photo of a KV-1 at a road junction south of Lake Peipus, near Pskov, while passing it). How many of these 1,400 tanks were left on 1 July? On 1 August? On 1 September? If there weren't many, or indeed any of the original cohort, why, if the Germans had 'nothing' to deal with them?

The Wehrmacht ran rings around the Red Army in summer 1941. It wasn't cheap, it wasn't pleasant, but they did, inadequacy of doorknocker guns and non-upgraded tanks of 1934 vintage (Panzer 35(t)) notwithstanding.

Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#828

Post by 1st Cavalry » 04 Feb 2013, 12:00

paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote:This is probably one of the more useful links for the Panzer III.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Waffen/panzer3.htm

Based on this I would surmise that most if not all Panzer III in Russia were either H or J variants. Production numbers in 1940 were low (and already included the H), and out of 381 present on 1 May 1940 155 were lost. 80 - 100 pre-H variants or so were sent to North Africa.

My conclusion would be that the Germans had a very clear technical advantage over the Russian tanks, especially at what were typical combat ranges (about 800m).
I'm tired of writing the same things.

From http://www.amazon.com/Encyclopedia-Germ ... 1854095188 the Pz III J and Pz IV F1 were first sent with the reinforcements in September -October.

At the start of Barbarossa the only Panzers having frontal hull protection that negates the Soviet 45mm gun would be Pz III H (308 built from October ’40 to April ’41) and Pz IV E (223 built from September ’40 to April ‘41 )

Keep in mind that all the figures I gave were for hull/superstructure not turret. All Pz III had 30mm turret front and side, Pz IV B,C version had 30 front/15 sides, D and E version 30 front/20 sides , F1 has 50 front/30 sides. Pz 35 has 25 front /16 sides, Pz 38 has 25 front /15 sides or in the E-F versions 50 front /30 sides.

As i said earlier German and Soviet tanks can destroy each other at ranges up to 500m. From 500m onwards German tanks have the advantage due to the weak armor of the T-26 and BT. Meanwhile the Germans have nothing to deal with the 1.500 T-34 and KV.
For the t-34 /kv the Germans had the 88th Flak :idea:

Besides you misrepresented what your source wrote :
Nowhere does it say first sent with the reinforcements in September -October the actual paragraph states :

The Auf J with 5 cm kwk L42 were used to equip the 2nd and 5th panzer divisions and a independent panzer regiment which were sent as reinforcements to Russia in september 1941. The remainder were used to replace the loss of approximately 1400 Pz kpfw III during the first year of fighting in russia and north africa .

Besides the paragraphs about Auf H combat service makes it clear that there were J models in service at the start of Barbarossa.
2nd and 5th had around 105 panzer III each. btw .
As for tank replacements, the figure for panzer III is around 300 sent to the front in 1941 most if not all were J because there was nothing else in production at that time .

And there is not only panzer III H or panzer IV E well protected against Russian 45 mm but also pz 38 E/F/G so how about actually reading your own sources ....

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#829

Post by Andy Syl » 04 Feb 2013, 12:32

Urmel wrote:Chris

I am sure the tiredness is mutual. You are too hung up on tank numbers and protection. The evidence from the border battles is clear, even IF the T-26 and BT series were as good as the German tanks, it didn't matter, they got wiped out in no time. So the whole discussion about their quality is a red herring.

You also presume that 500m was a typical engagement range. That is not my understanding, I believe 800m was far more likely.

Finally, as for the Germans having nothing to deal with 1,400 T-34s and KV-1, again, that's a red herring. Apart from tactical setbacks (e.g. 1.PD at Siauliai/Schaulen in the opening days), these monster tanks had ZERO operational impact. They either broke down, ran out of fuel, or were overrun and left behind, providing a great picture opportunity for the Landser (my grandfather took a great photo of a KV-1 at a road junction south of Lake Peipus, near Pskov, while passing it). How many of these 1,400 tanks were left on 1 July? On 1 August? On 1 September? If there weren't many, or indeed any of the original cohort, why, if the Germans had 'nothing' to deal with them?

The Wehrmacht ran rings around the Red Army in summer 1941. It wasn't cheap, it wasn't pleasant, but they did, inadequacy of doorknocker guns and non-upgraded tanks of 1934 vintage (Panzer 35(t)) notwithstanding.

Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?
Urmel,

We know that the Wehrmacht "ran rings", etc. But the fact that the Soviet tank park was superior to the German one is not "looking at the tree". It suggests that, in the summer of 1941, there were a specific set of circumstances which led to the Soviet defeat, and not some inherent weakness of the Red Army.
The active formations of the Red Army, the best units, with the best personnel and best specialists, had all perished by October 1941. Yet, after October 1941, the Wehrmacht didn't run any "rings" anymore, despite the fact that, logically, the ACTIVE German formations should have gone through the half-trained soviet RESERVISTS like a knife through cheese.

In 6 months, the Red Army had recovered sufficiently enough to launch a major offensive at army group level and in 2 years it was capable to launch offensives at theater level. The T-34 which had "zero operational impact" in July-August suddenly had a big operational impact in December, 4 months later. How come?

I asked Appleknocker, who was one of the loudest here who insisted on the awful state of the soviet logistics, command and control, whether it is possible for an army to fix these weaknesses in such a short a time. Specially AFTER losing all its pre-war personnel, heavy equipment and a good part of its demographical and industrial base. The only answer I received was silence.
Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?
Can we please stop regurgating the same old cliches and use our brains?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#830

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 12:40

Andy Syl wrote:Urmel,

We know that the Wehrmacht "ran rings", etc. But the fact that the Soviet tank park was superior to the German one is not "looking at the tree". It suggests that, in the summer of 1941, there were a specific set of circumstances which led to the Soviet defeat, and not some inherent weakness of the Red Army.
These two things are not mutually exclusive. The very radical structural measures taken by STAVKA shouldn't be ignored, the Red Army structure in November looked nothing like the one in June.
Andy Syl wrote:The active formations of the Red Army, the best units, with the best personnel and best specialists, had all perished by October 1941. Yet, after October 1941, the Wehrmacht didn't run any "rings" anymore, despite the fact that, logically, the ACTIVE German formations should have gone through the half-trained soviet RESERVISTS like a knife through cheese.
Make it November and we agree. But of course at that time it was not the same Wehrmacht anymore that crossed the Bug in June.
Andy Syl wrote:In 6 months, the Red Army had recovered sufficiently enough to launch a major offensive at army group level and in 2 years it was capable to launch offensives at theater level. The T-34 which had "zero operational impact" in July-August suddenly had a big operational impact in December, 4 months later. How come?

I asked Appleknocker, who was one of the loudest here who insisted on the awful state of the soviet logistics, command and control, whether it is possible for an army to fix these weaknesses in such a short a time. Specially AFTER losing all its pre-war personnel, heavy equipment and a good part of its demographical and industrial base. The only answer I received was silence.
You can't look at either army in isolation, they were after all fighting each other. And it's not as if the Red Army offensive was a rioting success. Looking at the state of German forces, if it had been more competent it should have gone on to Minsk. It didn't - why? One reason is of course that it had not lost 'all' its pre-war personnel.

Andy Syl wrote:
Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?
Can we please stop regurgating the same old cliches and use our brains?
Can we please stop insulting each other? I find it diminishes the enjoyment of a good debate so.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#831

Post by Andy Syl » 04 Feb 2013, 13:24

Urmel wrote:These two things are not mutually exclusive. The very radical structural measures taken by STAVKA shouldn't be ignored, the Red Army structure in November looked nothing like the one in June.
A major Red Army reorganization began in April 1940, yet, according to the traditional version, somehow it did not have effects until June 1941, as the state of the Red Army at that time is described as catastrophical.
Do you seriously expect me to believe that the Stavka managed to do in 5 months of war (and very horrible ones, at that) what they hadn't managed in 14 months of peace, with all the resources of USSR at its disposal?
But of course at that time it was not the same Wehrmacht anymore that crossed the Bug in June.
In what way, exactly?
I'm not aware of any significant changes in the Wehrmacht structure by November. Sure, they suffered losses, but much smaller than the Red Army. The casualties of Barbarossa are assessed at aroun 800,000 - 1 million for the Wehrmacht and around 5 millions for the Red Army. The ratio is even bigger for the equipment losses.
If anything, the disparity between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army should have become even bigger.
Looking at the state of German forces, if it had been more competent it should have gone on to Minsk.
It has nothing to do with competence per se. It just didn't have enough forces for such an ambitious undertaking after the losses it suffered by that time - as Zhukov correctly pointed out.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#832

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 13:38

Andy Syl wrote:
Urmel wrote:These two things are not mutually exclusive. The very radical structural measures taken by STAVKA shouldn't be ignored, the Red Army structure in November looked nothing like the one in June.
A major Red Army reorganization began in April 1940, yet, according to the traditional version, somehow it did not have effects until June 1941, as the state of the Red Army at that time is described as catastrophical.
Do you seriously expect me to believe that the Stavka managed to do in 5 months of war (and very horrible ones, at that) what they hadn't managed in 14 months of peace, with all the resources of USSR at its disposal?
Of course not. But they managed to re-organise into something they could manage (largest tank unit the Brigade, abolition of Corps, reduction of Rifle Divisions to glorified regiment size). It wasn't the same re-organisation that was planned in April 1940.
Andy Syl wrote:
But of course at that time it was not the same Wehrmacht anymore that crossed the Bug in June.
In what way, exactly?
I'm not aware of any significant changes in the Wehrmacht structure by November. Sure, they suffered losses, but much smaller than the Red Army. The casualties of Barbarossa are assessed at aroun 800,000 - 1 million for the Wehrmacht and around 5 millions for the Red Army. The ratio is even bigger for the equipment losses.
If anything, the disparity between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army should have become even bigger.
Some issues: much shorter on supply. Casualties fall primarily on front-line troops, so they were being bled dry at the sharp end. Vehicle losses, degradation of mobility.
Andy Syl wrote:
Looking at the state of German forces, if it had been more competent it should have gone on to Minsk.
It has nothing to do with competence per se. It just didn't have enough forces for such an ambitious undertaking after the losses it suffered by that time - as Zhukov correctly pointed out.
It wasn't just a force issue. They came pretty close to breaking Army Group Centre (just look at the map of the Rhzev salient after the battle), but they suffered heavily in trying that. Competence of commanders in my view played a key role.

Not that any of this is relevant to the question of the thread.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#833

Post by paspartoo » 04 Feb 2013, 13:50

Urmel wrote: Chris
I am sure the tiredness is mutual. You are too hung up on tank numbers and protection. The evidence from the border battles is clear, even IF the T-26 and BT series were as good as the German tanks, it didn't matter, they got wiped out in no time. So the whole discussion about their quality is a red herring.
I don’t know if the T-26 and BT were as good as the german tanks. What I do know was that they could kill them at normal distances. Considering their huge numbers I don’t see how it’s a red herring.
Urmel wrote: You also presume that 500m was a typical engagement range. That is not my understanding, I believe 800m was far more likely.
I simply don’t know what distance was the ‘average’. If someone has specific information please share.
Urmel wrote: Finally, as for the Germans having nothing to deal with 1,400 T-34s and KV-1, again, that's a red herring. Apart from tactical setbacks (e.g. 1.PD at Siauliai/Schaulen in the opening days), these monster tanks had ZERO operational impact. They either broke down, ran out of fuel, or were overrun and left behind, providing a great picture opportunity for the Landser (my grandfather took a great photo of a KV-1 at a road junction south of Lake Peipus, near Pskov, while passing it). How many of these 1,400 tanks were left on 1 July? On 1 August? On 1 September? If there weren't many, or indeed any of the original cohort, why, if the Germans had 'nothing' to deal with them?

The Wehrmacht ran rings around the Red Army in summer 1941. It wasn't cheap, it wasn't pleasant, but they did, inadequacy of doorknocker guns and non-upgraded tanks of 1934 vintage (Panzer 35(t)) notwithstanding.

Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?
How can we do that when people dismiss Soviet numbers (Bt, T-26) because these tank are ‘outdated’ and Soviet quality (T-34, KV) with the argument that they had ‘ZERO’ impact.
By the same logic Panther and Tiger tanks had ZERO impact in the West. The poor performance of Soviet formations can be attributed to many different things. I’ve already mentioned that Soviet tanks used by the Germans were found to have faulty parts and constantly broke down.
1st Cavalry wrote:
For the t-34 /kv the Germans had the 88th Flak :idea:

Besides you misrepresented what your source wrote :
Nowhere does it say first sent with the reinforcements in September -October the actual paragraph states :

The Auf J with 5 cm kwk L42 were used to equip the 2nd and 5th panzer divisions and a independent panzer regiment which were sent as reinforcements to Russia in september 1941. The remainder were used to replace the loss of approximately 1400 Pz kpfw III during the first year of fighting in russia and north africa .

Besides the paragraphs about Auf H combat service makes it clear that there were J models in service at the start of Barbarossa.
2nd and 5th had around 105 panzer III each. btw .
As for tank replacements, the figure for panzer III is around 300 sent to the front in 1941 most if not all were J because there was nothing else in production at that time .

And there is not only panzer III H or panzer IV E well protected against Russian 45 mm but also pz 38 E/F/G so how about actually reading your own sources ....
I misrepresent? This is what I said : ‘From ‘Encyclopedia Of German Tanks Of World War Two’, p65 the Ausf J was used to equip the 2nd and 5th Pz div and an independent pz regt which were sent as reinforcements to Russian in September 1941. The remainder were used to cover the losses of 1941’

If you check the previous pages you’ll see I always said at the start of operation Barbarossa. How can the vehicles be used at the start and be used to replace losses? As for the Pz 38 who posted the numbers young Einstein? You did ? Did you notice the part about side turret and hull being 30?

I asked before do you have a breakdown of tank types? It would be nice to at least get something from this discussion.
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#834

Post by Andy Syl » 04 Feb 2013, 14:04

Urmel wrote:
Of course not. But they managed to re-organise into something they could manage (largest tank unit the Brigade, abolition of Corps, reduction of Rifle Divisions to glorified regiment size). It wasn't the same re-organisation that was planned in April 1940.
And this helped the Red Army become more effective... how?

For instance, wasn't the first disbanding of the mechanized corps at the end of 1939 one of the main arguments used to prove the poor state of military thinking in the Red Army? You know, "obtuze cavalry men who can't understand modern warfare and opposed big tank formations", "dispersal of tanks", etc, you know the shtick.
Now you tell me that limiting the size of largest tank units to brigades HELPED the Red Army?
Some issues: much shorter on supply. Casualties fall primarily on front-line troops, so they were being bled dry at the sharp end. Vehicle losses, degradation of mobility.
Overstreching of supply lines does not mean "the Wehrmacht was not the same". Blame the idiotic German command who probably thought that, after crossing the Dniepr, the German troops would just parade towards the Volga and did not pay any mind to the minor problem as to how they were going to supply a 3 million men army in central Russia.
Also, your point about casualties is absurd. Was the German army supposed to fight without taking casualties? Didn't you just say that "you can't look at either army in isolation"? The soviet losses were several times greater, so, as I said, logically, german losses should not have led to a disappearance of the gap between the 2 opponents...
They came pretty close to breaking Army Group Centre (just look at the map of the Rhzev salient after the battle), but they suffered heavily in trying that. Competence of commanders in my view played a key role.
What reasons make you to think it was the competence of commander and not insufficience of forces, particularly as Stalin decided to spread them thin in an attempt to launch a theater-level offensive?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#835

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 14:11

paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote: Chris
I am sure the tiredness is mutual. You are too hung up on tank numbers and protection. The evidence from the border battles is clear, even IF the T-26 and BT series were as good as the German tanks, it didn't matter, they got wiped out in no time. So the whole discussion about their quality is a red herring.
I don’t know if the T-26 and BT were as good as the german tanks. What I do know was that they could kill them at normal distances. Considering their huge numbers I don’t see how it’s a red herring.
They were gone by September, if not earlier. So why do they or their performance matter to us, if they clearly didn't matter much in battle?
paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote: You also presume that 500m was a typical engagement range. That is not my understanding, I believe 800m was far more likely.
I simply don’t know what distance was the ‘average’. If someone has specific information please share.
There are lots of discussions around on this. 800m seems to be the usual distance that one comes across. Also, the Germans would have known if the Soviet lights could kill them at 500m but they themselves can kill the Soviet lights at 1,000m, and they would have exploited this gap tactically.
paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote: Finally, as for the Germans having nothing to deal with 1,400 T-34s and KV-1, again, that's a red herring. Apart from tactical setbacks (e.g. 1.PD at Siauliai/Schaulen in the opening days), these monster tanks had ZERO operational impact. They either broke down, ran out of fuel, or were overrun and left behind, providing a great picture opportunity for the Landser (my grandfather took a great photo of a KV-1 at a road junction south of Lake Peipus, near Pskov, while passing it). How many of these 1,400 tanks were left on 1 July? On 1 August? On 1 September? If there weren't many, or indeed any of the original cohort, why, if the Germans had 'nothing' to deal with them?

The Wehrmacht ran rings around the Red Army in summer 1941. It wasn't cheap, it wasn't pleasant, but they did, inadequacy of doorknocker guns and non-upgraded tanks of 1934 vintage (Panzer 35(t)) notwithstanding.

Can we please stop looking at the trees, and focus on the forest?
How can we do that when people dismiss Soviet numbers (Bt, T-26) because these tank are ‘outdated’ and Soviet quality (T-34, KV) with the argument that they had ‘ZERO’ impact.
By the same logic Panther and Tiger tanks had ZERO impact in the West. The poor performance of Soviet formations can be attributed to many different things. I’ve already mentioned that Soviet tanks used by the Germans were found to have faulty parts and constantly broke down.
Well it's not an argument but historical fact. The tanks were gone by September, and the Germans were in Smolensk, Kiyv, and other places they had no business to be. I would in fact argue that the impact of Panthers and Tigers was purely tactical in Normandy (and just look what happened to the Panther-equipped Panzerbrigaden in Lorraine in September - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arracourt and http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 05.html#b6). Still, the Germans covered the 680km from Brest Litovsk to Smolensk a bit faster than the Allies did cover the 680km from Caen to Nijmegen. But there really wasn't much between them.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#836

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 14:14

Andy Syl wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Of course not. But they managed to re-organise into something they could manage (largest tank unit the Brigade, abolition of Corps, reduction of Rifle Divisions to glorified regiment size). It wasn't the same re-organisation that was planned in April 1940.
And this helped the Red Army become more effective... how?
It reduced the load on staffs, for instance.
[...]
Andy Syl wrote:Now you tell me that limiting the size of largest tank units to brigades HELPED the Red Army?
Brigades that were more like battalions, even. The massive reduction in C&C and logistics helped.
Andy Syl wrote:
Some issues: much shorter on supply. Casualties fall primarily on front-line troops, so they were being bled dry at the sharp end. Vehicle losses, degradation of mobility.
Overstreching of supply lines does not mean "the Wehrmacht was not the same".
It wasn't the only point. But it should be clear that an army that is starved of supplies and reinforcements is not the same as one that is well supplied and has received adequate reinforcements to replace its casualties.
Andy Syl wrote:
They came pretty close to breaking Army Group Centre (just look at the map of the Rhzev salient after the battle), but they suffered heavily in trying that. Competence of commanders in my view played a key role.
What reasons make you to think it was the competence of commander and not insufficience of forces, particularly as Stalin decided to spread them thin in an attempt to launch a theater-level offensive?
I think you just answered your own question. :milwink:
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#837

Post by paspartoo » 04 Feb 2013, 14:34

Urmel wrote: They were gone by September, if not earlier. So why do they or their performance matter to us, if they clearly didn't matter much in battle?
Well no1 the Germans had to devote resources for destroying them. No2 who destroyed roughly 2.800 German tanks in the East in 1941? Communist Santa-claus? Didn’t Soviet tanks get some of those?
[
Urmel wrote:
There are lots of discussions around on this. 800m seems to be the usual distance that one comes across. Also, the Germans would have known if the Soviet lights could kill them at 500m but they themselves can kill the Soviet lights at 1,000m, and they would have exploited this gap tactically.
In theory yes but if you look at German reports and some of their estimates on penetration of enemy tanks you can see serious mistakes. I don’t know if they told their tankers to open fire at max range. Up to 500m seems to me to be a normal combat range.
Urmel wrote:
Well it's not an argument but historical fact. The tanks were gone by September, and the Germans were in Smolensk, Kiyv, and other places they had no business to be. I would in fact argue that the impact of Panthers and Tigers was purely tactical in Normandy (and just look what happened to the Panther-equipped Panzerbrigaden in Lorraine in September - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arracourt and http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 05.html#b6). Still, the Germans covered the 680km from Brest Litovsk to Smolensk a bit faster than the Allies did cover the 680km from Caen to Nijmegen. But there really wasn't much between them.
You’re working backwards. Great victories by the Germans means Soviet army was crap= Soviet tanks had zero impact. There are countless factors affecting the Soviet forces negatively (surprise german attack, poor leadership, deep enemy penetrations, loss of supply bases, total enemy air superiority etc). Similar factors affected the German army in 1944. Why do you think one was shit while the other is universally acknowledged to have fought well?
By the way does the Sherman side have anything else apart from the Lorraine battles to show? By the same logic Pz III is superior to T-34 and KV since it defeated them at Brody-Dubno.
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#838

Post by Andy Syl » 04 Feb 2013, 15:14

Urmel wrote:It reduced the load on staffs, for instance.
No, it didn't. Reducing the divisions to regiment sized would lead to increasing the load on staffs. For instance, let's say that a 10,000 men division has a staff of 100 officers. If you reduce that division to 3,000 men, then you would need 300 officers for the divisional staffs for the same 10,000 men.
Brigades that were more like battalions, even. The massive reduction in C&C and logistics helped.
Again, it did not. Think about what exactly whose problems in logistics and C&C were claimed to have been. They were the kind which manifest themselves at platoon, company or batallion level at most.
For instance, the infamous radio problem. It was the individual tanks which lacked radios (the commanding tanks possessed them) and it was claimed that this was one of the major reasons for the defeat. It makes no difference whether those tanks were grouped in brigades of 50 tanks each or armies of 1,000.
The same thing can be said about the whole maintenance trope.
I think you just answered your own question.
Stalin making an unsound strategic decisions does not automatically equate with a lack of competence of soviet commanders.
It's not as if the Wehrmacht was free from interference from their own "Grofaz" either.
Can we please stop insulting each other? I find it diminishes the enjoyment of a good debate so.
It is not my intention to insult anyone, but, with all due respect, I am under the impression, from the replies I receive, that some people are not thinking their arguments through, but merely reiterate steoreotypes which they have been taught.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#839

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 15:18

paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote: They were gone by September, if not earlier. So why do they or their performance matter to us, if they clearly didn't matter much in battle?
Well no1 the Germans had to devote resources for destroying them. No2 who destroyed roughly 2.800 German tanks in the East in 1941? Communist Santa-claus? Didn’t Soviet tanks get some of those?
How many were lost by September? To what causes? What was the operational impact of these losses?

Come on, you're an academically educated economist. Analyse.
paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote:
There are lots of discussions around on this. 800m seems to be the usual distance that one comes across. Also, the Germans would have known if the Soviet lights could kill them at 500m but they themselves can kill the Soviet lights at 1,000m, and they would have exploited this gap tactically.
In theory yes but if you look at German reports and some of their estimates on penetration of enemy tanks you can see serious mistakes. I don’t know if they told their tankers to open fire at max range. Up to 500m seems to me to be a normal combat range.
Let's agree to disagree then. From my research on North Africa it is clear that they adapted tactics to theatre/enemy. I have no reason to presume they did not do so in Russia. And 1,000 or 800m is hardly max range when it came to drilling holes into T-26s.
paspartoo wrote:
Urmel wrote:
Well it's not an argument but historical fact. The tanks were gone by September, and the Germans were in Smolensk, Kiyv, and other places they had no business to be. I would in fact argue that the impact of Panthers and Tigers was purely tactical in Normandy (and just look what happened to the Panther-equipped Panzerbrigaden in Lorraine in September - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arracourt and http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 05.html#b6). Still, the Germans covered the 680km from Brest Litovsk to Smolensk a bit faster than the Allies did cover the 680km from Caen to Nijmegen. But there really wasn't much between them.
You’re working backwards. Great victories by the Germans means Soviet army was crap= Soviet tanks had zero impact. There are countless factors affecting the Soviet forces negatively (surprise german attack, poor leadership, deep enemy penetrations, loss of supply bases, total enemy air superiority etc). Similar factors affected the German army in 1944.
I am glad we are in full agreement. I think it is clear that operationally, they did not matter. The reason they did not matter are the surprise, the poor leadership, the loss of supply bases, the state of the tank formations and mech corps at the start of the campaign. None of these cuold be rectified by having superior tanks, as the historical evidence clearly shows.

As an aside though: the deep penetration was the effect by the way, not the cause of the collapse. Total air superiority did not exist, the LW could not cover the whole front. There are reports from as early as the first week of German columns complaining about the lack of air cover.
paspartoo wrote:Why do you think one was shit while the other is universally acknowledged to have fought well?
I actually think the Wehrmacht was pretty sh*t in the West. I know it's not a popular opinion.
paspartoo wrote:By the way does the Sherman side have anything else apart from the Lorraine battles to show? By the same logic Pz III is superior to T-34 and KV since it defeated them at Brody-Dubno.
I am not saying the Sherman was superior to the Panther, so please don't put words in my mouth. It appears clear from the evidence that 4th Armoured Division with all its support was superior to the forces thrown at it by 5. Panzerarmee, and that's what mattered, not whether one tank had an advantage over the other in terms of protection and gun power.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#840

Post by Urmel » 04 Feb 2013, 15:31

Andy Syl wrote:
Urmel wrote:It reduced the load on staffs, for instance.
No, it didn't. Reducing the divisions to regiment sized would lead to increasing the load on staffs. For instance, let's say that a 10,000 men division has a staff of 100 officers. If you reduce that division to 3,000 men, then you would need 300 officers for the divisional staffs for the same 10,000 men.
Not if you reduce the staff size at the same time. You can do that by pushing elements that were originally part of the division (supply, artillery, support arms) up to army level either fully or in part, and concentrate them.
Andy Syl wrote:
Brigades that were more like battalions, even. The massive reduction in C&C and logistics helped.
Again, it did not. Think about what exactly whose problems in logistics and C&C were claimed to have been. They were the kind which manifest themselves at platoon, company or batallion level at most.
For instance, the infamous radio problem. It was the individual tanks which lacked radios (the commanding tanks possessed them) and it was claimed that this was one of the major reasons for the defeat. It makes no difference whether those tanks were grouped in brigades of 50 tanks each or armies of 1,000.
The same thing can be said about the whole maintenance trope.
No it can't. I'm sorry, but that is not a sensible argument. The amount of transport for example needs will go down drastically, since you can more easily integrate the tank force with the overall force, and you are no longer having to hold ready transport to support deep operational moves.
Andy Syl wrote:
I think you just answered your own question.
Stalin making an unsound strategic decisions does not automatically equate with a lack of competence of soviet commanders. It's not as if the Wehrmacht was free from interference from their own "Grofaz" either.
There were others who were quite frankly incompetent or bordering on it. How about Budyonny? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semyon_Budyonny Kulik? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grigory_Kulik Timoshenko and his failed offensive in 1942? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semyon_Timoshenko And that's just the Marshals.
Andy Syl wrote:
Can we please stop insulting each other? I find it diminishes the enjoyment of a good debate so.
It is not my intention to insult anyone, but, with all due respect, I am under the impression, from the replies I receive, that some people are not thinking their arguments through, but merely reiterate steoreotypes which they have been taught.
Well with all due respect, it seems that others who are replying to me are not thinking their arguments through either. What's good for the goose...
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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