Domen121 wrote:Anything cannot be compared to WW1 experience - anything before and anything after it.Othon wrote:As for German human casualties they were very low as compared to WW1 experience!
But during the most bloody for Germans year of WW1 - 1914 - they lost 270,000 dead in 5 months (70% of them died due to combat reasons, the remaining 30% died due to non-combat reasons) - which gives on average 37,800 died due to combat reasons per month - and remember that in 1914 Germans were fighting on several fronts.
So I cannot agree with your statement at all.
Even if comparing with what followed German casualties in Poland in relation to length of the campaign (casualties per day / casualties per week / casualties per month) cannot be described as low.chili wrote:Sure, German casualties can be described as low if one compares with what followed, but they had some 50 000 KIA, WIA and MIA. They also lost a great many tanks and planes.Othon wrote:It was simply easily won by Germans short operation. German casualties were quite low.
Wehrmacht men casualties in Poland according to the most recent data were 17,246 killed, 421 missing and at least 36,296 wounded = at least 53,963 killed / missing / wounded.
Major part of these casualties were inflicted by Polish rifles, machine guns, grenades and bayonets - by ordinary infantrymen & cavalrymen - because Poland did not have strong, numerous and modern artillery, Air Force and armoured force. Polish light field artillery was good in knocking out tanks and armoured vehicles by direct fire, but not in supporting infantry or cavalry on the battlefield - especcialy in comparison with German field artillery howitzers and guns, which turned out to be very effective in supporting infantry and inflicting heavy casualties to enemy's infantry. Poland had got very not numerous heavy artillery and low amounts of ammunition supplies for heavy field guns.
German campaign in Poland can be described as a face to face confrontation of steel and flesh.
Each German infantry division had got as big practical firepower as between 1,5 and 2 Polish active service infantry divisions, provided that these Polish active service divisions were fully mobilized and full strength.
All German infantry divisions were also much more mobile than all Polish infantry divisions - in Polish active service infantry division there were 76 cars & trucks, 20 motorcycles and 6939 horses. In German infantry division - between 1009 cars & trucks (this includes 615 trucks and 394 cars - Personalkraftwagen) plus 527 motorcycles and 201 trailers in I wave division and 578 cars & trucks + 415 motorcycles and 168 trailers in III wave division plus also between 4842 horses + 919 horse waggons in I wave division, 4854 horses and 823 horse waggons in II wave division and 6033 horses + 1529 horse waggons in III wave division.
Every German infantry division was always able to quickly form a motorized Kampfgruppe if necessary, and to send it to any place within several dozens of kilometres from the main force of the division in a very short time.
Wehrmacht casualties in Fall Gelb (10.05.1940 - 05.06.1940 = 27 days) are described as 10,252 killed, 8,463 missing, 42,523 wounded = 61,238 killed / missing / wounded.
Daily casualties in Fall Gelb were lower than daily casualties during the first 18 days of the Polish campaign (until the Soviet Invasion of Poland and its results) - despite huge superiority of Allied Armies in comparision to the Polish Army and despite the fact that Allied starting conditions on 10.05.1940 were infinitely better than Polish starting conditions on 01.09.1939 (Polish army was ordered to defend over 1,600 kilometres long frontline - this order was completely impracticable since the very first hour of that war).
Also the battle of Bzura was most probably the bloodiest for the German side single battle until late months of 1941 - costing the Germans between ca. 1/35 and ca. 1/3 of their men casualties in Poland - http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=152480.
During Fall Rot - the second phase of the Western Campaign - German men casualties were much higher than in Fall Gelb, despite the fact that they were confronting weaker than previously allied forces and mostly reserve divisions.
This was caused by the fact that during Fall Rot German infantry played much bigger role than during Fall Gelb - in which tanks and fast units played the biggest role (exactly like in Poland in 1939).
For example the biggest Polish defeat and the biggest German victory during the first 16 days of the Polish campaign (so before the Soviet Invasion of Poland) - defeat of not fully mobilized, not concentrated and not combat ready Reserve Army "Prusy" in the area Tomaszow Mazowiecki - Radom - Iłża - was achieved almost entirely by German fast divisions (Panzer, leichte Panzer and Motorisiert) with just small support of several Infanterie divisions.
In Poland similar second phase of the German campaign like Fall Rot in France practically did not take place - because the Soviet Invasion took place and Germans did not have to capture the remaining 40 - 45% of Polish territory - which was - at least great majority of this territory - available only for infantry operations (especcialy in Autumn).
German casualties during the first phase of Fall Barbarossa (22.06.1941 - 03.07.1941) are given as 11,822 killed, 39,109 wounded and 3,961 both captured and missing - during the same time frontline Russian armies were practically destroyed - considering that Russian forces which confronted Germans on 22.06.1941 were dozens-times stronger than the Polish army in 1939, these casualties can be described as low price for such a success.
And in the end - German casualties in Yugoslavian campaign (06.04.1941 - 17.04.1941) were - according to German data - lower than 1,000 killed / missing / wounded. Strength of Yugoslavian army in 1941 finally can be compared to the strength of Polish army on 01.09.1939 - unlike strength of Aliied army in 1940 and Soviet army in 1941.
Also Invasion of Greece (06.04.1941 - 30.04.1941) - during which German enemies had got around 50 - 60% of the Polish Army strength in 1939 - cost the Wehrmacht 1,099 killed, 385 missing and 3,752 wounded, while terrain conditions in Greece were much harder for the attacker than in western and central Poland in September of 1939.
Best regards!
Peter
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Edit:
By the way - have you seen Polish pre-war Infantry Regulations? I suppose not. So here are some translated fragments:Domen121 wrote:Major part of these casualties were inflicted by Polish rifles, machine guns, grenades and bayonets - by ordinary infantrymen & cavalrymen - because Poland did not have strong, numerous and modern artillery, Air Force and armoured force. Polish light field artillery was good in knocking out tanks and armoured vehicles by direct fire, but not in supporting infantry or cavalry on the battlefield - especcialy in comparison with German field artillery howitzers and guns, which turned out to be very effective in supporting infantry and inflicting heavy casualties to enemy's infantry. Poland had got very not numerous heavy artillery and low amounts of ammunition supplies for heavy field guns.
German campaign in Poland can be described as a face to face confrontation of steel and flesh.
Close combat, face to face confrontation with the enemy, is always the deed which indicates about the greatest value of infantry.
a) Bayonet in this combat is a perfect tool for infantryman. Bayonet is the decisive mean in every sudden contact with the enemy, when there is no time for shots. In forest and especcialy in the dark, bayonet becomes the main mean of combat. Fire is then little effective, it wrecks surprise effect and easilly disorganizes everyone.
b) Dagger is very good especcialy for combat in a trench, in urban area and while fulfilling special missions, where rifle is less handy.
Riflemen must be trained in such a way that by unrestrained rush and shout "HURA" they must be able to create an impression of an everything crushing force, which nothing is able to resist. While running everyone should join to these who will first storm into enemy's position, in order to assault together. Rifleman fights using everything he has got with him: bayonet, butt, knife, shovel, fist.
Hand grenade is exceedingly intensifying moral influence on the enemy during every sudden strike (especcialy in the dark).
The only impulse of a rifleman in case of sudden contact with the enemy should be going for him and defeating him in close combat. Everyone should know that not strength but espirit in attack and speed of blows decides about the result of combat.
Polish pre-war infantry squad since 1931 was very numerous and had got 19 soldiers (before 1931 - 13 soldiers).During an assault inside enemy group / enemy lines a squad must vehemently push straight forward, not allowing itself to be stopped by resistances aside or by neighbours remaining behind. Resistances encountered on its way should be overcame in turn by sudden fire assaults and firm strikes. In case of enemy counterattack a squad must stick to the ground and eliminate the enemy by fire of a hand machine gun and all riflemen. It is forbidden to withdraw, even in case of outflank threat. Commander of a squad, deputy and older riflemen must be mainstay and example for riflemen in determination and obstinacy in overcoming all enemy attempts of regaining captured terrain. By keeping cold blood and determined behaviour they must hold a unit in their hands, they must influence on rising spirits and ambition of riflemen, and especcialy on calmness and self-restraint while conducting accurate fire. Every effort of the commander of a squad and riflemen must be based on unswerving trust and confidence to their superiors and comrades, who will liberate them even from the temporarily hardest situation.
Probably only Japanese and Italian squads were bigger.
Polish rifle platoon while fighting in extended line:
1, 2, 3 squads = 57 soldiers
command = 5 soldiers (including commander) + a coachman (who did not participate in combats)