Following your recommendation, I have looked of Podolsk's archival documents on Vyborg - Petrozavodsk operation (the fourth Stalin impact).Juha Tompuri wrote: While waiting more info about the draft documet, you can yourself check the Podolsk archives about info of the same subject. If you dont't know where to look there, I'm sure you can always contact knowledged countrymen of yours, like Professor Kilin.
Here that there is available.
On February, 12th, 1944 Finland, seeing, that group of armies " North " departs under impacts of Red Army (the first Stalin impact) on the West, has requested conditions for an exit from a condition of war from the USSR and British Empire.
The USSR has answered, that for this purpose it is necessary:
- To pay 600 million US dollars;
- To remove the Finnish armies on a line of border of 1940;
- To intern German armies in territory of Finland;
- Immediately to return all Soviet prisoners of war, and as prisoners of war of the countries of an antihitlerite coalition.
Considering, that Finland was directly guilty of destruction more than 600 thousand citizens of the Leningrad which has died during blockade of city it is possible to tell, that the offered USSR conditions of an exit from war were very soft for Finns.
Probably, I.Stalin showed greater sympathy to Finns and did not wish to show to them more severe constraints.
However in the beginning of March 1944 the Red Army has stopped approach to group of armies «North» and front was stabilized to the river Narva.
Probably, having solved, that the Red Army has exhausted, Finns have interrupted negotiations and have declared refusal to accept the offered conditions of an exit from war.
On April, 16th Finland has informed on this to representatives of the USSR.
In reply to it, Stavka operation has developed, which purpose consisted in forcing Finland to an exit from war.
According to the plan of this operation of an army of the Leningrad front, operated Karelian isthmus, and the armies of the Karelian front operated in southern Kareliya (between lake Ladoga and lake Onega) should strike on the Finnish strengthenings and grasp the cities of Vyborg and Petrozavodsk.
The ultimate goal of operation consisted in that, to leave on a line: Tikshozero (150 km to the north from Kuolisma) - Sortavala - Imatra - Lappenranta - Kotka.
From this plan it is visible, that at Stavka never was such purpose - to occupy Finland.
Is not present by way of this operation of instructions about that the Red Army has made in Finland communistic revolution.
Who is not visible here and the one when and as should move the population of Finland to Siberia.
It is not visible here the plan of settling of territory of Finland Russian people.
However from this plan it is precisely visible the following.
Vyborg - Petrozavodsk operation (the fourth Stalin impact) it was provided:
a/ to clear territory of the USSR from of armies the opponent;
b/ an exit of armies of Leningrad front on a line of border of 1940.
Actual events developed as follows:
On June, 10th artillery corps have striked powerful blow on the strengthened points of the Finnish defense on Karelian isthmus.
Units of Soviet 21-st army have quickly broken through the Finnish defense and have started to develop approach in a direction of the city of Vyborg.
According to the plan, the immediate task of operation - capture of the city of Vyborg - should be executed during from June, 18 till June, 20th, 1940.
And this a task has been executed precisely in time - on June, 20th the city of Vyborg was to take. That is, on this task it was required only ten day.
Note:
For comparison:
- During Winter war 1939/40 for break of the same boundary of the Finnish defense and capture of the city of Vyborg of Red Army it was required three and a half of a month.
- Finnish - German armies for overcoming the same distance (in the opposite direction) it was required to summer of 1941 to two months.
After the first purpose of the fourth Stalin impact has been reached, at 02 o'clock 15 minutes on June, 21st, 1941 Stavka has directed of Commander armies the Leningrad front marshal Govorov instruction No 220119.
The document 1 - «Instruction Stavka No 220119 from 21/6/1944»
CAMD.Instruction Stavka Supreme Main Command No 220119
The commander armies of the Leningrad front
About continuation of approach on Karelian isthmus.
On June, 21st, 1944
02 hour of 15 minutes
Stavka Supreme Main Command orders:
1. To armies of the Leningrad front, acting Karelian isthmus to continue approach with a task 26-28.06.1944 the main forces to take possession a boundary Imatra, Lappenranta, Virojoki. A part of forces to attack Keksgolm, Elisenvara with the purpose of clarification from the opponent of Karelian isthmus to northeast from the river and lake Vuoksi.
2. In the further the main forces to develop approach with a task to take possession boundary Kuovola, Kotka and will be fixed on east coast (bank)of the river Kjumin-Joki. To provide the main grouping from the north.
3. To install about 24.00 6/21/1944 a following differentiating line between Karelian and Leningrad fronts: up to Korovkino - former and further southern and western coast of Ladoga lake, Tervus, Elisenvara, Tajpionkoski, Lappenranta, Lahti (all points for the Leningrad front inclusive).
4. On the given orders to inform.
Stavka Supreme Main Command
I. STALIN
A. ANTONOV
f. 148a, i. 3763, f. 166, s. 376, 377. The original.
[RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), pp. 97,98]
====================================
Apparently, instruction No 220119 from 21/6/1944 contains the requirement - to develop the plan of the further actions for armies of the Leningrad front with the purpose:
a/ clarifications of all territory of Karelian isthmus from the opponent;
b/ an exit of armies of the Leningrad front on a boundary: Imatra - Lappenranta - Virojoki;
c/ a ultimate goal of all operation: an exit of armies of the Leningrad front on a boundary: Kuovola - Kotka also will be fixed at east bank (coast) the rivers Kjumin-Joki.
On this document signatures of Supreme Commander in Chief I. Stalin and member Stavka - the deputy Chief of the General Staff of the general of army A. Antonov are put.
In reply to this instruction, at 19 o'clock 30 minutes on June, 21st, 1944 the staff of the Leningrad front has presented in Stavka the report No 8831. In this report the decision on development of approach on Karelian isthmus is stated.
That is here with what should end Vyborg - Petrozavodsk operation (the fourth Stalin impact) is stated.
Translation into English language of the text of the report No 8831 from 21/6/1944.
The document 2 - «The Report of Commander armies of Leningrad front with the decision on development of approach on Karelian isthmus No 8831 from 21/6/1944»
CAMD.The report of commander armies of Leningrad front No 8831
To Supreme Commander in Chief of the plan for development of approach on Karelian isthmus.
On June, 21st, 1944
19 hour of 30 minutes
I represent the decision on development of approach on Karelian isthmus to execution of Your instruction No 220119 from 21.06.1944.
1. Tasks of operation.
Armies of the Karelian direction of the Leningrad front continue approach with a task 26-28.06.1944 main forces to take possession a boundary Imatra, Lappenranta, Surpjalja. Simultaneously clear of the opponent Karelian isthmus to northeast from the rivers and lakes Vuoksi approach of a part of forces on Hitola, Keksgolm.
2. A plan of operation.
To put the main impact on Lappenranta with the subsequent expansion of impact of two armies on the West with the purpose of an exit them on a boundary Lappenranta, Surpjalja and one army, will be forwarded through the river Vuoksi at the front Antrea - Enso, to come in the general direction on Hitola.
3. Planning of operation.
The first a stage (immediate task) - 22-24.06.1944.
Since boundary Kukauppi, station Kavantsari, JUustila, Tienhara to develop impact in a northwest direction, striking the main blow to Lappenranta and, being covered on the river Vuoksi, not later 6/24/1944 to leave on boundary Enso, lake Nuijama-jarvi, Lajnela, Nisalahti.
The second stage (the subsequent task of armies) - 24.-25.06.1944.
Developing impact to Lappenranta, Imatra with consecutive expansion of approach to the West with a task for not later 26.06.1944 to leave on a boundary Imatra, Lappenranta, Surpjalja, having grasped straight off the basic strong points of a defensive strip of the opponent of construction 1940/41; simultaneously to prepare for force break of this strip.
59-th army is entered since boundary Penttilja, Lajnela, having united 109-th rifle corps and 9-th rifle corps operating in a direction of Lappenranta.
21-st army from now on unites 108-th rifle corps and 110-th rifle corps, acting a seaside direction, and 30-th Guards rifle corps, transmitted of a front reserve.
Border between armies: Lajnela, Meta (all for 59-th army).
23-rd army forces the river Vuoksi and develops impact in the general direction on Hitolu.
115 rifle corps it is forwarded through the river Vuoksi in area in area Kiviniemi and in interaction with 23-rd army strikes in the general direction on Keksgolm.
4. Construction of operation.
The immediate task is solved by 23-rd and 21-st Armies in structure of: 23-rd Army two rifle corps; 21-st Army - three rifle corps.
The subsequent task is solved by 23-rd, 59-th and 21-st Armies in structure of: 23-rd Army - three rifle corps's; 59-th Army - two rifle corps; 21-st Army - three rifle corps.
For performance of the put tasks I ask:
1. To strengthen front:
Two rifle corps (as it is not enough available forces for performance of put tasks) ;
One engineering-sapper a brigade;
Two motorized pontoon-roadways battalions with parks N2L;
One battalion of dogs-mine detectors [battalion dogs for search of mines]
;
Two parks NLP (for two engineering brigades);
Two motor-battalions of special destination (amphibian).
2. To release to front:
Tanks T-34 - 30 pieces;
Self-propelled artillery SU-76 - 30 pieces (for restoration of tank units);
Mines for GMU M-31 - 7000, M-13 - 10 000;
100 motor vehicles "studebekker" (for pontoon and engineering units)
Commander armies of the Leningrad front
the Marshal of Soviet Union GOVOROV
Member of the Military council of the Leningrad front
general-colonel ZHDANOV
The chief of a staff of the Leningrad front
general-colonel POPOV
f. 217, i. 1227, f. 95, s. 161-163. The original.
[RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), pp. 286,287]
===================================================
This document have signed: Commander armies of the Leningrad front, the chief of a staff and a member of the Military council.
Apparently from the presented decision on development of approach, command of armies of the Leningrad front considers, that it is not enough forces available at its order for the decision of the tasks put in instruction No 220119.
It has been caused by that Finns have thrown to Karelian isthmus in addition four infantry divisions (3-rd, 6-th, 11-th and 17-th) and 20-th brigade. Then, 10-th infantry division crushed in the previous fights has been completely restored due to reserves. Besides here have arrived still and German armies:
122-nd Infantry Division, 200-th Infantry Regiment, 303-rd brigade of assault instruments. In this connection command of the Leningrad front asks Stavka to allocate in addition two rifle corps, and as combat material and an ammunition.
However in reply to this request for allocation of additional forces Stavka at 02 o'clock 00 minutes on June, 22nd, 1944 direct following instruction No 220121.
In instruction No 220121 from 22/6/1944 refusal to allocate additional forces for armies of the Leningrad front contains.
Here translation on English the text of this instruction.
The document 3 - «Instruction Stavka No 220121 from 22/6/1944»
CAMDInstruction Stavka Supreme Main Command No 220121
the commander armies of the Leningrad front
about the statement of the plan of approach on Karelian isthmus.
On June, 22nd, 1944
02 hours of 00 minutes
Stavka Supreme Main Command approves your decision presented by the code of 21.06.1944 of year for No 8831, and specifies:
1. On strengthening of front in addition by two rifle corps to not hope.
The front has enough forces and means for performance of the put task.
2. The others you means will be, whenever possible, are given.
Stavka Supreme Main Command
I. STALIN
A. ANTONOV
f. 148à, i. 3763, f. 166, s. 378. The original.
[RA. GPW. vol. 16 - 5 (4), p. 98]
===================================================
As a whole (in aggregate) these documents give full representation about plans by which was guided Stavka at scheduling Vyborg - Petrozavodsk operations (the fourth Stalin impact).
All these documents are signed by corresponding officials. Authenticity of these documents does not raise the doubts.
Besides authenticity of these documents proves to be true also process of events on Karelian isthmus in June - August, 1944.
Hence, those who executed plans Vyborg - Petrozavodsk operations (the fourth Stalin impact) were guided by these documents.
If Vyborg - Petrozavodsk operation (the fourth Stalin impact) had such greater purpose - as occupation of Finland and inclusion of this state in structure of the USSR it is possible to not doubt that Stalin would allocate for such purpose and two rifle corps (about which ask marshal Govorov), and to them two more armies. It is possible to not doubt, that in this case Stalin would allocate still and two artillery corps of break.
As at this time Stavka had in a reserve such forces.
If Stalin has not made this it means, that he did not have such intentions
On the other hand, the document presented by you «The Document on unconditional surrender of Finland » has doubtful value.
His origin is not clear, who is not clear his author, not clear to whom he intended.
The contents of the text of your document contradicts a course of events in June - August, 1944.
As my text translation of documents on English language is not correct I give the Russian text of these three documents:
The document 1 - «Instruction Stavka No 220119 from 21/6/1944»
The document 2 - «The Report of Commander armies of Leningrad front with the decision on development of approach on Karelian isthmus No 8831 from 21/6/1944»Äèðåêòèâà Ñòàâêè ÂÃÊ N 220119
êîìàíäóþùåìó âîéñêàìè Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà
î ïðîäîëæåíèå íàñòóïëåíèÿ íà Êàðåëüñêîì ïåðåøåéêå.
21 èþíÿ 1944 ãîäà 02 ÷àñ. 15 ìèí.
Ñòàâêà Âåðõîâíîãî Ãëàâíîêîìàíäîâàíèÿ ïðèêàçûâàåò:
1. Âîéñêàì Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà, äåéñòâóþùèì íà Êàðåëüñêîì ïåðåøåéêå, ïðîäîëæèòü íàñòóïëåíèå ñ çàäà÷åé 26-28.06 ãëàâíûìè ñèëàìè îâëàäåòü ðóáåæîì Èìàòðà, Ëàïïåíðàíòà, Âèðîéîêè. ×àñòüþ ñèë íàñòóïàòü íà Êåêñãîëüì, Ýëèñåíâàðà ñ öåëüþ î÷èùåíèÿ îò ïðîòèâíèêà Êàðåëüñêîãî ïåðåøåéêà ñåâåðî-âîñòî÷íåå ðåêè è îçåðà Âóîêñè.
2.  äàëüíåéøåì ãëàâíûìè ñèëàìè ðàçâèâàòü íàñòóïëåíèå ñ çàäà÷åé îâëàäåòü ðóáåæîì Êóîâîëà, Êîòêà è çàêðåïèòñÿ íà âîñòî÷íîì áåðåãó ð. Êþìèí-Éîêè. Îáåñïå÷èâàòü ñâîþ ãëàâíóþ ãðóïïèðîâêó ñ ñåâåðà.
3. Óñòàíîâèòü ñ 24.00 21.06.1944 ãîäà ñëåäóþùóþ ðàçãðàíè÷èòåëüíóþ ëèíèþ ìåæäó Êàðåëüñêèì è Ëåíèíãðàäñêèì ôðîíòàìè: äî Êîðîâêèíî – ïðåæíÿÿ è äàëåå þæíûé è çàïàäíûé áåðåã Ëàäîæñêîãî îçåðà, Òåðâóñ, Ýëèñåíâàðà, Òàéïèîíêîñêè, Ëàïïåíðàíòà, Ëàõòè (âñå ïóíêòû äëÿ Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà âêëþ÷èòåëüíî).
4. Îá îòäàííûõ ðàñïîðÿæåíèÿõ äîíåñòè.
Ñòàâêà Âåðõîâíîãî Ãëàâíîêîìàíäîâàíèÿ
È. ÑÒÀËÈÍ
À. ÀÍÒÎÍÎÂ
ÖÀÌÎ.
Ô. 148à, îï. 3763, ä. 166, ë. 376, 377. Ïîäëèííèê.
[ÐÀ. ÂÎÂ. òîì 16 – 5(4), Ñ. 97,98]
ÖÀÌÎÄîêëàä êîìàíäóþùåãî âîéñêàìè Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà N 8831
Âåðõîâíîìó Ãëàâíîêîìàíäóþùåìó ïëàíà ðàçâèòèÿ íàñòóïëåíèÿ íà Êàðåëüñêîì ïåðåøåéêå.
21 èþíÿ 1944 ãîäà 19 ÷àñ. 30 ìèí.
Ïðåäñòàâëÿþ ðåøåíèå íà ðàçâèòèå íàñòóïëåíèÿ íà Êàðåëüñêîì ïåðåøåéêå âî èñïîëíåíèå Âàøåé äèðåêòèâû N 220119 îò 21.06.1944 ãîäà.
1.Çàäà÷è îïåðàöèè.
Âîéñêà êàðåëüñêîãî íàïðàâëåíèÿ Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà ïðîäîëæàþò íàñòóïëåíèå ñ çàäà÷åé 26-28.06.1944 ãîäà ãëàâíûìè ñèëàìè îâëàäåòü ðóáåæîì Èìàòðà, Ëàïïåíðàíòà, Ñóðïÿëÿ. Îäíîâðåìåííî î÷èùàþò îò ïðîòèâíèêà Êàðåëüñêèé ïåðåøååê ñåâåðî-âîñòî÷íåå ðåêè è îçåðà Âóîêñè íàñòóïëåíèåì ÷àñòè ñèë íà Õèòîëà, Êåêñãîëüì.
2. Çàìûñåë îïåðàöèè.
Ãëàâíûé óäàð íàíåñòè íà Ëàïïåíðàíòó ñ ïîñëåäóþùèì ðàçâåðòûâàíèåì óäàðà äâóõ àðìèé íà çàïàä ñ öåëüþ âûõîäà èìè íà ðóáåæ Ëàïïåíðàíòà, Ñóðïÿëÿ è îäíîé àðìèåé, ôîðñèðîâàâ ð. Âóîêñè íà ôðîíòå Àíòðåà, Ýíñî, íàñòóïàòü â îáùåì íàïðàâëåíèè íà Õèòîëó.
3. Ïëàíèðîâàíèå îïåðàöèè.
Ïåðâûé ýòàïà (áëèæàéøàÿ çàäà÷à) – 22-24.06.1944 ãîäà.
Ñ ðóáåæà Êóêàóïïè, ñòàíöèÿ Êàâàíòñàðè, Þóñòèëà, Òèåíõàðà ðàçâèâàòü óäàð â ñåâåðî-çàïàäíîì íàïðàâëåíèè, íàíîñÿ ãëàâíûé óäàð íà Ëàïïåíðàíòó è, ïðèêðûâàÿñü ïî ð. Âóîêñè, íå ïîçäíåå 24.06.1944 ãîäà âûéòè íà ðóáåæ Ýíñî, îç. Íóèÿìà-ÿðâè, Ëàéíýëà, Íèñàëàõòè.
Âòîðîé ýòàï (ïîñëåäóþùàÿ çàäà÷à àðìèé) – 24.-25.06.1044 ãîäà.
Ðàçâèâàÿ óäàð íà Ëàïïåíðàíòó, Èìàòðó ñ ïîñëåäîâàòåëüíûì ðàçâåðòûâàíèåì íàñòóïëåíèÿ íà çàïàä ñ çàäà÷åé íà ïîçäíåå 26.06. âûéòè íà ðóáåæ Èìàòðà, Ëàïïåíðàíòà, Ñóðïÿëÿ, çàõâàòèâ ñ õîäó îñíîâíûå îïîðíûå ïóíêòû îáîðîíèòåëüíîé ïîëîñû ïðîòèâíèêà ñòðîèòåëüñòâà 1940/41 ãîäà; îäíîâðåìåííî ãîòîâèòü ñèëîâîé ïðîðûâ ýòîé ïîëîñû.
59-ÿ àðìèÿ ââîäèòñÿ ñ ðóáåæà Ïåíòòèëÿ, Ëàéíýëà, îáúåäèíèâ 109-é è 9-é êîðïóñà, äåéñòâóþùèå â íàïðàâëåíèè Ëàïïåíðàíòû.
21-ÿ àðìèÿ ñ ýòîãî âðåìåíè îáúåäèíÿåò 108 è 110 ñê, äåéñòâóþùèå íà ïðèìîðñêîì íàïðàâëåíèè, è 30 ãâ. ñê, ïåðåäàâàåìûé èç ôðîíòîâîãî ðåçåðâà.
Ãðàíèöà ìåæäó àðìèÿìè: Ëàéíýëà, Ìåòå (âñ¸ äëÿ 59-é àðìèè).
23-ÿ àðìèÿ ôîðñèðóåò ð. Âóîêñè è ðàçâèâàåò óäàð â îáùåì íàïðàâëåíèè íà Õèòîëó.
115 ñê ôîðñèðóåò ð. Âóîêñè â ðàéîíå â ðàéîíå Êèâèíèåìè è âî âçàèìîäåéñòâèè ñ 23 À íàíîñèò óäàð â îáùåì íàïðàâëåíèè íà Êåêñãîëüì.
4. Ïîñòðîåíèå îïåðàöèè.
Áëèæàéøóþ çàäà÷ó ðåøàþò 23-ÿ è 21-ÿ àðìèè â ñîñòàâå: 23-ÿ àðìèÿ äâà ñê; 21-ÿ àðìèÿ – òðè ñê.
Ïîñëåäóþùóþ çàäà÷ó ðåøàþò 23, 59 è 21 À â ñîñòàâå 23-ÿ àðèÿ – òðè ñê; 59-ÿ àðìèÿ – äâà ñê; 21-ÿ àðìèÿ – òðè ñê.
Äëÿ âûïîëíåíèÿ ïîñòàâëåííûõ çàäà÷ ïðîøó:
1.Óñèëèòü ôðîíò:
à) äâóìÿ ñòðåëêîâûìè êîðïóñàìè (òàê êàê èìåþùèõñÿ ñèë äëÿ âûïîëíåíèÿ ïîñòàâëåííûõ çàäà÷ íåäîñòàòî÷íî);
á) îäíîé èíæåíåðíî-ñàïåðíîé áðèãàäîé;
â) äâóìÿ ìîòîðèçîâàííûìè ïîíòîííî-ìîñòîâûìè áàòàëüîíàìè ñ ïàðêàìè Í2Ë;
ã) îäíèì áàòàëüîíîì ñîáàê-ìèíîèñêàòåëåé;
ä) äâóìÿ ïàðêàìè ÍËÏ (äëÿ äâóõ èíæåíåðíûõ áðèãàä);
å) äâóìÿ ìîòîáàòàëüîíàìè îñîáîãî íàçíà÷åíèÿ (àìôèáèÿ).
2. Îòïóñòèòü ôðîíòó:
à) òàíêîâ Ò-34 – 30 øò.;
á) ñàìîõîäíîé àðòèëëåðèè ÑÓ-76 – 30 øò. (äëÿ âîññòàíîâëåíèÿ òàíêîâûõ ÷àñòåé);
â) ìèí äëÿ ÃÌ× Ì-31 – 7000, Ì-31 – 10 000;
ã) 100 àâòîìàøèí «ñòóäåáåêåð» (äëÿ ïîíòîííûõ è èíæåíåðíûõ ÷àñòåé)
Êîìàíäóþùèé âîéñêàìè Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà
Ìàðøàë Ñîâåòñêîãî Ñîþçà ÃÎÂÎÐÎÂ
×ëåí Âîåííîãî ñîâåòà Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà
ãåíåðàë-ïîëêîâíèê ÆÄÀÍÎÂ
Íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà
Ãåíåðàë-ïîëêîâíèê ÏÎÏÎÂ
ô. 217, îïèñü 1227, ä. 95, ë. 161-163. Ïîäëèííèê
[ÐÀ. ÂÎÂ. òîì. 16 - 5 (4), Ñ. 286,287]
====================================================
The document 3 - «Instruction Stavka No 220121 from 22/6/1944»
ÖÀÌÎÄèðåêòèâà Ñòàâêè ÂÃÊ N 220121
êîìàíäóþùåìó âîéñêàìè Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ôðîíòà
îá óòâåðæäåíèè ïëàíà íàñòóïëåíèÿ íà Êàðåëüñêîì ïåðåøåéêå.
22 èþíÿ 1944 ãîäà 02 ÷àñ. 00 ìèí.
Ñòàâêà Âåðõîâíîãî Ãëàâíîêîìàíäîâàíèÿ óòâåðæäàåò âàøå ðåøåíèå, ïðåäñòàâëåííîå øèôðîì 21.06.1944 ãîäà çà N 8831, è óêàçûâàåò:
1. Íà óñèëåíèå ôðîíòà äîïîëíèòåëüíî äâóìÿ ñòðåëêîâûìè êîðïóñàìè íå ðàññ÷èòûâàòü.
Ôðîíò èìååò äîñòàòî÷íî ñèë è ñðåäñòâ äëÿ âûïîëíåíèÿ ïîñòàâëåííîé çàäà÷è.
2. Îñòàëüíûå ïðîñèìûå âàìè ñðåäñòâà áóäóò, ïî âîçìîæíîñòè, äàíû.
Ñòàâêà Âåðõîâíîãî Ãëàâíîêîìàíäîâàíèÿ
È. ÑÒÀËÈÍ
À. ÀÍÒÎÍÎÂ
ôîíä 148à, îïèñü 3763, äåëî 166, ëèñò 378. Ïîäëèííèê.
[ÐÀ. ÂÎÂ. òîì 16 – 5(4), Ñ. 98]
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udachi / Good Luck
Yuri
, how about Soviets who didn't evacuate the civilians from the Leningrad ( actually southern part of Carelian Isthmus + Kronstadt + Oranienbaum ) ?
