The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

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Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#121

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 13 May 2009, 11:06

Domen121 wrote:
Othon wrote:As for German human casualties they were very low as compared to WW1 experience!
Anything cannot be compared to WW1 experience - anything before and anything after it.

But during the most bloody for Germans year of WW1 - 1914 - they lost 270,000 dead in 5 months (70% of them died due to combat reasons, the remaining 30% died due to non-combat reasons) - which gives on average 37,800 died due to combat reasons per month - and remember that in 1914 Germans were fighting on several fronts.

So I cannot agree with your statement at all.
chili wrote:
Othon wrote:It was simply easily won by Germans short operation. German casualties were quite low.
Sure, German casualties can be described as low if one compares with what followed, but they had some 50 000 KIA, WIA and MIA. They also lost a great many tanks and planes.
Even if comparing with what followed German casualties in Poland in relation to length of the campaign (casualties per day / casualties per week / casualties per month) cannot be described as low.

Wehrmacht men casualties in Poland according to the most recent data were 17,246 killed, 421 missing and at least 36,296 wounded = at least 53,963 killed / missing / wounded.

Major part of these casualties were inflicted by Polish rifles, machine guns, grenades and bayonets - by ordinary infantrymen & cavalrymen - because Poland did not have strong, numerous and modern artillery, Air Force and armoured force. Polish light field artillery was good in knocking out tanks and armoured vehicles by direct fire, but not in supporting infantry or cavalry on the battlefield - especcialy in comparison with German field artillery howitzers and guns, which turned out to be very effective in supporting infantry and inflicting heavy casualties to enemy's infantry. Poland had got very not numerous heavy artillery and low amounts of ammunition supplies for heavy field guns.

German campaign in Poland can be described as a face to face confrontation of steel and flesh.

Each German infantry division had got as big practical firepower as between 1,5 and 2 Polish active service infantry divisions, provided that these Polish active service divisions were fully mobilized and full strength.

All German infantry divisions were also much more mobile than all Polish infantry divisions - in Polish active service infantry division there were 76 cars & trucks, 20 motorcycles and 6939 horses. In German infantry division - between 1009 cars & trucks (this includes 615 trucks and 394 cars - Personalkraftwagen) plus 527 motorcycles and 201 trailers in I wave division and 578 cars & trucks + 415 motorcycles and 168 trailers in III wave division plus also between 4842 horses + 919 horse waggons in I wave division, 4854 horses and 823 horse waggons in II wave division and 6033 horses + 1529 horse waggons in III wave division.

Every German infantry division was always able to quickly form a motorized Kampfgruppe if necessary, and to send it to any place within several dozens of kilometres from the main force of the division in a very short time.

Wehrmacht casualties in Fall Gelb (10.05.1940 - 05.06.1940 = 27 days) are described as 10,252 killed, 8,463 missing, 42,523 wounded = 61,238 killed / missing / wounded.

Daily casualties in Fall Gelb were lower than daily casualties during the first 18 days of the Polish campaign (until the Soviet Invasion of Poland and its results) - despite huge superiority of Allied Armies in comparision to the Polish Army and despite the fact that Allied starting conditions on 10.05.1940 were infinitely better than Polish starting conditions on 01.09.1939 (Polish army was ordered to defend over 1,600 kilometres long frontline - this order was completely impracticable since the very first hour of that war).

Also the battle of Bzura was most probably the bloodiest for the German side single battle until late months of 1941 - costing the Germans between ca. 1/35 and ca. 1/3 of their men casualties in Poland - http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=152480.

During Fall Rot - the second phase of the Western Campaign - German men casualties were much higher than in Fall Gelb, despite the fact that they were confronting weaker than previously allied forces and mostly reserve divisions.

This was caused by the fact that during Fall Rot German infantry played much bigger role than during Fall Gelb - in which tanks and fast units played the biggest role (exactly like in Poland in 1939).

For example the biggest Polish defeat and the biggest German victory during the first 16 days of the Polish campaign (so before the Soviet Invasion of Poland) - defeat of not fully mobilized, not concentrated and not combat ready Reserve Army "Prusy" in the area Tomaszow Mazowiecki - Radom - Iłża - was achieved almost entirely by German fast divisions (Panzer, leichte Panzer and Motorisiert) with just small support of several Infanterie divisions.

In Poland similar second phase of the German campaign like Fall Rot in France practically did not take place - because the Soviet Invasion took place and Germans did not have to capture the remaining 40 - 45% of Polish territory - which was - at least great majority of this territory - available only for infantry operations (especcialy in Autumn).

German casualties during the first phase of Fall Barbarossa (22.06.1941 - 03.07.1941) are given as 11,822 killed, 39,109 wounded and 3,961 both captured and missing - during the same time frontline Russian armies were practically destroyed - considering that Russian forces which confronted Germans on 22.06.1941 were dozens-times stronger than the Polish army in 1939, these casualties can be described as low price for such a success.

And in the end - German casualties in Yugoslavian campaign (06.04.1941 - 17.04.1941) were - according to German data - lower than 1,000 killed / missing / wounded. Strength of Yugoslavian army in 1941 finally can be compared to the strength of Polish army on 01.09.1939 - unlike strength of Aliied army in 1940 and Soviet army in 1941.

Also Invasion of Greece (06.04.1941 - 30.04.1941) - during which German enemies had got around 50 - 60% of the Polish Army strength in 1939 - cost the Wehrmacht 1,099 killed, 385 missing and 3,752 wounded, while terrain conditions in Greece were much harder for the attacker than in western and central Poland in September of 1939.

Best regards!
Peter

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Edit:
Domen121 wrote:Major part of these casualties were inflicted by Polish rifles, machine guns, grenades and bayonets - by ordinary infantrymen & cavalrymen - because Poland did not have strong, numerous and modern artillery, Air Force and armoured force. Polish light field artillery was good in knocking out tanks and armoured vehicles by direct fire, but not in supporting infantry or cavalry on the battlefield - especcialy in comparison with German field artillery howitzers and guns, which turned out to be very effective in supporting infantry and inflicting heavy casualties to enemy's infantry. Poland had got very not numerous heavy artillery and low amounts of ammunition supplies for heavy field guns.

German campaign in Poland can be described as a face to face confrontation of steel and flesh.
By the way - have you seen Polish pre-war Infantry Regulations? I suppose not. So here are some translated fragments:
Close combat, face to face confrontation with the enemy, is always the deed which indicates about the greatest value of infantry.
a) Bayonet in this combat is a perfect tool for infantryman. Bayonet is the decisive mean in every sudden contact with the enemy, when there is no time for shots. In forest and especcialy in the dark, bayonet becomes the main mean of combat. Fire is then little effective, it wrecks surprise effect and easilly disorganizes everyone.
b) Dagger is very good especcialy for combat in a trench, in urban area and while fulfilling special missions, where rifle is less handy.
Riflemen must be trained in such a way that by unrestrained rush and shout "HURA" they must be able to create an impression of an everything crushing force, which nothing is able to resist. While running everyone should join to these who will first storm into enemy's position, in order to assault together. Rifleman fights using everything he has got with him: bayonet, butt, knife, shovel, fist.
Hand grenade is exceedingly intensifying moral influence on the enemy during every sudden strike (especcialy in the dark).
The only impulse of a rifleman in case of sudden contact with the enemy should be going for him and defeating him in close combat. Everyone should know that not strength but espirit in attack and speed of blows decides about the result of combat.
During an assault inside enemy group / enemy lines a squad must vehemently push straight forward, not allowing itself to be stopped by resistances aside or by neighbours remaining behind. Resistances encountered on its way should be overcame in turn by sudden fire assaults and firm strikes. In case of enemy counterattack a squad must stick to the ground and eliminate the enemy by fire of a hand machine gun and all riflemen. It is forbidden to withdraw, even in case of outflank threat. Commander of a squad, deputy and older riflemen must be mainstay and example for riflemen in determination and obstinacy in overcoming all enemy attempts of regaining captured terrain. By keeping cold blood and determined behaviour they must hold a unit in their hands, they must influence on rising spirits and ambition of riflemen, and especcialy on calmness and self-restraint while conducting accurate fire. Every effort of the commander of a squad and riflemen must be based on unswerving trust and confidence to their superiors and comrades, who will liberate them even from the temporarily hardest situation.
Polish pre-war infantry squad since 1931 was very numerous and had got 19 soldiers (before 1931 - 13 soldiers).

Probably only Japanese and Italian squads were bigger.

Polish rifle platoon while fighting in extended line:

1, 2, 3 squads = 57 soldiers
command = 5 soldiers (including commander) + a coachman (who did not participate in combats)

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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#122

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 14 May 2009, 22:33

Basing on our data from the list of KIA German officers on Axis History Forum, general data concerning casualties and averaged statistics I made such a chart:

Casualties - killed and wounded:

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Casualties of RKKA are unfortunately completely averaged and equally divided between 19 days of their campaign in Poland.

For comparison average German casualties during the first phase of Westfeldzug - Fall Gelb (27 days) - 2268 per day.

From the chart above:

Wehrmacht / RKKA / Slovenska Armada casualties:

01 IX - 2415 / 0 / 6
02 IX - 2234 / 0 / 29
03 IX - 2052 / 0 / 22
04 IX - 1690 / 0 / 79
05 IX - 2354 / 0 / 9
06 IX - 1509 / 0 / 15
07 IX - 1570 / 0 / 0
08 IX - 2777 / 0 / 0
09 IX - 2596 / 0 / 1
10 IX - 2355 / 0 / 1
11 IX - 2415 / 0 / 0
12 IX - 3501 / 0 / 0
13 IX - 1570 / 0 / 0
14 IX - 1630 / 0 / 0
15 IX - 2173 / 0 / 0
16 IX - 3683 / 0 / 0
17 IX - 2777 / 211 / 0
18 IX - 3622 / 211 / 0
19 IX - 1630 / 211 / 1
20 IX - 1087 / 211 / 0
21 IX - 1449 / 211 / 0
22 IX - 785 / 211 / 0
23 IX - 725 / 211 / 0
24 IX - 605 / 211 / 0
25 IX - 605 / 211 / 0
26 IX - 966 / 211 / 0
27 IX - 1027 / 211 / 0
28 IX - 544 / 211 / 0
29 IX - 181 / 211 / 0
30 IX - 181 / 211 / 0
01 X - 181 / 211 / 0
02 X - 483 / 211 / 0
03 X - 181 / 211 / 0
04 X - 241 / 211 / 0
05 X - 302 / 211 / 0

As 100% I accepted the following data:

Wehrmacht = 17,246 KIA + 421 MIA + min 36,296 WIA = min 53,963 (sources: Wehrmacht Zentralstatistik document from 30 XI 1944 + "Wojna Obronna 1939" p. 850 - 851 + Hahn - Kriegsmarine data + data concerning number of WIA from Guderian's XIX Corps)
RKKA = 3858 - but I rounded it up to 4000, anyway, this data may well be underestimated (sources: Krivosheev)
Slovaks = 38 KIA + 11 MIA + 114 WIA = 164 (sources: "Axis Slovakia: Hitler's Slavic Wedge, 1938-1945", p. 81 + data from the thread about Slovakian casualties on Polish DWS forum)

Of course after summing up numbers from the specification of casualties on separated days results might be a bit different (I was rounding percentages to third / fourth place after point and later numbers to unities if results were with fractions).

First of all I counted how many officers from our data on AHF were killed on each day - then I converted this to percentages - later I attributed the same percentages of overall casualties to each day.

List on AHF is not complete yet but rather is representative (there will be no any major changes in proportions).

Two officers, whose death dates are earlier than 01.09.1939 were included to casualties on 01.09.1939 (VB sometimes provides the latest known date when the officer was still alive - especcialy in case of MIA officers - and not the factual date of death). If the date of being WIA was not provided, I was not including officers who died of wounds after 05.10.1939. I was also not including officers with unknown date of death.

In case of died of wounds officers if there were provided both the date of death and the date of being WIA - in my calculations I was taking into account the date of being WIA.

After 05.10.1939 certainly many officers who were WIA in period 19 IX - 05 X died of wounds - so if I knew dates when these officers were WIA, it could slightly change the general view of the chart to advantage of this particular period.

Also the fact that Luftwaffe suffered vast majority of its casualties before 17 IX slightly influences on the proportion of casualties in period before 17 IX and after 17 IX to advantage of the earlier period (because in Luftwaffe officers constituted bigger percentage of overall casualties). But not all of KIA Luftwaffe officers were taken into consideration while I was creating this chart, only some part of them.


Artur Szulc
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#123

Post by Artur Szulc » 16 May 2009, 16:49

Othon wrote this to Domen some time ago
You are from Poland as I suppose so I fully understand your attitude but try to understand mine - Polish campaign really was not any important event to entire Second Wold Word outcome.


I wrote this on that subject:
Weather Domen121 is from Poland or not is irrelevant on the issue. Like me (born in Poland, but have lived most of my life in Sweden) Domen is probably only trying to present a more adequate and nuanced description of the Polish Campaign 1939. Steven J Zaloga and Swedish military historians Niklas Zetterling and Marco Smedberg are also trying to do the same. Like my self in my book which was released in Sweden last year. Being Polish have nothing to do with this issue at all.
And Othon responded:
Maybe it has to do because such odd opinions are now common in Poland.
Othon, can you please be more specific. How do you know that such "odd opinions are now commom in Poland"? Has any polish military historian or historian expressed these odd opinions? Who?

And on the subject of speed: German panzerspearheads from the XVI Corps advanced about 240 km and reached Warsaw in eight days. In France 1940 German armour had about 300km to go before they reached the English Channel from the Ardennes. They did this in ten days. Add the fact that the French and British were more prepared then the Poles, the German advance in France is even more astonishing.

Best regards,
Chili

Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#124

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 16 May 2009, 17:36

Add the fact that the French and British were more prepared then the Poles, the German advance in France is even more astonishing.
And add the fact that in Poland 4. Pz.Div. was advancing (since 3 IX - after Mokra on 1 IX and Ostrowy on 2 IX) through the huge gap in Polish defensive lines and was the fastest advancing division of all German units, while in France German forces which reached the English Channel were advancing through the main Allied force with similar speed...

Another thing is that both French resistance in 1940 and Polish resistance in 1939 is always described as much stiffer than Soviet resistance during first months of Barbarossa until the winter.

Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#125

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 16 May 2009, 22:41

Btw - Chili and Othon - do you speak Polish?

If yes, I would like to invite you to our Polish DWS forum - especially to participation and discussion in this highly interesting thread, during which we encounterred some inaccuracies and controversions in sources:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=9 ... 6#p1374946

Best regards!
Peter

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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#126

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 23 May 2009, 15:56

Othon wrote for example:
Othon wrote:Also German Army was not out of ammo and fuel at that time as opposed to present Polish beliefs. Without Soviet support Germany would conquer rest of Poland in a few weeks but not any longer.
And many similar statements.

As good response for some of Othon's claims I recommend this thread - especially first post posted by Wojtek_84:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=122996

This post reveals that Germans had got very serious problems with logistics during the Polish Campaign of 1939 - especially during its later phases. Wojtek 84 quotes some aspects of the report of Stauffenberg quoted by Peter Hoffmann in his book "Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905–1944".

Stauffenberg was serving in 1. lei.Pz.Div. during the Polish Campaign. He was complaining especially about:

- lack of roads, which could be used by supply services of the division (usually they had got one road, sometimes they were sharing it with another division - during pre-war military exercises division always had got 2 or more roads)
- reports concerning supplies were becoming obsolescent before proper services could even receive them
- during the whole campaign division was not receiving required amounts of ammunition, food and fuel
- there was shortage of spare parts, to gain them they had to dismantle them from destroyed vehicles
- there were no supplements or reinforcements of vehicles and weapons (and division suffered heavy casualties)
- during fast assaults division had to get supplies from army magazines in too big distances from the frontline
- nobody on any level of organization knew anything about localization and contents of magazines
- officers of quartermastery sometimes even used to pull out their pistols while arguing about fuel in magazines
- they were receiving only 50% of fuel which was being used up - without captured fuel division would have had to stop
- hardly any truck of the division was able to move in off-road areas
- in quartermastery companies there were still such functions like for example a gardener

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- there were no supplements or reinforcements of vehicles and weapons (and division suffered heavy casualties)
Casualties of the division in Poland:

Starke an Panzern (number of tanks):

Beim Ausrucken - 65 Pz II, 120 Pz 35(t), 41 Pz IV = 226
Beim Einrucken - 57 Pz II, 43 Pz 35(t), 32 Pz IV = 132 (including both operational and not operational tanks)
Totalverluste (tanks written-off) - 8 Pz II, 77 Pz 35(t) and 9 Pz IV = 94

Casualties of II./Panzer-Regiment 11. from this division in Poland:

Beim Ausrucken / Beim Einrucken / Totalverluste:

Pz 35(t):

Stabskompanie - 7 / 0 / 7
5. Kompanie - 17 / 14 / 3
6. Kompanie - 0 / 0 / 0
7. Kompanie - 17 / 11 / 6

Total: 41 / 25 / 16

Pz IV:

Stabskompanie - 0 / 0 / 0
5. Kompanie - 0 / 0 / 0
6. Kompanie - 14 / 10 / 4
7. Kompanie - 0 / 0 / 0

Total: 14 / 10 / 4

Pz II:

Stabskompanie - 0 / 0 / 0
5. Kompanie - 5 / 4 / 1
6. Kompanie - 5 / 5 / 0
7. Kompanie - 5 / 4 / 1

Total: 15 / 13 / 2

Sources:

Thomas Jentz, "Panzertruppen 1933 - 1942", pp 104, 134 and 141
Joachim Baschin, "Der Panzerkampfwagen 35(t)"
Vladimír Francev, Charles K. Kliment, "Československá obrněná vozidla 1918 - 1948"

Quotation from "Československá obrněná vozidla 1918 - 1948" about Pz 35(t) tanks in Polenfeldzug:

"[...] These tanks covered over 600 kms in Poland without any considerable or serious technical breakdowns [...]"

Men losses of the division in Poland were at least 305 KIA / MIA (including 22 officers) and at least 575 WIA - over 50% of these casualties was suffered during the last three days of the campaign - 18th, 19th and 20th of September - during the battle between Modlin and Warsaw in Kampinoska Forest. On 21st of September around midday the division was withdrawn from the frontline because of heavy casualties suffered during the previous days - not only in men but especially in equipment - including a lot of cars, trucks, motorcycles and many tanks.

Since 1st of September until 13th of September division lost 132 KIA / MIA and 236 WIA = 368 soldiers. During the battle in Puszcza Kampinoska between 18th and 20th / 21st of September division lost 600 soldiers.

Many soldiers of the division were also captured by Poles, but all of them were later recaptured (for example on 18th of September the whole 7./KSR.4 was captured by Poles, but on 21st of September it returned back to the division).

Best regards!
Peter

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Several photos of Pz IV from 2. Kp. of I./Panzer-Regiment 11. destroyed near Pociecha on 18th of September 1939:

Additional information about Prince Ratibor can be found in our thread on AHF about German officers KIA in Poland:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 20&start=0
Prinz von Ratibor Viktor Albrecht Johannes Josef Michael Maria, 12.02.1916, Lt., [Zgf. i. d. 2. Kp./Pz. R. 11], [6. Pz. Brig.], 18.09.1939, VB
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Tank number "2." is this Panzer IV - map was made by Polish soldier who destroyed this tank - Roman Orlik:

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Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#127

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 14 Jul 2009, 14:00

Article titled:

Rojenia o "Wojnie Błyskawicznej" (Dreams about the "Lightning War") - from "Kurjer Poranny", 11.08.1939:

http://strony.aster.pl/wrzesien/

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Text of the article:
Jeden z generałów włoskich dość szczerze oświaczył niedawno w toku fachowych wywodów wojskowych, że Italia zdolna jest jedynie do prowadzenia "wojny błyskawicznej", że musi ona szybko osiągnąć decydujące rozstrzygnięcia, nie stać jej bowiem na walkę przewlekłą, ze względu na brak surowców, zapasów, na położenie strategiczne itd.

Idea wojny błyskawicznej, która w literaturze włoskiej stawiana jest jako w a r u n e k zwycięstwa. w publicystyce niemieckiej, przeznaczonej przede wszystkim na użytek wewnętrzny, przedstawiana jest jako p e w n i k, na którym opiera się cała strategia i polityka współczesnych Niemiec. Tak, jak "błyskawicznie" zajęta została Austria i w dwóch etapach Czecho - Słowacja, mają być przeprowadzone w mniemaniu niemieckim błyskawiczne działania wojenne wobec przeciwników Trzeciej Rzeszy. Zgodnie zresztą z jej dążeniami do hegemonii i zaborczości. W szczególności taki to miałby być przebieg, w przekonaniu naszego zachodniego sąsiada, wojny polsko - niemieckiej.

Zdaje się, że tak lekkomyślne stawianie sprawy potrzebne jest propagandzie niemieckiej dla podniesienia na duchu swojej opinii publicznej, oczywiście najzupełniej posłusznej, ale coraz bardziej zalęknionej skutkami polityki Trzeciej Rzeszy, która zdołała postawić na nogi przeciw Berlinowi cały niemal świat. Jedynie wmawianie poczciwym Niemcom, że z Polską "załatwi się" Trzecia Rzesza w niespełna trzy miesiące, a z Wielką Brytanią w terminie nie o wiele dłuższym, może, w mniemaniu nieocenionej propagadny niemieckiej, podtrzymać "bojowy" nastrój w narodzie niemieckim.

Nie mamy zamiaru trudzić się polemiką z takim stawianiem sprawy, nie mamy też zamiaru pozbawiać Niemców dziecinnych rojeń na temat możliwości prowadzenia błyskawicznych działań wojennych. Niech się łudzą takimi fantazjami. Tym większe i boleśniejsze będzie ich w razie czego rozczarowanie. Tym większa ich klęska. Jeżeli w przeciągu półtora wieku trzy największe monarchie Europy nie zdołały zgnieść rozbrojonego i powalonego na ziemię narodu polskiego, nie zdoła tego również dokonać w trzy miesiące albo nawet w trzy lata Trzecia Rzesza.

Rzesza niemiecka dała dowód już w marcu tego roku kompromitującego nieorientowania się w psychice narodu polskiego na terenie politycznym. I jeżeli pragnie obecnie powtórzyć raz jeszcze ten eksperyment w dziedzinie wojennej, to dozna rozczarowań na pewno jeszcze boleśniejszych. Porównywanie przebiegu działań wojennych do okupacji niebroniącej się Austrii lub Czecho - Słowacji już samo przez się jest dowodem niepokojącej aberacji.

Ale nie o to nam chodzi. Teoria o "wojnie błyskawicznej" rozwijana jest w publicystyce niemieckiej również dlatego, że podobnie jak dla Włoch, jest to jedyna metoda uzyskania sukcesów przez strategów Trzeciej Rzeszy. Tylko, czy jest to metoda realna?

Już wojna domowa w Hiszpanii wykazała p r z e w l e k ł o ś ć działań wojennych, których broń pancerna, ani lotnictwo, jak się okazało, nie zdołały przyśpieszyć. Każdy rodzaj broni rodzi zawsze w szybkim czasie skuteczne środki przeciwdziałania, które całkowicie wyrównują szanse walki. Tak było od początku, tak jest również teraz. A jeżeli propagandziśi niemieccy powołują się naiwnie na przebieg okupacji Austrii i Czech, to te dwa marsze zmotoryzowanych wojsk, nie napotykających na opór, zdołały jednak wykazać, jak ryzykowna jest bezgraniczna wiara w motoryzację, która w 50 proc. na terenie Austrii zawiodła. Oczywiście broń musi być modernizowana, ale nie można nigdy zapominać - co właśnie czynią panowie rządzący Trzecią Rzeszą - że rozstrzygającym czynnikiem na wojnie będzie żołnierz, i że wiara w nogi ludzkie i w konia, okaże się na pewno mniej zawodne od wiary w motor, benzynę i naftę, zwłaszcza gdy ktoś tych środków pędnych nie posiada.

Lecz czy, nawet pomijając te wszystkie różnice moralne, psychiczne i strategiczne, wojna błyskawiczna jest możliwa. Autor nie podejrzany o szczególną stronniczość, p. Stefan Possony, Węgier, wykazuje w książce "Gospodarka Wojny Totalnej" całą absurdalność takiego stawiania sprawy.

Nie wdając się w obszerne wywody autora, szeroko udokumentowane, wskazemy tylko na kilka liczb do których Possony doszedł na podstawie przebiegu wojny światowej z 1914 - 1918, sprawdzonych na doświadczeniach wojny domowej w Hiszpanii. Dla ułatwienia sobie obliczeń Possony bierze pod uwagę front 1000 kilometrowy, przy czym rozróżnia działania ofensywne i defensywne na tym odcinku, wykazując wielką różnicę potrzeb, zależnie od tego, jaką wojnę dane państwo prowadzi. Wobec tego, że wojna "błyskawiczna" musiałaby być wojną ofensywną w wielkim stylu, należałoby liczby podane przez Possony'ego jeszcze powiększyć.

I tak Possony oblicza, że dla prowadzenia wojny ofensywnej na 1000 kilometrowym froncie z intencją zupełnego zniszczenia przeciwnika, potrzeba 4 miliony żołnierza, dla wojny defensywnej - 1.600.000. Jednocześnie na tyłach na jednego żołnierza powinno pracować przy wojnie ofensywnej 12,5 robotników, przy wojnie defensywnej 9 robotników.

Dla zniszczenia punktów węzłowych na przestrzeni frontu 1000 kilometrowego głównodowodzący musi mieć do dyspozycji rocznie 30 - 40.000 samolotów. Bombowców musiałby mieć przy wojnie ofensywnej 65.000 na rok (przy defensywnej 15.000), samolotów myśliwskich 39.000 . Armat 45.000, karabinów maszynowych 200.000, dział przeciwlotniczych 50.000 itd.

Potrzeby żelaza w wojnie ofensywnej wynoszą 37.300.000 ton. Ażeby 5 proc. mieszkańców wielkich miast (do czterech milionów mieszkańców) mogło ponieść straty fizyczne, trzeba by posłać, uwzględniając celowość uderzeń bombowych, 6.000 samolotów. W rezultacie państwo, które chciałoby prowadzić wojnę błyskawiczną, musiałoby mieć rocznie do dyspozycji 200.000 samolotów rocznie. Jeśli chodzi o Niemcy, to ich produkcja żelaza musiałaby wzrość czterokrotnie, a produkcja Włoch musiałaby skoczyć ze 100 na 2.300. Possony daje oczywiście szereg innych jeszcze tego rodzaju przykładów.

Są to liczby gigantyczne. Possony uzasadnia i omawia je szeroko, wykazując pośrednio, jak naiwne są rachuby tych, którzy chcieliby w "błyskawiczny" sposób osiągnąć w wojnie współczesnej decydujące rozstrzygnięcia. W rezultacie książka, jego prowadzi do wniosku, że w przyszłej wojnie doniosłą rolę odegra potencjał gospodarczy. Państwo, dysponujące surowcami i mogące tworzyć zapasy, uzyskają szybką - nawet nie biorąc w rachubę czynników moralnych - przewagę nad państwami pozbawionymi podstawowych produktów. Jedyna szansa tych państw, to "wojna błyskawiczna", ale właśnie ta metoda okazuje się całkiem złudna. Ani Niemcy, ani Włochy, mimo przeprowadzanych od dawna zbrojeń, nie rozporządzają dostatecznymi środkami technicznymi, by móc zastosować metody szybkiej wojny wobec przeciwnika, ktory będzie się bronił. A że w wojnie długotrwałej nie mają one - jak same przyznają - żadnych szans zwycięstwa, więc pozycję ich nie trudno ustalić.

Oto ogólne wnioski jakie wypływają z wywodów książki Possony'ego.

Oczywiście obliczenia jego nie były potrzebne dla stwierdzenia, że metody "wojny błyskawicznej" nie da się zastosować wobec Polski.

ljadw
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#128

Post by ljadw » 08 Oct 2009, 10:27

Domen,Here are the names of some German officers Killed in the Polish campaign,maybe they will be useful
Kp von Alphen of Geb.PiBtl 54 +O9 09 at Rymanow
Kp Gutschke IR 27 +O2 O9 at Tschenstochau
Kp Kienitz IR 11 31 10 Berlin (DOW )
Kp Lunke Stabe 13 ID 01 10 at Kock-Radzyn
Kp Westphall 197 ID ?

nimbuss
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#129

Post by nimbuss » 08 Oct 2009, 15:43

Hi Ijadw!

as for:
ljadw wrote:Kp Gutschke IR 27 +O2 O9 at Tschenstochau
IR 27 was from 12.Inf.Div, that fought in northern Poland. Tschenstochau (Częstochowa) is far from their battlefields.
But there is very similar name on the list:
Gutsche Hellmut, 21.03.1907, Maj., II. (Bau) Abt., Nachr. Rgt. 570 (bis 26.08.1939 Kdr. 3. (Fu) Nachr. Abt. 53), 02.09.1939 (4 km v. Tschenstochau), VB, Gedenkschrift des Fahnenjunkerjahrgangs 1926
So, it may be some mistake. Could You please write down Your source and any additional informaton from that source about this officer? I am especially interested in circumstances of Maj. Gutsche's death, so if Kp Gutschke is in fact Maj. Gutsche - this info would be very helpful to me.

best regards
AG

ljadw
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#130

Post by ljadw » 08 Oct 2009, 17:21

nimbuss wrote:Hi Ijadw!

as for:
ljadw wrote:Kp Gutschke IR 27 +O2 O9 at Tschenstochau
IR 27 was from 12.Inf.Div, that fought in northern Poland. Tschenstochau (Częstochowa) is far from their battlefields.
But there is very similar name on the list:
Gutsche Hellmut, 21.03.1907, Maj., II. (Bau) Abt., Nachr. Rgt. 570 (bis 26.08.1939 Kdr. 3. (Fu) Nachr. Abt. 53), 02.09.1939 (4 km v. Tschenstochau), VB, Gedenkschrift des Fahnenjunkerjahrgangs 1926
So, it may be some mistake. Could You please write down Your source and any additional informaton from that source about this officer? I am especially interested in circumstances of Maj. Gutsche's death, so if Kp Gutschke is in fact Maj. Gutsche - this info would be very helpful to me.

best regards
AG
sorry ,my mistake:it should be IR 7
Source is :Gedenkschrift des Fahnenjunkerjahrgangs 1926
Text is as follow:Hauptman Helmut Gutschke 21-03-O7 in York +02-09-1939 vor Tschenstchau IR 7 als Hauptmann und chef einer Fernsprecherkompanie der Korpsnachrichtenabteilung des XV AK
I presume it is the same person,although was he a major or captain ?
Cheers

Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#131

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 09 Feb 2010, 12:41

Returning to the discussion on pages 4 and 5 of this thread about the direct Soviet-German cooperation on the battlefield against Polish military forces in Poland in 1939 (mainly Shoobedoo was involved in that discussion).

In point No 3 h) of the order of OKW from 21.09.1939, 8.00 PM, we can read:

"Russians has offered us an armed help against Polish regular forces and insurgents"

Source: National Archives of USA. T. 319. r. 477. kl. 8067998-999

Also Russian historian Natalia Lebiedieva in her article which was published in "Nowa Gazieta" wrote:

"I'm going to recall one of examples of aid given to units of Wehrmacht by the Red Army. On 23 September Soviet command received information, that in the area west from Hrubieszow major Polish forces [Front Północny] were gathering. Germans wanted to attack them with tanks [2. Pz.Div.]. 'They [Germans] propose us - the commander of Russian division, Ivanov, reported - to take part in joint annihilation of that group'. As the result [of this proposal] the Soviet 8th Rifle Corps was directed towards Hrubieszow, where it started to fight against the Polish units."

This cooperation (it was during the 2nd battle of Tomaszow Lubelski) was already mentioned by me on pages 4 & 5.

Soviet 8th Rifle Corps consisted of 44th, 81st (since 17 IX) and 14th (joined after 17 IX) Rifle Divisions.

Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#132

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 09 Feb 2010, 12:41

Returning to the discussion on pages 4 and 5 of this thread about the direct Soviet-German cooperation on the battlefield against Polish military forces in Poland in 1939 (mainly Shoobedoo was involved in that discussion).

In point No 3 h) of the order of OKW from 21.09.1939, 8.00 PM, we can read:

"Russians has offered us an armed help against Polish regular forces and insurgents"

Source: National Archives of USA. T. 319. r. 477. kl. 8067998-999

Also Russian historian Natalia Lebiedieva in her article which was published in "Nowa Gazieta" wrote:

"I'm going to recall one of examples of aid given to units of Wehrmacht by the Red Army. On 23 September Soviet command received information, that in the area west from Hrubieszow major Polish forces [Front Północny] were gathering. Germans wanted to attack them with tanks [2. Pz.Div.]. 'They [Germans] propose us - the commander of Russian division, Ivanov, reported - to take part in joint annihilation of that group'. As the result [of this proposal] the Soviet 8th Rifle Corps was directed towards Hrubieszow, where it started to fight against the Polish units."

This cooperation (it was during the 2nd battle of Tomaszow Lubelski) was already mentioned by me on pages 4 & 5.

Soviet 8th Rifle Corps consisted of 44th, 81st (since 17 IX) and 14th (joined after 17 IX) Rifle Divisions.

Spain
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#133

Post by Spain » 09 Feb 2010, 14:53

Very interesting debate about german casualties during Poland campaign. But I wonder if anybody knows the exact number of KIA, day by day, according with the total amount of 17,246 KIA. I,m specially interested to know the exact number of causalties of XIX Guderian panzers corps between 1th and 17th.
Thanks

Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#134

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 09 Feb 2010, 15:36

Hi Spain!

There is no something like "exact amount" of casualties. All data (even reports) are rough estimations. That's why one can find two reports on losses of the same unit in the same period which provide different numbers of casualties.
number of causalties of XIX Guderian panzers corps between 1th and 17th.
Why only between 1st and 17th? The last battle of the Corps in Poland (battle of Sawin) ended on 19.09.1939. On 18.09.1939 II./SR.6 from 3. Pz.Div. suffered the highest daily losses of all battalions of the division in Poland.

Overall losses of Guderian:

01.09.1939 - 04.09.1939 (combats in the Corridor): 260 KIA/not found MIA + 600 WIA
07.09.1939 - 19.09.1939 (combats in Eastern Poland): 890 KIA/not found MIA + 1385 WIA

Estimated losses of individual divisions of his Corps (in brackets exact number of officers KIA):

3. Pz.Div. - 190 (10) KIA/MIA, 320 WIA; including 18 (1) KIA from 6. Kompanie / Pz.Lehr.Rgt.
10. Pz.Div. - 259 (15) KIA/MIA, 434 WIA; inc. 13 (2) KIA, 18 (6) WIA from Pz.Rgt.8 (tank casualties - 75)
2. Mot.Div. - 208 (11) KIA/MIA, 352 WIA
20. Mot.Div. - 455 (24) KIA/MIA, 815 WIA; exact losses 15 - 16 IX (Brest-Litovsk) = 134 (7) KIA, 237 WIA
Korpstruppen - 38 (2) KIA/MIA, 64 WIA

As you can see the heaviest casualties were suffered by 20. Motorized Division (including 24 officers KIA).

Additionally Flak units of the Corps suffered some losses (including 2 KIA officers from I./Flak.Rgt.61).

But losses of Flak units were counted together with Luftwaffe losses.

Best regards,
Peter

Spain
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Re: The German Campaign in Poland (1939)

#135

Post by Spain » 09 Feb 2010, 16:59

Thanks Peter!!
very usefull and professional information!!
best regards

Jose Manuel

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